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The  present  thesis  focuses  on  the  role  of tragedy  and  on  the  multiple  versions  of 
theatricality in selected Essays and Lives of Plutarch. Most interestingly the ‘tragic’ does 
not  emerge  exclusively  from  the  many  quotations  from  the  tragedians  which  are 
dispersed in the whole of the Plutarchan corpus, especially in his Essays; it also emerges 
from  distinctive  suggestions of tragedy, tragic  imagery,  tragic parallels  and texturing. 
Plutarch acknowledges the importance of tragedy in literary education, but is still very 
ready to criticise what the poets say. Even so, he does not treat tragedy negatively in 
itself, but figures it as a possibly bad and corrupting thing when it is wrongly transferred 
to  real-life  contexts.  In  this  way  he  requires  from  his  readers  thoughtfulness  and 
reflection on that relation between tragedy and real life, while he also makes them reflect 
on whether there is a distinctive ‘tragic stance of life’, and if so whether a philosophical 
viewpoint would cope with real life more constructively.
In the Lives there may be less explicit thematic hints of tragedy, yet there is a 
strong theatricality and dramatisation, including self-dramatisation, in the description of 
characters, such as Pompey and Caesar, particularly at crucial points of their career and 
life. By developing the idea that the  ‘tragic’  aspects may relate to the ways in which 
characters are morally or philosophically deficient or cause them to falter -  but if so, in a 
way  that  is  itself familiar  from  tragedy  -   they  also  relate  extremely  closely  to  the 
characteristics which make the people great.
The tragic mindset (this idea will be illustrated from Plutarch’s direct references 
to tragedy as well as his allusions to the theatrical world) offers a fresh angle in reading 
Plutarch’s work and makes the reader engage more in thinking how both  ‘tragic’  and 
theatre can be used as a tool to explore a hero’s distinctiveness in addressing the issues of 
his world.Contents
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viIntroduction
’AXe^avfipos B’  o OepcwW rvpawog (...),  Seojpuevo^ rpa/yqidov epvnaBicrrepov vfr  'fftovrfc 
ftiereSr)  Ttpb$ t ov  oJktov.  avawfb^traq ovv  ck  tov  Oea/rpou  9drrov v} fiafrqv  a/rrpei,  beivov 
ehau Xeycav,  ei roovvrovt; a/noo’<f)a.TTa)v ttoXitou; otyhfoerau roTg  Eko/3^  kou  YIoKvB jevt^  
TraJtemv  hn$au<pv(ov.  ovto$ yuev  ovv  puKpov  kou  (titcrjv  knpbJcfhTO  tov  rpa/yqpBov,  oti  t vp/ 
ipu%r)v outou KaBanep (ribqpav epuzkaJ-ev.
Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae (...), as he watched a tragic actor, felt himself much 
more moved to pity through enjoyment of the acting. He jumped up, therefore, and 
left the theatre at a rapid pace, exclaiming that it would be a dreadful thing, if, when 
he was slaughtering so many citizens, he should be seen to weep over the sufferings 
of Hecuba and Polyxena. And he came near visiting punishment upon the actor 
because the man had softened his heart, as iron in the fire. (On the fortune or virtue 
o f  Alexander, 334A-B)1
This arresting passage -  so Aristotelian in many ways -  raises a number of interesting 
points  of central  importance  to  this  dissertation.  First  of all  it  shows  the  enduring 
panhellenic appeal  of Athenian tragedy. Though the  incident dates to the early fourth 
century,  the  appeal  is  still  visible  in  the  Hellenistic  and  Roman  eras  in  a  range  of 
contexts. The passage also testifies to the complex emotional and intellectual pleasure 
effected by tragedy and its capacity to stir audiences. Its various aspects and effects and 
its continuing cultural importance make tragedy an important theme in Plutarch, and the 
main theme discussed in the present thesis. In the wide range of topics and characters 
which Plutarch discusses in his highly diverse work, tragedy is an area which Plutarch 
can always exploit for its wisdom and authority, for the powerful vocabulary and imagery 
and, no less, for extracting significant moral lessons.
All translations in the present thesis are based on the (various) Loeb editions unless otherwise noted.
1The powerful theatrical performance and the excellent skills of the actor led Alexander to 
take pleasure (yfovrj) in the acting, and moved him to pity.2 The effect of the acting and 
the emotions it stirred were violent enough to make a tyrant as savage and ruthless as 
Alexander of Pherae leave the theatre.3  Yet there is more to this passage than just the 
power of tragedy in rousing emotions like pity and compassion, or the value of Euripides’ 
poetry.  Theatrical  performance  here  raises  awkward  questions  about  the  relationship 
between the real world and the fictive world of tragedy. For Alexander in this anecdote 
tragedy presents a disturbing and even threatening paradox in the way it subverts his 
emotional control and makes him question both his self- and his public perception. One 
of the main aims of the present thesis is to show how theatre may be transposed into real 
life and how Plutarch questions the effects of this kind of transposition. True, tragedy has 
an unquestionable educative and entertaining value, but when the great men who interest 
Plutarch in his biographies display features which resemble the attitude of actors or of 
tragic characters,  we  shall  see that there  is  a  certain danger  lurking.  And again, this 
danger is not restricted only to the great men’s careers and fate, but it also involves the 
reader who might well regard Plutarch’s -  or, even tragic -  characters as examples of 
behaviour to imitate.4
However, in the passage cited above this danger is travestied: the tyrant should indeed 
learn a lesson from tragedy, which would be to show pity to people and cease to cause 
further misfortunes to them or inflict cruel punishment. Yet, Alexander seems to be afraid 
either to acknowledge such a lesson or to be seen displaying the humane side of his 
character which he never showed in his real life as a harsh ruler, and therefore leaves the
2 Cf. Heath (1987), 8-11, 32-36 -  on pleasure (also on the pleasure of emotional response) and mimesis see 
also Aristotle’s Poetics (1447a 8-1448b 38, 1450a 19-21, 1452b 29, 1453a 35-36, 1453b 10-13, 1459a 21, 
1462b  13-14). For a detailed analysis of hedone in Plutarch’s perception of poetiy see Valgiglio (1967), 
328-335.
3 The variation of the same incident which Plutarch gives at Pelop. 29.9-10 is telling. There, the story goes 
along different lines: upon leaving the theatre, Alexander sent a message to the actor telling him to take 
courage and not be affected in his acting by his departure, for it was not out of contempt for his acting that 
he was going away, but because he was moved to pity and he was ashamed to be seen by citizens who 
knew that he never had taken pity on anyone. Yet, this version, too, shows the importance of image for 
Alexander,  both  the  image  he  has  of himself and  his  public  image.  It  also  (incidentally)  illustrates 
Plutarch’s flexible use of his source material.
4 Cf. Bucher-Isler (1972), 72-73, on the function of examples and their importance for both writers and 
readers. On the parallel use of exempla by Livy for practical matters and moral concepts, and by Seneca see 
Chaplin (2000), and Roller ((2001), 88-97), respectively.
2theatre. He learns nothing from the juxtaposition. What is more, Alexander came near to 
visiting further punishment, this time on the actor himself. That would be even more 
absurd,  since  it would  imply  on Alexander’s  side  a wrong mapping of reality on to 
poetry. True, poetry and reality have to harmonise in some ways -  poetry must mirror 
reality to some degree if it is to appeal and affect -  yet they have to be kept distinct as 
well.  Rather than seeing acting and real  life as two worlds which interact, Alexander 
confuses mimesis with reality, carried away as he is mainly by the effect that hedone has 
on him. It is the same sort of mistake as the guard in Suetonius’ Nero makes: failing to 
distinguish reality from  imitation, and  identifying the emperor as Hercules (the tragic 
character he was representing in the play), he rushes on stage to save Nero and free him 
from his chains {Nero 21.3).5 The mask which Nero is wearing brings confusion to the 
guard, who apparently sees too much of Nero in Hercules, and also too much of Hercules 
in Nero. Similarly, Alexander fails to distinguish between representation and reality.
Plutarch and the classical past
In  Plutarch’s  oeuvre  we  find  influences  from  all  aspects  of culture,  philosophy  and 
history.6 The familiarity he shows with earlier literature is remarkable, and is most clearly 
demonstrated in his many quotations from ancient authors.7 Together with Athenaeus, 
Plutarch  is  probably  the  author  who  quotes  the  greatest  number  of ancient  writers: 
philosophers, poets, historiographers, orators. But, unlike Athenaeus (who mostly quotes 
long passages to show his erudition), Plutarch does not quote merely to parade learning.8  
For  Plutarch  quoting  is  a  way  of interpreting  literature.  Plutarch  lived  in  the  1  st_2nd
5 Bartsch ((1994), 47-49) discusses the passage pointing out that Suetonius seems particularly interested in 
the  guard’s  reaction  as  ‘the  mark  of an  inability  to  remain  wholly  within  one  of the  two  possible 
interpretative frames, the reality-frame or the theater-frame’ (p. 49).
6 Cf. de Romilly (1988a), 219: ‘...on trouvait dans l’oeuvre de Plutarque tous les aspects de 1’Anti  quite: les 
grands hommes de l’histoire, les doctrines des philosophes, la religion de Delphes, et aussi, entremel£s, des 
citations  de podtes  et des mots  historiques,  des  arguments  et  des anecdotes,  et  des hauts  faits,  et des 
curiosit6s’.
7 See, among others, Helmbold and O’Neil (1959), Tagliasacchi (1961), 71-72, Fuhrmann (1964), 41, Di 
Gregorio (1979) and (1980), Brunt (1980), de Wet (1981), Mossman (1988) and (1992), Desideri (1992b), 
Van der Stockt (1987) and (1992), Jouan (2002), 187.
8 About the reception of poets and historians by Athenaeus see Braund and Wilkins (2000) and especially 
in that volume: Bowie (pp. 124-135), Sidwell (pp. 136-152), Walbank (pp. 161-170), Pelling (pp. 171-190, 
esp.  181-184:  ‘Quotation as reception’),  Arafat (pp.  191-202), Trapp  (pp.  353-363);  cf.  also  Ambaglio 
(1990).
3century A.D.  but he engaged  in a kind of literary dialogue with the whole of Greek 
literature, starting from Homer.9 Greek literature and philosophy are the quintessence of 
his paideia, not only a means of displaying his erudition. The tendency to revive classical 
authors is a popular one in Plutarch’s times1 0  -  and we must keep in mind that these 
authors have become ‘classical’ already for Plutarch. Plutarch’s use of their texts is not 
only an indication of his admiration for the classical past but also a sign of the popularity 
of classical  authors  in  his  times.  Every pepaideumenos  of those  times  had  a  good 
knowledge of Greek tragedies and was still reading the famous tragic and comic poets. If 
Homer was the poet par excellence for the education of Greek young men since archaic 
times,  Greek  plays  were  among  the  most  popular  pieces  of literature  used  for  the 
education  of  both  Greeks  and  Romans.  The  heroes  of  Greek  tragedies  were  still 
exemplars for learned men in Hellenistic times.
But  how  much  of the  classical  tradition  was  also  performed,  so  that  in  addition  to 
reading,  people  could  familiarise  themselves  with  Greek  tragedies  in  a  visual, 
performative context, at theatres? The question is difficult to answer with certainty, since 
the evidence we have is poor, leaving much space for conjecture. Yet it is true that still in 
the Hellenistic era every city or town regarded a theatre as a necessary public building.1 1  
Competitions went on at different festivals until the first century B.C., and prizes were 
given,  especially  to  actors  who  were  now  highly  valued  -   indeed,  higher  than 
playwrights.1 2   In  Plutarch’s times, the production of new Greek plays had practically 
stopped,1 3  yet theatre continued to be very important in the Hellenistic world; it was the
9 Cf. Van der Stockt (2000b), esp. pp. 104 and 109.
10 Cf. Marrou (1956), Bowie (1970), Russell (1981),  112, Berry (1983), 76, Morgan (1998), Too (1998), 
esp. p. 208, and Cribiore (2001),  197-199. Hellenistic writers and Plutarch too, are more interested in the 
wisdom of classical than of their contemporary authors.
11 Baldry (1971), 129. He also attests that the theatre of Dionysus was in use until the fourth century A.D.; 
similarly Garland (2004), 63. Cf. also Xanthakis-Karamanos (1980), 3-34.
12 Cf. Pickard-Cambridge (1968), 82, Baldry (1971),  130-133, Gebhaid (1996), C. P. Jones (2001), and 
Garland (2004), 49. The actors’ growing importance is testified by the guilds which they formed -  Baldry
(1971), 131-133; cf. also Sifakis (1967), 99-103, and Garland (2004), 63-67. On the actors’ standing in the 
Greek and Roman society see also Hugoniot, et al. (2004).
13  See  again Pickard-Cambridge (1968),  82:  ‘By the time of Dio  Chrysostom  (about A.D.  100) most, 
though apparently not all, of the plays performed were old, but in Lucian’s day (late in the second century) 
the compositions of new plays had ceased’; cf. Kokolakis (1960b), and Baldry (1971), 131.
4most popular form of dramatic entertainment, and continued to attract large audiences.1 4  
Plutarch  and  his  contemporaries  must  have  had  the  opportunity  to  see  some  re­
productions of old plays, in their original or revised form, but it is more probable that in 
this period of decline of theatrical productions plays were staged in an excerpted form. 
Some important or popular parts from well-known plays were singled out and were still 
being performed  in the first centuries A.D.1 5   Thus a new kind of art form  started to 
flourish, the pantomime, and emphasis was now laid more on music and dance than on 
the traditional kind of dramatic performance.1 6
Given  all  these particular traits of theatre  in  the Hellenistic era,  we can assume that 
Plutarch’s  contact with  poetry was achieved  largely through reading and not through 
performances, but the character of this ‘performance culture’ is still relevant in a broader 
sense.17  For in this world of fragmentary reproductions, there is a tendency by writers 
(e.g.  Plutarch)  and  actors  to  take  passages  out  of their  context,  and  audiences  are 
consequently expected to value and understand passages out of context. The declamatory 
character of Hellenistic drama, which is inherent both in the practice of selecting well- 
known  tragic  lines  and  in  their  recitation  by  a  single  actor  on  stage,  doubtless  also 
affected the evaluation of tragedy by intellectuals in Hellenistic times, suggesting a link 
between drama and artificiality. In the Table Talk, more than anywhere else, we can see 
both the declamatory aspect of tragedy -  different speakers at the symposium recite tragic 
lines as an epideixis of their erudition and rhetorical skills1 8  -  and its fragmentary use, as 
tragic lines are used in the discussion of a range of various questions, and often lose the 
significance they had in their original context.
14 Thus Garland (2004), esp. pp. 48-50; cf. Baldiy (1971), 130.
15 See Pickard-Cambridge (1968), Bartsch (1994), 71, Barnes (1996), 167 ff., Easterling and Hall (2002), 
C. P. Jones (2001).
16 Cf. here Bartsch (1994), 71, C. P. Jones (2001), 206, Hunter (2002),  190-191, Jouan (2002),  188-189, 
and Garland (2004), 63.
17 Cf. Hunter (2002), 190-191; cf. Westaway (1922), 185.
18 For more on epideixis as display in oratory see now Carey (2007), esp. pp. 237-240.
5Plutarch is unparalleled in antiquity for the extent of his use of theatrical vocabulary and 
imagery, or of quotations from tragedies.1 9  His reading in the tragic corpus is very wide. 
Significantly, Plutarch  is the only testimonium  for quite a large number of lost plays 
(mainly of the three tragedians), which would have otherwise remained unknown to us.20 
One may  say that tragedy is  a fundamental part of the  cultural universe of Plutarch. 
Tragedy is important for Plutarch, both for practical purposes of argument and persuasion 
but also from a theoretical point of view with reference to the nature of education and the 
role of literature within that process (cf. below, pp. 9-11). It can be of equal importance 
with philosophy, or, at least, it can serve as a preparation to understand philosophical 
truths and help men to internalise philosophy in their way of living (cf. the conclusion of 
How a young man..., 35F-37B); at the same time tragedy has a role to play in Plutarch’s 
style and narrative technique.
Plutarch’s readership: the author-reader dynamic and writer authority
Plutarch is an author who interacts both with ancient authors and with his own audience. 
His readers often belong to the circle of his friends, and are always, or almost always, the 
so-called pepaideumenoi, both Greek and Roman men belonging to the elite of the cities 
of the Roman empire, sometimes holding high ranking offices and roles in the Roman 
imperium.21 They are people who are part of the same intelligentsia as Plutarch. In other 
words, they  share with  Plutarch the  same paideia;  they received the  same or  similar 
education  in  their  youth,  they  read  the  same  books  and  saw the  same  spectacles  in 
theatres.  Against this cultural background Plutarch  can  be called a pepaideumenos in 
action, to use an expression by Anderson concerning the Second Sophistic 22 Plutarch’s
19 Cf. Tagliasacchi (1960), Calero Secall (1990) -  see also p. 3 n. 7. D’Ippolito ((2000a), 548), by using 
various  criteria,  furnishes  a theoretical  classification  of the  Plutarchan  quotations  (direct  or  indirect; 
verbatim or paraphrased; apologetic or polemic, etc.).
20 Jouan (2002) gives a rough estimate: sixty references to lost plays of the three tragedians, and some 
fifteen fragments of minor tragedians and adespota (p. 187). Cf. Helmbold and O’Neil (1959), Di Gregorio 
(1980), and Cannat* Fera (1996), 420.
21  Cf.  C.  P. Jones (1971), G.  Anderson (1993),  8-11,  Stadter (2000),  494-498  and (2002), and Pelling 
(2002c). About paideia and the role of the pepaideumenoi in Roman Greece see Whitmarsh (1998) and 
(2001), esp. pp. 1-26, and 96-130 -  cf. Quet (1978).
22  G.  Anderson  (1989).  See  Swain  (1996)  for  a  detailed  discussion  of the  characteristics  of the  first 
centuries A.D. concerning the historical and educational background. To this cultural phenomenon and
6readers may not -  or do not need to -  have the same impressive culture as the author from 
Chaironeia;  it suffices that they (especially the  Greek elite,  of course) have a similar 
cultural background. That shared background is something that Plutarch exploits in quite 
subtle ways, as we will see.
In the Plutarchan corpus there is an impressive variety of topics, yet all his works share a 
common  objective  which  focuses  on  the  ethical-educational  aspect.  The  topics  he 
discusses and the ancient authors he brings into those discussions are a matter of personal 
choice, and as such they are indicative of his personal preferences for certain authors, in 
contrast to others who are less used.  The choice of authors  is  important both for the 
bonding between author and readers and for the building of the author’s own authority, 
and it is partly reader-conditioned and partly author-conditioned -  or, perhaps it is more 
accurate to say, author-and-reader-conditioned, for what is most relevant on the reader- 
side is the picture of and relationship with the author that such quotations encourage the 
reader to build.23 Plutarch chooses the authors from whom he quotes according to the 
authors he knows his readers are familiar with, thus effecting a bond with his readers, as 
he projects confidence that writer and reader are moving in the same intellectual world. 
The strategy concerning quotations is not the same in all his writings, and the use of 
authors clearly varies according to each topic and its specific focus and purpose.  When 
quoting, Plutarch does not always feel the need to give full details about the source of the 
quotation 24 Moreover, he may adapt the original passage, or use it in a condensed form, 
or quote from memory -  with all the effects this could have on the accuracy and truth of
generally to  this  era belonged,  for example,  Dio of Prusa,  Seneca the Younger,  Quintilian, Lucian  of 
Samosata, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Marcus Aurelius and other writers of the Early Empire  (cf.  G. 
Anderson (1990), 9-10). In using the term  ‘Second Sophistic’  I am well aware of the ambiguity it has 
concerning its nature and its representatives -  one notices the awkwardness with which it is used by some 
scholars. G. Anderson (1990), 91-110, for example, clearly questions the (‘artificial’?) term of the ‘Second 
Sophistic’ itself (its origins, its limits, etc.) and detects some true problems in tracing its starting-point. He 
also discusses the problem of who were called, or, rather, who had the right to be called ‘sophists’  in 
antiquity, during the movements of the First and Second Sophistic; cf. also id. (1993), esp. pp. 236-246. For 
a fuller discussion of the issue see Bowersock (1969) and (1974), Bowie (1970) and (1982), and Brunt
(1994);  Reardon  (1971)  sees  the  term  (‘Second  Sophistic’)  as  conventional  and  recognises  that  its 
convenience may often be misleading.
23 Cf. Hinds (1998), esp. pp. 10,49-50,103 and 144.
24 Cf. Heirman (1972), 34: ‘Some of the authors are always quoted anonymously. Their words seem to have 
become  part  of the  collective  cultural  memory,  and  to  have  acquired  a  status  comparable to  that  of 
proverbs’ (e.g. How a young man...  15B, 16A, 17F); cf. also Ziegler (1949), 280, Van der Stockt (1987), 
288-289, and de Wet (1988), 13-14.
7the quoted passage. This is the case, for instance, with many quotations from Plato but 
also from tragic poets: Plutarch supposes that a learned reader could easily identify the 
work or the author from which these were taken. Quotations from, or allusions to, ancient 
texts  can  only  have  an  effect  if readers  are  learned  enough  and  therefore  ready  to 
recognise  and  respond  to  them.  Yet,  besides  being  required  to  identify  and  assess 
quotations and allusions, Plutarch’s readers may be asked both to connect the quoted 
passage with its original context and to disconnect it and perceive any new implications 
given by its new context. Plutarch assumes that his readers are sophisticated enough to 
understand his quotations and allusions.25 In this way one can speak of a kind of natural 
sympatheia between Plutarch and his audience 26
The bond between author and readers is double-edged: it boosts the readers’ confidence 
concerning their knowledge of classical texts, whereas it also makes them aware that they 
cannot compete with  Plutarch’s  authority,  created  and developed as  it  is through the 
various ways he uses his material. Yet it is by this very assumption and inclusion of his 
readers within his exclusive group that Plutarch tacitly invites a positive response from 
them. But even if the Plutarchan readers are marked out as pepaideumenoi, it is always 
the author who increases his authority by being the one who controls the game between 
the  well-learned  author and  his  educated  readers.27  In  addition,  there  may  also  be  a 
possibility that Plutarch  is aware that his choices may not ultimately quite match the 
expectations  of his  readers,  or  at  least  some  of them.  If so,  this  would  have  other 
consequences  too:  it  would  assert  his  authorial  superiority  and  distance  from  them, 
preserving the reader-author divide and creating his authorial persona -  a persona which 
also depends on the selection of authors he chooses to quote. And, needless to say, the 
image or images of Plutarch that will emerge for the readers may be (though they need 
not always be) different from the historical individual Plutarch.
25 Cf. Pelling (2004b), 416. About Plutarch’s expectations from his readers see Wardman (1974), 37-48, 
and about the art of poetic allusion in general see Gamer (1990).
26 Cf. Schmitz (1997), 171.
27  Cf.  Schmitz (1997),  171-175,  who  shows  (by examining different texts  of Imperial times)  how the 
paideia of the readers can serve as the link between author and readers.
8Through his choice of quotations Plutarch is not merely assuming but constructing his 
readership, which includes both the true (or, actual) reader addressed by Plutarch and the 
imagined (but not necessarily imaginary) reader to whom he appeals. It is beyond the 
scope of this introduction to examine in detail the true readers of the Lives and of the 
single treatises of the Essays, as they are numerous, or what lies behind the choice of 
dedicatee.  In any case, besides the true reader (i.e. the real people to whom Plutarch 
dedicated his works) one has also to take into account the ideal reader.28 One can imagine 
two types of ideal reader, depending on two senses of ‘ideal’. Firstly, the one whom the 
text affects to assume: the reader who might be learned enough to identify all Plutarch’s 
quotations and understand all possible hints or allusions to classical texts -  and indeed, 
the true reader will make an effort to approximate that sense of ‘ideal’ -  and secondly, 
the  type  of ideal  reader who,  because  he/she  may  not  catch  all  the  allusions  but  is 
flattered by the expectation that he/she might, falls short, but not far short, of the first 
type of ideal reader. This second type of ideal reader (constructed by both author and 
reader) also helps Plutarch maintain his authorial superiority, and we will go on to see 
how that authority is constructed through the way Plutarch exploits and explores those 
quotations -  not merely that so many quotations are used, but also how they are used.
As the scope in different works varies, the use of quotations adjusts to each particular 
scope.  Thus,  Plutarch  employs  tragic  sayings  in  different  ways,  often  passing 
contradictory comments on the very same lines, at times accepting and at times refuting
*yQ
them  -  always with a moral purpose which plays a significant role towards defining his 
attitude towards tragedy and tragic poets.30 The large range and flexibility of quotations 
as well as their strategic use by Plutarch is well exemplified in the Table Talk structure, 
where the first book contains die greatest number of tragic quotations of all books. As I
28 See Pelling (2002c) for ways in which Plutarch constructs his own persona and his audience; cf. also 
Duff (2004), who sees two types of Plutarchan reader: the casual and die ideal (serious) reader (pp. 278- 
279).
29  Nikolaidis  (1991)  discusses  Plutarch’s  contradictions,  focusing  on  striking  examples  of diverse  or 
contradictory comments on the same tragic quotations, now approving and now disapproving of them, 
according to the immediate requirements of the subject under discussion (esp. pp. 159-161, 174 and 177); 
cf. Pelling (1980)=(2002a), esp. pp. 96-102; also Babut (1969a), 172 ff., and Van der Stockt (1999b). In her 
paper about Plutarch’s treatment of Thucydides, de Romilly argues that the adjustment and free use of 
quotations is a well-thought and elaborate technique of Plutarch (1988b).
30 Cf. e.g. Jouan (2002), 192.
9explain in the relevant chapter (chap. 4), this is not accidental; on the contrary, it is a kind 
of programmatic statement concerning the importance of tragedy in the symposium and 
at the same time a guideline for the reader to pay particular attention to tragedy not only 
for its edifying role but also for its entertaining value at symposia in general. Tragic poets 
offer Plutarch useful material, which he can manipulate according to the needs of each 
treatise or Life, as well as concise apophthegms on various topics. Tragic citations also 
serve as stylistic embellishment or illustration,3 1  and have the effect of making Plutarch’s 
treatises or narrative more diverse. Moreover, quoting provides both charm and utility 
(“%apiv  k o u   xpelav”),  as  stated  in the  Table  Talk (736E:  “erre/ra nepi  (rri%(jov  evKoupiau; 
evefiahev Xoyov, ox;  puovov %apiv aXkau k o u  xpeiav earrtv the lieyaXyv e% ov<rr)$”). So we can 
again see that, apart from aesthetic purposes, Plutarch also uses tragedy as a means of 
appealing to and building authority.32 The appeal to poetic texts as a source of authority is 
a practice which can be traced back at least to the late archaic period in ancient Greece. 
Yet it is not a kind of straightforward authority which Plutarch seeks in the tragedians; 
according to his immediate rhetorical need he uses their wisdom to support his case, and 
yet he often challenges their authority too. He invokes the tragedians to establish the 
authority of individual statements, but also challenges their sayings so that he establishes 
his own authority as somebody who is able to refine their sayings and adapt them to real 
life terms. By correcting or adjusting poetic lines he takes on the role of a literary critic 
and at the same time asserts his authority as a moralist and educator.
It  is  true  that  Plutarch  highly values the  wisdom  of Greek poets  of the  archaic  and 
classical  periods,33  aligning  himself  with  the  authoritative  Greek  tradition  of  the 
Hellenistic era, and quotes from them. However, in Plutarch’s view the truth of poetry 
remains to be checked -  this is one of the main strands of thought in his How a young
31 Cf. e.g. Di Gregorio (1976), 168, and de Wet (1988), 19-20.
32  Hillyard (1981) aptly remarks that the use of quotations, allusions and exempla (see above, p.  4) is 
central to Plutarch’s technique of persuasion. He also makes the distinction between ornamental quotations 
and quotations which are used to lend authority (p. xxv).
33 164D: “r<p (nxjxoraTqi 'Ofjuqpq}”, 348D: “ 17 EvpmStov crania”, Sull. 4.4: “ t o v  Evpnrilhjv tro^ov iv&pa,”; cf. Van 
der Stockt (1992), 131.
10man  should  listen  to  poetry?*  Greek  tragic  poets  have  touched  upon  many  human 
concerns and emotions, and yet they are not to be fully trusted; readers should be just as 
ready to call poetic views ‘wrong’ and ‘improper’ as ‘right’ and ‘proper’ (26B). Greek 
tragedians present in their plays all types of characters and behaviour,  good and bad, 
simple and complex. The multiple voices in their poetry make it all the more challenging 
for the audience/reader to discover, if at all, a kind of exemplary truth.35 Plutarch warns 
the readers against taking poetic lines at face value; in no case must the reader believe 
that there is an absolute agreement between the views of the poet and those expressed by 
a dramatic character -  poets may put fallacious statements in the mouth of characters like 
Eteocles or Ixion, but in doing so they do not show approval of them; they are merely 
matching wicked characters like these with wicked sentiments (cf. 18E ff.). Furthermore, 
although it is easy to be carried away by the beautiful poetic representation, the reader 
must not take dramatic characters as models to imitate in life.36 When reading Greek 
tragedies, readers must always be aware that the form (poetic representation) is distinct 
from  the  content  (poetic  meaning)  (18A-F,  28A).  Plutarch  makes  a  clear  distinction 
between  what  is  aesthetically  good  and  what  is  actually  good:  for  example,  one  is 
expected to be able to appreciate a painting for its beautiful and vivid representation of 
Medea’s  murdering her children, but one  is certainly not expected to admire the act, 
which the painting presents, as such; just the opposite (18A).
Plutarch  is a moralist and as such his tone  is often didactic.  There are lessons to  be 
learned in all areas of life which he discusses; these are at times straightforward (e.g. in 
the direct personal advice he gives in many Essays) and at times less easy to extract -  and 
this is the case with the Lives, where, from the biographies of great men, the reader is 
asked to extract lessons from both their virtues and vices. Thus in the Lives the didactic
34 On this essay, which I discuss in chapter 1, see, among others, Von Reutem (1933), Heirman (1972), 
Valgiglio (1973) and (1991), Schenkeveld (1982), Carrara (1988), Van der Stockt (1992), Br6chet (1999), 
Zadorojnyi (1999b) and (2002).
35 Cf. Russell (1981), 90-91.
36 As happens in tragedy, in Plutarch’s Lives, too, there are no simply ‘good’ or ‘bad’ characters, no clear- 
cut examples to imitate and examples to avoid; things are more complex than that -  cf. Duff (1999a).
37  As Westaway puts it,  ‘the young reader must be trained to discriminate between artistic and ethical 
values’ ((1922), 85).
11tone and moralising are more complex:38 it is about other people teaching us, although 
this kind of procedure needs the active involvement of the reader/audience. Through the 
specific lessons that the stories of Plutarch’s great men suggest -  perhaps even the ones 
the great men learned themselves -  the reader is supposed to internalise some general 
characteristics or patterns of human character and behaviour, and then deliberate on how 
these can improve his/her life, on a personal level.39 So there is a kind of double move 
here,  from  the  specific/personal  to  the  general,  and  then  back  again  to  the  specific. 
Plutarch’s moral  ism has both an inward and an outward aspect. Duff says that the Parallel 
Lives, like the best tragedies, invite the reader to challenge, to consider and ponder.40
The scope of the present thesis
The present thesis is an attempt to define and describe the ‘theatrical’ and the ‘tragic’ as 
important aspects of, or even as a way of reading, Plutarch’s work. The different uses of 
tragedy and theatre in his Lives and Essays reveal Plutarch’s dynamic relationship to 
them. Although he neither develops a theoretical framework of what poetry is nor does he 
treat poetry in a single, coherent way41  -  as opposed to the more systematic analyses by 
Aristotle and Plato42 -  through his individual comments on tragic passages and through 
his use of theatre, the reader collects pieces which contribute to an understanding of 
Plutarch’s views on poetry and tragedy in particular. His goals remain highly practical 
and his approach pragmatic, with an underlying coherence in his views on poetry. Even if 
he does not develop a general theoretical background for his view on poetry, especially in 
the essay How a young man... he creates a kind of norm for how readers should respond
38 Cf. Duff (1999a), esp. pp. 52-71, and Pelling (1988b), who distinguishes two versions of moralism, the 
protreptic and the descriptive (p. 15).
39 Stadter (2000), however, following Plutarch’s statement in the prologue of Aemilius (1.1), sees a more 
immediate link between Plutarch’s characters in the Lives and the readers’ lives; he regards the image of 
the mirror as a key-tool which helps the readers apply directly the moral function of the Lives to their own 
lives (esp. pp. 503-505). For some examples of Plutarch’s use of the image of the mirror see Fuhrmann 
(1964), 98, n. 2, and Duff (1999a), 32-34. Cf. also On listening to lectures 42B, and How to recognise that 
one is making progress in virtue 85A-B.
40 Duff (1999a), 9 and 309.
41 D’Ippolito (1996a) underlines the fact that it is difficult to trace Plutarch’s views on poetiy (as well as on 
oratory), mainly because the relevant works are lost: e.g. “IIept Tmnrrucfe” (Cat. Lam. 60), “flepi Tmvtyuvrwv 
t»V rj aur&v emfieXeia.” (Cat. Lam. 220); cf. Van der Stockt (1992), 12.
42 See Aristotle’s Poetics, and Plato’s Rep. n, in, X. Jouan (2002),  191, remarks that Plutarch does not 
want to write his own Ars Poetica.
12to and understand poetry, and most importantly, for how to use poetry in their lives.43 
Ideally, above all poetry should appeal to both ‘pleasure’ and ‘utility’.44 So, the readers 
are guided towards a path of learning how and what to value in poetry. Among other 
things, they learn to accept falsehood and fiction not as things consciously chosen by the 
poets in order to mislead but as necessary poetic devices for the purposes of pleasure, 
allurement and diversity (16A-17A, 25B-D); to give some credit to poets for their views 
on human and divine matters but not to treat them as law-givers (28B; cf. 17B-17F, 20E- 
21 A, 22D, 23A-24C); to accept that poetry is an imitative art and as such  it must be 
valued  for  its  artistic  qualities  and  not  for  any  reality  it  depicts  (17D-18F,  25B-C), 
although it clearly has references to real life and real character types (26A); to extract 
useful messages even from erroneous poetic sayings, or correct them by finding better 
statements as an antidote within poetry itself;45 and, finally, to be critical of the poetic 
sayings rather than of the poets themselves.
Although there is admittedly an abundant use of the tragedians’ wisdom in all Plutarchan 
work, the word limits of a thesis do not allow a thorough examination and discussion of 
all cases where Plutarch uses tragic wording or imagery.46 The present study will explore 
the importance of the ‘tragic’  in selected Plutarchan Lives and Essays, focusing on two 
particular aspects; firstly, on the diverse use, deployment and adaptation of actual tragic 
quotations in selected Essays {How a young man should listen to poetry,  How to tell a 
flatterer from a friend,  Were  the Athenians more glorious  in war or  in wisdom?,  On 
Exile,  and the Table  Talk); and secondly, on the more subtle contribution of theatrical 
imagery (mainly, metaphors) and atmosphere to the Lives (the focus will be mainly on 
two  Roman  Lives,  Caesar  and  Pompey)  and  on  how  they  contribute  to  Plutarch’s
43 As Russell remarks on Aristotle’s different view concerning the utility of poetry, ‘The pleasure of poetry 
includes that of learning. Poetry does a service for the life of contemplation, rather than for the life of 
action. [...]  If poetry has a utility on the practical  level, whether technical or moral, this must then be 
accidental’ ((1981,92).
44 Cf. Russell (1981), 8 6 : a combination of ars and ingenium could be regarded as the wise poet’s aim; cf. 
Horace, Ars Poetica 341: ‘he who combines the useful with the pleasant wins every vote’.
45 Cf. Westaway (1922), 87.
46 The work by Helmbold and O’Neil of 1959 offers a full list of all occurrences of tragic quotations (and 
also of allusions, paraphrases, or other, more or less dubious, references) as well as of other quotations by 
Plutarch from various authors.
13construction of characters.47 At times our author outlines the lives of his characters as if 
following  theatrical,  and  particularly  tragic,  plots,  drawing  implicitly  a  connection 
between  his  biographies  and  on-stage  performances,  in  which  tragic  characters  are 
replaced,  as  it were, by great men of Greek and Roman history.  Modem scholarship 
discussing the  Lives,  for example,  of Alexander and  Crassus,  has  demonstrated that 
sometimes Plutarch builds or tends to present his Lives like a tragedy, so that we compare 
his characters with tragic heroes:48 biography crosses its boundaries thus becoming, or at 
least tending to become, (a kind of) tragic biography. The ‘tragic’  is a feeling which at 
the end does not describe and specify only Greek tragedy but also the lives of great men. 
The analysis of the Lives of Caesar and Pompey from a theatrical perspective makes it all 
the  more  clear how  close  great  individuals  can  come  to  authentic  tragic  characters. 
Borrowing the title of a book on Alexander by Bosworth, in those lives one can even 
speak of a ‘tragedy of triumph’.49 What marks these two Lives as particularly tragic is the 
striking reversal of tyche (Fortune) -  reminiscent of the tragic peripeteia; their destructive 
errors  in  combination  with  their  character  flaws  (or  virtues,  since  some  virtues  of 
character under specific circumstances may turn into flaws working against them); the 
sense of unavoidable destiny which however, is gradually built on their mistakes, so that 
finally they are trapped in their past and can do nothing but walk to their fateful end; and 
last, but not least, there are many profoundly emotional scenes, which evoke pity and fear 
both from the ‘internal’ audience (the actual viewers of events) and from the ‘external’ 
audience  (readers).  All  this  creates  indeed  a  tragic  feeling  overarching  Caesar  and 
Pompey.
Several scholars have discussed the ‘tragic’ in specific works of Plutarch,50 and generally 
they describe theatre as having a negative tone; this is partly true, as theatrical behaviour
47 Of course, not all Lives offer themselves for such an analysis (an analysis of the ‘tragic’ and ‘theatrical’), 
but this kind of analysis can be very useful or even necessary for some Lives, e.g. the ones chosen for 
discussion.
48 See e.g. Mossman (1988) and (1992), and the observations by Pelling in (1979), (1988a), (1995a) and 
(1997c).
49 Bosworth (19%), Alexander and the East: the tragedy of triumph.
50 Schiapfer (1950), De Lacy (1952), Tagliasacchi (1%0), Fuhrmann (1964), Di Gregorio (1976), (1979) 
and (1980), Carrara (1988), Mossman (1988) and (1992), Pelling (1988a), (1988b), (1997c) and (2002a) 
passim, Calero Secall (1990), Desideri (1992b), Van der Stockt (1992), Braund (1993) and (1997), Keitel
(1995), Cannat& Fera (1996), Zadorojnyi (1997), Jouan (2002), Duff (2004), Beneker (2005a) and (2005b).
14can  imply  pompous,  exaggerated  behaviour  and  pretence,  extreme  pathos,  or  a 
melodramatic turn. But this is not the whole truth. In Plutarch theatre is not something 
that is to be rejected as such. True, together with the ‘tragic’, it is at times associated with 
inappropriate behaviour,  if it defines people’s  behaviour  in  real  life,  when  they may 
exhibit arrogance or behave disingenuously (e.g. the flatterer who acts in order to achieve 
his goals driven by personal interests). Yet at times the tragic is not reprehensible, but 
acceptable: this is the case,  for example,  when  it describes emotional  intensity,  or is 
associated with the splendid and grandiose side of characters and events (cf. for example 
the incident with the pirates in Caesar (2.1.-2.4):5 1  Caesar’s theatrical behaviour is used 
by Plutarch to exalt and forebode his influence and power later on). A systematic analysis 
of the role of theatre and tragedy proves that there is a more complex connection between 
Plutarch and theatre. The study of their role in the Essays and Lives which are selected 
for the purposes of the present thesis aims to refine our understanding of their use by 
Plutarch, and examine in what ways they can give hints about how the reader should read 
about or understand characters and actions, i.e. the human ethos.
The  first chapter (‘The moral  and  educational  use of poetry’)  is  an  attempt to  place 
Plutarch  in the Hellenistic tradition;  it touches  upon his  Platonism -  but also on his 
deviation from Plato’s views on poetry,52 since in contrast to Plato Plutarch assigns an 
important role to poetry in the education of the young people. Poetry becomes for him a 
part of his methodology, of his argument, and finally of the ethical-educational aspect of 
his writings. The exemplifying case chosen for a discussion of the tragedians’ influence 
and of their interactive communication with Plutarch  is the essay How  a young man 
should listen  to poetry.  Taking  as  a  starting point  Plutarch’s  own  comments  on  the 
passages he quotes from tragedy, the reader is urged to be critical towards poetry, and to 
value the poetic views or doctrines on a pragmatic rather than merely artistic level, so that 
poetry will finally become useful in real-life terms and a preparatory stage to a deeper 
understanding of philosophy.
51 Cf. Jouan (2002), 194, and the examples he gives for the positive associations of the ‘tragic’: Nic. 21.1, 
Demetr. 53.1, Pelop. 34.1, Mar. 27.2, Demosth. 29, Alex. 19.7-8.
52 For the banishment of poets from the ideal state see Rep. 398A-B, 568B, 595A ff., 607B ff. and Laws 
817A ff.
15Chapter 2 (‘Theatrical imagery in Plutarch’s Essays’) deals with theatrical vocabulary 
and  images  in two  Essays,  in How  to  tell a flatterer from  a friend and  in  Were  the 
Athenians more glorious in war or in wisdom?. Since the flatterer acts as a friend in order 
to achieve his goals, Plutarch sees in his attitude pretence and falsehood; his mindset 
reflects the theatrical world: the flatterer often resembles an actor on stage and his life 
can be seen as a performance in life. Yet the fault lies also with the person who likes to 
be flattered, who prefers an audience of flatterers to true friends who might point out to 
him some unpleasant truths, or admonish him. Thus tragedy and theatre become a point 
of reference for life against which real-life attitudes and actions are measured; these are 
proved to  be wrong  if they  resemble theatrical  behaviour.  In  Were  the Athenians...? 
Plutarch’s view on poetry and drama is defined by the rhetorical purposes of the essay, as 
it is a declamation, where our author’s aim is to glorify the political superiority of Athens 
and  its  military  successes  by  using  tragedy  and  generally  the  Athenians’  literary 
achievements as a negative foil. A key-theme which is important in both Essays is the 
notion of anam) (deception), which is a main feature of the flatterer’s behaviour but also 
specifies, in a different sense, tragedy and theatre.
In  chapter  3  (‘The  role  of tragedy  in  On  exile')  tragedy,  and  especially  Euripides’ 
Phoenissae where exile is an important theme,  has a substantial role to play,  as  it  is 
incorporated into the development of Plutarch’s argument about exile. Polyneices, who is 
not at all a typical example for an exile, laments his fate as an exile who cannot enjoy the 
happiness which one can only enjoy if living in one’s homeland. Plutarch rebuts this view 
-  opportunistically,  presenting it at times as the character’s view and at times as the 
poet’s view  (to  gain  poetic  authority)53  -  to  prove that  happiness  and  virtue  can  be 
attained in any land. Use of the tragic background is here closely connected to drawing 
moral lessons to make the reader think in more philosophical terms. Interestingly, even in 
this treatise Plutarch tampers with the original context of tragic lines according to his
53 This kind of opportunistic attitude contrasts his warning to readers in How a young man...  (18E ff. -  
ironically enough, one of his examples here is Eteocles, the Eteocles of the Phoenissae) not to assume that 
what a character says reflects the view of the poet (see p. 11, and chap. 1, p. 24 ff). This variation between 
Plutarch’s works shows again that he adjusts his views to fit particular contexts and purposes. Cf. e.g. 
Nikolaidis (1991).
16particular purposes. The reader’s familiarity with tragedy is presupposed in this essay 
(more  than  elsewhere),  and  is  necessary  for  a  further  understanding  of  Plutarch’s 
argument as well as of the new context in which the tragic passage is set. On the whole, 
On Exile offers a good example of Plutarch’s alternating between critique and positive 
exploitation of tragedy.
Chapter 4 (‘Tragedy and Theatre in the Table Talk') aims to show how tragedy becomes 
an important theme in a symposium. Plutarch and his multiple personae in the Table Talk 
use the tragedians firstly as an epideixis of their erudition -  the symposia, by nature, 
justify epideictic practice -  and  secondly,  in  order to  gain  authority  from  the  Greek 
tragedians, even if their views are taken as a point of disagreement. In addition, theatre 
can also be used as a metaphor to draw parallels with the practice of symposia, especially 
if one thinks of the various types of performance which take place at a banquet, mainly 
for purposes of entertainment.
Chapters 5 and 6 (Theatrical aspects in Pompey and Caesar) attempt a close reading of 
Pompey  and  Caesar  as  a  pair.  Such  a  reading  shows  that  the  two  Lives  -   but, 
significantly, not only those Lives -  are less self-contained than modem scholarship has 
tended to assume, although they are not set as a pair by Plutarch.54 In fact the two Lives 
complement each  other  in more ways than one.  They share common themes,  one of 
which is the ‘tragic’; this does not confine itself to distinctive tragic texturing or tragic 
parallels: the theatricality of one Life carries over to the other and intensifies incidents 
and moments which the two Lives share but which Plutarch does not highlight in the 
same  way.  Because  of the  different perspectives  and  aims  of each  Life,  Pompey  in 
Caesar is not explored in the same way as in his own Life -  the same of course applies to 
Caesar in Pompey, too. In this way the reader can only get a fuller picture of the two great 
men if he/she reads the two Lives together; interestingly, what may often be suppressed 
in one Life is brought out in the other Life.  On the whole, the Lives of Pompey and 
Caesar make it possible for the reader to see a number of different versions of the ‘tragic’
54 Cf. Pelling, who, taking as a starting point the ‘boundary-breaking’ in Caesar, emphasises how Plutarch 
constructs his whole series of Lives so that they go together and can be read as a coherent whole ((2006b), 
269).
17and of the ‘theatrical’. The ‘tragic’ is felt in the explicit parallels which Plutarch draws 
with tragic and epic heroes, but all the more in his allusions to tragedy. The metaphors 
not only work as a part of the tragic imagery, but they also make the reader, especially by 
their visual  impact,  recall  similar incidents  and patterns  in tragedy (such  as ominous 
dreams,  characters  acting roles or facing moral  dilemmas, theatrical  analogies, tragic 
irony, the divine element).
Even a selective examination of the ‘tragic’  and of ‘theatricality’  in certain Lives and 
Essays, shows that these themes are a major Leitmotiv in Plutarch. Theatrical imagery 
and the ‘tragic’ are significant not only for aesthetic reasons, but also for their reference 
to life which makes them for the readers a way of seeing human characters and patterns 
of behaviour under a different light. Plutarch’s treatment of tragedy and theatre shows 
that these areas interact with reality and can be a way of describing real life. Theatre 
invades a person’s life and often shapes it, so that apart from role-playing in theatre, there 
is also role-playing in life. Clearly there needs to be a relation between poetry/theatre and 
reality, yet, as the opening passage of this Introduction shows, a possible failure to make 
a distinction between these two worlds entails dangers, which in some of Plutarch’s Lives 
may finally lead even great men to their downfall.
181. The moral and educational use of poetry
Introduction
The role of poetry and its ethical value in antiquity is an issue explored as early as the 
Presocratics; Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus all questioned to a certain degree 
the  authority  of Homer  and  Hesiod  as  educational  poets;  later,  Plato,  Aristotle  and 
Isocrates engaged with the issue more fully.1   ‘Literature must serve a purpose outside 
itself: it must be useful, if not by increasing one’s command of language and knowledge 
of the world, then by improving the ethical makeup of its audience and readership’2 -  this 
was a fundamental as much as a widespread conviction in archaic and classical Greece. 
The educational role of poetry becomes problematic equally early, however, for a variety 
of reasons. Partly it is the disparity between the social role of poetry and its content, 
especially the way the gods are depicted (so e.g.  Xenophanes); partly it is the rise of 
competing  claims to  educational  authority, beginning again  in  the  archaic period  but 
especially visible in the sophists (see e.g.  Protagoras’  critique of Simonides’  poem  in 
Plato’s Protag. 340a ff.), in Socrates and in Plato. Plutarch is heir to this tradition.
Plato’s work -  and in particular Ion and Books II, III and X of his Republic, which touch 
upon the role of poetry -  may have constituted the theoretical background  on which 
Plutarch based his own view on poetry and poets.  But Plato, although he may sometimes 
attack specific poets, such as Homer or Hesiod for being far from the truth (truth, here, as 
a philosophical notion), generally adopts a holistic view of the role of poets and poetry’s 
problematic nature. Plato rejects poetry -  as an imitative art -  with reference to its bad
1  Plutarch’s pragmatic approach to education owes much in spirit to Isocrates -  see Marrou (1956), Too 
(1998), and Too and Livingstone (1998).
2 Sicking (1998), 101.
3 A systematic analysis of Plato’s two critiques of poetry in the Republic is offered by Halliwell (1997); cf. 
also Ferrari (1989), R. B. Rutherford (1995), 228-239, Urmson (1997), and Nehamas (2001). About Plato’s 
literary theory  and  its  anthropological  origins  see  also  the  discussion  by BQttner  (2000)  in  his Ph.D. 
dissertation, esp. pp. 1-17. BQttner argues against the idea that Plato does not develop a system of literary 
criticism but instead presents individual judgements on poetry in different parts of his work -  even if it 
would be awkward to talk about Plutarch’s ‘poetics’, in Plato’s case it is not.
19effect on the ‘ideal state’ (cf. Rep. 377f, 392c-398b, 568b, 595a, 607b, and Laws 817a ff.) 
and on the education of young men,  since  it brings about emotions which should be 
suppressed (cf.  Rep.  603c-606d).  He  considers  the poet to  be  ‘third  from  the truth’, 
because he imitates the world of senses, which in turn imitates the world of forms (cf. 
Rep. 602c).4 He also reproaches poetry for its bad influence on human soul, since poets 
present mortals and even  gods as  suffering from passions.  Thus,  instead of trying to 
suppress desire in favour of reason, they stir feelings; they drive audiences and readers to 
extreme feelings and, by extending the human passions to the divine sphere, they may 
lead people to question the authority and superiority of gods.5
Plutarch  was  a  great admirer  of Plato,  and  his  entire  work  is  imbued  with  platonic 
influences;6  yet  their  views  diverge  significantly  concerning  poetry.7  Plutarch’s 
standpoint for developing his view on poetry is very different from Plato’s, as are also his 
criteria and purposes for examining and criticising the role of poetry together with its 
ethical perspectives. He does not form his judgement on poetry based on political  or 
idealised criteria, as does Plato in order to establish the frame and the component parts of
o
his ideal state.  Plutarch sees things in a more pragmatic aspect; therefore he examines 
how and to what extent poetry can become useful for or an  indispensable part of the 
literary  and  philosophical paideia.  Contrary  to  Plato,  Plutarch does  not reject poetry 
outright, but he does share to some degree Plato’s concern about the untruthfulness of 
poetry, as he admits at 17D-E (How a young man...): ^noirjTiKjj fiev ou naw peLov earl 
aXTjOeiag,  v)  Be nepi  t o u t’  aXySeia  k o u   roTg prqBev  aXXo  nertotTjfievoig  epyov  jj yvaxnv  k o u
4 The poet’s role is thus undermined or even regarded as dangerous and deceptive, since he presents a truth 
which is far from mirroring anything true or real. Cf. Russell (1981), 104.
5 Cf. Rep. 378b ff., where Plato develops his theory on how poets may create false images of the gods and 
thus make people believe that gods are responsible for both human happiness and misery. To prove this he 
uses several examples from well-known and respected poets, such as Homer and Hesiod.
6 Plato’s influence on Plutarch is undeniable; cf. R. M. Jones (1916), Von Reutem (1933), 89-100, Dillon 
(1977),  184-230 and (1988), Zadoiojnyi (1999a) and (2002), Trapp (1990) and (1999), Ash (1997), 192- 
196,  and  Pelling  (1999a).  But  Plutarch  was  also  open  -   often,  with  some  reservations  -   to  other 
philosophical schools (Stoics, Epicureans,  Cynics, Pythagoreans):  on Plutarch’s  eclecticism  see Russell
(1972), 63-83; cf. Reardon (1971), 36 ff., Berry (1983), and Hershbell (1992a) and (1992b); cf. also the 
forthcoming book by Kechagia.
7 Br6chet (1999) offers an extensive comparison between Plato’s view on poetry and Plutarch’s stance in 
How a young man should listen to poetry.
8 Plato is particularly concerned about the education of the city’s guards (< f>u\au<e<;), since they perform a 
very important role for the city by being responsible for its security -  see Rep. 375c ff.
20fjba9v)(riv rou ovroq ev pJhka, ^vam 9r r)par6<; ecrri kou dv< r)vrpTTo< ;” (‘The art of poetry is not greatly 
concerned with truth, and the truth about these matters, even for those who have made it 
their sole business to know and understand the reality, is exceedingly hard to track down 
and hard to get hold of). The two, poetry and truth/reality, are for Plutarch not closely 
related, therefore there always remains for the readers the danger of misunderstanding or 
not perceiving the truth expressed in poetic terms, and this is what Plutarch wants to 
eliminate. Poetry imitates life in a plausible way, but it also deviates from truth to offer 
pleasure to the audience; and this deviation may carry with it certain dangers for the 
ethical training of young men (note the very platonic statements at  15A:  “fihamet  kou 
8ia4>6eip€f\ and at 15C: “topoktikov kou Ttapa^opov” —  poetry is apt to cause damage and 
corrupt, and can be disturbing and misleading) (cf. Rep. 388a-d). However, Plutarch can 
‘forgive’ poets for inaccurate or misleading statements on important topics of life, since 
he recognises above all their good intentions (cf. e.g. How a young /w<zw...16A-B,  19D, 
20E, 25D). Poets do not try to deceive the audience on purpose, but their use of truth 
blended with fiction may be at times confusing and surprising.
So Plutarch does not follow Plato in his exclusion of poetry -  as part of all mimetic arts 
that should be excluded from the polis -  but adopts a different, more subtle approach: he 
prefers  to  include  poetry  in  the  state,  provided  that  its  citizens  develop  first  their 
judgement (“kpiVis”), or, better,  ‘faculty of discernment’9 to an adequate level, so that 
they will be finally in the position both to benefit from its positive effects and to resist 
strongly its possible harmful effects.  He does not see poetry as a threat to the state’s 
stability,  or as  a cause  of the citizens’  corruption;  on the contrary,  he recognises  its 
central role for the state, where the citizens will see poetry as an area that can sharpen 
their mind and can be used as a good exercise, directing them towards philosophy and a 
better  understanding  of  the  paramount  philosophical  truths  and  values  for  life. 
Philostratus went even further concerning the multiple uses of poetry. He suggested that 
it be used in political life as well. Thus, when referring to tyrants, he encourages them to 
follow a literary career. Then they will kill less (‘SJttov ... anoKTevovaiv”), and may even
9 The translation of the term  which is preferred here is suggested by Whitmarsh ((2001), 50) -  cf.
also Too’s discussion (1998) of the term, esp. pp. 9-10 and 131.
21‘cure themselves of their violent disease by the medicine of poetry’ (Lives of the Sophists 
500.15-23).1 0  There were of course cases where literature did not improve the tyrant’s 
character; the example of Dionysius I comes to mind. Although he was a playwright, he 
never ceased to be an oppressive, archetypal tyrant. Like Plutarch, Philostratus, too, sees 
in poetry an undeniable pragmatic value.
In  his  surviving works Plutarch  does not establish a ‘coherent’  theory on poetry, but 
instead  comments  on  specific  passages taken  from  poets  and  other  authors with  the 
ultimate goal of eliminating any risks from adopting (morally) dangerous lines and to 
maximize the benefits that can derive from poetry. One could argue that he takes on the 
role  of  an  intermediary  -   but  a  discreet  and  unbossy  one  -   between  poets  and 
audience/readers.  In  his  work  the  readers  do  not  find  comments  on  entire  works  or 
general judgements on authors.1 1  Instead they are invited to read between the lines and 
beyond Plutarch’s individual comments on quotations and dicta to form the picture of his 
general  attitude  towards  poets  and  poetry,  or  (even)  reconstruct  his  ‘implied  poetic 
theory’. Plutarch, for his part, focuses on how readers should understand poetry rather 
than on what poets teach them -  thus he lays particular emphasis on the reception of 
poetry.
Plutarch concedes to readers authority and a significant degree of autonomy.  It is the 
readers who are then both empowered and assigned the task to judge what they read and 
decide for themselves what is good or bad for their education and ethical improvement. 
So, the issue is not only that poets do not simply dictate to us what kind of examples we 
should imitate or avoid; it involves directly Plutarch’s own approach to poetry, and the 
ways he believes that poetry can be useful and effective. The path for poetry to achieve 
its  significant role  goes  through the  readers:  through their active participation  in  the 
educational procedure, the careful reading of poetry, and their internalising of any truths 
in poetry which can be useful for their life. Plutarch teaches the readers to always choose
1 0  Ahl (1984), 201.
1 1  Cf. Van der Stockt (1992), 161. There is of course the comparison between Aristophanes and Menander 
(“XuyKpto-eax; ’ Apurrojtavovs k o u  Mev&vdpou enrro^wj”), but otherwise we do not find that kind of comparison 
in Plutarch.
22and percolate what they read -  in a way, to become eclectic as he himself was eclectic: he
adopted from different philosophical Schools and authors those ideas that either appealed
1 0
to him most, or were useful for the ethical and instructive purposes of his work.
Although he appears to be indecisive as to whether poetic statements can sometimes be
more dangerous than useful for the education of young people, his citation of tragedians’
lines -  as well as of other poets’ lines -  together with his personal comments, indicates
that he considers poets to have a great edifying potential. Wardman rightly argues that
Plutarch, in his How a young man..., ‘keeps up his criticism of poetry, including tragedy,
but offers also a partial defence. Poetry can be useful, even though it does refer to myth 
1 or the unreal’.
Tragic poetry encourages multiple readings and interpretations of characters and actions; 
morality  in  tragedy  is  not  straightforward.1 4  As we will  see  later on  in  this  chapter, 
Plutarch tries to give more pragmatic than artistic value to poetic sayings. The tragedians, 
whom he so often quotes in this essay, are the basis upon which Plutarch develops his 
educational theory. In How a young man... Plutarch is not seeking the mere authority of 
the  tragedians  as  wise  poets -  as  is  the  case  in  other  essays,  discussed  in  different 
chapters of the present thesis -  as much as the authority of their moral teaching and 
rhetorical calibre. Pelling, when discussing ethical moralism in tragedy, notices that it is 
‘more often descriptive than protreptic, exploring ethical truths of human nature rather 
than producing simple examples to  imitate or avoid’.1 5   However,  for the purposes of 
Plutarch’s (moral) essays, the author uses more its protreptic than its simply descriptive 
character to achieve his goals as an educator.
Finally we come up with a paradox: Plutarch suggests systematic ways of approaching 
poetry, but at the same time the way he deals with poets and their sayings is not always 
consistent, and may even be contradictory at points. Yet his lack of coherence becomes
1 2  See n. 6 above.
1 3  Wardman (1974), 171.
1 4  Cf. e.g. recently in Gregory (2005): Croally (pp. 55-70), Allan (pp. 71-82, esp. p. 81), Pelling (pp. 83- 
102), and Cairns (pp. 305-320).
1 5  Pelling (1990a), 258.
23his strength as an author and educator, since it allows him to approach poetry in a more 
flexible way than his predecessor,  Plato, and to  follow different strands of thought.16  
Unlike the philosopher, Plutarch does not exclude poetry from the state, but he introduces 
a more pragmatic and sophisticated use of poets, so that they become of benefit for the 
citizens;  Plutarch’s  thesis  is  that  poetry  is  beneficial  unless  misused.  Anyway,  the 
intellectual environment of the first centuries A.D. would not allow Plutarch to adopt the 
Platonic agenda concerning poetry. Plutarch lives in a period of increasing Hellenism, of 
what is generally called the ‘Second Sophistic’ (c. 50-250 A.D.), arguably a movement 
which  encouraged  the  study  of classical  authors  and  the  return  to  the  theories  and 
examples they had set.1 7  Plutarch’s times are not times to obliterate the classical past, but 
to revive it, and the great liberation of the past is a central element in its relevance and 
appeal.
How a young man should listen to poetry
In How  a young man should listen  to poetry, the focus point of the present chapter, 
Plutarch places the emphasis on the educational role of poetry for the young man, and 
dissociates poetry from aXrjQeia in its double sense: ‘truth’ and ‘reality’.1 8  The pragmatic 
basis of the essay is that the young in the early stage of their education cannot distinguish 
poetic truth from poetic pleasure, and that, in general, art’s aesthetic and ethical value are 
in  constant  interaction,  so  that  they  may  occasionally  overlap.  The  pragmatic  and 
practical side of the essay is strengthened by its structure: it is presented as a letter to 
Marcus Sedatius, whom Plutarch encourages to pass it on to his young son, Cleander, to 
read (14D-15B).19  But of course the perspective  is wider than that which the private
1 6  An interesting parallel can be drawn here between Plato and Plutarch. Proclos has said about Plato that 
he  adjusts his  comments  on  different literary passages  according to which  author they belong to and 
according to the  specific context,  in  which they are  put (R.  1.42.3-1.54.2).  The  same  applies  also  to 
Plutarch whose use of poetic quotations is very context-specific -  cf. Van der Stockt (1999a), 134-139.
1 7  Cf. Introduction, p. 6, together with n. 22.
1 8  Cf. Schenkeveld (1982), 67 n. 15. Sicking ((1998), 99) points out that ‘this ambiguity of the Greek term 
aX'qQes is often important in Plato’, too.
1 9  The issue of dating the essay is a difficult one; see C. P. Jones (1966), 71; cf. Valgiglio (1973), 68-69, 
Philippon  (1987),  76-70,  and  Zadorojnyi  (1999b),  18.  Concerning  the  two  addressees  (Sedatius  and 
Cleander) Zadorojnyi ((2002), 305) aptly remarks that they ‘acquire symbolic significance’, as if merging 
the Roman with the Greek world.
24purposes  imply,  as  the  use  of  ‘we’  also  suggests  from  15E  onwards
ovv.. .eKKOTTTmfiev  a4xLvi(,um*v..  It is an essay for every educator, for every father
and his sons.20
So, the essay has a strong educational and practical rather than theoretical element, and 
Plutarch is more analytical in the way he comments about poetry, since he quotes from 
poetic works to exemplify the various approaches to poetry -  or, better, confronts poetic 
statements with each other.2 1  Poetic lines can be very context-specific and therefore they 
may be dangerous for the readers if they think that they reflect general truths. Even if 
Plutarch is not always in agreement with the poets, poetic references offer him a good 
starting-point for developing a system of criticism based on moral and educational value. 
The  second  poet -  after the  poet par excellence,  Homer -  who  appears to  have  for 
Plutarch a special educational power is Euripides; therefore he is the most popular among 
all tragedians in this essay but also generally in Plutarch’s work.22 And yet, young people 
in particular who study poetry intensively should not be carried away by the authority of 
the wise poet and believe whatever he says. They should always examine the truth of 
poetic sayings and try to understand all their possible implications. Plutarch takes on the 
task of suggesting how his readers should understand various poetic dicta, how far and 
why they should approve or disapprove of poetic sayings. This task is not limited within 
literary boundaries but expands into the domain of morality and philosophy, as will be 
shown. Plutarch may not be developing an educational theory, as already said, but he 
wants to offer his (young) readers some edifying guidelines which they must apply then 
to all kinds of poetic works, and beyond.23
20  Schenkeveld sums up the idea nicely:  ‘To put it in modem terms, the textbook for the pupil and its 
companion, the instructions for the teacher, are here put together’ ((1982), 71). And Goldhill makes the 
point that the ‘how to’ texts show in Plutarch a constant move from an apparently narrow intellectual topic 
to the broad issues of proper living ((2002), 271).
2 1  Cf. Schenkeveld (1982), who discusses the structure of the essay and explains the relation between the 
theoretical  and practical  chapters and the way they alternate.  Hie structure of the essay has also been 
discussed by Heirman (1972), 16-43, Valgiglio (1973) and (1991), and by Zadorojnyi (1999b), 16-68 (esp. 
pp. 17-25), and (with less emphasis on the structure-part) by Von Reutem (1933), 31 and 84.
52 Cf. Helmbold and O’Neil (1959) -  cf. also SchlSpfer (1950), 48-56, Di Gregorio (1976), 151-153, and 
Carrara (1988).
23 Education lies at the centre of Plutarch’s concerns. Harrison agrees with Hamilton on classifying all of 
Plutarch’s writing as paideia ((1987), 277) -  cf. Hamilton (1969), xxxviii, and passim.
25One of the focus points in the essay How a young man... is how young people should be 
educated.24  Both  their parents  and their  school  play  a  major role  in  their  education. 
Children who receive good education will even manage to extract useful messages from 
passages that may be base and improper with reference either to morality or aesthetics 
(cf.  32E-F). Not only will they then be able to distinguish between  ‘good’  and  ‘bad’ 
poetry -  and show their preference for the former -  but they will also explore ways to be 
taught by the poetry which depicts characters that are unworthy of imitation. In addition, 
Plutarch names explicitly two big advantages and values -  which, again, have a practical 
value  for  life  -   that  one  will  acquire  from  perusing  poetry  (35D):  moderation 
(“fierpiorvrra”) and magnanimity (“pteraXo^poovi^v”). Unless the young men develop a 
skill of appreciating poetry and interpreting it correctly (less) in aesthetic and (more in) 
moral terms, they will not be able to discern between what has merely literary value and 
what could also have a pragmatic value for real life.
For Plutarch there are several things that may be disturbing or dangerous in poetry. One 
of those dangers emerges if one takes poetic lines at face value and thinks that they echo 
the poet’s personal view since the effect is to give the poet’s moral authority to morally 
questionable views. Even more dangerous would it be if poets were obeyed as if they 
were law-givers, Plutarch says emphatically (28B). The metaphor is clearly pointing out 
that the task of law-givers and poets is not the same; nor is the value of the work they 
produce in any way similar: the law-givers enact and enforce laws that must be respected 
by everyone, but poets produce works of which everyone must be critical, so that the 
poetic ways of defining both good and bad are not meant to be internalised in a direct 
unquestioning way.
Poetry is considered to be an imitative art, and only as such should it be assessed. The 
central idea of mimesis, in these passages and elsewhere, should be examined carefully. 
As is known, Plutarch is not the first to use this term. The term is already charged with a 
very specific meaning, though quite differently, in Plato (cf. Rep. II, III, X) and Aristotle
24 Perhaps Plutarch’s essay serves also as a reply to a lost work of Chrysippus with the same title (How a 
young man should listen to poetry), known from Diog. Laert. 7.200.
26(cf. Poet.  1447a 8-1448b 38,  1450a  19-21).  For Plato mimesis means mere imitation, 
while for Aristotle it becomes a less pejorative term; it means representation and includes 
all creative writing.25 Concerning mimesis, Plutarch is Platonic, ignoring the redefinition 
of mimesis by Aristotle.26 But, still, Plutarch deviates slightly from Plato, since he does 
not  understand  the  term  within  the  frame  either  of epistemology  (see  Plato)  or  of 
stagecraft (see Aristotle). He charges it with a more pragmatic meaning; he closely relates 
imitation to reality and life.27 It does not concern only a part of people, such as poets, 
painters or actors, but it can be applied to people in general -  as Duff puts it, ‘In Platonic 
and Aristotelian thought, as in ancient historical theory, it was the artist who engaged in 
mimesis.  For  Plutarch,  the  effect  of the  Lives  is  such  that  it  encourages  mimesis 
(imitation), in the reader himself.28 Whitmarsh has explored in Plutarch the ‘thin line’ 
which separates real life from Life.29 Mimetic representation and reality are sometimes so 
close in Plutarch’s Lives that Plutarch can claim the fidelity of a mirror to be a paramount 
quality of his biographies.30 Plutarch’s recasting of this subtle term may be considered as 
part of his significant contribution towards the understanding of imitation as a procedure 
which works on multiple levels.
At  17F-18D  Plutarch  discusses poetry and painting as  imitative  arts.  Simonides was, 
presumably, the first who compared poetry to painting:  it is  ‘painting which  speaks’ 
(“Zayypaufita.  <f>9evyopevv)”),  whereas  ‘painting  is  inarticulate  poetry’  (‘Wtjots ovytbtra”) 
(17F-18A).3 1  Plato had also described poetry and painting as mimetic activities (cf. e.g. 
Rep. 500c-501b, 597d-599b). By the parallel which Plutarch draws between poetry and
25  Valgiglio  ((1967),  319-337) offers an  extensive analysis of the  concept of mimesis  in Plutarch  and 
compares it with die view of Plato and Aristotle; cf. also Van der Stockt (1992), 21-55, Harland (1999), 6- 
18, and Duff (1999a), 34-45. A broader discussion of Platonic and Aristotelian poetics of imitation, with 
references  also  to  Plutarch,  is  offered  by  Sicking  (1998),  85-100;  cf.  also Walbank (1960),  216-220, 
Tagliasacchi (1961), 81-92, and Newmyer (1964). About Plato’s hostility to art see T. Gould (1972), and 
about Plato’s mimesis doctrine see also Keuls (1978), 9-32, and Murray (1996), 3-6 and 28-30.
26  Cf.  e.g.  Russell  (1981),  99-113,  and  Halliwell  (1998),  109-137;  the  latter  discusses  the  different 
categories of mimesis, as well as Aristotle’s innovative concept of poetic mimesis as compared to Plato’s 
view.
27 Unlike Plato, for whom the phenomenal world is only a copy of the real world, for Plutarch there is no 
disparity between phenomenal and real world -  so imitation of the real world is less problematic.
28 Duff (1999a), 40.
29 Whitmarsh (2001), 54-57.
30 About the image of the mirror and its use see Introduction, p. 12 n. 39.
3 1  Sicking ((1998), 90) gives a short review of the likening of a picture to a silent poem in different authors 
(from Simonides and Horace to Lessing).
27painting he attempts to illustrate how important it is to keep always in mind that poetry, 
exactly like painting, does not depict only nice or admirable things. Moreover, both arts 
are, more or less, based on reality, but they must not be evaluated as mirroring reality.
The  example that Plutarch  gives  at  18D  refers to  Euripides’  Medea.  Timomachus,  a 
painter, depicted the ugly and unnatural act of a mother, Medea in this case, killing her 
own children. The art of painting and its requirements of etnoq allows or even obliges the 
painter to portray beautifully things which, by their nature, may be anything but beautiful 
(18D: uov yap eon raurro to koXov ti tufieurBat kou koJuos” —  ‘For it is not the same thing at 
all to imitate something beautiful and something beautifully’).32 Plutarch underlines that 
what the art of painting here teaches the viewers to do is not to consider the act depicted 
as good -  and consequently imitate it -  but instead just admire the likeness of the act 
depicted, and appreciate its closeness to reality (18A: “rftofieBa  kou  9av(jLa£otiev ov% 
Haukov aAA’ a> g fyioiov” -  ‘We are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but 
as a likeness’; and  18B: “aAA’ enatveTv fiovov < a$ htappdnrov rq> imoKeifievq) Ttpoawmp  kou 
oikcT ov” -  ‘But we should simply commend it as fitting and proper to the character in 
hand’, the key-words being here “bapturrrov” and “o/icefov”).33 The young man must be 
trained to discriminate between artistic and ethical values.34 Art should be evaluated as 
art, as an imitation of reality, and not as a model to imitate.35
Not only does Plutarch warn young people against the bad use of art, but he also gives 
guidelines about how they should evaluate poetry itself (18E). The analogy is obvious 
now: the object of poetry may be far from beautiful and pleasant, but the way in which 
poetry  treats  it  may  render  it  beautiful  and  instructive;  there  is  indeed  a  significant 
difference between what poetry describes and how poetry describes it:
32 Again this goes back to Aristotle’s Poet. 1448a 1-8. Cf. Sicking (1998), 107: ‘It is not the event itself that 
inspires admiration, but the craftsmanship of the maker who has represented his subject TzpocryKovTioq ; and 
earlier (p. 106): ‘Depicting an ugly being as a beautiful thing would violate the requirements of npbrov and
eiKoq’.
33 The idea leads us back to Aristotle’s Poet.  1454a 24-25 (“rpnw ie t o  opMtov t o u t o  yap erepov xoQ xpnyrrov 
t o  ffloq icat appLonov Tronjovu...”) and 1454b 8-11.
34 Cf. Westaway (1922), 86-87.
35 On the imitative dimension of poetry and painting, as well as on art’s aesthetic value, see Van der Stockt 
((1990a), 23-31). For a historical overview of the idea of mimesis in poetry see e.g. Sicking (1998), esp. pp. 
90 and 99-101.
28(18C-D)  ovrwq  o  veoq  [...]  didaunceaQa)  rrp  pupwvpuhyv  rouha  tiuvapuv  kou  re%yr)v 
brouveTv, ou; tie diaOecret; kou 'npa^ei; puyuehou kou TrpofSadXecrQau kou KouciCpiv.
Let the young man  [...]  learn to admire the ability and art which imitates these 
things,  but  to  repudiate  and  condemn  the  dispositions  and  actions  which  it 
imitates.36 (18C-D)
One notices in these lines the presentation of the pairs “tiuvapuv kou Te%yr)v” and “$ta8e<ret; 
kou  TtpaJgEi?  as  if they stood in  strong opposition to each other.  Moreover, the single 
(positive) infinitive “btauveTv” contrasts its two (negative) opposites ‘SrpojSoAAeertfai  kou 
kolki& iv”.  The  rhetorical  emphasis  laid  on  the  last  two  words  alludes  to  Plutarch’s 
emphasis on the dangerous kind of mimesis.37
Along these lines, Plutarch has to disagree with Sophocles’ dictum:
ovk «rr’ ow r’ epytav pur) KaXwv bn) KoXa*  (Soph., TGF, frag. 839)
From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed.  (27F)
Plutarch’s argument refers here to statements which can be highly confusing since the 
tragic figures’ eloquence may not reflect good character. Young people should be aware 
of that and disapprove of charming, eloquent words spoken by mean characters. Both 
examples he offers are taken from Euripides (27F-28A), the one referring to Phaedra’s 
allusive, yet dextrous, accusations against Hippolytus  in Hip.  Veiled, and the other to 
Helen in Troades (Troad. 919 ff.) who attacks Hecuba using a subtle argument, according 
to which she is the one to blame for the start of the Trojan war since she gave birth to 
Paris, the man who kindled the war. What is of particular interest in these quotations is 
the way Plutarch links the two tragedians: after having quoted the Sophoclean line, he 
introduces the Euripidean plays, about which he will talk immediately after, by using an 
unusual phrase:  “kou  o (ruo-Krqvo; ourrou” (27F). The word “ovoktivo;”  is taken from the 
militaiy field -  Plutarch uses it with its first meaning in the Lives to describe generals or 
political figures sharing the same tent with someone (cf. Ale. 4.4, 7.3, Luc. 8.6, Pomp. 
3.1, Ant.  13.2; also in the Essays, at:  148A, 503A, 998D) -  however, the word appears
36 Cf. Aristotle’s Poet.,  1448b 8-10 and  1448b 24-27, where Aristotle refers to the positive or negative 
reception of different kinds of poetry.
37 Cf. Plato’s Rep. 601a ff., where the philosopher examines different arts and evaluates artists according to 
the quality of mimesis in their work.
29here to depart from its first meaning, as if to introduce a pun, hinting at the theatrical 
stage and implying that the two tragedians shared the stage (ovv+o-Kyvy) in competitions; 
so that  would no longer stand for the tent but for the theatrical stage instead.
As Plutarch remarks, poets create different figures, whether good or villains, who speak 
lines according to their character (18E-F). Therefore, the reader must understand that bad 
characters do bad deeds or behave in improper ways. For example, when Eteocles utters 
despicable  words,  the  readers  must  both  perceive  his  words  as  depicting  aptly  his 
character and refrain from identifying him with the tragedian:
(18E-F)  a,v  ovv  imofUfAvwrKtofAev  roug  nauSas  irri  tout’  ovk  enauvodvre^  ovBe 
8oKtfiaj£ovTes  oAA’  arona  kou  <{>ouj\a  ^cuuXoiq  kou  ost6tzoi$  yQetn  kou  Txp<xr<imoi$ 
nepmSevre$ 'ypouftova’iv, ovk a.v vrm tvfc do&fc fSkamroivro r&v Tronqr&v.
If then we remind our sons that authors write them, not because they commend or 
approve them, but with the idea of investing mean and unnatural characters and 
persons with  unnatural  and mean  sentiments, they  could not be  harmed  by the 
opinions of poets. (18E-F)
It would be certainly both dangerous for young people and ‘unfair’  for the poet to be 
identified with a dramatis persona, although, one has to admit, this move may result from 
the  author-reader  relationship.38  Interestingly,  Plutarch  himself seems  to  commit this 
‘mistake’, when he launches to criticise poetry by attacking not the tragic characters who 
speak the specific  lines but the playwrights themselves (especially clear at  17C, 2IF, 
25A-B,  27F, 28C).39 But is this a tactical approach by Plutarch so that he may gain 
authority for himself? In any case, Plutarch’s opportunistic use of quotations and poets as 
to suit his purpose or context is a point to keep in mind concerning the way he both 
manipulates and presents his material.40
38  There  is a fascinating  discussion  of this  confusion  of personae by Bartsch  (1994).  She  particularly 
discusses the case of Nero as tragoedus (pp. 36-62). Since Nero both wrote tragedies and performed on 
stage, it was very difficult for the audience not to identify at some point the poet with the emperor, the actor 
with the poet, or even the actor with the tragic character. On the author-reader relationship see Introduction,
pp. 6-12.
Cf. Aeschines:  he seems to commit the same  ‘mistake’, e.g.  in his Against  Timarchus  128  (quoting 
Hesiod), 129 (quoting Homer), 151 and 152 (quoting Euripides) -  in all these cases he does not make any 
distinction between the poet’s voice and the individual characters’ voices.
40 See also SchlSpfer (1950), 14 and 23.
30Plutarch underlines the fact that some poetic lines may convey disturbing moral messages 
and have a bad influence on the readers if the latter do not realise the poet’s objectives; 
yet the same lines are to be regarded as right and appropriate if they correspond to the 
character  who  utters  them.  Here  possibly  Plutarch  goes  further  than  Aristotle,  who 
disapproves  of  ‘unnecessary’  baseness  {Poet.  1454a);4 1   he  places  the  emphasis  on 
appropriateness to character rather than appropriateness in less specific aesthetic terms. In 
the example which Plutarch gives at 18D-E he makes clear that the reader must dissociate 
the authorial voice from the poetic character; Eteocles says: 
emep yap abineiv %pr), tvpawtdog Ttepi
KahXiorov attiKeiv  (Eur., Phoen. 524-525)
If one must commit injustice, it is best
to do so for the sake of tyranny.  (18D)
The reader may perceive the lines as an attempt of the poet to describe wrongdoing as 
“koAov”.42  Propriety,  however,  concerning the  faithful  representation  and propriety  in 
moral terms are two different things, and so the reader is meant to transcend the propriety 
of the lines as such to think about propriety in terms of the character who speaks these 
lines. As so often in Plutarch, tragic quotations are reused in different contexts.  So, at 
125D-E of Advice  on health Plutarch clearly disapproves of the lines, and goes on to 
correct them so as to suit their new context which makes the point about continence for 
the sake of health.43 Again in the Nicias-Crassus Synkrisis, Plutarch recasts and expands 
the Euripidean lines;44 yet in this case Plutarch’s spirit is more compromising concerning 
the implications of the tragic lines: if one must do wrong, then it would be better to do it 
for the sake of a great undertaking (4.3: “aAAa 7 roAAou np/yriov to aftiiceTv, \w\ pgubicog p/rft 
eni roTg rv%o\j<riv cog rt <f>au\ov •rj puKpov Ttpdiep&vovg to BIkoiov”).
4 1   However, it must be noted, there is no strong evidence that Plutarch had first-hand knowledge of the 
Poetics -  see Sandbach (1982), 208 and 229, Zadorojnyi (1997), 172, and Duff (2004), 285 n. 53.
42 This question of what is ‘wrong’ or ‘right’, ‘good’ or ‘evil’ seems to be potentially at the centre of most 
great dramas. Circumstances may sometimes necessitate wrongdoing, forcing people to choose between the 
lesser of two evils (e.g. in Antigone what seems to the protagonist as right and appropriate, to bury her 
brother, appears to Creon as wrong and illegal).
43 Cf. Nikolaidis (1991), 158-159.
44 Cf. Duff (1999a), 273-274.
31Similarly to Eteocles’ case, Ixion’s lines are in character, although they are fallacious for 
the truth they suggest:
(18E) rov /t lev diKauou rips tioKrprtv apisuoo
ra 9* epya rov rcav $pcbisTo$m  hs9a Kcp9ave?<;  (Eur., Ixion,  frag. 426a)
Achieve the just man’s good repute,
but deeds that fit a man capable of everything, therein shall be your gain. (18E) 
Plutarch’s comment is explicit (17B): “\vo%jkopo\ fiev ehn TJbyoi kou \lsev9c?gy 'EreoKXe? 9e kou 
’l&ovt.. .Txpenovres” (‘These are wicked and fallacious sentiments, but fitting respectively 
for Eteocles and Ixion...’) (18E). Significantly, the lines here (18D-E) are not meant to 
be read  in  isolation, detached  from their context, but presuppose that the reader has 
knowledge of the complete work, so as to understand that the portrayal of Eteocles and 
Ixion in the lines quoted by Plutarch reflects the general portrayal of the two characters.45 
Earlier, too, Plutarch was able to read beyond the disturbing truth of Aeschylus’  lines 
suggesting that ‘a god creates fault in men/ whenever he is willing to crush a house in 
woe'  (**feo£ fihf curious tfsei f3poroT$J oraus  kouccoovu  (Kofui naitmfirps QeX'fj”) (Niobe, frag. 
154a 15-16): lines such as these serve the goal of conveying the delusion and ignorance 
of the character who utters them concerning the gods.
Plutarch  advises  his  audience/readers  to  make  a  distinction  between  what  fictitious 
characters say and what poets say accordingly, and to pay particular attention to any hints 
or reactions from the poets’ side concerning their agreement or disagreement with how 
their  characters  speak  or  act  (cf.  19A:  “ed ptaAa npotreicreov  ei rtvcu;  o  wowynfc  autr6$ 
eybtyurets tiidaxn  Kara rwv Xeyoftevwv to$ duoxepcuvotieiKov vn’  airrmT —  ‘Close attention 
must be given to see whether the poet himself gives any hints against the sentiments 
expressed to indicate that they are disliked by him'). One of the reasons Plutarch admires 
Homer is exactly this, that he is one of die poets who explicitly approve or disapprove of 
what different characters say, leaving the reader with no doubts as to how poetic lines are 
to be understood (19B ff.).
45 Schenkeveld (1982), 64-65.
32In  amending  poetic  quotations,  Plutarch  often  makes  use  of  words  such  as 
“avTmapaTiOrMu”  (‘set against’),  “Tropa^aAAoj”  (‘interpolate’),  “^avyptujHo”  (‘rewrite’), 
“e7royopfloco” (‘amend’) (cf. 2 IB, and esp. 33C-D) as part of his terminology when dealing 
with passages, yet he does not develop this terminology further into a system of wider 
application.46  Plutarch  recognises that the poets have  a certain  degree of authority -  
which  he  exploits  opportunistically  himself -  but he  still  scrutinises their words  and 
shows their occasional misinterpretations of truth or reality 47 As the words listed above 
show,  the  tragedians’  (and  other  poets’)  dicta  are  subject  to  the  audience’s/readers’ 
judgement while the truths expressed by die tragedians are to be adjusted to the readers’ 
needs. The words “enavopBoco” and “eTiavopScocris” are interesting for yet another reason 
which fits into the wider perspective of the Plutarchan corpus: Plutarch uses the word 
“bravopQaxriz”  in  the  prologue  of Aemilrus  (Aem.  1.4:  “[t i]  npo< g  enawopQcomv  rjBcov 
kvepyorepov” -  ‘what more effective for the improvement of character?’). Beyond the 
very specific aim which Plutarch sets in this essay on poetry and which he will achieve 
by amending poetic texts so that they become more of ethical value for the young men, 
there is always the general programmatic goal of his Lives as he himself defines it in the 
prologue of Aemilins, and that is the improvement of character. The ethical register is 
undoubtedly  a significant element that  imbues  all  of Plutarch’s works,  and the word 
“eTrett/opflaxns” gives a tinge of that register even in this essay, where Plutarch seems to be 
apparently only correcting poetic texts.
When Plutarch detects a disturbing statement, he first tries to find another statement (as a 
counterbalance) within the works of the same poet, and encourages the young readers to 
do the same. An example of this correcting pattern can be found at 20D, where Plutarch 
compares pairs of lines taken from Euripides’ Archelaus and explicitly indicates which of 
the two lines one should prefer —  here it is always the second: 
toAA’ , co tc k v o v, (r^taXXoucriv au/Opamoig 9eoi.
46 Cf. SchlSpfer (1950), 55. On “htavopBwmf see also G6mez Cardo (1999), esp. 375-376.
47 Concerning the poetic criticism practised by Plutarch Wardman infers that it ‘is that of a philosopher who 
is used to turning to the poets for quotable examples and who is prepared to rewrite or bend what seems to 
him false doctrine’ ((1974), 171-172).
33t o  pgunov ehrag, ouriao-aurBat Beovg.  (Eur., ArcheL, frag. 254)48
Often do the gods, my child, cause men to fail.
You have named the simplest way; just blame the gods. (20D)
And again in the same set of quotations Plutarch quotes lines which refer to a common 
theme, that is, the gods and our duties towards them: 
t i   frrjra Buetv tie? tre KarBavoviievov;
afietvov ovBeig KOfjuirog eixrefietv Beovg.  (Eur., Hyps., frag. 752k, lines 20-21)
Why to sacrifice when you must die?
It is better thus; god’s worship is not toil.  (20D)
The comparison of lines such as these, which are put in a close sequence, suggests that 
contradictory sayings must not lead us to reject poetry and blame poets for inconsistency. 
Plutarch proposes a different approach to his readers: to justify and defend the poets by 
choosing the better sayings found in their works.49 This positive approach to poetry can 
be  also  traced  in  his  suggestion  that,  if something  strikes  the  readers  as  completely 
misleading, or simply as unpleasant, they must consider the astonishment it causes to be 
one of the poet’s edifying methods, since it manages to attract their special attention and 
invites them to react immediately and amend, if possible, the dictum (cf. 17  A).
This pattern of poetic criticism is developed by Plutarch also when quoting several lines 
from Sophocles in a long sequence of tragic lines: 
deivog yap epnetv Ttkovrog eg re rafiara 
kou npog fieprjka, %umoBev newjg avvjp 
ovtf evrv%a}v duvatr’ av u>v epq. tu%e?v. 
kou yap 8v(rei8eg (r&pua kou dutrcovvfiov
yXajorrfl orxf>dv riBnyrtv evfwptftov t ’  tdeTv.  (Soph., Aleadae, frag. 88.6-10)
Clever is wealth at finding ways to reach 
both holy and unholy things, and hence 
a poor man, even if he gains access,
48 Again cited at 1049E of On Stoic contradictions, where the two lines are quoted as contradicting each 
other —  and at 1049F Plutarch makes the point that the second line could be used as a reply to Chrysippus in 
more than one cases.
49 On the same discussion see Schl&pfer (1950), 9-10, where he argues in favour of Plutarch’s positive 
attitude to poetry, which may be explained as due to his admiration of what was achieved during the 
classical period, and which constitutes a deviation from Plato’s polemic against poets.
34could not attain what he desires.
For wealth makes an ugly and ill-omened body,
by means of speech both wise and beautiful to look at.  (2 IB)
Against those statements about wealth Plutarch suggests that the young reader sets other 
lines that are preferred for being closer to the truth; the verb he uses (‘‘avTmapa^onei”) is 
part of the special vocabulary that signals Plutarch’s reaction and attempt to  lead the 
young men to a positive reaction (cf.  above, p.  33).  Yet, Plutarch  follows a different 
method of rectification here: although the ‘better’ (preferred) lines are still to be found in 
the work of the same poet, this time they are not necessarily taken from the immediate 
context but can come from a different context in other plays:
yevono k< lv amXovro^ ev Tipwu$ avyp  (Soph., TGF, frag. 835)
KOU
ovBev kclk'hov  ei Ka)mq foove?  (Soph., TGF, frag. 836)
KOU
aAAa Ttov noXXwv koXxdv 
TI?  & KOKo/HoilXoS
foovrig €K Tp€< f> ei rov evaucova izXovtov;  (Soph., Tereus, frag. 592.1-3)
Even without wealth a man may be esteemed 
and
A beggar is not bad, if he has a noble mind 
and
In the blessings of plenty 
what enjoyment is there,
if blessed wealth owes its increase to evil-counselling care?  (21B-C)
Plutarch suggests that young people should be critical towards poetic statements while 
directing them explicitly -  with the language he uses -  towards the best (cf. 20C: “feTrq) 
fleXnovi  cruvyyopeTv”,  and  20D:  to,  fieXriova  rjj  Kpiaei  tov$  veov$  KaTevOuvoifiev”’ ,
similarly at 33D: “rouf veovg 7rapau<aXeTv irpog t o  /SeXriov”). Where it is impossible to find a 
better saying from the same poet, then the reader is advised to look into other poets’
35works and find lines which can restore truth and give to things their right value.50 Again 
later, Plutarch quotes lines from two Euripidean plays to finally add another, better line 
from the same poet:
TzoXkaucri fAopfaug 01 9 eoi oo^iaryLaTtov
(T(f)a^Xovcnv  Kpeiarroveq ire^vKorei;  (Eur., TGF, frag. 972)
By many forms of artifice the gods
defeat our plans, for they are stronger.  (20F-21  A)
To those lines he prefers another Euripidean line:
ei deol ti Bpaxri (f>au?M v, ovk e’ urtv 9eoi  (Eur., Beller., frag. 286b 7)
If gods do something that is base, they are not gods.  (21 A)
It is certainly not accidental that most of the examples corrected at 20D-21A refer to 
gods, or touch upon a religious context.5 1  Plutarch’s religious sentiment obviously ranks 
high among his concerns.  Frag. 972  is quoted again at 431A (On the obsolescence of 
oracles), only there Plutarch suggests that the word ^oxxJhopAttov” were substituted by 
“7rpar/LtaT£ov” to make the line less offensive concerning gods’ attitude towards mortals 
(‘gods don’t act using tricks but facts’).52  It is not only  in the poets themselves that 
Plutarch searches for better sayings, but he also proceeds to make personal suggestions 
for correcting and improving poetic sayings. At 34A Plutarch introduces his own ‘better 
version’ of a tragic line in a way which is similar to 21A (“jScAnov eipyfievov vrf  avrov”): 
fieknov eineTv” (34A), and stresses the importance of virtue as compared to beauty; 
according to Plutarch young men  should replace the word “koAAo^” with ‘VA^pov” in 
frag. 355 (“onov npooH to koAAo$,  a^tide^io^') -  the same method of correcting a tragic 
line by replacing a word for another is followed in the other line which he quotes at 34A 
(TGF, adesp., frag. 356).
50 Cf.  Schenkeveld ((1982), 63), who discusses  ‘the various remedies offered [by Plutarch]  in order to 
protect the boy’s mind against bad influences’, ranging ‘from choosing the better opinion of two conflicting 
lines which stand in immediate vicinity to countering a wrong statement with one chosen from the writings 
of another author’ -  cf. also p. 69.
5 1   Plutarch’s theology is discussed by Flacelidre (1974), Brenk (1977), and (1998), Valgiglio (1988), as 
well as by Bernard (1990) (with reference to Dialogue on love), esp. pp. 268-274, and Gallo (1996b).
52 At 1049E (On Stoic contradictions) Plutarch refers once more to the same quotation as applauded by the 
Stoics, but here instead of “< £auA © v” (or, “<£A a.upov” in other MSS.) we have the word “o/o^ov”. Barigazzi 
has  discussed  Plutarch’s  use of some fragments  from  Euripides’  Bellerophon (and  from  Phaethon)  in 
(1994), 39-55.
36These last examples introduce another way of ‘correcting’ poetic verses, where Plutarch 
rewrites them, replacing specific words or interpolating another verse or two to give a 
clearer message to the readers and guide them in the right direction. It is interesting to 
compare  this  practice  of editing  texts  by  making  amendments  with  the  practice  of 
Alexandrian  scholars  such  as  Zenodotus  and  Aristarchus  of Samothrace.  The  former 
became famous for his recension of Iliad and Odyssey, and, in his effort to get back to the 
original  Homeric  text,  he  made  several  alterations,  introduced  new  readings,  and 
sometimes even inserted new lines.53 However, while Zenodotus usually amends the text, 
so that it makes better sense, Plutarch -  rather in the manner of Aristarchus’ emendations 
on the grounds of to  n p e n o v54 -  corrects the text with moral criteria in mind.
At 33C Plutarch gives an example of interpolation of a phrase in a supposed dialogue 
where Antisthenes is presented to give an immediate reply to the poet upon hearing the 
lines from Euripides’ Aeolus:
ti  au<r% p6v ijv fnvj roTcn %pa)fi€vot<; done?;  (Eur., Aeolus, frag. 19)
What is shameful if its doer think not so?  (33C)
Plutarch adopts and reproduces the line which Antisthenes inteijected (“7rapa£aAAo>v”): 
a u o y p o v   t o   y   cu<r%pov,  k o ,v doicyj  k o v  firi)  So k j}
A shame is a shame, though one may think so or not.  (33C)
Plutarch uses Euripides’  quotation  in  his  attempt to moralise  against the true  danger 
which would arise, particularly for young people, if there were no absolute standards in 
life and if everything was subject to relative truth. Plutarch’s educational system allows 
no such sophistries as the one suggested above by the tragedian.
Plutarch advises his reader to be alert to the nature of the poetic language, and examine, 
for instance, whether the use of poetic words  is  literal  or metaphorical/twisted.  Poets 
often use figurative speech or words with their different meanings at various instances 
(cf. 22C, 22E-F, 23B-C, 24D).  Some typical examples are provided by the tragedians
53 Aristarchus of Samothrace (c. 216-144 B.C.) also produced critical recensions of various texts (e.g. of 
Homer,  Hesiod,  Archilochus,  Alcaeus,  Anacreon,  Pindar)  and  commentaries  (imopLv^arot)  on  Homer, 
Hesiod, Archilochus, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Aristophanes, Herodotus a.o. mainly based on the criteria of 
consistency and appropriateness of eth o s.
54 See above, n. 53.
37again. In the first passage cited below (24D), the word to which Plutarch refers as having 
various meanings in different poets is the word ‘virtue’ (“open?”). As virtue can describe 
a quality of a person in different domains, poets may use the same word to imply e.g. 
good repute, influence, honesty and justice: 
el Be Bavetv 9efu$, cbBe BaveTv koXov,
e\q aperrjv KaraXxjauy^evovq f&ov  (Eur.,  TGF,  frag. 994)
If to die is right, thus to die is good,
letting our lives go in a way that is virtuous.  (24D)
Dying in virtue would be the best end which a man could hope for.  So,  in this case 
‘virtue’ is used with one of its main, most straightforward, meanings.
However,  in the  second example,  at 25A-B, a distortion of the notion of ‘happiness’ 
Q'evBauyjovta”) strikes Plutarch as most disturbing and dangerous, while it gives him a 
reason  to  attack  Euripides  (25A:  uEvpimBr^  Be  TroXXvjv  epyaJ^erau  Tapaycqv  kou 
tfvravoiiv...”)55 -  his attack is based on two of his lines, the first from Medea and the 
second from the Phoenissae:
fj/v) (tot yevoiro fampo$ euBauyuov  o$  (Eur., Med. 598)
A prosperous life that causes pain is no wish of mine.  (25B)
And:
ti tt)v TupawiB\ aBiKiav euBatyuova
rifife;  (Eur.,  Phoen. 549-550)
Why do you so excessively honour tyranny,
which is prosperous injustice?  (25B)
Unless one comprehends the figurative and distorted use of ‘happiness’ in these lines, one 
may be thrown into confusion and puzzlement. Obviously Plutarch does not agree with 
the verse from Medea. According to him, we should wish to live, even if we shall live a 
painful life only. Plutarch warns against understanding all poetic words with their literal 
meaning. The examples he takes to demonstrate this refer again to the gods, the one taken 
from Euripides and the other from Sophocles:
55 About allegorical interpretations of poetry and the potential dangers they may carry see 19A ff. -  cf. e.g. 
Nikolaidis (1991), 163.
38fjua rov yuer* a/rrpaiv TApf ”Apv) re (fxt'tviov  (Eur., Phoen. 1006)
No, by Zeus enthroned among the stars and 
by Ares, the god of slaughter  (23B)
and:
rv<j)Xib<; yap, Si yvvauK€$, ovd’ opwv "Apry;
ovd$ npooSntq) iravra rupfia^ei koko.  (Soph.,  TGF,  frag. 838)
For blind and unseeing Ares, you women,
with the face of a swine stirs up all ills.  (23C)
In Euripides’ line the names of the gods stand for the gods themselves, but in Sophocles’ 
lines Ares is used only as the equivalent of ‘war’ (cf. 23D-E).
Reading poetry can be more beneficial for the readers if they move to a wider application 
of general statements made in poetry -  Aristotle emphasises that poetry, in contrast to 
history, does not deal with what did happen but more with what might happen (Poet. 
1451b 4 ff.). This approach, which again involves a quasi-editorial approach to the text, 
gives  poetry  a  wider  application  and  makes  it  important  for  the  education  of  all 
generations of all times. Plutarch gives several examples of poetry’s potential as an area 
from which general truths can be extracted. At 34B, after acknowledging that this method 
of reading  poetry  by  giving  to  the  poet’s  statements  a  wider  application  was  first 
introduced by Chrysippus, Plutarch quotes a Euripidean line:
rig £’ eori douXo$ rov SaveTv afoovrig a*v;  (Eur., TGF, frag.  958)
What man who does not reckon death can be a slave?  (34B)
Immediately he suggests to the readers to replace readily the word “daveiv” with “tovo^” 
or “motos”, whereupon they would get a new statement, which would be equally correct 
and of similar value. And again, another example at 34E: 
lift) t tXoQ tov ernyfc. ovxi Oauiia&o (kov
ov %(b kokiotos pqStiax; eicrrjoarv.  (Eur. Aeolus,  frag. 20)
Do not speak of wealth. I can’t admire a god
whom the basest man secured easily.  (34E)
This time the central word is “ 71Aovrov”. In the same context in place of “ 71Aourov” we can 
put  repute  (“£o£av”),  personal  beauty  (“oShmlto^  eviioptjuav”),  the  general’s  cloak
39(“orparvjyiKyv  yfijatfwilki”),  or the  priestly  crown  (“lepamcov  <rrc<£avov’’),56  and  still  the 
implications of the line would be very similar. This is part of poetry’s grandeur, that it 
can be applied to and understood in wider contexts and always keep its great educational 
value. This is exactly what young people have to learn and always keep in mind, how to 
appreciate  poetry  in  all  its  possible  dimensions,  versions  and  interpretations.  This 
approach to poetry underlines multiple moral messages and offers the readers a good 
starting-point to make further thoughts on what they read and how they interpret it (cf. 
also 34D). Rather than offering his readers a  definitive  answer about, simply, what is
good  and  what  is  bad  about  poetry,  Plutarch  invites  them  to  a  more  reflective
appreciation of its value which shall lead them to the accomplishment of pedagogical and 
ethical aims.
Nevertheless, Plutarch is elsewhere wary of accepting general poetic statements, since 
they may occasionally result in dangerous conclusions. Therefore, one must be ready to 
react against sayings such as:
& > uA o« yap avftpa, k o v  9paovorcXayx^6g rig jj,
orav ovveifrfj purjrpog %  ixarpog kokol  (Eur.,  Hippol. 424-5)
For it enslaves even a bold-hearted man when he is conscious 
of sins committed by his mother or father.  (28C)
and:
oyuicpov (ftpovcTv % pr) rov KOK&g TTerrpayora.  (Eur.,  TGF, frag. 957)
The one who does not prosper must be of humble mind.  (28C)
Euripides’ lines are expressed as general truths but they must not be adopted by young 
people who will come across them; instead, they must question them to prove that the 
truth is different concerning the matter of the lineage as the defining factor in one’s life. 
The importance of the family is undeniable; yet if that be humble, then one must find the 
strength to rise against one’s bad fortune and become a great man (34C-D). Doctrines 
such as the one quoted above must be rejected so that they do not mislead the young men 
or lead them to receive passively their fate. Heraclitus has said that “jSAa£ avQpamog eiri
56 Plutarch’s reference to the priestly crown reminds us of his position as a priest at Delphi’s oracle. It is 
certainly an odd woid, which would not easily come to mind in this generalising context; but for Plutarch it 
seems to be a common word in his life at Delphi.
40noam Xoy<p (jnXe? bTrovpOau” (DK B87) (‘the fool is dismayed by every word that is said’), 
and Plutarch advises that one should internalise the saying as a guideline so as not to be 
carried away by truths that are not well sustained. For Plutarch philosophy can set things 
right and alert young men against anything that might be harmful for them (cf. 28D: 
“raQra fib ouv afSXafifj 7rotpe^ei rvjv rwv rcon^iamov aKpoamv” —  ‘This, then, will take away 
all danger of harm from the perusal of poetry’).
Yet it is not only poetry that can profit from philosophy, as the example above proves. 
The relation between poetry and philosophy is double-sided: therefore, philosophy can 
benefit from poetry, too. Plutarch considers poetry to be a necessary part of education on 
account of its introductory role to philosophy (and beyond): poetry prepares the ground 
for the readers to understand what philosophers have said.57 Poetry can serve as the most 
effective propaedeutic to philosophy (cf.  15F-16A:  ‘Poetry should not be avoided  by 
those  who  are  intending  to  pursue  philosophy,  but  they  should  use  poetry  as  an 
introductory  exercise  in  philosophy  (“7TpofaXjotrofarreov”),  by  training  themselves 
habitually  to  seek  the  profitable  in  what  gives  pleasure,  and  to  find  satisfaction 
therein’).58 Blended with philosophy, poetry can redefine its objectives and make readers 
pursue philosophy via poetry. Although the poets’ sources may differ greatly from those 
of the philosophers, since they use fiction/myths as their source(s), both of them aim to 
point out to those who study them valuable moral and edifying messages. On poetry as 
the correct way to start one’s education Plutarch invokes Sophocles by name (“Kara, rov 
SexfcwcAea”) for the gnomic wisdom he offers, when saying: 
epyov Be navro$ vjv ru; apxqrou KaXtb<;,
kou ran; reXevrag ehcoq e a tf   ovrux; e%ew  (Soph.,  TGF, frag. 831)
If one begins each task in the proper way,
so it is likely that also the ending will be.  (16A)
Therefore Plutarch does not only encourage young people to start from poetry to be able 
later on to understand philosophical matters, but he also suggests to them that they should
57  Compare Heirman’s observation that  ‘the importance of poetry is the purification of both poet and 
listener, and above all the preparation of the reader to a life of moral culture, the life of a philosopher’ 
((1972), 189).
58 As Morgan remarks, ‘Poetry must be shown to display logos',  lo g o s trains the p sy c h e of the n ou s and is 
associated with p h ilo so p h ia , which produces virtue’ ((1988), 147).
41accept it and approve of it as long as they can benefit from the pleasure it offers; if not, 
then they should rather disapprove of it and question the value of the poetry which would 
contradict beneficial principles.
Poetry may contain  both  good and bad elements,  but so  does  life.  Plutarch  draws a 
parallel at 25C-D where two Euripidean lines work in a double way: they emphasise the 
coexistence of ‘good*  and ‘bad*  in both gods and men’s life while they also make an 
important point for Plutarch’s argument about the value of truth and imitation in poetry. 
The lines read as follows:
ouk av ykvono xtoplg earBXa kcu Kauca,
aXX* «rri mg ovyKpa/rig.  (Eur., Aeolus, frag. 21.3-4)59
The good and the bad cannot be kept apart,
but there is some commingling.  (25C-D)
When it comes to poetry, what matters most -  apart from the practical value -  is variety 
and pleasure. Therefore poets present both characters and gods experiencing the good as 
well as the bad, for otherwise their stories would be dull and uninteresting. Watching the 
changes  of  tyche  and  of  characters’  emotions  contributes  significantly  to  the 
entertainment and emotional engagement of the audience. At the same time Plutarch uses 
this Euripidean statement to respond to the Stoics, who declare that nothing base can 
attach to virtue and  nothing good  to vice.60 In this way the  quotation  gains,  beyond 
anything else, a philosophical character -  just another piece of evidence that poetry and 
philosophy go hand in hand.
Plutarch goes on to explore how closely poetry and philosophy are related. Poetry may 
indeed sometimes teach similar things to philosophy, as is shown in the following lines 
taken from Euripides: 
eyct) #’ ovdev npeorfiurepov 
vopu^u)  cruxfooovvau;,
end roTg a^aBoTg aei fyveori  (Eur., TGF, frag. 959)
59 The lines are quoted again at 369B of On Isis and Osiris and 474A of On tranquillity of mind.
60  Homer  is  also  said to  have  contradicted this  statement of the  Stoics  (25C).  There  is  an  important 
discussion of the terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as used by the Stoics in Roller (2001), 64-126, esp. pp. 64-77.
42There is nothing that I hold
in a higher esteem than a moderate life,
when it always joins those that are good.  (36C)
There is nothing of higher esteem than a virtuous life. This statement could be introduced 
or, at least, shared by a philosopher, too. The further examples which Plutarch offers his 
readers at 36F-37A, all taken from tragedy, show that poetry can initiate young men into 
important philosophical truths concerning the value of life and death (cf. the lines from 
Euripides’ Cresph., frag. 449.4-6), the wealth that nature brings (Eur., frag. 892.1-2), or 
the control of emotions as a way leading to happiness and virtue (adesp.,  frag.  360). 
Poetry  attached  to  reality,  as  well  as  to  philosophical  truths,  can  be  as  useful  as 
philosophy  itself.  Plutarch  gives  poetry  unquestionable  power  and  value,  which,  if 
ignored, would confine poetry within the boundaries of imitation and to  its value as 
individual pieces of literature with no reflections of moral truths in it. By that stage the 
young man has graduated to the world of Plato, and this is the important allusive register 
in the last simile at 36E which captures the most significant reasons why one should read 
poetry:  after  the  young  man  will  have  studied  poetry  he  will  be  able  to  perceive 
philosophical  tenets  more  easily,  as  if looking  upon  die  sun  after  leaving  darkness, 
although  accustomed  for some time to  a  reflected  light.6 1   This  light  may  be  only  a 
reflection, as Plutarch says; however, it will allow the young man to see the truths of 
philosophy (and poetry) and it will dispose him positively toward them, inviting him not 
to run away but to engage deeper in them.
The  emphasis  which  Plutarch  lays  on  poetry  as  the  first  step  of  a  young  man’s 
philosophical education and of his deeper understanding of it is demonstrated by the 
structure of this essay: How a young man... starts and finishes with the discussion of that 
issue (chap.  1, esp.  15F-16A and chap.  14, 35F-37B); it is then apparently a strategic 
choice made by Plutarch to open his discussion of education and to end it by making a 
point about philosophy. Even if the readers, by the end of the essay, may question the 
benefits from poetry as such on the basis of the poets’ occasional untruthfulness, they can 
have no doubts about poetry’s true value as the best introductory exercise to philosophy.
6 1  The image echoes the cave simile from Plato’s Republic (514a-517b, 532b)- cf. Sicking (1998), 113.
432. Theatrical Imagery in Plutarch’s Essays
Introduction
The  use of dramatic vocabulary and theatrical  imagery may vary significantly  in the 
different Essays, according,  firstly, to Plutarch’s objective,  secondly, to the addressee 
and, thirdly, to the genre to which each essay belongs and which directs the main train of 
thought in each treatise. The identification of ‘genres’ in Plutarch is a complex question,1  
and may have been so even for original readers: at least in some cases they may have 
been effectively working out, as they read, the  way  in which a work was  operating, 
sensing particular affinities with  different  genres  and  antecedents,  and  evaluating  for 
themselves, say, how far an argument was to be taken as Plutarch’s last and deepest word 
on a subject, or how far an argument was to be developed for the needs of the immediate 
context. Therefore, we should not necessarily expect the treatment of tragedy, or indeed 
borrowings from tragedy, to work in exactly the same way in every treatise. In the same 
way, we should not be trying to work out a single, coherent Plutarchan ‘view of tragedy’, 
but rather seeing what sort of possibilities tragedy opened up for Plutarch, and the range 
of ways he could exploit it for particular contexts and arguments.
The present chapter will focus on two essays, on How to tell a flatterer from a friend and 
on  Were  the  Athenians  more  glorious  in  war  or  in  wisdom?,  which  exemplify  the 
different ways  in which Plutarch treats tragedy.  In Plutarch’s work there are varying 
aspects of tragedy: there are many tragic quotations -  a direct use of tragedy -  and there 
is also the use of tragedy as a metaphor. Accordingly, we can expect to find strands in 
these two works that do not reconcile easily with each other or with what Plutarch says 
elsewhere (e.g.  in How  a young man  should listen  to poetry).  Although  in  Were  the
1  One may ask the same kind of question for the Lives: is it history, biography, or both? And even if we 
give an answer to this question, it will still be awkward to give only one definition of what is meant under 
those two genres. The purposes of this chapter do not allow a thorough discussion of the genre-issue in 
Plutarch. About the issue of Plutarchan biography overlapping with historiography, see e.g. Duff (1999a), 
17-22  and  52-53,  and  Pelling  (1980)=(2002a),  102-107,  (1990c)=(2002a),  esp.  pp.  156-162, 
(1990d)=(2002a), 130-132, (1995b)=(2002a), 207-211; cf. also de Romilly (1988b).
44Athenians...? there are no tragic quotations, in How to tell a flatterer... Plutarch uses the 
wisdom  of the  canonical  Greek tragedians  with  significant  frequency.2  However,  the 
distinguishing feature of this essay is the use of theatre as part of the imagery which 
Plutarch employs, therefore the analysis in this chapter will focus on this usage of theatre. 
The discussion will concentrate on theatrical images (vocabulary, metaphors, allusions) 
in these two essays where theatre is used to make a significant point either concerning the 
inappropriateness of a possible transposition of theatre into real life,3  or exploiting the 
notion of theatre as a world of illusion in order to describe behaviour which is mainly 
impersonation.
In this context theatre becomes the place which brings to the foreground the antithesis 
between illusion and reality -  as much as the convergence of the two elements. In How to 
tell...  the antithesis involves both the flatterer and the person who is flattered, as the 
former creates an  illusionary reality which influences the  latter’s  life,  and the person 
flattered  is  unable  to  distinguish  a  true  friend  from  a  flatterer.  The  essay  Were  the 
Athenians...?  is  itself  based  on  a  contrived  antithesis  (not  operating  elsewhere  in 
Plutarch), that between dramatic action (performances) and political action. In his attempt 
to exalt the historical and especially the military achievements of the Athenians, Plutarch 
places a low value on poetic production, a move which stands in contrast to his use of 
tragedy in other essays, and especially in How a young man..., where the use of poetry is 
a proof of Plutarch’s acknowledging a certain  value in  it as an  essential  part of the 
education of young people. And yet, in his quotations it is poetry which survives, and 
Plutarch  himself contributes  to  the  survival  of tragedy.  The  antithesis  might  seem 
internally contradictory or at least uneasy for another reason too, because this essay of 
epideictic character suggests a hierarchy of important events in the Athenian past which 
cannot possibly favour the cultural achievements in a comparison with the military or 
political success of Athens.
2 49F, 50F, 51C, 51E, 52C, 53C, 58A-B, 61A, 62C, 63A, 64C, 65A, 68E, 69A, 69D, 70A, 71F, 72C, 72E, 
73C, 74A-B.
3  Cf. Tagliascchi (1960), 129. It is the presence in the real world of events and behaviour which belong in 
the theatre which Plutarch criticises.
45In both essays there is a formal borrowing from rhetorical/epideictic, but that does not 
preclude a commingling of tragic texturing too: the important thing then is to see how 
this works and what it adds to the two essays under examination. How to tell a flatterer 
from a friend is in its outset pragmatic in the sense that it is presented as advice -  a kind 
of napauvenKos Xoyo$ -  on how one should be aware of flatterers and at the same time 
learn to appreciate true friendship, and in that it also displays a moral value.  Were the 
Athenians more glorious in war or in wisdom? has close affinities with the declamatio, 
and that particular character can partly justify  Plutarch’s derogatory  attitude towards 
tragedy and poetry. Thus, the ‘generic’ particularity of the essay may generate a different 
mindset,  and  in  these  registers  and  trains  of thought we  should  not  be  surprised  if 
attitudes are slightly different from elsewhere (e.g. How a young man...). The essay’s 
tone may also affect the way in which theatre imagery is used. The pragmatic focus is 
again very  important.  It  governs  Plutarch’s judgement not just of poetry but also  of 
historiography.
How to tell a flatterer from a friend?
There is a quite popular saying which Plutarch repeatedly uses on different occasions and 
in different essays,5 according to which Phocion replied to Antipater who told him to do 
something that was not right and appropriate to do: ‘You cannot use me both as a friend 
and as a flatterer’. The saying, with which Plutarch fully agrees, illustrates that to be a 
friend and at the same time a flatterer is  incompatible.  The negative portrayal of the 
flatterer by means of theatrical imagery connected to falsehood and exaggeration casts, at 
the same time, a favourable light on the behaviour of the true friend; thus the contrast 
between flattery and friendship is accentuated.6
4 Many of the themes discussed here can be also found in Papadi (2005).
5  See How to tell a flatterer... 64C, Marriage Advice 142B, (the spurious) Sayings of Kings 188F (about the 
spurious Plutarchan works see e.g. D’Ippolito (2000b)), On Compliancy 532F-533A, and again Phocion 
30.3, Agis and Cleomenes 2.4.
6 Cf. 49E-F, 50B-C, 53C, 54C, 55A, 55D, 59D-E, 62A ff., where the contrast between the flatterer and the 
true friend is highlighted.
46The construction of a parallel between flatterer and actor is effective and apt if one thinks 
that the  flatterer is a person who  is,  or must be,  distinguished by some of the  main 
qualities which distinguish an actor;7 in both cases a possible successful impersonation 
brings rewards to the individual -  for the actor it brings credit for his impersonation, and 
similarly for the flatterer it brings more influence and power. Thus the flatterer’s acting 
must be plausible, if he is to achieve his goal, or at least, a part of his goal, which is to 
convince his audience of something that is not true, or that he is something that he is not. 
This aspect of his role is what makes the objective of the flatterer and the actor seem so 
similar; they both have to perform, to put on a play, to pretend they are someone else, for 
otherwise they will fail. This failure would entail in the end the 'mask slipping’ and the 
disclosure of the real self, the real character of the flatterer or that of the actor.8  So, 
theatre offers an effective metaphor to describe the character of the flatterer, and at the 
same time it is a pointer of propriety concerning patterns of behaviour. Moreover, the 
flatterer, exactly as the actor, is forced in a way to enter into a nexus of multiple ‘voices’, 
according to what both the occasion and the person he flatters require.9 Behind the mask 
of a friend, and indeed of a very trustworthy and caring friend, the flatterer veils his real 
face and suppresses his self-interested ambitions. Behind the care for the other, for the 
person he flatters and serves, he tries to hide the selfish interest in himself.
The danger for the people affected by the behaviour of the flatterer and of the actor may 
be not of the same kind and level, but is undoubtedly real. The one flattered may be taken 
in by the flatterer’s pretence and take the wrong decisions in life, whereas the audience 
who attends an actor’s performance needs to become part of the spirit of the theatrical 
aram?  which,  in  this  case,  does  not  entail  any  actual  dangers.10  Thus  the  theatrical
7 O’Donnell also traces similarities between the flatterer and the actor in the passages she discusses in 
(1975), esp. pp. 73-76.
8 However, we have to acknowledge here a difference in the meaning of ‘real character’, if there is such a 
thing, in these two cases. In the case of the flatterer, it would be helpful for the person who is being 
flattered to know his real character and intentions, his  —  a term of highest importance for Plutarch, 
especially in the Lives. In contrast, in the case of the actor, the real character is not at all what the audience 
seeks to know; in the theatre, it is not at all about disclosing the ‘real’.
9 Plutarch describes emphatically, by means of a simile, this quality of the flatterer to adjust at 53D: the 
flatterer is like a chameleon; he can imitate everything, as the chameleon can imitate all the different 
colours of its environment. See also p. 54.
1 0  More on amootj on p. 55 ff.
47illusion, apart from being an indispensable part of the conditions of performance, is also a 
means of persuasion. The audience has to be deceived, they have to believe that what is 
happening on stage is to some extent based on reality of some sort and in some sense, so 
that the actors and the performance as a whole may convey a  ‘reality’.  This kind of 
deception is a harmless one in comparison to the damage that may be caused by the 
flatterer. Gorgias supports this theatrical variation of illusion and justifies it: it is proper 
in its entirety, and it is part of the pleasure (n$oi/i$) which theatre offers to the audience.11
Whereas most of the time this rapprochement is implicit, it becomes explicit on occasion, 
for example when Plutarch says that the flatterer is considered to be playing the role of 
the  friend  in  full  consciousness and  solemnity:  “#cau  oTuos  rpwyiKo^  koriv  ou  araivpiKoq 
< J> iX tou; imoKpiTvg ovBe ku)ijuk6s” (‘and in general he plays the part of friend with the gravity 
of a tragic actor and not like a comic or satyric actor’) (50E). This statement puts the 
actor of a satyric drama or comedy in a lower position in the sense that his acting is less 
serious. This whole notion merits further attention. What is it that makes tragic acting 
more ‘serious’? Some of it may relate to performative differences and acting styles: the 
comic plot allows more scope for explicit breach of the ‘dramatic illusion’, e.g. in the 
case of a comic actor acknowledging the presence of the audience. This may be further 
accentuated by the acting styles. In contrast, the tragic character never acknowledges the 
play’s  illusion.  So  part  of the  difference  between  tragedy  and  comedy  may  be  the 
consistency with which the tragic actor remains ‘in character’.1 2  But Plutarch’s statement 
here,  at  50E,  is part of his  argument that the  flatterer wants to  intervene  in  serious
t T
praxeis.  Part of what  is  at  stake  is the profoundly  serious  issues  involved  and the
1 1  Cf. the discussion of Gorgias’ words, which are folly quoted by Plutarch himself at 348B-C, on pp. 61- 
62.
1 2  Cf. e.g. Dover (1972), esp. 59-65, and Silk (2000), esp. 91,215 and 272.
1 3   We must keep always  in mind that a circle of flatterers is usually formed around an  important and 
powerful person (the king is an obvious representative example here, which is also discussed by Plutarch -  
cf. for example 56F, 58A, 58E-F, 60B-D, 62F-63A), and the impact of that person’s decisions is often not 
only on his personal life but on the lives of others, too. In Demetr.  18.4 we have an example for the 
powerful influence of a flatterer:  “ t o o w t w   7(r%u<re  K o k c u « x ;  tjxo vT j  fu a .  k m   T o a a v r r ^   e v e n & fy r e   r v jv   o iK o v fie v y v  
/xero^SoAifc” (‘so great influence had a flatterer’s single word, and with so great a change did it fill the whole 
world’). Dio’s second oration focuses on how a king should be most careful to avoid the flatterers -  cf. 
Berry (1983), 75.
48consequences  of the  deception;1 4   for,  instead  of merely  flattering  in  a purely  social
context, the flatterer seeks to become involved in activities which affect the well-being of 
the victim. In addition, for Plutarch ‘the flattery which we must regard as difficult to deal 
with  is  that which  is  hidden,  not that which  is  openly  acknowledged,  that which  is
context  the  hidden  flattery  resembles  tragedy,  whereas  the  flattery  which  is 
straightforward and presented as a joke resembles comedy.
Later, when Plutarch talks about rich or powerful people, he describes their need to be 
surrounded by friends who agree with them in everything by employing images from 
drama. They are, he says, like the tragic actors who need a chorus of approving voices, 
consisting either of friends or the audience. The vocabulary here is clearly taken from the 
theatrical context, and bears interesting implications for Plutarch’s attitude to display and 
to the realism/illusion antithesis: “oXX’ axmep oi rpayqiSoi %opo\j deovrau  <f>tXa)v truvg^ovruiv 
vj  Oearpou  ovvemKporoOvrcx;”  (‘But,  like the tragic actors,  [such people]  want to have a 
chorus of friends  singing the same tune or a sympathetic audience to applaud them’) 
(63A). The flatterer, as Plutarch asserts at 63C, is always in agreement with his victim in 
words  and  expressions,  without having  a personal,  independent voice.1 5   The  people, 
however,  who  need  flatterers  around  them  seem  to  prefer  -   and  in  this  way  they 
encourage  -   those  who,  by  assenting  or  remaining  silent,  behave  as  attendants 
(“tmovpyos”) or servants (“Jiaicovos”) (cf. 63B). The silence of the flatterer is a specious 
way of expressing agreement, and in  its goals  it is very different from the theatrical 
silence of characters on stage, when this occurs.
Unlike Pliny,16  Plutarch clearly here does not just blame the flatterer; he also blames 
those who succumb to flattery. They like to be surrounded by people who agree with
1 4  Cf. Arist. Poet. 1453a 34-39, where Aristotle observes that in comedy even the worst enemies, such as 
Orestes and Aegisthus, exit at the end as friends -  nothing too serious ever happens in the end.
1 5  Cf. Arist. EN 1126b 13-14, where exactly this attitude of the flatterers is described -  see Hunter (2002), 
204 n. 35.
1 6  Pliny only finds fault in the flatterer and not in the victim’s behaviour (Letters 2.20). Cf. also Tacitus,
serious, not that which  is meant as a joke’  (50F: “kou  KoXautetav  rn^reov %(LXem\v  tvjv 
XavQa.vov<rav  ov  tt}v  opuoXoyovtr&v,  oude  Tvjv  rtaiCpvtrcLv  aXXa,  njv  tnroudaj&utraw”).  In  this 
Hist. 1.15.
49them  (“%opou...(f)t?M)v  (ruvqudovruiv”,  63A)  and  to  have  the  approval  of  others  (here 
presented by the applause of the theatre audience: “Oeaurpov aweniKpormvvTos”, 63A); thus 
they also take part in the acting as they themselves are performers in the ‘play’ that takes 
place in real life. They do not look for, or expect, honesty from those around them. In this 
context of false behaviour (on the flatterer’s side) and wrong objectives (on the side of 
the people who like to be flattered) the theatrical is used to create dissonance, to mark a 
kind of unacceptable human attitude. It is true that plays need the chorus; performers 
need an audience as well as the approval of the audience. But people who crave for this 
kind  of approval  in  real  life behave  inappropriately,  because  they  prefer  illusion  to 
reality.
We see here an example of a pattern common in Plutarch, according to which what is 
most disturbing is not the  ‘theatrical’  in itself but the transfer of what is presented in 
theatre -  and regarded as appropriate for theatrical purposes and conventions -  into real 
life,  which  has  very  different  conventions,  rules  and  ideals  from  those  which  are 
prominent in theatre (cf. also pp. 52, 62, 71-72,127,180, 188 ff., and passim). Theatrical 
illusion seems to clash with the reality of life. Arguably then the ‘chorus’  of flatterers 
(here  and  e.g.  at  65C-D,  quoted  on  p.  52  below)  creates  an  illusion  which  impedes 
understanding and appropriate  action.  We  shall  see that the attitude taken  here  is  in 
harmony with that in  Were the Athenians...?, where the literature/life antithesis is still 
more prominent; it is also to some degree compatible with Plutarch’s attitude in How a 
young man..., where poetry is not presented as conveying truth as such. Poetry imitates 
life  in  a  plausible  way,  but,  in  order  for  it  to  also  offer  contrived  pleasure  to  its 
audience/readers, it has to comprise some other elements too, which however, may be far 
from touching upon truth.1 7  Thus neither in this case is poetry an area which teaches 
truths  of life  as  such;  it  is  rather the  readers’  way  of approaching poetry  that  will
17 See e.g. 15C-D (on poetic deception), 16B ff. (on truth contrasted with fiction, and on poetry’s falsehood 
combined with plausibility and pleasure) -  at 17A note especially Plutarch’s wording: “toOto & ■na.irn & jA © v 
om fiiSoTmir^a. kou Ttkeurpui npoq ydovyv < ij efcnXrr£iv aucpoarroQ yeyove” (‘but it is clear to everybody that this is 
a mythical fabrication which has been created to please or surprise the hearer’), and at 17D: ^nonjriK^ ftev 
ov navv fieXov ear} -rfc akifieiaq” (‘the art of poetry is not greatly concerned with truth’). For more on this 
essay see my chapter 1.
50distinguish truth from lie. Taken as a whole, Plutarch’s relationship with tragedy shows 
both some persistent elements and some tensions which are never quite resolved.
The image of a chorus of flatterers appears again at 65C-D, where Plutarch describes 
Medius, a close attendant of Alexander, as the leader of the chorus of flatterers around 
him: ‘S$v  o  tov rrepi tov ’AAe£ovdpov %opov rtbv koXokow oT ov e^apxfx; kou oxxfHOTvjg
K opu< f> auo< ; bri tou$ apitrtov$ (ruvTerarflLevoiv” (‘This Medius was, if I may call him so, leader 
and skilled master of the choir of flatterers that danced attendance on Alexander, and 
were  banded  together  against  all  good  men’).  The  choice  of vocabulary  cannot  be 
accidental:  “e&pxps”  and  “Kopu^auo^”  make  the  metaphor  explicit  and  encourage  the 
reader to perceive, once more, a scene of real life in theatrical terms. The example of 
Alexander shows, once again, that flatterers are keener to seek the company of important 
men to gain some of their authority and fame.
The way in which a friend must offer his admonitions requires for Plutarch no audience 
either, since this should not be seen as an opportunity to make profit or gain some kind of 
glory, as if rebuking someone were a kind of public ‘spectacle’. Therefore, the advice 
given should have ‘nothing of show or display in it to attract a crowd of witnesses and 
spectators’  (70F-71A:  irau^yvptK^v  purfi’  hridetKTticrjv  pwfie  pMprupoug  kou  Sea/rau;
ovvavyoucrcw”). Although the metaphor is quite general with possible resonances of non­
theatrical  contexts  such  as  epideictic  oratory,  the  noun  “fleaTas”  (not  “aucpoato*”) 
certainly invites us to think in part about theatre. The flexibility of theatre metaphor is 
noteworthy. The issue is not here about theatrical illusion versus reality but about public 
versus private, though again the question of display/spectacle is at issue, since the rebuke 
in this case shares with the behaviour of the flatterer the focus on the impression that is 
made. Accordingly, the public rebuke is self-regarding rather than helpful to the friend, 
since it serves more to display the speaker’s virtue than to improve the friend’s flaws. 
The  very  fact  that  it  is  public  may  prompt  display  (the  flatterer  sees  himself  as 
performing to an audience) and illusion. But it also transposes into the public domain 
matters  which  should  be dealt with  in  private.  Not only does  Plutarch  use theatrical 
vocabulary to make his point but he also quotes here a line from Euripides’ Stheneboea
51(frag.  665) on the distressful effect of admonishing the one we love, to add that this 
distress is increased by the presence of a public, thus rendering the reproof undesirable 
and more painful.1 8  It cannot be without importance that he quotes a tragic poet; there 
may be certainly  some effect in having a quotation  from tragedy incorporated  in his 
warning against being tragic:
(71 A)  ov  yap  amkutg  “vovBerovfievog  epwg  puiXXov ttie£ei” Kar’  Eupimbrjv,  aAA’  av 
vovSerfj ng ev izoXXoig kou psr) fetdofievog, nav vwrypva kou tt o L v naOog eig to avauaxuvrov 
Kadiarrrjmv.
For it is not enough to say, as Euripides has it, that ‘if love is reproved, then it 
grows more urgent’, but if admonition is offered in public, and unsparingly, it only 
confirms each and every morbid emotion in its shamelessness. (71 A)
The use of ‘theatre’ gains in flexibility from its use both as a simile-metaphor and as a 
literal aspect in social intercourse. The flatterer is the kind of person in whose actions 
pretence  and  falsehood  prevail;  he  even  takes  the  front  seats  at  entertainments  and 
theatres, so that he will have the opportunity to flatter the rich, famous or powerful by 
giving up his seat:
(58D-E)  o9ev  bpav  eonv  ourrovg  edpag  re  rag  Tzparrag  ev  aKpoaurem  kou  Bearpoig 
KaraXapfiavovra^,  ov%  on  toutcuv  atjtoGow  ainroug,  aXX’  oncog  imefyoraqievoi  roTg 
’ nXovmoiq  KokaKeutoai,  kou  Aoyov  Karap%ovrcu;  ev  avvoboig  kou  crvvebpioig,  elra 
napa%a)poOvT(H;  (bg  Kpehrocri  kou  pveranBeyuevovg  pquarra  npog  rouvavrtov,  aimep  %  
buvarog v} ixkovanog oj evdotgog o avTikeyuiv.
This is the reason why such persons are to be seen taking possession of the front 
seats at entertainments and theatres, not because they think they have any right to 
them, but so that they may flatter the rich by giving up their seats. So, too, in an 
assemblage  or  a  formal  meeting  they  may  be  observed  to  begin  a  subject  of 
discussion, and later to give ground as though before their betters, and to shift over 
with the utmost readiness to the other side, if the man opposing them be a person of 
power or wealth or repute. (58D-E)
1 8 Cf. Trapp (2007), 152-153.
52To the theatrical spectacle the flatterer adds his own performance. All the flatterer does 
and says serves his ultimate goal, namely to appear as an honest, trustworthy friend and 
as a person who does nothing out of personal interest, while at the same time he receives 
the powerful person’s favour.
However, the flatterer can only appear as a friend, but he can never obtain the inner and 
more substantial qualities of a friend. The element of imitation together with deception is 
brought  out  in  Plutarch’s  comparison  of the  flatterer’s  type with  animals,  and  more 
specifically with a chameleon (53D). The comparison shows that the flatterer is someone 
who can imitate everything and everyone,1 9  apart only from what is really worthwhile -  
exactly as the chameleon can take every possible colour apart from white.  Again at 5ID 
the chameleon image is employed, although this time to stress the very changeability of 
the flatterer’s appearance rather than of his character, as well as the fact that he never 
changes the reality:
(5 ID)  aitrnep  ra>v  (hjptcov  otra.  tk^ ukoto,  tvjv  xpoav  rpemaBaui  ovvouftofjwiodrou  roTg 
CmoKeifievoig %pwp/wi kou %a)pioig'  errei #’ cKeivog e^a/na/rgL re kou TzepiKaXxmrerau raug 
ofioiorrqtnv...
As in the case with some animals to which Nature has given the faculty of changing 
their hue, so that they exactly conform to the colours and objects beneath them. 
And  since the  flatterer uses resemblances to  deceive  and to wrap about him...
(5 ID)
The flatterer can indeed create an illusion of anything or anyone he chooses to imitate, 
yet it will be only an illusion.
19 Cf. 50A-B (about imitation again). Compare Political precepts 800A:  ‘Now court flatterers, like bird- 
catchers, by imitating the voices of kings and assimilating themselves to them, insinuate themselves deeply 
into their good graces and decoy them by deceit’. An obvious parallel which comes to mind is again that of 
the actor, although his case is slightly different, since he is forced by the theatrical conventions to enter the 
same procedure of changing and altering his character. Cf.  Demetr.  18.3-4: Plutarch describes here the 
ability of ‘the actors to adapt to their costumes their gait, voice, posture at table, and way of addressing 
Others’: “ ‘KaSamp Tpar/iK&v imoKprr&v afia. tjj <tk€vfj avfj^ierafia^mrrwiv kou /3adiojia kou (fxovrjv kou KaraucXurtv 
Kai Tipotra/yopewiv”.
20 Cf. Ale. 23.4-5, where Alcibiades is compared to a chameleon.
53’Amam? (deception) which here is related to the flatterer’s behaviour is a common term 
used by Plutarch when talking about poetry, especially tragedy, and about the actors’ role 
on stage.2 1  In How a young man... Plutarch often depicts poetry as something deceptive 
and fake. Gorgias also called tragedy a deception (15D): ‘T opyias tie -rr)v Tpauyqfiiav elnev 
anaryv...” —  and again, in Were the Athenians...? Plutarch introduces the same quotation 
(348B-C; see below, pp. 61-62). But here it is necessary to make a distinction between 
the good anary and the bad anary, as it were; following that distinction, the theatre can 
then be an example of good -  if properly understood and properly used -  anary, and 
flattery clearly the example of bad anarvj. In theatre, as in other representative arts as 
well, deception is acceptable as part of the mimesis; it is a necessary convention there (cf. 
above, pp. 48-49). Similarly, a less harmful kind of flattery, and consequently of anarr), 
is that of the lover, discussed at 56D: in order to create often a beautified picture of the 
person he loves, the lover is guided by motives which are more honest; this is why the 
deception he may favour is clearly more ‘innocent’ than a deception that is intended. 
However, in the case of the flattery which does not originate from innocent motives it is 
only an aberrant means of achieving the flatterer’s ultimate goal. Taking the notion of 
anavq further, the flatterer does not only incorporate deception and falsehood, but leads, 
with his words and behaviour, the one whom he flatters to ignorance, or, at least, to a 
deceptive knowledge of his self: ^avrrrarrerou  yap  aei npoq to ‘ ‘yvtbBi  craur6v\  anarvpt 
€KaujT€p npoq iaurov ep.nomv kou ayvoiav eauroO kou tmv nept aurov ouyaBwv kou kokcov” (‘For 
[the  flatterer]  always  takes  a  position  over  against  the  maxim  ‘know  yourself,  by 
creating in every man deception towards himself and ignorance both of himself and of the 
good and evil that concerns himself) (49B) 22
The whole discussion on this side of the flatterer’s character reminds us of a very similar 
discussion in How a young man..., with poetry being presented as akin to flattery, and 
poets taking the role of flatterers, as demonstrated, for example, at 16A-B. There Plutarch 
disassociates truth  from  fiction, by stressing the fact that the  latter avoids distress  in 
favour  of  the  pleasant.  The  most  important  thing  for  fiction  is  to  please  its
21 Cf. Di Gregorio (1976), 172.
22 Cf. later, at 65F, where the value of the precept “yvm8i aairmv” is again stressed: if we are aware of our 
flaws and keep away from self-love or conceit, we will not fall easy victims to flatterers.
54audience/readers, consequently it sometimes has to beautify things for this purpose, while 
the truth is rather factual and is not afraid of becoming sometimes unpleasant:
(16A -B )...‘7toAA<x  ipevBovrau  aoiBoV23  t o ,  i* b   enovre<; ra  B*  anovreq.  em vres  tiev,  ori 
•npo$  v)Bovr)v  oKoifc  kou  %apivf  vjjv  oi  nAenrroi  ftioiKovariv,  auHrrrpoTepcw  Tyyovvrau  tijv 
aX'TjOeta.v  to v  ipevBov$.  v)  pub  yap  epyq)  yiyvofievrj,  kow   arepneg  €%f)  t o   teho$,  o v k
e^torarau'  to  Be TtXarTOfievov Xjoyq) pqurra TrepiyQuopei  Kai Tperterai irpoq to rjBiov €K  tov
■ i   «   2 4 AimovvTo$.
...‘Poets tell many lies’, some intentionally and some unintentionally; intentionally, 
because for the purpose of giving pleasure and gratification to the ear (and this is 
what  most  people  look  for  in  poetry)  they  feel  that  die  truth  is  too  stem  in 
comparison with fiction. For the truth, because it is what actually happens, does not 
deviate from its course, even though the end may be unpleasant; whereas fiction, 
being a verbal fabrication, very readily follows a roundabout route, and turns aside 
from the painful to what is more pleasant. (16A-B)
Deception is also attributed to the art of painting, which, by creating illusive pictures, 
may well be compared to poetry’s falsehood (16B): “aAA’ axmep ev ypatjxjut; KtvyriKwrepov 
eo n   xpwfjui  ypoftfiijc;  Bia.  to   avBpe’ iKekav  kou  anarrriXov,  outux;  ev  not'qfuurt  fiepuyfibov 
nidavoTvjTi  ipevBo$  eKTrXyTTei..” (‘But just as in pictures, colour is more stimulating than 
line-drawing  because  it  is  life-like,  and  creates  an  illusion,  so  in  poetry  falsehood 
combined with plausibility is more striking...’). One notices here the emphasis on the 
element of colour, which, exactly as at 5ID (see above, p. 54), is a powerful means of 
accomplishing deception.25
23 About this aphorism ascribed to Solon, see Sicking (1998), 105, and n. 3; cf. also Valgiglio (1967), 320.
24  Similarly at  17A:  “twto tie -naan«  Bfjhov art iHifamonHta.  kou  TiKaurfia ixpoq vfiovTjv n r} ZiarXnrjfyv  aKpoarroG 
yeyove” (‘But it is clear to everybody that this [sc. a mythical image created by Aeschylus in his Niobe] is a 
mythical fabrication which has been created to please or astound the reader’). Cf. De Lacy (1952),  161: 
‘This deception arises in part from the poets’ conscious and intentional use of fiction to please or amaze the 
audience, in part from the fact that the poets are themselves deceived’.
25 Cf. 53D-E, where the discussion concerns again the painters, and indeed the bad painters, who are unable 
to attain to the beautiful, and resort to bad traits of the face in order to achieve resemblance. In the same 
way the flatterer has to imitate all kinds of vices to achieve his base goals. The flatterer, like a bad painter, 
is by nature inclined to the worse and distasteful (u< f> utret tc top a fi eau/roD -npo$ to. %eipova. KaTuvrr^ ear!”) 
(‘For by nature he is of himself prone to the worse’) (53E). Cf. De Lacy (1952), 161 and his comparison 
between poetry and painting concerning the creation of deception.
55So:  is  tragedy  in  this  essay  a  wholly  negative  thing?  Not  necessarily.  Theatre  is 
undoubtedly  a place where  myth  and drama  are  intermingled to  serve  as  sources  of 
education and pleasure, and not to produce a false reality which the audience must then 
project on real life -  as is the case with the flatterer. The audience at theatre is, to some 
extent, always aware of the illusion that takes place, and considers it as appropriate in its 
place. Yet the person who is flattered does not always realise the anarr} and therefore he 
often projects himself into a ‘play’  unwillingly; this kind of connivance is undignified 
and inappropriate. So, unlike what might happen from attending the theatre, in everyday 
life real dangers can emerge from theatrical behaviour; thus the transposition of tragedy 
on stage into life, especially when the two become hard to distinguish from one another 
may entail true dangers for the people who are affected by the deception created. It is the 
very availability of tragedy as a point of reference for life which should enable people to 
realise that they are behaving badly, because their behaviour is more appropriate for one 
mode -  namely, tragedy -  than for another, real life. In this respect tragic poetry, and 
poetry in general, has an important mission to accomplish, not only as a propaedeutic 
stage leading to philosophy, but also as a way of discovering the truths of a moral life. 
And this is a point which Plutarch makes convincingly in How a young man should listen 
to poetry?6
26 See my chapter  1. Cf. in that essay 15F, 35F-36A, 36C-37B. On the interrelation between poetry and 
philosophy see also Wardman (1974), 171, Di Gregorio (1976), 173, Schenkeveld (1982), Morgan (1998), 
147-148, and Zadorojnyi (2002).
56Juxtaposing drama and history: Were the Athenians more glorious in war or in wisdom?
In this rhetorical essay Plutarch attempts to compare two things that are very different: 
the contemporary value of theatrical performances and the  eternal value of historical 
achievements which would stand as an unquestionable, eternal proof of the importance of 
Athens to all generations ever after. Plutarch draws on a pattern which he has also used in 
other essays, such as “Ilepi tov rmrepov vdoop %  iwp xpijmfiarrepov”: exactly as in this essay, 
this pattern (Tt6repov...rj...) is based on a contrived antithesis or choice which is in fact
2 7 rhetorical and serves the author as a way of epideixis, to argue the one or the other case. 
The comparison between the historical past of Athens and its literary achievements limits 
the writer’s ability to present a nuanced picture. This means that Plutarch is forced to 
some extent into a black-and-white view by the antithetical nature of the essay. Instead of 
taking its place within a complex of ideas, poetry becomes  isolated as the subject of 
choice and comparison. This, once again, suggests that Plutarch’s attitude toward poetry 
(and history) is likely to be very context-specific and to some degree fluid, depending on 
the very choice of theme.
Tragedy is presented as an occupation which is significantly less important and of less
Oft practical value than military activity;  moreover, tragedy is blamed for the significant 
cost it has for the Athenians: it makes them lose valuable time and it diverts the funds 
which would otherwise be devoted to military affairs.29 At 348F-349B Plutarch criticises 
the  expenses  of  dramatic  productions,  such  as  those  of the  Bacchae,  Phoenissae, 
Oedipus, and Antigone, and suggests that the money spent for them might better be given 
to warlike undertakings:
27 Cf. Van der Stockt (1990b), who goes as far as to suggest that the specific rhetorical purposes do not 
allow the reader to take the essay seriously (p. 173).
28 This is explicitly stated when Plutarch uses the word “rai^ia” for describing poetry, and especially tragic 
poetry. See 348F (discussed below, on p. 59), and 350B: “’AAAA vy A  la, rtau&ta to, r&v TmiTjrcbv”. Poetry is 
supposedly just a kind of amusement, a childish pastime.
29 For the issue of time lost (or, not spent in a profitable way) cf. 350E-F, where Plutarch compares the time 
needed to complete important political or cultural achievements with the time needed to complete pieces of 
literature; for the issue of excess in money spent for performances (their preparation, etc.) see also e.g. 
349A-B -  cf. Wilson (2000) about the expenses and the sponsors of dramatic performances (esp. pp. 50- 
108).
57( 3 4 8 F - 3 4 9 A )   I Ipog  a   Aouaav  kvip  airofSXEipoLg  ov  Kou<&g  emev  tog  apapravova'tv 
’AQvfltauoi  peyaXa.  ttjv   trnoufrijv  eig  vip  naufttav  KOLTavaXJarKOVTeg,  roureart  peyahov 
oltzootoXcdv daunavag kou arrpa.revpa,Ta)v e<f>odta, KaroLxopvyyoOvreg eig  t o   Bearpov.  av yap 
eKXoyioBjj r&v Bpapa/rtov ckootov wrov Ka.Te<rrr), izXeov a.vriXxt)Ktog (jxtverrau 6 frrjpog eig 
Bok%o^  kou  Ooiviorratg  kou  Oidmodotg  kou  ’Avriyowqv  kou  to,  WLydeioug  koko.  kou 
’H A e K T p a g ,  aiv  irnep  rrjg  •yye/Muia^  kou  tvjg  eXeuBepiag  noXeptMV  Tovg  fiapfiapoug
avakuMrev.
It was in reference to all this that a Spartan not ineptly remarked that the Athenians 
were making a great mistake in wasting their energies in amusements, that is to say, 
in  lavishing  on  the theatre  what would pay  for  great  fleets and would  support 
armies in the field.  For,  if we reckon up the cost of each tragedy, the Athenian 
people will be seen to have spent more on productions of Bacchae, Phoenissae, 
Oedipuses and Antigones, and the woes of Medea and Electra, than they spent in 
fighting for their supremacy and  for their  liberty against the barbarians.  (348F- 
349A)
The  Athenians  make  too  much  effort  for  something  that  is just  a  pleasant  pastime 
(“afJULpravoumv ’ABrpouot yueyaXa, tt)v (movdvjv eig tvjv rtauhav KaravaAiVfcovres” —  note here 
the contrast between the two terms used:  ‘Wou^v” and “mw^a!/’).30 The fact that the 
remark which Plutarch defends here belongs to a Spartan is not without significance: 
Spartans  were  exemplary  warriors,  men  of deeds  and  not  of words,  the  epitome  of 
practicality.3 1  Plutarch is looking upon Athenian tragedy through non-Athenian eyes. His 
stance  is  a-historical  in  die  sense that  he  extracts  his  discussion  from  its  immediate 
historical context and ignores, for the purposes of emphasis on his argument, the cultural, 
social, political, and religious importance of tragic festivals in Athens, which were an 
established state institution (and an excellent opportunity for Athenian epideixis to the 
rest of the Greek world).32 He also ignores the fact that Athenian tragedy was admired 
elsewhere in the Greek world as early as the fifth century. It seems that tragedy is an area 
where the Athenians spend vainly a lot of time and money, and this may have impeded
30 Cf. Plato’s Laws, 803c-e. Plato there has the Athenian stranger making a distinction between serious and 
non-serious preoccupations, clearly suggesting that only the former deserve our attention
31 Cf. Rawson (1969), 107-115.
32 Cf. Goldhill (1990); also Silk (2000), 9.
58the  battles  fought  for  both  the  establishment  of their  military  supremacy  and  the 
restoration  of  their  liberty.  Yet  Plutarch’s  objection  is  restricted  to  tragedy  as 
‘performance’ -  and all that this entails. The poetic content may be useful and important 
for educational and other purposes, but it is the financial cost of performances which is 
problematic. Although Plutarch recognises that tragedy is popular and pleasant, in this 
essay  he  repeatedly  lays  emphasis  on  the  contrast  between  ‘real’  heroes  (on  the 
battlefield) and tragic heroes (on stage), and employs theatre in an epideictic or even 
polemic approach to characterise everything that is more concerned with words instead of 
actions. So arguably the real/illusionary antithesis emerges here again and brings the two 
essays under discussion in this chapter closer regarding their standpoint.
The outcome of this comparison is not positive for tragedy and for all those involved in 
its production and performance. In the end it seems to be a comparison on two different 
levels, as the value of tragedy and history are not equal; tragedy’s positive effects are 
temporary and superficial, in contrast to those of historical and military action, which 
offer the city a true reason for pride and glory, even many years after the achievement.33 
In Plutarch’s words:
(348D )  ci  o u ra x ;  r)  YLvpm idov  orxfria.  kou  v)  'L o^ oK ^kooq Ao y io v tjq   kou  to   A i< r% u \ov  otoiao, 
t i   T (ov  (k)(r% €pa)v  aTrf)XXaJ;ev  % n  Tutv h ip m p o o v   T te p te rm n p e v ,  aJqiov  y e   r a  dpafM vra,  To?q 
T ponauotq  avm rapatO eT vad  kou  r tp   <rrparrryyiq)  to   Q ea rp o v  a vra va u rrrjo -a u   kou  ro u q  
a p u rre ia u q  T a q  B iB curK oX iaq a v T in a p a fia fa T v .
If in this manner the wisdom of Euripides, the eloquence of Sophocles, and the 
poetic magnificence of Aeschylus rid the city of any of its difficulties or gained for 
her any brilliant success,  it is right to  compare their tragedies with trophies of 
victory, to let the theatre rival the general’s office, and to compare the records of 
dramatic performances with the prizes for excellence at war. (348D)
Tragic performances are contrasted to war and its effects in a comparison which does not 
favour them.  Even  the  three  great tragedians  cannot be  of any  practical  benefit  for
33 Plutarch stresses also elsewhere, e.g. in Political precepts, that the glory or fame of a performance does 
not last for long (823E:  ‘So, observing these things, we must not be humiliated or overwhelmed by the 
reputation which the masses gained from theatres, kitchens, and assembly-halls, remembering that it lasts a 
short time  and  ends  the minute the  gladiatorial  and  dramatic  shows  are  over,  since  there  is  nothing 
honourable or dignified in this reputation’).
59Athens, since they cannot solve any of its problems. Plutarch, once again, ignores the 
original historical context (the practical value of the works of the tragedians was widely 
recognised in all antiquity and beyond) -  this move is effectively prejudging the issue by 
the choice of criteria, which are always going to favour the practical.34 At the same time 
Plutarch does not treat tragedy as part of the Greek cultural heritage that still survives in 
his days, whereas he treats the historical achievements of the classical years -  already 
‘ancient’ history in his days -  as something live and present. However, he acknowledges 
certain virtues of the three tragedians: he shows his respect for Euripides’ wisdom, for 
Sophocles’  eloquence and for Aeschylus’  grandeur, although somehow all three words 
(uav<f)ta\ “hyyionqq”, “<rrofia”) have a spot of ambivalence about them. One wonders if by 
“otx^/a”  Plutarch  is  here  also  thinking  of  some  kind  of  ‘sophistry’,  ‘cunning’;  if 
hints at a touch of garrulity in Sophocles’ style; and if by “<rro^a” he attributes 
bombast to Aeschylus.
At 348B-C Plutarch calls tragedy wnanr),  ‘deceit’, and here again Gorgias’  remark on 
(xtoxttj is exploited:
Tjv& qtre  b ’  rj  T p a y q tb ia   kou  btefiorjB r),  O a u ficu rrb v  a tc p o a fia   kou  S e a fia  tm v   t o t ’  a v 9p a m a )v  
y e v o fie v r)  kou  n apa/JX oQ o’a   ro?g  fivO otg  kou  T otg  -naJdeartv  am aT T )v,  (bg  T o p y ia g   fa tr 'iv ,  r)v  o 
t ’  a.TTa.TrjO'OLg  biK au orepog  to v   fir)  am arrvyraurrog,  kou  o  a n a rrjB e ig   orxfxirrepog  to v   fir) 
am a.Tr)6evT og.  o  fie v   y a p   a-naT T ftrag  diK a u o rep o g ,  b n   to v 9’  im oa% 6fie v o g   n e n o ir)K € v   o   # ’ 
a /n a rr fie ig  o rx fx b rep o g ’  euaA oirov y a p   v t f   rfio v rjg  X o y w v  t o  psr)  a v a to Q rfro v .
But tragedy  blossomed  onwards  and  won  great acclaim,  becoming  a wondrous 
entertainment for the ears and eyes of the men of that age, and, by the mythological 
character of its plots, and the vicissitudes which its characters undergo, it effected a 
deception wherein, as Gorgias remarks, ‘he who deceives is more honest than he 
who  does  not  deceive,  and  he  who  is  deceived  is  wiser  than  he  who  is  not 
deceived’.  For he  who  deceives  is  more  honest,  because  he  has  done what he 
promised to do; and he who is deceived is wiser, because the mind which is not
34 This is articulated most  lucidly by the characters in Aristophanes’  Frogs, where the contribution of 
poetry to die improvement of the city is acknowledged -  on this point cf. Too (1998), 48-49.
60insensible  to  fine  perceptions  is  easily  enthralled  by  the  delights  of language.
(348B-C)
Again here the issue of illusion versus reality comes into play. For Plutarch, deception is 
an important aspect of tragedy, if not one of its main traits. Both the representation of the 
mythical character of the plot  and the characters’ sufferings (“7rafleeriv”) lead to
deception. We have already seen something of this treatment of anarv) (p. 55), and this is 
where the two works we are treating come together, but this time the nature of the deceit 
is  explored  more  elaborately.  Gorgias’  remark,  phrased  like  a  sophistic  conundrum, 
indicates the inevitable effect of anary as referring both to the actors on stage and to the 
audience. In tragedy, according to Plutarch’s interpretation of Gorgias’ remark, deception 
works on three levels: firstly, the material is false, since the plot is based on myth and not 
history; secondly, the audience is deceived, as tragedy performed on stage makes the 
audience confuse the real with the imaginary; and thirdly, the actors themselves pretend 
to be other than they really are, thus causing confusion in their own personality and 
character, since theatrical conventions compel them to adopt various ethical values and 
behave in somebody else’s manner (cf. 345E, and above, p. 54 n. 19)35  -  and might not 
the effect of acting and  speaking with the mouth and the personality of the character 
whom  the  actor  impersonates  be  disastrous  for the  consistency  of his  character and 
behaviour if transferred to real life?
At  348E  Plutarch  goes  one  step  further  in  his  ‘polemic’  against the  lavishness  that 
tragedy presents in performances; he describes tragedy as a statue, and tragic actors as its 
decoration. Again Plutarch presses here the issue of practical value, hence the emphasis 
on the visual trappings of tragedy (on the stage and on the street of tripods). His language 
is harsh and derogatory, especially when he refers to bad examples of tragic actors, such 
as  Callipides,  Nicostratus,  Polus  and  others,  who  contribute  nothing  but  lavish  and 
exaggerated ornaments to tragedy:
35 For this tripartite deception see De Lacy (1952), 159. On the connection between falsehood and tragedy 
cf. also Plato’s Cratylus 408c: “evTaiJfo yap tO^ettrrot oi (ivSoi Te kou to, \l/evfrq etrrtv, 7rcpi tov Tpa/yiKOv fitov” 
(‘for tales and falsehoods are most at home there, in the tragic life’). Plutarch makes use here of a less 
qualified version of Plato’s argument, contrasting to the unplatonic line he took e.g. in How a young man... 
which was more accommodating to literature.
61(348E)  ...k o u   <tk€va$ kou  Ttpotrumeia. kou  ^topuovq kou ywjxawau; a/no o'Kvjvrfc nepiaucrou$ 
kou  Tpiirodauz entvtKiovq  KopuCpvre^'  Tpa/yiKoi  ft’  aunroT<; imoKptrou [k ou] NiKOOTpa/rot  kou 
KoAAiTrrri^u  kou  M^viVkoi  kou  Qeo&opot  kou  ITcoA o/  a v virw a ra /v ,  coairep  yvvauKoq 
noXvreXovi;  v fjq   Tpa/yqxSiou;  KOfiputrrau  kou  di< j> po< f> 6poi,  fiaXXov  (i>$  ouyaXfJukrtov 
eyKoujarrau  kou xpuowrau kou fia4>ei$ noLpou<dXou9ovvr€g.
...Let them bring with them their equipment, their masks and altars, their stage 
machinery, their revolving changes of scene,36 and the tripods that commemorate 
their victories. Let their tragic actors accompany them, men like Nicostratus and 
Callippides, Mynniscus, Theodorus and Polus,  who robe Tragedy and bear her 
litter, as though she were some woman of wealth; or rather, let them follow on as 
though they were painters and gilders and dyers of statues. (348E)
Theatre imagery, here as also throughout the essay, is useful for Plutarch to encapsulate a 
whole set of ideas concerning the ‘arty’ life as opposed to life of action, all bound up with 
history, writing, painting, statuary and the like. Plutarch, once again, draws a comparison 
between  tragedy  and  imitative  arts  (paintings,  statues).37  The  comparison  entails  that 
tragedy  is  something  impractical,  like  a  statue.  Moreover,  the treatment  of statue  is 
idiosyncratic in this train of thought, as is also the treatment of theatre itself38 Arguably 
Plutarch is interested more in the significance of a statue than its appearance, in the ideas 
it conveys rather than in its aesthetic value. As Mossman remarks, the writings of poets 
and authors of fiction are connected with the more pejorative idea that images only offer 
an  imperfect  and  sometimes  delusory  version  of reality.  Tragic  actors,  painters  and 
gilders of statues are all concerned with producing deception.39
At the beginning of this passage Plutarch  also refers to the tragic equipment.  Again, 
everything,  namely  the  tragic  masks,  the  machine,  the  altar  and  the  other  tragic
36 We must bear in mind that these are features of theatre contemporary with Plutarch; so, Plutarch is not 
criticising the classical theatre here.
37 About mimesis and Plutarch’s conception of it in the essay see Van der Stockt (1990b), 174-177.
38 For a hill discussion of Plutarch’s use of statues see Mossman (1991). Statues are of inadequate value if 
compared to living originals (p. 100). Mossman discusses representative examples of the use of statues in 
tragedy to show that Plutarch makes a similar use of them. In both tragedy and Plutarch there are statues 
which are substitutes for the people they represent, and statues which are used in similes (p. 103). They are 
used  either to create pathos or irony, or as symbols of the futility of human pride (p.  107).  Cf.  also 
Wardman (1967) and (1974), 140-152.
39 Mossman (1991), 109.
62contrivances  constitute  evidence  of a  great  dramatic  victory;  however,  this  kind  of 
evidence  is  for Plutarch of only poor value.  At the  same time he contrasts dramatic 
victories with military triumphs which are unquestionably more  significant.  One also 
notes that the image of deceptive tragedy is supported by Plutarch’s reference to painters; 
painters can ‘give life’ to statues and pictures (with the colours and the material they use), 
and  likewise  actors  can  provide  tragedy  with  grandeur  by  using  various  kinds  of 
equipment, but they must know that this grandeur is far from lasting for as long a time as, 
for  example,  military  glory  lasts  (cf.  347C:  “wot’  el  tou$  Qoypa^ovvrag  ovk  a£tov 
TrapafiaJ^eiv to?g oTpasrrfl'oTg, p/rjde rovg loropovvraug TzapafiaXXioyuev’’ —  ‘ So, if it is unworthy 
to compare painters with generals, let us not compare historians either’).40
Plutarch makes a series of comparisons which are supposed to bring out his (suggested) 
antithesis between poetry (tragedy) and history, poets and historiographers, actors and 
heroes, men of words and men of action, artists and writers, myth and life, words and 
deeds, illusion and reality 4 1  His objection is not confined to tragedy, but extends into the 
area of historiography as well.  As he  finds  fault with the truth which the tragedians 
convey, he makes analogous comments for the accounts of historians who, although they 
themselves are not part of any historical events, make claims on the glory gained by those 
who rightly deserve to be glorified (345F: “avoKXarai yap aim t& v % paTrovrcav enl rovg 
ypab^omaq kou  avakapmei do% r)< ; euhoXov aAAorp/os, epujxtivofiei^y; 81a. ratv A oywv Tvjg TtpaJ^eax; 
(bg ev eoxmrpep” -  ‘For there is reflected from the men of action upon the men of letters an 
image of another’s glory, which shines again there, since the deed is seen, as in a mirror, 
through the agency of their words’).
When referring to the example of Xenophon, Plutarch stresses that he, unlike the other 
‘passive’  narrators-historiographers,  deserves  some  of the  glory  which  his  narrative 
generates,  since  he was both  actor and  narrator of the historical  events he described
40 About this passage see Van der Stockt (1990b), 177.
41 Aristotle, too, compared history with poetry in his Poetics but along quite different lines (cf. above, p. 
39).  De  Ste.  Croix (2001)  discusses  especially Poetics  1451a 36-b  11,  where Aristotle,  in  contrast to 
Plutarch  here,  proceeds to  draw the  conclusion that  ‘poetry  is  something more philosophic  and  more 
worthwhile (“trnoviatorrepov”) than history, because poetry deals rather with universals [“to, ko0’ © A ou”], 
history  with  particulars  [“r» K<tff  enao-rov”]’  (p.  391).  Aristotle  places  poetry above  history.  Cf.  also 
Walbank (1960), 217-219.
63(345F). The attitude of those historiographers who seek to be glorified for the events they 
just narrate is judged as wrong for one more reason: it resembles very much the attitude 
of the tragic actors who often merge themselves with the characters they play, in order to 
gain for themselves the heroes’ glory and success (345E: “oi  aXkoi rravreg loropiKoi [...] 
aXXorpta)v  yeyovamv  epycov  anmep  dpapatwv  imoKpiraJ,  Tag  t< ov  OTpaTqy&v  kou  fZauriXeaiv 
npafietg  diartQefievoi  kou  Tauq  eKetvoiv  imoduofievot  p.vr)fxauq,  i'v’  dig  au'yrjg  Tivog  kou  (fxorog 
tieTourxuxrtv” -  ‘But all the other historians [...] have been for the exploits of others what 
actors  are  for  plays,  exhibiting  the  deeds  of the  generals  and  kings,  and  merging 
themselves with their characters as tradition records them, in order that they might share 
in a certain effulgence, so to speak, and splendour’). The historians who compete with 
their  figures,  exactly  like  performers,  arguably  violate  propriety  and  do  harm  to 
themselves by creating an illusion. Plutarch’s evaluation of historiography is consistent 
with his view of tragedy,  and the two genres  are assimilated to one another;  but his 
broad-brush view on reflected glory is only established by the petitio principii that the 
doers of deeds are the really meritorious ones.
While Plutarch is generally rather chary of praising imitative arts, including painting and 
poetry, at 347A he detects some (basic) affinity in the aim of those two arts, since they 
both  aim  to  represent vividly emotions  and characters.  But exactly this  vividness  of 
representation, which is essential for theatrical performances (and paintings), may be also 
one of the aims of the historians. Thucydides is named as an example of historians who 
strive to achieve a certain vividness in his writing:
(347A) o  £’  ouv  SovKvdifrry;  a€i  rq)  "kbyq>  7IP0£ raurrjv apuXkarai  rvjv  evapyeiav,  olov 
OeaTTjV  TTOt'rj&a.i  tov  aKpoarvjjv  kou  to,  yivofieva  nepi  tou< ;  opatvrag  etcnX'tficriKa  kou 
TopaucriKa natSv) Toig ava/yivaxrKouo'tv evepyaercurdcu \i%vevofievo<;.
Thucydides is certainly always striving for this vividness in his writing, since it is 
his desire to make the reader a spectator, as it were, and to produce vividly in the 
minds  of  those  who  peruse  his  narrative  the  emotions  of  amazement  and 
consternation which were experienced by those who beheld them. (347A)
Moreover, writers,  in this case mainly historians, are  said to take on a role which is 
decidedly secondary in the sense that their history gains value only because of the real
64value of the acts described (345C ff.) -  that same petitio principii. Although the best 
historian is the one who manages the best mimesis (347A: “ kou  t m v   loroptK&v K panoro$ o 
t t)v  tinf)yr)(nv  axmep  ypa/fyrjv  iraBeoi  kou  npoowrmig  eifaXtmot'rjO'ac;”  —   ‘The most effective 
historian  is  he who,  by a vivid representation of emotions and characters,  makes his 
narration  like a painting’),  it is  assumed that this kind of mimesis must clearly take 
second place to the original. Evidently, Plutarch applies comparable strictures to tragedy 
and historiography concerning mimesis. Historians take on  features of the tragedians’ 
style, so as to make the readers feel as spectators of the history narrated, ‘performed’ in 
front of them.42 In this way emotions of amazement and consternation are raised in the 
reader-spectator:  “to  ytvofieva  nepi  rovq  opoivrau;  eicrOwiKTiKa  kou  rapoucriKa.  ttoBv)  t o ?$ 
ava/yivdxncownv evepyauraujQou” (347A), a statement which hints at tragedy’s effect on the 
audience, and illustrates an affinity between tragedy and visual art.
Further light on the value of historiography which Plutarch attributes to good mimesis is 
shed by the proem of Pericles, and the proem of Nicias, which suggests that for rhetorical 
purposes the essay is pushing a particular line further than Plutarch, in another genre or 
mindset, would find comfortable 43 In the former (1.2-2.4) the art of painting is compared 
to history, and, although the train of thought is quite different, Plutarch suggests that 
good mimesis can itself impact on real life achievement. The ‘pleasure’ gained from the 
vision of bright and pleasant colours is contrasted to the usefulness of reading about other 
men’s virtuous deeds which invite the reader to imitate them, thus contributing to his/her 
own good (2.4: “to yap  k o X ov e< f> ’  aurro ’ npaucuKox; Kivei kou npaucnicrjv eu9u$ oppxp evriQrjtriv, 
'fjfkmoiouv ou rfj pufMyrei t o v Searvp/, aAAa rfj toropiqL t o v epyou rrjv rcpoaupemv napexofievov” —  
‘For  the  good  stirs  one  actively  towards  itself and  implants  immediately  an  active 
impulse,  forming  the  spectator’s  character  not  so  much  by  imitation  but  by  the 
investigation of the work, providing him with a characterful choice of action’; and earlier, 
at 1.4: “tou/to  eoriv ev t o ?$  am*  aperffe epyoig,  a.  kou  Qrjhov riva   kou  TtpoBufjuav  ayoaybv efe 
pAVWiv efnroie? ro?g itrropyacuriv” -  ‘These things are found in works done out of virtue,
42  The author’s attempt to make his narrative more vivid and emotionally more engaged and effective, 
reminds us of the ecphrasis and its importance in works of literature -  cf. Bartsch (1989), 109-143.
43 On the proems of Plutarch’s Lives and the principal themes and techniques which Plutarch employs in 
them see e.g. Stadter (1988).
65which implant in those that investigate them a sort of emulation and desire which leads to 
imitation’). The focus is on the impact, which good imitation may have on the readers, by 
stirring them up towards imitation of the ‘virtuous’ in their life.
In the second passage, in Nicias’ prologue, Plutarch explicitly refers to Thucydides and to 
his virtues as a historian. As Pelling notices,44 in contrast to what Thucydides is today 
most admired for, Plutarch here seems to base his admiration on the aesthetic value of his 
work, namely on his emotional, vivid and varied narrative (Nic.  1.1: “...o tto x; erri rous 
diiwrfrretrtv  aug  &ouKV$idr)<;,  aurd$  ourrov  7repi  toOra  TzaJhjTiKarra.TO<;  evapyeararo^ 
TtoiKiXarrarfx; yevofievtx;, apAp/rjray; e^eirqvoxe”) (‘...as I treat the events that Thucydides has 
already handled  incomparably:  in this part of his narrative he was  indeed at his most 
emotional,  vivid,  and  varied’).  This  remark  of Plutarch  on  Thucydides’  enargeia  is 
comparable to what he suggests at 347A, in the passage quoted. Interestingly, all three 
passages make a significant point concerning Plutarch’s stance toward historiography, 
toward his own work, and furthermore toward tragedy. Plutarch’s own work is mimesis, 
but he sees it as having a practical purpose, since it educates and offers examples 45
Contrary to Thucydides’ treatment of history which is vivid but emotionally restrained, 
there  were  other  historians,  like  Duris  of  Samos,  Phylarchos,  or  Timaeus  of 
Tauromenium, who were more strident examples of sensational historiography and aimed 
to  write history with the emotional  impact of tragedy (‘tragic history’).  For Polybius 
tragedy and history are not compatible.  Yet Plutarch is not entirely consistent on the 
issue,  although  both  are  very  critical  towards  the  historians  who  did not  respect the 
particular aims of history as opposed to those of tragedy.46 However, as Mossman proves
44 Pelling (1990d) = (2002a), 117.
45  For a detailed  analysis of the multiple levels of mimesis  and their interpretation  in the prologue of 
Pericles see Duff (1999a), 34-42.
46 On ‘tragic history’ see Walbank (1955), (1960), (1972), 34-43, (1985), (2002), 231-241, esp. 236-239; cf. 
also Brink (1960), Russell (1973), 123, Wardman (1974), 168-179, Pelling (1980) = (2002a), esp. p. 111 n. 
27, Desideri (1984), Mossman (1988), 91-92, Duff (2004), 280 (esp. n. 31, where he interestingly questions 
the very existence of a school of ‘tragic history’), and Van der Stockt (2005), 298-305 (esp. pp. 299-303).
66with  the  examples  she  gives  from Alexander and  Demetrius,  Plutarch  himself partly 
succumbs to the charms of tragic history, thus assimilating tragedy to history.47
Despite any reservations about tragic writing that often surface in the Lives, there are also 
many tragic tinges and hints that Plutarch himself uses to give depth to his writing. The 
different  strands  of thinking  about  tragedy  we  have  found  in  the  Essays  reflect  a 
multiplicity of perspectives that also surfaces in the narratives of the Lives. We shall see 
a good deal of this later in the thesis.
47 Mossman (1988), 85 and 91 ff. Cf. De Lacy (1952), 168-171, Tagliasacchi (1960), 129 ff., and Wardman 
(1974), 178. Walbank (1985) makes a similar point about Polybius: although his stance towards history was 
anti-tragic, in his own narrative there are hints of tragic colouring.
673. The role of tragedy in On Exile
Introduction
(.Demosth.  1.1)  'O   pev  ypa.ipau;  to  em  rft  v'ikj)  rife  ’OXupmcunv  tmro8pofua$  eig 
’AAjafita&qv  eyKCoptov,  err’  Evpnrt'drfc  cb$ o  ttoXik;  KpareT X6yo<;,  effl  erep6$  n$ ijv,  w 
Xoorrie XeveKi'cov, <fnjai xprjvau rip evfiaupovt npcbrou \mup£au “rav rmkiv evdoKipov”m  eyd) 
tie rip fiev evdaupovytreiv peXXovrt rvjv adsrjBtv'rjv evdoupovtav,  $ $   ku jjflet  kou  iiaMoet  to  
TiXeiarov eartv, ovdev ijyovpau diaujfepetv adoigou kou   raneivifc ita,rpi8o$ nij pnqrpos apopfav 
kou  ptKpa$ yeveaBau.
The author of the encomium upon Alcibiades for his victory in the chariot-race at 
Olympia, whether he was Euripides, as the prevailing report has it, or some other, 
says,  Sosius  Senecio, that the  first requisite to  a man’s  happiness  is  birth  in  a 
‘famous city’; but in my opinion, for a man who would enjoy true happiness, which 
depends for the most part on character and disposition, it is no disadvantage to 
belong to an obscure and poor city, any more than it is to be bom of a mother who 
is without beauty and of little stature. (DemosthA A)
This is the prologue of the Life o f Demosthenes, and although it is not about exile (it does 
not mention exile at all),  it could serve as a very good  introduction to the subject of 
banishment which Plutarch discusses in a separate essay with that title (“Ilepi <far»k”)>  
since it touches upon important themes for the argument of that essay.1  The main point in 
these first lines quoted above is that no famous city or noble lineage can guarantee true 
happiness,  or should be regarded as a prerequisite towards achieving it;  instead,  it is 
rather one’s character and disposition which plays the major part (“ev tfBet  kou  foa&oei t o  
TrXeiorov earn;”) towards reaching, or not reaching, happiness. Moreover, this is the main 
line on which Plutarch draws to develop his argument in the essay On Exile. Adopting a 
rationalistic approach to the subject rather than a more emotional approach that the issue 
of exile would seem to invite by its nature -  he claims that there is not one single place, 
the  place  of birth,  that  one  must  regard  as  his  homeland,  but  a  homeland  can  be
1  On this prologue see recently Zadorojnyi (2005), and on the rhetoric of the whole Life see Mossman 
(1999). About the proems in the Lives see Stadter (1988), and about the constructed narrator and narratee in 
them see Pelling (2002c) and (2004b), esp. pp. 407-412 (on Demosthenes' prologue).
68potentially any place which one chooses to live in or is compelled to resort to (in case one 
is exiled).2 Consequently, a man should not think of happiness as something strictly and 
exclusively interwoven with his homeland but should consider it to be a good (ouya86v) 
which he can attain in any city or village, provided that he himself, by his own character 
and attitude, develops the appropriate conditions for that purpose.
Living in a different historical reality from the classical city-states, Plutarch attempts to 
disconnect polis and patris —  and consequently also to weaken the bond between the 
citizen and the city for the rhetorical purposes of his consolation-treatise -  two concepts
•   * 3 which in the archaic and classical Greece were generally considered to be identical.  In 
addition,  he  distances  himself from  most  of the  literature  before  him  (e.g.  Homer, 
Tyrtaios,  Alcaeus,  Theognis,  Herodotus,  Xenophon,  Euripides,  Andocides,  Isocrates, 
Cicero, Ovid, Seneca), i.e. from authors who either just described single cases of exiles 
and discussed different sides of banishment, or wrote about exile based on their personal 
experience.4 In literature exile was generally presented as a terrible misfortune, since it 
implied the loss of  patris, which defined the identity of a hero or citizen. Plutarch rejects 
this view and recasts the consolatio-tradition under a different light by arguing in this 
essay that exile should be actually nothing to console one about. The topic of exile was 
popular  also  for  the  Hellenistic  diatribe;  among  others,  writers  about  exile  included 
Teles, Musonius Rufus, Favorinus, and Dio Cassius (all profoundly influenced by cynic- 
stoic doctrines)5 -  and it is from them that Plutarch, partly, borrows many conventional 
consolatory topics (topoi).
2  About places of Roman exile see Baldson (1979),  112-115. He also discusses the different forms of 
banishment in Rome (relegatio, deportatio, etc.) in Imperial times (pp.  102-115). Cf. also Seibert (1967), 
and (1979); Nielsen (2004), and Forsdyke (2005) (about exile in Greece).
3  On the meaning of patris and  patriotism  (which is also traced  in the Demosthenes-prologue, 2.2) in 
archaic and classical times see Dover (1974),  161-163,  186, 231, 296-299, and Nielsen (2004). Passages 
where polis appears as a synonym of patris include: Hdt. 6.109.6, 8.61.1, Lysias 31.6, Xenophon’s. Hell. 
4.4.6,4.8.28, Isocr. 3.23.14.13. Demosth. 20.51, 21.15, Plato’s Crit. 51c, Laws 856d.
4 See Odys. 9.34, 15.228, 23.120, II.  13.695-696, Hdt. 1.150.1, Andoc. On the Myst. 5, Eur. Troad  1272- 
1274, Sen. Cons. Helv., Ov. Tr. 2, Epistles from Pontus (for the two works and their place in Ovid’s poetics 
of exile cf. Nagle (1980), and Williams (1995)). For more examples from various authors and genres see 
Seibert (1979), 275 ff, and Nielsen (2004), 51-57.
5 Cf. Pisani (1992), 463, and Caballero and Viansino (1995), 16-17.
69On Exile
In the opening of On Exile Plutarch refers to tragedy, and more specifically to the tragic 
chorus. The use of tragedy in this programmatic statement allows Plutarch to encapsulate 
his rationalising approach by using an extreme example of sympathy to articulate the 
difference between emotion and reason. His argument concerns how to treat a friend who 
has fallen into adversity. The words addressed to him should be encouraging and helpful, 
and have a positive effect on him, or at least they should aim to mitigate the cause of 
distress and not to make things worse. If the adviser who takes up the role to comfort a 
friend  does  not  follow  the  right  path  of encouragement  and  does  not  use  the  right 
technique, then exactly the opposite result is achieved, and he may resemble one who is 
unable  to  swim  and  yet  tries  to  save  somebody  who  is  drowning  (599B).  Plutarch 
introduces himself as a friend and as an author who takes on the task of offering moral 
advice to the specific or general reader of his letter of consolation.6 The second simile 
which Plutarch introduces at this point refers us directly to the tragic context, although it 
describes an aspect of real life:
(599B)  ou  yap  ovvUkucpvovTcov  kou  (ruvemOpvjvouvrtov  axmep  %opGsv  rpotyiKcov  ev  TO?g 
aflovX'TfroH; xpeiav exofiev, aAAa noy>prpiat£ofieva)v kou  didaurK O vrcov ori t o  XmreTaSou kou 
t o  ranetvouv eauurov eni naunri puev axpyorov ecrrt  kou ytvoyuevov K evax;  kou  owwjtco^. ..
It is not partners  in tears and  lamentation,  like tragic choruses, that we need in 
unwished-for circumstances, but men who speak frankly and instruct us that grief 
and self-abasement are everywhere futile, that to indulge in them is unwarranted 
and unwise... (599B)
Here as elsewhere tragedy can be used to express aberrant behaviour, behaviour which is 
criticised as inappropriate because it fails to address reality. Plutarch criticises the excess 
of reaction:  the  role  of the  tragic  chorus  as  a  group  of people  who  accentuates the 
suffering by lamenting with and for the characters is far from being commendable as the 
model for the reaction of a friend in a similar situation.7 For example, in OT (1297 ff.) or 
in  the  Persians  (843  ff.)  the  chorus  weeps  together  with  the  main  character;  yet  in
6 Cf. Opsomer (2002), 290.
7 For more on the dramatic role of the chorus, its Active identity and its contribution to the drama see e.g. J. 
Gould (1996).
70Antigone the chorus is not sympathetic.8 Whether choruses are sympathetic or not, the 
element of sympathy is emphatically underlined -  even by the absence of sympathy. One 
also  notices  here  that  in  Plutarch’s  language  there  is  a  reflection  of his  attitude  in 
minimising the ‘unfortunate’ side of the situation; he is decidedly euphemistic (“ev roTq 
afiovXrrrots”). The true friend should be honest and advise the person in adversity towards 
a stance of life which does not allow grief and self-degradation in the course towards 
recovering  and  acting  wisely  thereafter.  This  life-as-drama  metaphor  shows  that  the 
theatrical conventions must not be applied to ‘real life’.9 However strong the emotional 
engagement of theatrical participants (chorus) may be, however (theatrically) necessary 
their compassion seems to be on stage and within the play, this kind of behaviour in real 
life, where practical decisions need to be taken for the future, is not merely unhelpful but 
actually detrimental.
And indeed there are similar implications in Plutarch’s Lives. There, again, we see that 
there is no space for pity for a ‘great man’ who, after achieving great fame in his life, by 
showing  admirable  qualities,  fails  to  cope  with  adversities,  such  as  banishment.  As 
Pelling  has  remarked  in  his  detailed  discussion  of  ‘pity  in  Plutarch’,1 0   there  are 
circumstances when, if a hero reacts in such a way as to make pity appropriate, then he 
can be blamed; and Plutarch does not refrain from reproaching him with reprehensible 
behaviour, as e.g. the Lives of Cicero and Demosthenes show (Cic. 32; Demosth. 26).1 1  
Surprisingly, the two men proved to be unable to cope with their banishment in a decent 
way, showed no courage and spent their lives in great misfortune and idleness. Their case
8 On adding our own laments to somebody’s misery see also (the example of the flatterer in) How to tell a 
flatterer from a friend 56A (“of 7raAAoi.. .yuxXXov imo r&v awemBprjvovvraw a/ywrau  k o u   awoSvpofievtov”) (cf. 
55D: “o k o X o J E ,. . .o-uvqutkov aei k o u   ovful>9e>yy6ttevo$n), and Consolation to his wife 610A-C. Cf. also Dialogue 
on love 749A: “ij i tpotjxuru;.. .%opov cure? avpunaQfj” -  Autobulus at the start of die dialogue points out that the 
debate only needs a sympathetic chorus and a stage to become a dramatic performance.
9 See also my chapter on How to tell a flatterer from a friend, where exactly this argument is sustained.
1 0  Pelling (2005a), esp. p. 302.
1 1  Interestingly, in the Demosthenes-Cicero Synkrisis, Plutarch presents Demosthenes in a slightly different 
light, not as a great man who was  lamenting for being driven out of his country (Demosth.  26.5-7) -  
indecent behaviour for such a great man -  but rather as a good, conscientious citizen who, in contrast to 
Cicero,  offered  much  to  his  country,  both  when  in  exile  and  after  coming  back.  Plutarch  makes  his 
appreciation of this quality of Demosthenes even more emphatic by contrasting his attitude with that of 
Themistocles and Alcibiades, when they faced the same adversity (Synkr. 4.3-4) -  they both even went as 
far as treachery (Them. 22 ff., and Ale. 23 ff).
71exemplifies  how  personal  failings  of  character  may  diminish  (former)  public 
preeminence.
The tragic touch at the beginning of the essay serves several purposes. Apart from its 
programmatic value,  it also prepares the reader for the  later quotations  from  specific 
tragic plays, and especially, as we will see, from Euripides’ Phoenissae, one of the most 
popular tragedies  quoted  in  Plutarch’s  work.1 2   It  is  perhaps  due  to  the  richness  and 
diversity  of themes  in  this  tragedy  that  Plutarch  uses  lines  from  the  Phoenissae  in 
different essays, always according to the needs of his argument. The quotations from this 
play as well as from other tragic plays have multiple functions. Plutarch often finds the 
most concise way to express his view on exile via poetry, particularly tragic poetry. So, 
instead of developing in this  case a theory about banishment, trying to  answer,  on  a 
theoretical level, questions such as whether exile is the ultimate misfortune for a man or 
not, or how one should act once in such a hardship, he prefers to be more pragmatic and 
explicit, taking specific examples  from the tragic tradition, and commenting on them, 
either rebutting or supporting them.
A tragic quotation may thus serve Plutarch as a way to summarise different views on 
exile, or present just one of the angles from which one could examine the matter. Such is 
the case, for example, at 599D-E, where he quotes from the Phoenissae:
— t i t © orepeoQ au TraTp'i&x;;  k o ko v fie y a ;
—  fieyiorov epyqt £’ etrri yuefcpv tj Aoyq>-  (Phoen. 388-389)
Joe. What is it like to be deprived of your country? Is it a great calamity?
Pol. The greatest: the reality far surpasses the description.  (599E)
Plutarch  does  not agree  with  Polyneices’  reply,  where he  claims the  exile  to  be  the 
greatest  evil  in  life  -   note  especially  here  the  superlative  (“/>ceyi<7T ov”)  and  the
12 Quotations in other essays: How a young man should listen to poetry 18D (w. 524-525), 23B (v. 1006), 
25B (w. 549-550), How to tell a flatterer from a friend 62C (v. 469, 472), 70A (v. 1742), 72C (v. 1688), 
73C (v.  528), Advice  on health  125D-E (w.  524-525),  Why does the  Pytfua  no  longer give  oracles  in 
verse? 407D (w. 958-959), On brotherly love 481A (w. 504-506, 536-538), 483E (v. 6 8), 484C (v. 539), 
On the love of offspring 497B (w. 439-440), On the love of wealth 526F (v. 368), Table talk 643F (w. 537, 
539),  Whether an elderly man should engage in politics 784A (v.  1688). Even Mastronarde (1994) says 
little about the popularity of the play in antiquity -  cf. Morgan (1988), 116, with the relevant nn. 99 and 
100; cf. also Cribiore (2001), 198-199.
72comparative (“/Aerpw”) forms of “pteya”, the adjective which Jocasta uses in her question. 
Plutarch explicitly states that he will refute the view of the majority which considers exile 
to be the ultimate misery in one’s life (599F: “'E<rra) Be Betvov, uxmep oi naAAoi Xeyovtn kou 
qvBovmv, y <j>vyy” -  'Assume that exile is a calamity, as die multitude declare in speech and 
song’) -  “oi TtoXkoi” here may allude to the ‘unwise’ people, as also at 600D it is used as 
the opposite of ‘the wise’:  “oi yev vouv €% ovt€ < z...to? < ; Be 7toAAo^”; even the language is 
suggestive of Plutarch’s view.1 3  It is certainly not without importance that he mentions 
song here (“$£ownv”): probably he is thinking of sung poetry; this could include lyric 
poetry but it is more likely that he thinks primarily of tragedy, as the example he has 
chosen to attack (Polyneices/Euripides) derives from that genre.
Poetry also provides the reply to the Euripidean character by means of words placed in 
the mouth of Aleman by the author of the following (Hellenistic) epigram:1 4  
XapBteg, ap%auoc, ■narrepmv voyo$, el yev ev uyuv 
erpe^ofiavy Kepvcu;  ri£ av vj youceXag 
%puoo<f>6po<;, prjamov koX c l Tuynava.' vvv Be yot ’AAKyaai 
ouvoyaL, kou 'LrcaLpTcu; elyu 7mhjrphmBo$, 
kou Mouoio^ eBa/rjv 'EAXyvtBau;, au ye rupawaiv 
9i)K0w AouTKvAeftj Kpetarrova kou T  uyea).
Sardis, of old the dwelling-place of my fathers,
had I been bred in you, then had I been
some priest or temple eunuch, tricked in gold,
smiting the beautiful kettledrums; now instead
my name is Aleman, and my country Sparta,
city of many tripods; I have been taught
the Hellenic Muses, who have made me better
than the despots Dascyles and Gyges.  (599E)
13 Cf. Caballero and Viansino (1995), 8 8 .
14 In the Anthol.  Pal., VII 709 [=frag. 9, Collectanea Alexandrina] the epigram is attributed to Alexander 
Aetolus, a Hellenistic poet of the 3r  cent. B.C. Cf. Pisani (1992), 464. Interestingly, Plutarch uses here a 
technique (i.e. to correct poetic lines by using other poetic lines) which he has prescribed in the How a 
young man... (cf. chap. 1, p. 33 ff.).
73The epigram addresses issues of loss and puts forward the present in contrast to the past: 
the person of the poem says that he would be a ‘nobody’ if he had stayed in his city but 
now that he lives as an exile in Sparta he has become a famous poet, even more famous 
than  those  two  important  figures,  Dascyles  and  Gyges.  The  negative  look  on  the 
homeland is part of the paradox on which Plutarch plays in this essay as it is also an 
important part of his argument, stressing the good that may derive from an adversity, and 
thus  adding  to  his  argument  some  educational  value.  The  epigram  echoes  Pindar’s 
Olympian  12. In the ode the poet makes the point that Ergoteles, Philanor’s son, would 
never had gained fame from his victories at Olympian and Nemean contests, had he not 
been driven from Knossos in Crete (w. 13-19).1 5
The quotation of the epigram, as all others in this essay, is carefully chosen by Plutarch to 
meet  his  target  of playing  down  the  principle  that  one  can  only  be  happy  in  one’s 
homeland. The specific citation could gain even more importance, if his addressee in this 
essay  is  Menemachus  of Sardis,  who,  as  implied  at  604B,  was  exiled  but  was  not 
confined to live in a specific place; in that case Plutarch specifically chose this epigram 
because of its reference to Sardis.16 Plutarch’s argument is of philosophical rather than of 
merely aesthetic value, and the same can be said about the quotations which he uses here: 
they are not decorative but embedded  in the general argument. The reader, on his/her 
part, must be especially alert to read closely the cited text, in order to be able to follow 
the argument throughout the essay.
Contrary to Polyneices, Aleman does not see exile as a great evil at all. Plutarch sees in 
him a wise man who made good use of (the turns of) his tyche, while in Polyneices he 
sees  a  man  to  whom  exile  was just  a misfortune,  an  event  which  turned  out to  be 
completely useless for his life and harmful to him.17  The contrast between the attitudes of
15 Compare Pythian 4, where Pindar combines the formal occasion of the ode (King Arcesilaus’ IV chariot- 
victory) with his immediate motive, by entering a plea for the recall of his friend Demophilus, a Cyrenean 
exile (w.  279-299).  For more on the two odes {Pythian 4  and Olympian  12) see Gildersleeve (1906), 
Burton (1962), and Braswell (1988).
16  Cf.  Pisani  (1992),  462,  470,  and  Caballero  and  Viansino  (1995),  7-10.  However  doubtful  the 
identification of Plutarch’s addressee in this essay, Plutarch explicitly dedicated his Political precepts to 
Menemachus; cf. C. P. Jones (1971), 43,110-111.
17 Cf. Barigazzi (1966), 252-253.
74the two is also reflected in the language which Plutarch uses, especially in the antithetical 
pev -  Be, and no less in the clear contrast between the two adjectives specifying exile 
(evxpycrrov  —   Buoxpqorov):  “to  yap  curro  Ttpa/yfia  Ttp  fiev  evxpqtrrov  v)  Bo£a...  rQ >   Be 
Buaxprynrov kou fShafiepov kimnpev” (‘Thus opinion had made the same event useful for the 
one, but useless and harmful to the other’) (599F). The one attitude is recommended as 
wise and beneficial, whereas the other implies that exile was, apart from useless, badly 
used -  “Butrxprpros” possibly treated here with its double meaning.
However, there are several interesting and complex issues that are raised by Plutarch’s 
use of Polyneices, if one reflects that Polyneices is, after all, not a typical example of an 
exile,  for  he  did  not  remain  idle  while  away  from  home:  instead  he  used  his  exile 
energetically and sought powerful connections in order to prepare his attack. So, apart 
from the  image of Polyneices as an exile,  in the Euripidean sub-text there is also the 
suggestion that he was in fact an example of inappropriate reaction to exile. But still, this 
returning exile with high ambitions to acquire absolute power represents for Plutarch the 
model  example  of the  type  of exile  which  he  attacks  in  this  essay.  He  is  indeed  a 
representative example of a person who was driven to exile because of his dissatisfaction 
with his lot and because he was no longer welcomed in his homeland, which are typical 
conditions in most of the cases of exiles. In choosing extreme cases, one could argue that 
Plutarch is in tune with the spirit of tragedy, which regularly seeks extreme examples to 
explore aspects of human experience.
Rather  than  Polyneices,  Plutarch  sides  with  Aleman  who  overcame  the  (supposed) 
calamity of exile and made the most out of that experience, following a philosophical 
course  of thought.  Philosophy,  both  as  a practical  activity  and  as  the  recommended 
attitude  in  life,  comes again  into play a few lines  later in  a reference by Plutarch to 
theatre, in this case to comedy:
(600B)  axmep  ouv ev  kidpudB'iql t'TfrvxvjKora <j>iXov  Bappeiv  kou  ttjv  tu%vjv  apujveaQcu 
napouoorfuov, epofievou, “nW rponovovnoKpiverou, “faXoowjxos” oi/tod^ kou qiieTs aurvrjv 
afjuji/wfieSoo ifuXotroxftovvreg a$W£‘
75“rov A /a Be -nux; uovra; rov (Zopeav Be rrai^;” 18 
As, then,  in the comedy a character who is urging an unfortunate friend to take 
heart  and  make  a  stand  against  Fortune,  when  asked,  ’How?’  replies,  ‘like  a 
philosopher’, so let us too make a stand against her by playing the philosopher 
worthily. But how are we to face
‘Zeus when he pours down rain? And how the North Wind?’ (600B)
By approving the comic character who exhorts his friend to show courage and to follow a 
philosophical path in his life, Plutarch recommends to his readers to apply to their own 
life the attitude of a philosopher towards any kind of misery by not remaining idle and 
passive but instead acting wisely (cf. 600B: “icoi yap ou% vopuevoi KaJfofoeOa ouBe kXmop&v” 
-  ‘in a rainstorm we do not sit idle or lament’). Contrary to other instances (already seen 
elsewhere),19  where Plutarch warns  us not to  imitate theatrical  behaviour  in our own 
lives,  here  he  encourages  us  to  be  taught  by  the  words  of  a  dramatic  character 
(“< w < 77rep...otmos  km  i^te^...”).  However,  the  quotation  catches  the  reader’s  attention 
because the recommended way of reaction and the good advice comes in this case from 
comedy, which is a less obvious genre than tragedy to provide philosophical lessons but 
still a genre which comes in some ways closer to ‘real life’ -  and this can partly justify 
Plutarch’s choice of the quotation in this case. Comic characters are usually portrayed as 
unable to  keep  good temper and to  show  steadfastness when  facing adversities;  they 
rather display weakness of character and often whimper about their misery.20 Yet in this 
case they display the kind of behaviour which Plutarch sets as a model. One notes also 
the oblique juxtaposition of tragedy (Polyneices) and comedy, the one being cast under a 
negative light here, and the other being given an unusual degree of dignity.21  Plutarch 
makes a highly pragmatic use of the material available.
Plutarch uses another powerful image to show that the view which presents banishment 
as an unbearable calamity is just an unfounded opinion, and therefore should not affect
18 Kassel and Austin (2001), adesp. 728 (=Kock, adesp. 118).
19 Cf. e.g. 599B-C (the image with the tragic chorus lamenting together with the tragic character for his 
miseries), discussed above, on pp. 71-72.
20 Cf. e.g. Strepsiades in Clouds, Xanthias in Frogs, Cinesias in Lysistrata.
21 Aristotle describes comedy as ‘a mimesis of baser characters’ (Poetics: 1449a 31-32: “ 13 tie #ca*up&a etrn'v 
[...] ftifjwu; iftauXarrepow”.
76us. The image is again related to the theatrical world (600E): children are sometimes, for 
no  particular  reason  perhaps,  afraid  of masks,  yet  we  usually  mitigate  their  fear  by 
bringing them closer to masks in order to get accustomed to them. Knowledge moderates 
fear in many cases, and reveals in this case all ‘the unsoundness, the hollowness and the 
tragic’ (“to aadpov  kou to  kevov kou Terpauyq^vjpevov awTOKaXimreiv”, 600E)22 of the masks. 
This is actually one of the rare moments in Plutarch where he comments on one of the 
theatrical devices and its aspects of deception, here created by the masks. By drawing on 
the  reader’s  familiarity with  masks,  Plutarch  turns a theatrical  image  into  a practical 
image which is economical and efficient. The mask may also stand here as a metaphor for 
the truth hidden underneath; behind the apparent calamity of the exile or of any other 
adversity, there is a reality which is not so hard to bear. According to Plutarch the fear of 
exile  is an  irrational  fear, as  is also children’s  fear.  Moreover,  banishment figures  in 
Plutarch as an evil coming only from outside and as something that can affect our life and 
psychology only if we appear weak,  idle and do nothing to  fight it with our internal 
strength. Banishment is an intolerable misery if we acknowledge it as such and do not see 
any good in it, or, rather, if we do not change it into anything which is good.23
As he will declare later on, in this essay Plutarch rejects the view that every man should 
be considered to have a native land, and develop a special, or, even more, an exclusive 
bond to it.24 ‘There is no such thing as a native land, any more than there is by nature a 
house or a farm or forge or surgery’, the Stoic Ariston had said,25 and Plutarch frilly 
adopts his view by adding that in each of those cases a thing is so named and called with 
reference to the occupant and user (600E-F). Tragedy can, as elsewhere, teach positive 
lessons, too; and Plutarch, to prove the rightness of his words, uses this quality of tragedy 
here by adopting Heracles’ words, who ‘rightly said’ (“cv pev 6 'HpaKA'fc efaev”):
’Apye?o$ $  &rfiauo$’  ov yap Ei>%opau
piaq* aTvaq pot rcupyof 'EAA^vcov Tzarpiq.  (TGF, adesp., frag. 392)
22 Apart from indicating the singing of the tale of a tragedy, “TpayqJteoftau” can also be used as to mean ‘tell 
in tragic style’, ‘declaim’, or even ‘exaggerate’; so, in a sense, it is connected to preposterous, pompous 
behaviour.
23 Cf. 600D-E, just before the mask-simile.
24 Cf. Lysias 31.6: “ttatra yfj narpi? airrotg etrrtv”, together with Carey’s comments on this passage and about 
the political importance of citizenship ((1989), 186-187).
25 SVF (ed. Von Arnim), i. 371, p. 85.
77An Argive I, or Theban, for I boast no single city; 
every fort in Greece is my country.  (600F)
Along the same lines, and in order to strengthen his argument, Plutarch invokes Socrates, 
who, he claims, did not call himself an Athenian or a Greek, but a ‘Cosmian’  (600F), 
‘because he did not shut himself within Sounion, Tainaros and the Cenaurian mountains’. 
The attribute ‘Cosmian’  is also, as Opsomer has noted, an obvious pun on the meaning 
‘orderly’,  ‘decent’,  ‘well-behaved’.26  Yet,  beyond  perhaps  its  justified  metaphorical 
connotations (those of a symbol of timeless wisdom), the attribute ‘Cosmian’ for Socrates 
is not justified either by his life -  he rarely left Athens -  or by the image which Plato and 
Xenophon  created  of him  in  their  works.  Plutarch  puts  forward  the  cynic  or  stoic 
representation of Socrates, which serves his rhetorical and authorial targets -  exactly as 
the Cynics and the Stoics attributed cosmopolitanism to Socrates as a ‘Socratic pedigree 
for their views’.27 Here again Plutarch remembers Euripides and cites his lines:
*0pfe tov inpou T& 1 /&’  ameipov auBepa
kou y ip  7 exovB'  uypau<; ev auyKaXau^  (TGF, frag. 941.1 -2)
You see there the boundless aether overhead
that holds the earth within its soft embrace?  (601 A)
Once  more the  quotation  does  not just  serve  illustration  purposes;  it is embedded  in 
Plutarch’s argument, and carefully selected for the specific point it makes. Plutarch turns 
the imagery offered by the citation, which notably is so general that it could be used in 
discussions of various issues, into a part of his sustained argument, and requires that the 
reader take it as such. By using the words of famous philosophers (of Socrates here, and 
earlier,  at  600F,  of Plato),  and  of popular  tragic  poets,  such  as  Euripides,  Plutarch 
manages to present his personal view on exile -  that the whole earth is our native land, 
and that ‘here no one is either an exile or foreigner or alien’ (601 A) -  as being of general 
value. His view is supposed to be not only a comfort for anybody found in that situation, 
but  also  a  ‘philosophy’,  a  stance  of life.  Plutarch  goes  one  step  further,  consciously
26 About this view and generally about the origins of cosmopolitanism see Opsomer (2002), 282 if.
27 Opsomer (2002), 282. Cf. Epict., Diatr. 1.9.1 (Epictetus argues that Socrates called himself a ‘Cosmian’ 
because of the kinship of god and humans), Cicero, Tusc. Disput. 5.37, and Diog. Laert. 6.63.
28 The lines are again quoted at 780D of the spurious (according to Teubner) To an uneducated ruler, and at 
919B of the Causes o f natural phenomena.
78arguing a paradox: he claims that, if we regard a single city as our homeland, then we 
consequently set our self as a stranger to all the other cities  (602B).29 Thus Plutarch 
achieves his two interlinked goals, the oblique use of public opinion about the definition 
of homeland, and the rhetorical manipulation of his material so as to serve the purposes 
of his argument.30
The sophistry is striking rhetorically since thereby Plutarch not only presents the bond 
between the  citizen  and  its city as  something that may  entail  dangers  (cf.  e.g.  602B 
above) but he also suggests that the homeland can be a prison, where the citizen is forced 
to live, no matter if the city happens to be inglorious, unhealthy, or in turmoil (602B: 
“ ...icav  ado£o£  7J,  Kaiv  vooxofrrfc,  now  TapaTrrjrau  orauretnv  u4>’  eainifc  kou  Ttpa/Ypa/rt  fj/r) 
v^iauvoumv'> ).  Bearing this  in mind, the Euripidean  line in  Telephus:  “27roprav eXaxeg, 
Taunuv Koafie  1” 31  (frag. 723.1) (‘Your lot is Sparta; look to Sparta then’) quoted in this 
context (602B) cannot possibly suggest for Plutarch useful guidance since it puts forward 
a passive approach  to  homeland.  The  line has a proverbial ring.  The moral  stance  it 
adopts is not one which Plutarch would always either accept or reject, as a comparison 
with its other use at 472D of the essay On tranquillity o f mind proves. There the same 
line  is cited, but in quite a different context: notably, Plutarch agrees with Euripides’ 
words and interprets them as urging us to wish to obtain things for ourselves which are in 
accordance to our personal qualities and calibre. This coheres with a tendency of Plutarch 
to use quotations of general value opportunistically, here particularly to attack those who 
exaggerate the value of the native city.
Plutarch supports the view that tyche gives us the freedom to choose the place where we 
wish to live and make it our ‘own city’: “ou  ^ tvxw  tVv  Wiouv  aufynpyrau,  roirrq) difiaxriv 
e%eiv  tv)v  apeo-aurav” (‘But Fortune grants possession of what city he pleases to the man 
she has deprived of his own’, 602B),32 and will later declare, in a most succinct way:
29 Cf. Musonius 41.11.
30 Plutarch is here heir to one strand of epideictic tradition. Cf. Kennedy (1972), 553 ff.
31 Euripides has: ‘Wvijv” instead of “Toyrov”.
32 Plutarch goes as far as regarding the feeling of not being bound to any specific place  as a great  privilege.
The kings of Persia used to spend every different season in a different region; in the same  way the  exile is
79“naur&v eartv efgovaia. TmXetov  fua^g KwDwtng” —  ‘the exclusion from one city is the freedom 
to choose from all* (604B), a remarkably positive way of seeing exile. In addition to this 
positive light which he casts on exile, he is creating a general reality which is partly un- 
historical.33  The truth  is that Plutarch’s  reasoning here  is only based on  the  specific 
situation of his addressee (obviously he was free to wander around the world as long as 
he did not return to his homeland -  cf. 604B).
Just before his discussion of tyche, at 601F-602A, Plutarch gave two examples of famous 
men who made the most out of their banishment, received kingly treatment as exiles and 
became first among many, Themistocles and Demetrius. He also quoted Diogenes the 
Cynic  who  replied  to  the  one  who  remarked:  ‘The  Sinopians  condemned  you  to 
banishment from Pontus’, by using the following words: ‘But I condemned them to stay 
there’;  there, adds Plutarch,  ‘where the waves of the Hostile Sea break’ -  a quotation 
from Euripides’ IT, v. 253: “aKpaig em pvyyfumv aJgevov nopov” (602A). The word “a§evou” 
creates a direct link with Plutarch’s topic, as exiles are also “a§evoi”, wandering around. 
However, the line  functions  in  favour of Plutarch’s argument since  it emphasises the 
potential limitations of the home city and presents the removal as a blessing.
At 607A-B we are given more examples of famous men and sons of exiled men, who 
offered glory to cities and who gained the appreciation and admiration of many people, 
who were not prejudiced against exiles; such were the cases of Theseus and Codrus for 
Athens, Eumolpus for Eleusis, and Heracles. Cadmus too, though ‘Phoenician bom’, did 
not  return  to  his  homeland,  ‘but  by  coming  to  Thebes  expatriated  his  ‘descendant” 
(“Oo/V/^ ne^uKwg,  ck £’  ”  opi&rau  “yevog”  eig rag  Oyfiag  napwyevofievog,  607B-C).  The 
quoted words are adapted from Euripides’ Phrixus (frag. 819.3), where the lines read as 
follows:  -ne^uKUig,  ck  £’  atieijZerai  yevog/  *EA XvpiKov”  (‘Phoenician  bom,  he
exchanged his race for Greek’). Plutarch suggests that, when somebody is reviled being 
called an ‘exile’  (cf. 607A: “aAA’ enoveitiurrov o (ftuyatg e<rri” —  ‘but ‘exile’  is a term of
free to stay in Eleusis during the Mysteries, in Athens during the Dionysia, to visit Delphi for the Pythian 
and Corinth for the Isthmian games, and generally he has a lot of leisure time and freedom (604C-D).
33 In Imperial times the exiled were not always free to choose the place of their exile, at least not in Rome. 
For a historical overview of the issue see Seibert (1979), Balsdon (1979), and the recent work by Forsdyke 
(2005).
80reproach’),  he  should use the poet’s words to reply to the affront,  since these words 
support the  argument that there are  well-known  examples of exiles  in antiquity who 
either were banished against their will or denied their homeland, but still became famous 
at the end. Plutarch picks up on the point made when he discussed the epigram about 
Aleman (599E); only there, he refuted Euripides to argue in favour of Aleman, whereas 
here he uses the tragedian’s voice as his own voice.
Plutarch’s renouncing of Polyneices’ view on exile becomes yet stronger and clearer at 
605F-606A, where he cites the same lines from the Phoenissae as at 599D-E but in a 
fuller version, indeed in a surprisingly extensive citation by Plutarchan standards. In the 
following words of Polyneices we have a clear declaration of his love for his homeland, 
an encomium patriae, as it were:34
—  tito orepeaQcu irarpfoos;  kokov fieya;
—  yukyiorov' epytp £’ eart yueiCpv %  Xoyip.
—  riq o rpoimg ainov; ri <f>uyamv to fiu< rrv% €< ;;
—  ev yuev yueyttrcov' ouk e%ei TtappTjcrtav.
—  douXov toS* ehraz, finj Xeyeiv a rt$ < f> poveT.
—  TTjv t&v KparrovvTiov afiaJKcw < f> epeiv %pea)v.35  (Phoen. 388-393)
Joe. What is it like to be deprived of your country? Is it a great calamity?
Pol. The greatest: the reality surpasses the description.
Joe. What is its nature? What is hard for exiles?
Pol. One thing is most important: no free speech.
Joe. A slave’s lot this, not saying what you think.
Pol. You must endure the stupidity of your rulers.  (605F-606A)
This is actually the opening quotation of chapter 16; in this chapter most of the quotations 
are verses by Euripides, with a particular preference for the Phoenissae.36 Plutarch partly
34 Caballero and Viansino (1995),  18 n. 52. They also make another point, by noticing that Polyneices’ 
profile is re-evaluated in Euripides; whereas in Aeschylus he was cast under an unfavourable light for 
going against his own land in his fight with his own brother to become a king, in Euripides he rather sets 
the model for an exceptional love for the homeland.
35 In the Euripidean text we have at v. 390  instead of  (“3urru^e?” seems to fit nicely
Plutarch’s preoccupations).
36 Notably, the lines which Plutarch quotes are mainly from the famous dialogue between Jocasta and 
Polyneices about central aspects of exile (w. 357-442).
81justifies the choice of citing Euripides by acknowledging straight from the beginning that 
he  is  a  poet  who  is  both  popular -   in  the  sense that his words  exercise  significant 
influence on audiences -  and famous for his powerful denouncing of exile: “’AAA’  errei 
ttoXXdik;  to,  tov  Evpimdov  kivci,  duvartoq  rife  <fwyv}q  Ka.'nqyoperv  fioKovvroq...”  (‘But  since 
many  are  stirred  by  the  words  of Euripides,  who  is  thought  to  arraign  exile  very 
forcibly...’) (605F). It is difficult to trace between the lines Plutarch’s stance towards the 
tragic poet or the tragic character, since the issue of the appropriateness of the words 
quoted is hard to solve. The readers may see in Plutarch’s introduction of the citation an 
attempt by the author to distance himself from the popular view (“& >#couvtos”), or to warn 
the readers against identifying Polyneices with Euripides. In that case Plutarch defends 
here the tragic poet. It could also be that Plutarch just implies that the lines from the 
Phoenissae may admit a more complex reading.
Yet  more  questions  are  raised  by the  comment which  follows the  quotation:  “raura 
TTpamos ovk op8a> q ov<? aXyOax; a&ovrau” (‘these initial assumptions are wrong and untrue’) 
(606A). The way in which Plutarch phrases his comment suggests that he wants to avoid 
indicating  specifically  who  is  making  these  wrong  assumptions.  Then,  whom  does 
Plutarch  in  truth  attack  here:  Polyneices  or  Euripides?  Plutarch  plays  with  the 
‘doubleness’  of ‘he’,  moving between  poet and  character according to  his  rhetorical 
needs. The problem of identifying who is Plutarch’s ‘ally’ or ‘target’ in his criticism is 
also traced in the following denouncement of Polyneices’ lines (or, of what is presented 
as Polyneices’ view in the tragedy): “nparrov yJev yap ou douXov to  Aeyetv a riq fypoveT,
aAAa vouv exovroq avdpoq ev Kaupoiq kou Tzpayyuaunv e%eiu/Qtaq kou oiamrjq deofievotq” (‘In the 
first place it is not a slave’s part ‘not to speak one’s mind,’ but that of a man of sense on 
occasions and in matters that demand silence and restraint of speech’) (606A) -  and he 
also gives historical examples of exiles, such as Theodores, Diogenes, or Hannibal who 
stood up for themselves and did not fear any ruler (606B-C).
In contrast to the earlier instance where Plutarch ‘corrected’ Euripides by using another 
poet (599D-E), here he amends his sayings by using Euripides himself, words written by 
him in a different play,  in his Ino. This should support the point, which I have made
82elsewhere,37 that Plutarch  is not hostile to Euripides or tragic poetry as  a whole, but 
selects and comments on passages in his various essays according to his argument and to 
the objectives of the specific topic under discussion. So, in this case Plutarch finds more 
suitable Euripides’ words in Ino, because they support his own view that silence is not 
one of the compelling restrictions of banishment but a wise choice in certain cases: 
irtyav 0’ ortou < fc? kou A eyeiv iv’ aoxf>aXeg^  (Eur., Ino, frag. 413.2)
Keep silent where there is a need, and speak where speech is safe.  (606A)
This second quotation from Euripides is certainly of a more general character than the 
lines by Polyneices where he emphasises his misfortunes caused by exile. Immediately 
after siding with the tragic poet, Plutarch returns to the first extended citation to rebut it. 
Contrary to what Polyneices asserts (v. 393), it is a general convention -  and thus not 
only a restriction which is associated exclusively with banishment —  that one has to bear 
the stupidity of the mighty. Plutarch takes his argument to the limit here. He assumes that 
the  city  goes through political  upheavals which  the  exile will  avoid  by  going  away, 
although it must be acknowledged that local political strife can be at times the cause for 
one being driven to exile. Then, he presents only half the truth, since it is true that the 
exile will have no longer any obligations towards his home town, but he avoids saying 
that the exile will probably have no rights as a citizen in his new city either. Plutarch 
manipulates the facts as he manipulates his (tragic) material so as to serve the casuistic 
purposes of his argument.
In chapter  16, which is  impressively rich  in quotations from the Phoenissae, Plutarch 
continuously switches from the poet to the character when commenting on the citations. 
At 606D he cites another couple of verses from the dialogue between Polyneices and 
Jocasta, but this time he presents them as Euripides’ lines (“to V  rod Evpm'itiov”). The 
lines are taken from the same part of the play, almost following the lines quoted before:
—  ou  ehmdes fiotrKovm ^vyautku;,  Xoyo^.
-  KaXoTg {&jETrovcri 7 ’ ofipuunv, fieXXoucrt 8e.  (Phoen. 396-397)
37 See esp. chap. 2, p. 51 (with the references given there), as well as my remarks on How a young man... 
(chap.  1, pp. 20-21 and 34), an essay with clearly more ‘programmatic’ value concerning the use of tragic
The same quotation is found again at 506C of Concerning talkativeness, where Plutarch uses the same 
line to exalt the importance of silence as opposed to talkativeness.
83Joe. Exiles, they say, live on hopes.
Pol. Yes, hopes with loveliness in their glance but delay in their step.  (606D)
Interestingly,  as  Plutarch  proceeds  into  his  analysis  of the  difficulties,  or  rather the 
supposed difficulties, which banishment carries for the person who is forced to leave his 
own land, he returns to Euripides’ treatment of the effects of exile in the Phoenissae, and 
quotes  extensively  from  the  famous  dialogue  between  Jocasta  and  Polyneices  about 
power (Phoen. 357-442). Yet, in the following quotation from the same play he deftly 
changes his target, focusing now on the tragic characters themselves:
—  $tAo/ & 7raTpo£ koi £evot cr  ovk dxjfeXovv;’
—  ev npdotre- ra < f> IX(ov £’ ovdev, vjv rig fhionycfj.
—  ov? Tjuyeveta < r’ Jjpev efc uiptx; fteya;
—  kokov to fi/r) e%etv to yevo$ ovk efiooKe lie.  {Phoen. 402-405)
Joe. But did your father’s foreign friends not help you?
Pol. You must prosper: Friends vanish if your luck turns sour.
Joe. And did your birth not raise you high?
Pol. Poverty is a curse; my lineage did not feed me.  (606E)
Plutarch attacks the tragic character here, reproaching him with ingratitude ( “ t o u t ’  rfa 
kou azaptoTo” -  606E), and, as he did before with the tragic poet (606A), he suggests that 
the reader pays attention to other lines which are closer to the truth. For, in contrast to 
this declaration of auf>tXta and to the expression of his complaint and bitterness that he is 
left alone (w. 402-405, see 606E, above), the Euripidean character himself admits a few 
lines later that he indeed has friends, thus contradicting himself: 
rroAAo/ & Aavacov kou MvktjvoJwv eucpoi 
napeioi, Tumpav %optv, ova/yKouav $’, €fioi
dtdovreg.  {Phoen. 430-432)
Many nobles of Argos and Mycenae are here,
rendering me a favour that I need but that
brings me pain.  (606F)
84One  notices  that  tragic  citations  are  embedded  in  Plutarch’s  argument.  In  both  the 
previous set of quotations (606D-E) and here, he corrects Euripides and Polyneices by 
using  Euripides  and  Polyneices  themselves,  respectively.  Thus  he  manages  both  to 
demonstrate his ability to see (from an authorial distance) the truth among the different -  
and occasionally misleading -  views that poet and character express in the Phoenissae, 
and  to  create  an  image  of Polyneices  which  presents  him  at  times  as  individually 
‘responsible’ for his views and at times as the mouthpiece of the poet. When that is the 
case,  then  Polyneices emerges as the  example par excellence  for an  exile,  since  his 
individual thoughts and ideas become the basis on which Euripides develops his general 
stance towards the  issue  of exile.  In  addition,  the manipulation  of the  quotations by 
Plutarch  appears  to  reflect  the  manipulation  of  the  individual  perspectives  and 
experiences of Polyneices and Jocasta to present them as the standard mindset concerning 
exile. Plutarch warns his reader and points out how distorted and misleading the views of 
the two tragic characters may be, and how important it is to understand that their views 
are defined by their personal experiences -  and this is a significant part of Plutarch’s 
contribution.
The same approach is evident also in the next citation: 
eyeb tie trot oure ttO p avijipa 
vofupov ev y 64101£, 
awfj^evaua. <F  \oy/r)vb<; eKvftevfrr)
Xoirrpo<f> 6pou tfutiau;.  {Phoen. 344-348)
I did not kindle for you the blazing torch
that custom requires in marriages.  [345-6]
The Ismenus River39 made this alliance
without the luxurious bath.40  (606F)
The comment which follows on the lines, quoted above and spoken by Jocasta, shows 
Plutarch’s disapproval of Jocasta’s lamentations about not having a torch to light on her
39 Ismenus was the river in Thebes from which the water for the bridegroom’s ritual bath was taken.
40 In these lines there are several discrepancies between the Plutarchan and the Euripidean text. At 1. 344 
the text by Euripides reads:  ovre oot rwpoq ivvjipa  and in the next line: “vofunov [ev 704101$], (b$
■npenei (tarepi fioKaptqi”.
85son’s  wedding  day.  Plutarch’s  argument that  both  water and  fire would  certainly  be 
available in Argos, as almost everywhere, and therefore they would also be available to 
Polyneices for his royal wedding, addresses the text only at its most superficial level, but 
at  the  same  time  it  may  reflect  trends  in  Greek  philosophy,  such  as  Stoicism,  or 
Cynicism. For in philosophy, and especially according to stoic doctrines, happiness can 
be  achieved  independently  from material  goods  (represented here by water and fire). 
With these reproaches against Jocasta and Polyneices chapter 16 comes full circle, since 
it  started  and  finished  with  verses  from  the  play  that  is  so  familiar  by  now,  the 
Phoenissae41 As already seen, it is a chapter where Plutarch engages in a more detailed 
discussion of tragic verses than usual to advertise the truth which he himself, as a moral 
philosopher, knows and defends.  Significantly,  in chapter  16 we have both a warning 
against poetic depictions and a use made of them, to show how wrong the characters can 
be. Whether Plutarch’s target at each case is the poet or the character, the readers are 
encouraged  to  be  aware  that  poetic  depictions  may  have  dangerous  consequences  if 
applied to one’s actual life; the awareness as a response to the authorial warnings and 
advice will lead them finally towards a philosophical evaluation of exile.
As we have seen, at several instances of this essay Plutarch not only rebuts sayings by 
(characters or) poets, such as Euripides, for being misleading and dangerous as a guide 
for life, but he also adjusts sayings by poets and philosophers so that they may serve his 
argument.42 Such is the case for example, when he argues that any land can become our 
native land. He remembers ‘the wise and useful’ Pythagorean precept ‘choose the best 
life, and familiarity will make it pleasant’ and changes it into his own maxim ‘choose the 
best and most pleasant city, and time will make of it your native land’ (“eAou noXtv rrjv 
apitmqv  kgu  r$t(mr)v,  TrarpiBa  $e  aurrrjv  o % p6vo$  imrijoei”,  602C)  —  again  using  here  a 
technique which he advocates in How a young man...(cf. pp.  39-40)  .  Since life in a 
native land often is accompanied by many duties which one has to fulfil for the sake of 
the state, the life in a quieter and smaller place can be politically calmer and of better 
quality (see also p. 84 on 606A).
41 Cf. Helmbold and O’Neil (see also above, p. 73, and n. 12).
42 For more on the philosophical background of the essay see Barigazzi (1966), and Opsomer (2002).
86The examples that he gives here are again extreme examples designed to emphasise the 
point; he mentions two islands, Gyaros and Cinaros, which are very small and dry, their 
land being described in a quotation, again from a tragic play:
(TKk'qpa.v, oKoprmv, kou farrevetrQau kouctjv  (TGF, adesp., frag. 393)
Rocky, unfit for com or vine or tree.  (602C)
Notably, this last quotation, in contrast, for example, to those from the Phoenissae, is not 
part  of Plutarch’s  polemic  against wrong  or  dangerous  views  on  banishment,  but  is 
smoothly incorporated into the author’s analysis. The line is from an unknown play and is 
not clearly  identified,  since the name of the poet and the play’s title are missing, or 
perhaps not given by a conscious choice of the author. The choice of the two examples 
that Plutarch  gives  is  striking; the two  islands  (Gyaros  and Cinaros)  are the outmost 
places  for  one  to  dwell,  and  both  were  places  of Roman  exile43  -  just  as  before 
Polyneices was treated as a typical example for an exile, whereas he too  is rather an 
exception, and an extreme case. However, the quotation manages to support Plutarch’s 
argument that, even in places of no fame and  importance, one can lead a decent and 
prosperous life.
Happiness should not be measured by physical measures, for example by the actual size 
of a city or an island, but by more general and perhaps philosophical criteria, especially if 
we think that our mortal life is a ‘journey’, with our souls being exiled from Heaven and 
Moon (607D) -  all together, a very Empedoclean idea (cf. e.g. Emped. DK B115, which 
is partly quoted at 607C). Plutarch again gives his work a philosophical cast by detaching 
happiness from external superficial goods. Yet these philosophical thoughts are in a way 
dictated by the pragmatic purposes of his essay (a letter of consolation). Plutarch transfers 
both his addressee and his general reader to philosophy as a mindset and as a genre (in 
the manner of e.g. Seneca’s Epistles).
43 Cf. Sen. Cons. Helv. 6.4, Juven. 1.73. The Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus was sent to Gyaros by Nero 
and later again by Vespasian -  Pisani (1992), 467.
87The point about conceiving life on earth as a journey is introduced just before with a 
citation of a tragic line by Aeschylus and makes the point that even Apollo was exiled 
from heaven:
a/yvov r’ ’AttqAAto fajyavtf am’ oupavou Beov  (Aesch., Suppl. 214)
And pure Apollo, god exiled from heaven.  (607C)
The quotation, carrying again Empedoclean resonances (cf. Emped. DK A31; see also 
above, p. 88), alludes to the prologue of Euripides’ Alcestis, where Apollo explains how 
he ended up being a slave in Admetus’  palace.44 Plutarch passes no comment on this 
saying, or rather prefers silence as the best comment to Aeschylus’  lines (‘euorofjA poi 
KeicHko'  koS* 'Hpo&n-ov -  ‘let my lips be sealed’, in the words of Herodotus, 607C).45 His 
silence could  imply several things:  it could mean that he agrees completely with the 
tragic poet, fully adopting his point as his own, or it could exemplify Plutarch’s pious 
treatment of the divine; in that case, it may not be a silence of awkwardness (i.e. he has 
nothing to add to Aeschylus’ saying) but a pious silence to create authority. The silence is 
interesting from another perspective, too, in that it casts a revealing light on his authorial 
relationship with Herodotus: taking  into account that Plutarch wrote an  essay against 
Herodotus (“nepi  Hpodorou KOKo^fe/a^”), the reader is surprised that here Plutarch 
stands in agreement with the historian, but then perhaps it is just another confirmation 
that he uses authors pragmatically as it suits him. In any case, the tragic quotation, which 
implies  a  kind  of  ‘divine  exile’,  makes  Plutarch’s  point  about  ‘human  exile’  more 
convincing  and  efficient.  So,  his  addressee,  as  every  reader,  could  be  comforted  by 
thinking that, since also gods are subject to exile, men should not consider banishment to 
be an unfair and unbearable adversity in life.
44 The story goes that Zeus punished Apollo because he killed the three Cyclopes to take revenge for the 
death of his son, Asclepius, whom Zeus had killed because he had brought back to life a dead person. 
Apollo plays a significant role in Alcestis, not only for the denouement of the story, but also as a symbol of 
light, juxtaposed to Death, who is also a prominent figure in the drama.
45 It refers to Hdt. 2.171.2, a phrase which the historian uses when he refers to Egyptian mysteries and to 
the Greek Thesmophoria, in honour of Demeter. The phrase is repeated at 636E of Table Talk and at 417C 
of On the obsolescence of oracles, just before Plutarch quotes the same line (from Aeschylus) as here, at 
607C:  interestingly,  in that essay Plutarch  is  dismissive of the Aeschylean  line, claiming that tales of 
concealment, banishment and servitude concern only demigods and not gods.
88The  two  consecutive  citations  from  Aeschylus’  Niobe  at  603A  illustrate  even  more 
clearly Plutarch’s point, by emphasising that all human affairs are much less important 
than divine affairs, and that no physical measurements can be applied to happiness. In 
contrast to those quotations discussed earlier (602A, 602C), in this case Plutarch gives 
some more details about the lines, mentioning the name of the character who speaks and 
the  genre to which  the work belongs  ( “to o   TavraAou  Xeyovnx;  ev  -rfi  tpoycp&V’).  The 
choice of the lines is not accidental, and their function does not (only) serve aesthetic 
purposes, as the specifics of the text are important for a fuller understanding of Plutarch’s 
argument. As he did before with Polyneices (and Jocasta), now too he wants the reader to 
think in specific terms about Tantalus and all the connotations which the character carries 
with him:
(TTzeipa) £’ apovpav <kodex’ •fjfiepwv odov,
BepeKvvSa. % <bpov  {Niobe, frag. 158.1 -2)
The field I sow is twelve days’ journey long, 
the Berecynthian land.  (603A)
The passage is striking for its (deliberate) hyperbole. Tantalus’ extreme wealth, though 
not the reason for his punishment in Hades, forebodes his downfall. However, the spirit is 
slightly different at 778B of On the fact that a philosopher ought most o f all to converse 
with leaders, where these lines reappear. The point there is that the philosopher should 
approach  rich  and  powerful  men  only  when  these  men  use  their  resources  for  the 
common good and never if they aim at selfish ends.
In the lines that are quoted together with these at 603A Tantalus appears to have learned 
his lesson -  another quotation from the same play: 
ovyuo$ $€ 7roTfio$ oupavq) Kvpwv ai/co46 
epafe n'nTTei kou fie npooxjiwve? radem
yivaxTKe rawOparrreia. fur\ oefieiv a/yaw;  {Niobe,  frag. 159)
My fate, while reaching upward to the skies, 
falls to the earth, and speaks these words to me:
Learn not to honour human things too much.  (603A)
46 In Aeschylus the first three words read:  tto0’ aftog”.
89The  last line makes again the point about the  superiority of the divine to the human 
element.  Plutarch  continues  to  give  a  philosophical  dimension  to  his  treatise  which 
matches perfectly its real goals as a letter of consolation (napaywfrrrriKOi; Xoyo^).47
At 604D-E Plutarch traces a paradox, a contradiction between Euripidean words and 
deeds. It is well known, he says, that Euripides wrote an encomium of his native land, 
Athens, but with his decision to move to Macedonia and to spend the last years of his life 
at the court of King Archelaus, he actually, in a way, refuted his own encomium. At this 
point Plutarch combines two Euripidean quotations from different tragic plays -  yet they 
are very close concerning their content -  producing one of the longest quotations of this 
essay, and generally of all his essays (nine lines, in total):
npwra fiev Aea>s ovk knoKroq aAAoQev, 
aurmxflov€$ d’ e^upuev-  ou d’  aXkau rroAeij,
7reaxrmv bpjoiox; diaul>opv)9e?(rau (3o\au$4*
oAAoi 7rap* aAAow eioiv elavuydyyifioi.  (Erechth., frag. 360.7-10)
el dr) troLpepyov %pr) n  Kopxraurau, yuvau,
ovpavov inrep yrfc e%opuev ev KCKpafievov,
iV  o u t’  a/yauv rwp ovre %eipuL mpm'iTuer
a  EAAa^ ’Aaia t ’  eicrpefet KaAA«7Ta, yrjv
&Aeap e%ovre$ rrjvde, ovvQrpevopev.  (TGF, frag. 981)
Where, first, the people are no immigrants 
but native to the soil; all other cities, 
disrupted once, as in the game, have been 
pieced out by importation from abroad.
If, lady, you permit a passing boast,
the sky above our land is temperate,
where neither comes excess of heat nor cold,
and we join in the chase of all the fairest fruits of Greece and Asia,
having this land as bait.  (604D-E)
47 The term refers back to the Sophists of the 4th cent. B.C., who introduced a r oAunias -  Caballero and 
Viansino (1995), 11.
48 In Euripides the line ends: “...dtafopaus eKrujyiewu”.
90Euripides exalts the virtues of Athens and Attica, his own native land, but the reality of 
his decision to depart from there shows that he could after all also bear living a life away 
from  it. At this point we notice that Plutarch moves from commenting on Euripidean 
verses to commenting on the life of the poet itself, offering the same kind of ad hominem 
argument against the poet which,  as we  saw earlier,  he offered against the character 
Polyneices (since also in the tragic character’s life he detected a discrepancy between 
words and practice) (cf. 606E-F). The characters who speak in the two citations above are 
here supposed to declare the view of the tragic poet about his own patris. The quoted 
verses, a hymn to Athens, serve here as a proof to Plutarch’s argument that no eulogy of 
one single native land is to be justified; and Euripides stands as the striking proof to that. 
So, although in this case Plutarch, again, does not support the view which the Euripidean 
lines suggest, the actual life of the poet offers him the example he needs to emphasise the 
relative significance of what is called 'native land’ and suggest to his readers that what 
they may call 'native land’ is of no actual importance towards achieving prosperity and 
virtue, and gaining fame.
The use of tragic quotations in this essay shows how Plutarch can both exploit and 
criticise tragedy, at times even weaving out of diverse tragic quotations a sustained 
argument about exile. The differing degrees of thoughtfulness required by different 
quotations challenge the readers to follow closely the argument and recall the specific 
context of the quotations, or just evaluate their general value. Although not explicitly, 
Plutarch  both  rejects  and  embraces  tragic  sayings  according  to  the  specific 
requirements of his argument and rhetoric. The readers are guided to re-read Euripides 
(and re-evaluate Polyneices’ words) through Plutarch’s filter. Plutarch’s strategy in On 
Exile agrees with his general attitude towards poetry, as expressed, for example, in the 
How a young man... (see chapter 1), where he encourages the readers not to imitate 
what poetry dictates but instead to be critical of it before applying poetic suggestions 
to their life.
The  role  of  philosophy  in  this  essay  aligns,  too,  with  the  pre-eminent  role  of 
philosophy in Plutarch’s works. The philosophical attitude and thinking in life (here,
91suggested  both  to  the  exile  and  to  the  general  reader)  is  a  main  thought-line  in 
Plutarch.  Philosophy  is,  after all,  a generic  choice  and  mindset,  and  as  such  it  is 
preferred to ‘tragic’ thinking, which may depict sides of the truth but cannot possibly 
be compared to the paramount philosophical truths. In addition, the essay transcends 
its advertised pragmatic purposes to gain timelessness.49 Yet, this timelessness does 
not only derive from the philosophical background and suggestions; it also emerges 
through the timeless wisdom of the tragedians who are quoted -  and this is perhaps 
why tragedy is found so valuable in other works of Plutarch as well -  and through the 
issues (such as exile, the value of homeland and friendship) which they addressed and 
Plutarch still addresses here, in this letter of consolation which has no longer just a 
pragmatic target and a contemporary audience.
49 Different aspects of timelessness in Pelling (1995a), (2000a), 58-60, (2002b)=(2002a), 253-265  (esp. 
261-262).4. Tragedy and Theatre in the Table Talk
Introduction
“Sympotic  dialogues  are  distinct  from  other  kinds  of  philosophical  dialogue 
because  of the  mark  left  on  them  by  the  background  against  which  they  are 
supposed to take place. They adopt the relaxed atmosphere of this background, the 
agreeable tone and nature of the topics discussed, the variety of different voices and 
that  perfect  blend  of discipline  and  freedom  which  guides  the  course  of the 
conversation and of events, and which always leaves an opening for something 
unexpected or spontaneous to happen. Plutarch's sympotic writings are in similar 
vein”.1
Indeed in the Table Talk, which consists of nine books, there is a great variety of topics 
discussed  (philosophical,  scientific,  religious,  issues  concerning  the  character  and 
emotions of men and women, and, as expected, the layout of dinners as well as food, of 
course). The great range of topics is one of the aspects in which Plutarch’s symposium 
deviates  from  the  previous  symposia  tradition.  Plato’s  Symposium  is  a  profound 
discussion of a single (if complex) philosophical issue; Xenophon’s Symposium, which 
was presumably influenced by Plato, is a more circumstantial account of a symposium 
focusing on one person, Socrates. In contrast Plutarch’s Table  Talk is distinguished by 
the variety of topics which  it examines,  since  it touches  upon  all kinds  of everyday 
matters, also sometimes trivial matters, such as for example, ‘why men are hungrier in 
autumn’  (635A-D),  ‘whether a variety of food  is more easily digested than one kind 
alone’  (660D-664A),  ‘why sailors draw water from the Nile before daybreak’  (725A-
a
725E),  etc.  Plutarch’s  symposium  does not just present a gathering for drinking and
1 Lukinovich (1994), 264.
2 Teodorsson (1989) sees in Plutarch’s Table Talk the confluence of two different genres, the symposion 
and the collections of problems (p.  12) -  about the genre of problems in Plutarch see Harrison (2000). 
Concerning  the  tradition  of symposia  which  may  have  influenced  Plutarch  in  composing  this  work, 
Teodorsson lists as possible models Aristoxenus’ “'Evfj^iiKra ovfnarrn<an, Perseus’ “’ ZvnnoriKoi bahoyoi” or 
“Su/LtmmKa. lmofjiV7)fjLaT(i \  and Didymus’  (“Xvwtncra.”) “ovnmMriau<a”, whereas Plutarch himself mentions
93entertainment, an event of social and cultural importance, but it becomes for both author 
and reader an event of educational character;3 it is a mirroring of and a contribution to 
paideia.
Philosophy and literature have certainly a prominent role to play in this paideia. Various 
aspects of poetry and theatre also come into discussion, such as, what is considered to be 
an appropriate and which an inappropriate quotation from the poets at drinking-parties 
(736D-737C), or, how old competition in poetry is (674D-675D), or even the intriguing 
question  ‘why we take pleasure in hearing actors represent anger and pain but not in 
seeing people actually experience these emotions’  (673C-674C). In this kind of poetic 
context, but also in the whole of the Table  Talk, Plutarch cites tragic plays in order to 
support his argument and reinforce the discussion, thus borrowing sometimes the gravity 
of tragedians’ words and at the same time their poetical authority.4
In addition, theatre also functions as a metaphor, as a way to talk about the character of a 
drinking-party, about what characteristics such a gathering should, or, rather, should not 
have. Amusement and spectacle are allowed as long as they accomplish the party’s aim 
which, according to Plutarch, is the creation of new friendships (621C: “aAAa kou Xoyoig 
kou  Seayiauri  kou  Trau&tajg  daxret  totcov  eicelvotg  povoig,  wra  npog  t o   avpmortiKov  reXog 
€&KV€?T<un).5 At 621B-C a participant -  whom Plutarch may possibly in this case use as 
his mouthpiece -  compares the image of the banquet-room to theatrical environment; the 
point being made is that a symposium should not become a gaming-establishment or a 
stage or a dancing-floor,  and  it is the symposiarch’s duty to make sure this does not 
happen: “ e t'nparov lie pot done? rotovrog tov t o  ovprmmov fiicujwXaJ^eiv 'rjptv kou prrj nepioipeoQat
Plato,  Xenophon,  Aristotle,  Speusippus, Epicurus,  Prytanis,  Hieronymus,  and Dio of the  Academy  as 
authors of symposiac works (612D-E) -  cf. Teodorsson, ib. Since we only have the titles, and in some cases 
also a few fragments of these works, it is very difficult to extract safe conclusions as to the degree of their 
influence on Plutarch’s Table Talk. In other authors of the 2nd century A.D., such as Gellius and Athenaeus, 
the mix of the two genres seemed a comfortable one, too; in Gellius there is a great variety of topics in 
philosophy,  history,  law,  as  well  as  literary  and  textual  criticism,  and  Athenaeus  displays  a  mass  of 
disparate material together with a conversational style (cf. Pelting (2000b), 172).
3  See  Scarcella (1998),  14  ff.,  esp.  p.  18,  and  Vetta (1992),  177  ff.  on the particularity of Plutarch’s 
symposium.
4 Cf. Cannaft Fera (1996), 419.
5 Cf. Paul (1991), 157.
94vuv fiev eKKXryriav BvjfioKpartKrjv vuv Be oycpXyv orxfuorov ytyvofievqv aZBt$ Be Kvfieurvpiov eTrd 
noo  (neqwjv  kou  9ufieXr)v. rj yap ov% bpare  tou$ fiev BrffiatyayymjvTa^  kou  BiKO^Ofievou^ irapd 
Bemvov, tov$ Be fieXer&vra^  kou  auva/yiyvaxrKovrau; ounwv nva ovyypdfifiaTa, rou<; Be fiifiot$ 
kou  opxtforauq  a/Y<ovo9ero0vra^;n  (621B-C  —   cf.  713F).  In  this  context  the  vocabulary 
related to performance and spectacle  “OufieX'rjv”) is of central importance. The
words “okvjv>jv”  and “OvfieXyv” point to the  stage and set an  image of conduct which 
should  not  be  applied  to  the  banquet-room.  Significantly,  at  621C  Plutarch  gives  a 
definition of the symposium: ‘the drinking-party is a passing of time over wine which, 
guided by gracious behaviour, ends in friendship’. There is also a less obvious use of 
theatre  at  621B-C,  quoted  above;  one  notices,  for  example,  the  words  and
“opxwrraus” in a disapproving reference to people who organise shows with dancers and 
mimes (621C -  cf. 672B). The governing principle is propriety. Plutarch rejects what he 
considers as improper (undignified shows with mimes and dancers) for the purposes of a 
banquet and defining the limits which such a gathering should not exceed.
Yet at 715D, where the point is solely about technical skill and its quality, dancing and 
music, as parts of a drinking-party, are thought of as resembling and being of the same 
quality as in theatre (“opwvra^ opxwrrds re  kou  KtQapurrds ovBev  n  %eipov ev avpmooriotq y  
(kdrpoig TTpdrrovTas”). One notes that in that case theatre has no bad connotations as such; 
just the opposite: it is used as a term of comparison which should prove the high quality 
of similar  activities  taking  place  at  a  symposium.6  Here,  as  we  have  already  seen 
especially in our chapter on How to tell a flatterer from a friend, Plutarch sways between 
two sides of theatre, the one that suggests acceptable kinds of entertainment and displays 
educational  objectives,  and  the  other  one  which,  if transferred  to  real-life  contexts, 
implies disingenuous behaviour, and therefore requires higher  levels of judgement  in 
order for it not to become dangerous for the reader. This double use of ‘theatre’ is evident 
not only in theatrical allusions or metaphors, but also in tragic quotations, as will be 
shown.
6 See Scarcella (1998), 262, who also compares the image of the banquet-room at 621B-C and at 71SD, 
with that in Xenophon’s Symposium (II, 1  ff.), where the judgement is quite different.
95Quotations  in  this  essay  are  chosen  for  their  appositeness  and  efficiency  in  their 
immediate context, or for their ‘economical’ way of processing an argument, in the sense 
that poetical sayings often offer a good summary of what a person of the dialogue wants 
to  argue.  Apart  from  the  authority  which  tragic  quotations  offer  Plutarch,  they  are 
frequently employed as embellishment, just as a stylistic adornment, embedded in the 
discussion.7 The focus on the immediate effect in the use of literary quotations is also 
reflected in the absence of a detailed discussion of the text cited. The point is reinforced 
if we take into consideration the fact that in this essay Plutarch refers to tragic poets or 
tragedy as a genre, and only seldom to tragic characters -  a small but significant pointer 
to the way that readers or listeners are not encouraged to contextualise the quotation in 
the original play. Moreover, quotations are here quite specific, in the sense that they are 
used to highlight individual issues and each of them is distinctive in itself; there is often 
no thematic or dramatic link between them.8  In addition, Plutarch appears less agonistic 
concerning his ‘competition’ with the tragic poets, yet in his, as in every, symposium, the 
competitive spirit is an important element.9 Participants exchange views on various and 
random issues, while trying to defend and establish their opinion by citing a well-known 
poet; thus they occasionally may seem to be engaged in a dramatic agon.10 In this way 
tragic quotation becomes part of, or, rather, contributes to the epideictic character of their 
conversation -  one can talk of a ‘capping’  competition which naturally takes place in 
symposia, between participants.1 1
The last remark becomes even more interesting, if we compare the Table Talk with other 
essays of Plutarch, such as On Exile (discussed in chapter 3). In the latter -  as in other, 
more  focused essays as well -  quotations have a structural role.  This means that the 
understanding of the argument presupposes a close reading of quotations; the readers can
7 Cf. e.g. Di Gregorio (1976), 168, and de Wet (1988), 19-20.
8 The topics of discussion are diverse and can change abruptly, as can also the place where the dialogue 
takes place, and of course die dramatic personae, too.
9 Singing and drinking competitions as well as various games like the kottabos (Komafrx;) used to take 
place at drinking-parties; cf. Athenaeus, Deipnos. 15.665d-668c. See also Sparkes (1960).
10 On the different parts and the structure of the symposium see Scarcella (1998), 14 ff.
11  Other parallels for ‘capping’ e.g. in Aristophanes’  Wasps (1224-1248, and  1309 ff.) -  cf. MacDowell 
(1971) -  and Birds 803-808, and in Seneca’s Apocol. 5.4. Also in Plato: Men. 80a-c, Symp. 215a4-b4 -  cf. 
Dover (1980), 164.
96follow Plutarch’s reasoning only if they pause to reflect upon the role of the quotations 
cited and engage critically with text and intertext In essays with a coherent subject and a 
conspicuous philosophical (On exile) or literary approach (How a young man...) Plutarch 
demands  that  his  reader  should  be  more  flexible  and  responsive.  Therefore, 
unsurprisingly, in On exile Plutarch is more prone to engage critically, for example, with 
what Jocasta or Polyneices says about exile (cf. 605F-606A, 606D, 606E-F),  and the 
actual quotations are here substantial for the argument which he goes on to make. In 
contrast,  the  sympotic  setting,  with  all  its  particularities,  does  not  favour  either  the 
development of a coherent sustained argument or a systematic treatment of a topic, hence 
in this essay a sequence of quotations does not serve a single strategic function.
In each book ten questions are posed and the interlocutors (Plutarch, his relatives, and 
friends), who vary in each case, attempt to answer them.12  The Table Talk is presented by 
Plutarch;  he  is the person  who tells the  story,  reporting the discussions held at each 
instance,  but,  apart  from  the  use  of reported  speech  and  of the  first  person,  actual 
dialogue (or, rather, what is supposed to have been a true dialogue) between different 
characters  is  also  present.  As  one would expect, the  use  of dialogue,  as well  as  the 
different personae at each conversation make the narration more vivid and add to it a 
certain amount of theatrical value and staginess -  the point is also made by Lukinovich in 
the  opening  passage  of this  chapter  (p.  94).1 3   Thus  we  have  two  levels  which  are 
interlinked: the banquet as context for the discourse and the discourse as concerning the 
banquet.14  It is important to notice here that the various tragic citations are not all put in 
the mouth of Plutarch but are uttered by the various dramatic personae} 5 So, sometimes 
we come across the use of a ‘quotation within quotation’ -  quite a common pattern, e.g. 
Plutarch quotes, for example, Theon on quoting Euripides (622A). The use of multiple
12 The only exception is book 9, which is devoted to the Muses and contains fifteen questions.
13  Cf.  Lukinovich (1994), 266, where  she points out that the dialogue form, in contrast to the simple 
narration without dialogue, may give the fictional impression that a variety of voices has been recorded 
‘live’, in a given context which is itself included in the narrative. Both Zanetto (2000a) and Van der Stockt 
(2000b) discuss the dialogue as a dramatic element in the Corpus Plutarcheum -  cf. also Ziegler (1949), 
253-255, Barigazzi (1988), Bracero (1996), and D’Ippolito (1996b). About the use of dialogue in Plato and 
its (general) advantages, see R. B. Rutherford (1995), 7-15.
14 Lukinovich (1994), 266.
15 See, for example, 643F, 655A, 657D, 665C, 718A, 737A, 741A etc. Nikolaidis (1991) points out that we 
cannot always be certain which of the dramatis personae represents Plutarch’s opinion (p. 154).
97speakers and multiple perspectives may be responsible for the lack of a more sustained 
use of tragedy in building arguments -  unlike, for example On Exile, which has a single 
voice.
Euripides is the most often quoted tragedian in Plutarch’s work, twice as often as any 
other tragedian; this is also the case in this specific collection.1 6  Yet surveying who is less 
quoted and why produces some striking results, even if we cannot always offer definite 
explanation for Plutarch’s patterns. One is surprised by the rare references to comedy and 
lyric  poetry  in  this  collection.17   Why  is  Aristophanes  practically  absent  from  these 
talks?1 8  At 712B ff. one participant, Diogenianus, lists all good reasons for Menander to 
be present at a symposium. He emphatically expresses the view that it is possible for a 
symposium  to  be  carried  out  without  wine,  but  not  without  Menander  ( “ ovtco  yap 
eyKCKparaj  roig avymocrioig  [sc.  vea  KO)(updta\,  < hg fiaXKov  av  oivoxj %a)pig jj Wlevawbpov 
diata/fiepvijo-at to p   tto to v ” ,  712B). Menander is also highly valued for his educational and 
edifying  power,  as  well  as  for  the  positive  influence  it  has  on  people’s  ethos  over 
drinking (712D: “ev de rq) mveiv ov SaujpiaurauyL  av el t o reprnvov aur&v kou yXauf>vpdv 041a koa 
Ttkcunv  rivd  kou  Karoucoay/rjoiv  bruftepei  ovvetgofioioCaav  ra  rjOv)  tmg  enieiKem  kou 
<f>i\avBparnoig” -  ‘but over the wine-cups, I cannot regard it as surprising that Menander’s 
polished charm exercises a reshaping and reforming influence that helps to raise morals 
to  a  higher  standard  of fairness  and  kindness’)  -   a  remark,  however,  which  is  not 
reflected  in  the  actual  use  of the  comic  poet  in  the  Table  Talk,  since  this  is  quite
19 meagre.
Similar is the case with lyric poetry. Despite the sympotic origin and focus of much lyric
20  • poetry,  and its congenial character for convivial conversations, lyric poets are much less
16 See Helmbold and O’Neil (1959). Actually, as the survey shows, in the Table  Talk there are twice as 
many  citations  from  or  references  to  Euripides  (twenty-two  in  total)  as  to  Aeschylus  and  Sophocles 
together (twenty-one quotations).
17 Cf. ib.
18 He is only cited twice (63 ID, 730B).
19 In total we have nine references to Menander, but only three cases where he is actually quoted (6 6 6F, 
706B, 739F).
20  Cf.  Stehle  (1997),  who  discusses  examples  from  archaic  lyric  poetry  (e.g.  Alcaeus,  Archilochus, 
Hipponax, Bacchylides, Anacreon), where the sympotic character is obvious.
98quoted than tragic poets.2 1  However, at 706B of the seventh book there is a significant 
reference to Euripides, Pindar and Menander; they are all used as model examples for 
good art, and praised for their educational value 22 In the same book, at 71 ID, Philip, one 
of the participants, expresses his admiration for two lyric poets, Sappho and Anacreon 
(“are kou SowT < fx> 0 < ; a,v qubofiev^ kcu t&v ’ Avou<peovTo$ eyw fioi  8ok(o K C LTO tAetrQ au to norrpiov 
audovv&m;” -  ‘Even when Sappho’s poems are sung, and Anacreon’s, I am moved to put 
down my cup respectfully’).23 Both passages are part of a contradiction, or at least of a 
paradox:  Menander,  Sappho  and  Anacreon,  who  are  here  clearly  shown  much 
appreciation and admiration for their poetic value (together with Euripides and Pindar) 
and for their appropriateness for the sympotic context, are hardly cited in the Table Talk. 
The paradox emerges even more strikingly when a few lines later, at 71 IE, tragedy is 
considered to be highly inappropriate for a symposium due to ‘its majestic elocution and 
its elaborate representation of events that are moving and sorrowful’;24 yet it is tragedy, 
and not comedy or lyric poetry, that is the genre which is so popular in the Table Talk.
It comes to the reader’s  surprise that tragedy (mainly Euripides), and  not comedy,  is 
preferred as the most appropriate material for one to refer to, no matter if, as already 
noted,  discussions  in  this  essay  are  often  focused  on  convivial  and  trivial  matters 
(drinking, food, arranging of the seating at a drinking-party, etc.). Plutarch locates his 
work within the didactic tradition of sympotic literature, and tragedy has certainly an
21  Some references: Pindar  617C, 623B, 643D-E,  704F-705A,  705F-706A,  706E,  745A,  746B,  747D; 
Sappho: 646E-F,  6 8 IB; Alcaeus: 647E, 726B; Aleman: 659B; Archilochus: 658B; Ibycus:  722D, 748C; 
Simonides:  722C,  743F. Apart from Pindar, all the other lyric poets are rarely called on; of the  forty 
quotations from or references to lyric poetry, half concern Pindar -  cf. de Wet (1988), 20-21 about Pindar’s 
popularity among all other lyric poets in both the Lives and die Essays. In contrast to the restricted use of 
lyric poetry, epic poetry, and especially Homer, is used in more than hundred cases.
22 In the whole of the seventh book, and in particular in the discussion of the eighth question, preference is 
given to New Comedy and its main representative, Menander, over Old Comedy and Aristophanes -  see 
esp.  712B  above,  where  Diogenianus  expresses  his,  rather  exaggerated,  admiration  for  Menander’s 
educational and moral contribution as well as charm. About the reasons for Plutarch’s preference for New 
Comedy over Old Comedy, see Van der Stockt (1992), 154-161. For an overview of the role of comedy in 
Plutarch (and about all the comic poets he quotes) see e.g. Zanetto (2000b).
23 The two poets are also mentioned as dinner entertainment by Aulus Gellius (19.9.4) -  C. P. Jones (1991), 
192.
24 Cf. C. P. Jones (1991),  192. It is Diogenianus who makes this remark; he is the one who more than 
anybody else in this dialogue supports comedy (Menander) against tragedy (712B ff.).
25 For the importance of tragedy in the post-classical period see Garland (2004), esp. pp. 1-11, and 57-67, 
where Euripides’ popularity among all tragedians is stressed.
99important part to play towards achieving the didactic goals of his symposium. The fact 
that in the opening book we have more quotations from tragedy than in any other book 
may also give a further importance to tragedy and to the role which Plutarch has reserved 
for theatre in this essay. It seems that Plutarch has an agenda, as it were, and tragedy 
fulfils the purposes of his agenda in this first book of the Table Talk, which, because of 
its position  has  inevitably  a programmatic  character.  Thus  apart from  its  importance 
concerning the scene setting, the opening book is also the place where Plutarch builds 
both  his  authority  by  using  the  tragedians,  and  his  communication  with  the 
audience/reader through erudition. It is then perhaps part of his strategy that it is mainly 
he who in the first two books employs tragedy, whereas in all the other books it is mainly 
his interlocutors in whose mouth tragic quotations are put. This may be understood as an 
attempt of Plutarch both to emphasise himself the use of tragedy, already from the first 
books of the Table  Talk, and to set himself and his own use of tragedy as an example 
which then others follow.
100Tragic quotations and theatrical imagery
Due to space limits I will only discuss two of the books of the Table  Talk; book 1   has 
been chosen for the great number of tragic quotations employed in it, greater than in other 
books,  and  book 7  for  its  extensive use of theatrical  metaphors.  However,  theatrical 
metaphors are also employed in book 1, and will be discussed below to show Plutarch’s 
use of theatrical imagery to explore sympotic propriety.
Table Talk Book 1
In the introduction of this book Plutarch wishes to justify the task he undertakes, namely 
to recall, write down, and send to Sosius Senecio the discussions held in various places, 
both in Greece and in Rome, on various occasions, and at which Plutarch was present 
(612E).  The  fact  that  Plutarch  chose  Sosius  Senecio  as  his  dedicatee  has  its  own 
significance.26 He is a political figure who, presumably like many other educated men of 
his times, may display a great interest in a symposium, and generally in literary education 
-  in a great range of topics, which however are not to be systematically and thoroughly 
examined. So, one could see in Sosius Senecio two worlds being brought together, the 
political and the cultural, exactly as those two worlds merge into one in the discussions of 
the Table Talk, thus the profile of the dedicatee mirrors the profile of the symposium.
The argument which Plutarch develops concerning the value of those conversations over 
dinner is a programmatic indication of didactic aim. On one hand one should forget the 
improprieties committed over drinking, but on the other hand one should remember the 
table conversations for they seem to be worthy of some attention, since important topics 
are discussed over them.  The quotation at 612D  from Euripides’  Orestes (v.  213:  “< * >
26  Similarly,  Athenaeus’  Deipnosophistae  is  dedicated  to  Timocrates.  Senecio  was  probably  one  of 
Plutarch’s best Roman friends, to whom Plutarch dedicated his Lives and Progress in virtue, and who is an 
active participant of the Table Talk I 1, 5, II1, 3, and IV 3. He was also a close friend of Trajan and one of 
the most eminent magistrates of his time. About Senecio see C. P. Jones (1970), 103, and (1971), 54-57, 
Puech (1992), esp. p. 4883, Swain (1996), 426-427, Stadter (2000), 496, and (2002), Stadter and Van der 
Stockt (2002), and Pelling (2004b), 407-408.
101TTorvia, ArqOv) tmv kok&v, a*; el oxxfnq”)21 is adapted and is meant to support the first part of
O ft the  argument,  since  Orestes also  calls  Lethe  a  wise  goddess.  In this  instance -   in 
contrast to some other instances -  the quotation is at least partly identified; the name of 
the tragic poet is provided by Plutarch (“kclt  Eupmifaqv”) and brought in to confirm his 
own view. The Plutarchan context does not make anything of any parallel or contrast; the 
more the reader thinks of the original context of the paraphrased quotation, the more 
he/she will be distracted from its point here. Plutarch’s actual words are:
(612D) enei lie kou am H okc? rwv fAev avtmcov oj Xrjfrr) T < p ovrt omjrrj k< at  Euptmdrjv eTvau, 
to  #’  oXax;  afJwytwveTv  tcov  ev oivq> fjurj povov  rip  fyiXonoiip  Xeyopbevq) lAafteoSau  rife 
TpaneQifc'  •  •
Since you too,  Senecio,  believe that forgetfulness of folly  is  in truth  ‘wise’,  as 
Euripides says, yet not to speak at all about all that occurs at a drinking-party is not 
only  opposed  to  what  we  call  the  friend-making  character  of  the  dining- 
table...(612D).
Plutarch quotes Euripides to rebut him -  following the established rhetorical procedure 
of refutatio sententiae.29 In this case the more the reader thinks of the original context 
of  the  paraphrased  quotation,  the  more  he/she  may  be  inclined  to  agree  with 
Teodorsson who argues that this citation sits rather uneasily in the Plutarchan context
T O here, as well as in the other instance when it is quoted, in On curiosity (522D).  First 
of all, Lethe was brought to Orestes not because of wine -  as Plutarch implies by 
regarding wine as the cause of forgetfulness -  but because of sleep; and secondly, the 
kind of Lethe, of which Plutarch speaks, concerns the forgetfulness of absurd things 
said  over  drinking,  which  the  playful  mood  of a  banquet  allows  (“t<Sv  arfrmov  07 
whereas  the  Lethe  that  came  to  Orestes  was  meant  to  make  him  forget 
shameful  acts of the past (“A 07&7 t&v  kouc&v”).31  Yet,  if one considers die  strategy 
which Plutarch follows by using tragic gnomai to claim for himself poetical authority,
27 The line is fully quoted at 522D of On curiosity, where Plutarch describes curiosity as a disease, whereas 
the man who is freed from it and ignorant of something unpleasant is, he says, in a position to utter Orestes’ 
words (at v. 213) with contentment.
28 An indirect reference to Dionysus, who was believed to be the son of Lethe (Forgetfulness). Cf. 705B, 
and the following pages for the position of Dionysus in the Table talk (pp. 105-106).
29 More on this rhetorical feature in Easterling (1982), 72.
30 The same opinion is shared by Scarcella (1998), ad loc.
31 Teodorsson (1989), 34-35.
102then the quotation-allusion fulfils its purpose. It all also goes hand in hand with his 
general  desire  to  display  his  erudition,  and  thus  enhance  the  authority  of  his 
programmatic statement, which is reinforced by the prominent use of tragic quotations 
in this first book of the Table  Talk (cf. p.  101  above). Plutarch applies a ‘filtering’ 
process to tragic sayings ‘de-contextualising’ them and adapting them to the needs of 
their new context.
Early in the discussion of the first question, Plutarch presents the opinion of some men 
who  think that  it  is  inappropriate  to  introduce  philosophy  into  a drinking-party,  and 
therefore only allow music and performance in it:
(613A )  kou  toih;  Wepaau;  opQux;  <f>aun  rau$  'yayieraug  aXAa  raw's  imXXaucun 
ovfJ4ie9u<n<€(rBau  kou <n>vop%e7aQau-  tow/to frr) kou  a^ioQai ttoicT v ei$ ra ovpsnotna. rrjv 
Iiovoiktjv  kou  ttjv  imoKptTucijv  enetaauyovra^  <f>iXoorxf>ia.v  tie  p/i]  kivovvto£,  ovre
ovp/nouCjEiv €K€iwjv enrvij&eiov ou(ra,v outf i)pJi$ rrfl/iKouha (rnoudcurriKa*; e%ovrau;'
They  commend  the  Persians  for  doing  their  drinking  and  dancing  with  their 
mistresses rather than  with their wives;  this they think we ought to  imitate by 
introducing  music  and  theatricals  into  our  drinking-parties  but  not  disturb 
philosophy. For they hold that philosophy is not a suitable thing to make sport with 
and that we are not on these occasions inclined to seriousness. (613A)
The anecdote presents the argument against which Plutarch and his  interlocutors will 
argue in their discussion of ‘whether philosophy is a fitting topic for conversation at a 
drinking-party’.  It serves as the starting point for further discussion about the character 
of philosophical debates at drinking-parties (613A-C), the character of the guests (613D- 
E), etc. This statement could thus be suggestive that theatre (or, generally, performance -  
“imoKpiTiicr)”) is in a way ‘inferior’ to philosophy, or at least of more entertaining value, as
32 Given Plutarch’s views on marriage (in Marriage Advice) Plutarch would not approve of the custom, as 
he does not approve of the argument here either (613A) -  cf. Marriage Advice HOB, and Artaxerxes 5.5, 
26.6. On the relationship between philosophy and symposia see Schenkeveld (1996). Teodorsson (1989) 
points out the strange attribution of the custom to the Persians, and not to the Greeks, although Greeks did 
the same (p. 40); cf. Scarcella (1998), 262. He also remarks that Plutarch’s statement contradicts Hdt. 5.18, 
where  it  is said that both wives and mistresses took part in Persian banquets -  however, he mistrusts 
Herodotus in this. For more on this Persian custom and on the role of wives and concubines at royal feasts 
see Brosius (1996), 94-104, esp. p. 94, and Schmidt (1999), 262 n. 12.
103clearly music is, too.33 But perhaps there is even more in this reference to imoKpmicy; 
given that the argument is seen as wrong-headed it could be a hint that there are good and 
bad kinds of performance which, respectively,  should or should not be brought into a 
symposium. So, again here the theatrical vocabulary allows Plutarch to make his point 
about propriety concerning a banquet. Moreover, taking into account that the word has 
also implications of pretence and falsehood,34 Plutarch makes a further point, namely that 
one should not be pretending among friends, at gatherings of friends, as is the occasion of 
a symposium.
As the discussion of the role of philosophers at a drinking-party progresses, Plutarch uses 
tragic imagery for programmatic purposes, to describe their task and show the importance 
of their contribution to the banquet, while at the  same time he makes  a reference to 
Dionysus, who is a central figure at the symposium:
(614A) <bg yap aJ nap*  Eupmlfy] fuuvaubeg avoitAoi kou aurifrrjpoi TO?g Supaaptoig itauovavu 
ToCg  brmQefievoug  TpaufMLTt^ovmv,  outo)  rwv  aAv)8tvd)v  (fuXoowfxDv  kou  ra,  o-KWfifj/iTa, 
kou  01 yeAarreg Toug pA\ Ttavrekdig arpwrovg Ktvmknv dputxryerwg kou owemtrrpefoumv.
Just as the Maenads in Euripides, without shield and without sword, strike their 
attackers and wound them with their little thyrsoi, so true philosophers both  with 
their jokes and laughter somehow arouse men who are not altogether invulnerable 
and make them attentive. (614A)
The allusion is here to Euripides’ Bacchae, where exactly this activity of the Maenads is 
described.37 Plutarch draws here a simile between true philosophers and the Maenads of
33 Plato is an obvious influence here. The question of what is appropriate to be discussed in a symposium 
and  what  kinds  of entertainment  should  be  allowed,  including  a  reference  to  the  role  of women  in 
entertainment,  is  examined  in Plato’s  Symposium,  too.  Plutarch  aligns  himself with the philosopher -  
claiming also part of his authority -  to show that a symposium, exactly as his symposium, is an important 
event for philosophical discussions.
34 Cf. Timol. 14.4, and How to tell a flatterer from a friend 53E.
35 References at: 612E, 636E, 647A ff., 654F, 657B, 657E, 671B ff, 675F ff, 676E, 680B, 683F, 710F, 
714C, 715E, 717A, 738B, 741A, 745A.
36 “Raw” could be understood here as meaning ‘both’ or ‘even’.
37  “rjfieTg fiev ow fevyovreg efyqXoZafiev/ fbucxarv trnapayfidv, ou tie vefiofievaug $Jbn\vl fioojcpig &rr}X8ov %etpog 
ourt&rpov fieraJ kou vrjv fiev av -npotreSteg evQrjXov tmptv/ fivKioftevyv eAxovaav ev xjepoiv  aAAau tie toafiaAag 
Iheiftopow  oTTapayfiaunv”  (Bac.  734-9) (‘We ran  away and thereby escaped  being tom to  pieces by the 
bacchants. But they, with no iron weapons in their hands, attacked some grazing cattle. You should have 
seen one of the women tearing asunder a bellowing fatted calf with her hands, while others tore heifers to 
pieces’). Importantly, the idea of philosophy as passion also occurs in Plato’s Symposium.
104Euripides, without using a word-by-word quotation from the tragic poet but summarising 
his description of the Maenads. The simile is meant to suggest that philosophers do not 
need to proceed to discussions of important philosophical questions to stir the attention or 
the conscience of those present at a drinking-party for they are able to practise philosophy 
in a less obvious way, when joking, making fun of others -  even when remaining silent, 
or jesting  (cf.  613F).  Likewise,  Euripides’  Maenads did  not need to  use  shields and 
swords to strike and wound their attackers; they achieved that just with their thyrsoi38 -  
interestingly, Plutarch uses the diminutive (“9up<rapiotq”) to diminish the means which 
were  available to the Maenads;  yet they were very effective.  Here Eunpides offers 
again  to  Plutarch  a  succinct  tragic  image  (akin  to  a  gnome)  which  can  make  his 
programmatic  statement about the role of philosophers more persuasive,  although the 
reader is not meant to reflect upon the details of the original tragic context, but rather to 
understand  the  purposes  of the  simile  for  the  discourse.  Concerning  Dionysus,  the 
reference  is  here  to  his  gentle  side.  Similarly,  earlier,  at  613D,  and  later,  at  615A, 
Dionysus figures again as a gentle god. In him we can see a mirroring of the nature of 
tragedy,  since he  is,  anyway,  so closely connected with theatre. Dionysus can be the 
gracious,  gentle  god  (Meilichios,  and Lysios or Eleutherens -  cf.  716B) but also the 
furious, enraging god, exactly as tragedy can be good, educative and entertaining, but 
also dangerous if transferred, with all that it represents, to real-life contexts.40
The  second  question  is  about how should the  seating of guests  at a dinner-party  be 
decided. There was an incident at one of Timon’s gatherings where a foreigner arrived 
after most of the guests had taken their places. Plutarch uses a theatrical image, taken 
from the context of comedy this time, to make a point about what is to be considered as 
appropriate or inappropriate behaviour in a symposium. The way the man entered the 
house was highly theatrical in a negative sense. He says,  ‘he came to the door of the 
banquet room, like a grandee out of a comedy, rather absurd with his extravagant clothes 
and train of servants’ (“noXXwv ovv  rcapovrmv £evo$ riq axrnep eimapv<jx)q ck Ktofjupdiaq, 
eoQrjri re neprrrfj kou OKoXouBtqi. naJ&ov CmoavXoiKorepoq, tjkcv a%pt rwv dupwv to v  avfyxovoq”,
38 Cf. 655A and 672B for other references to the thyrsos.
39 Cf. Teodorsson (1989), 50.
40 About a similar duality in meaning compare also Antony 24, discussed below, on p. 113.
105615D). Theatrical imagery is employed here to signify the excessive and preposterous 
behaviour of the foreigner, with emphasis on his luxurious, extravagant clothes and on 
the large number of attendants.4 1
The image created by Plutarch has clearly a negative tone -  note the  language used, 
which has negative implications (“eim<zpv<l)o<;” and ‘‘u7ro<roA oi#coT€po^”).42 Not having found 
a seat worthy of him left, as the foreigner himself claimed, he decided to depart, even if 
some guests tried to convince him to stay. His attitude and final decision was greeted 
with joy and laughter; the Euripidean quotation, which is cited in the following lines, is 
carefully chosen by Plutarch, and we shall find reason to suspect that it is given new 
nuances in its new context:
(615D-E)  ckcivov  fiev  ovv  noXXip  yeXuni  ‘%<upovraq  ev^nffiovvrag  eicnefirceiv  dofuov' 
(Eur.,  Cresphontes,  frag.  449.6)  eueXevov  oi  Karoucetfievor  kou  yap  fyrav  ttoAAoi
r  t  t  43
f i e r p t o x ;   vrronencoKonre^.
Thereupon  the  guests  at  table  with  much  laughter  urged  them  ‘With joy  and 
cheering words send him from the house’, for there were many who had had a little 
something to drink. (615D-E)
There is a parallel incident in Plato’s Symposium, which may again be in Plutarch’s mind 
when he describes the scene with the foreigner -  at 7IOC he explicitly refers to the scene. 
At 212c ff. Plato describes Alcibiades’ entrance into the gathering in a very similar tone; 
his  extravagance  and  eccentric  behaviour  attracts  suddenly  the  attention  of all  the 
participants. The parallel between this scene and Plutarch’s scene (described at 615D ff.) 
could  be  significant,  since  it offers,  once  more,  evidence  that  Plato’s  Symposium  is 
generally at the background of the Table Talk. Yet Plato’s Alcibiades may also be a point 
of  contrast  with  Plutarch’s  foreigner  (the  protagonist  of  the  incident)  -   almost  a 
caricature-figure  -   since  Alcibiades,  despite  his  provocative  entry,  is  eventually  a
41  For examples of disorderly conduct, excess and extravagance at banquets, as described in Plutarch’s 
Lives and in other historical writings see Paul (1991).
42 Concerning the history of the word “evnapvfa”, it is a word which initially denoted a fine robe with a 
purple border, and later described the very person who wore it. Cf. Teodorsson (1989), 65; he also rightly 
sees in the word “wrwroXwwrepoj’’ a deliberate understatement on Plutarch’s part.
43 Cf. Sen. Apocol. 4.2.
106welcomed guest who has certainly an important contribution to make at the drinking- 
party.
The context in which the same quotation is employed becomes more challenging and 
significant at 36F of How a young man..., a programmatic essay where Plutarch attempts 
to  guide the young people towards a careful reading of poetry. There, the  line from 
Euripides’  Cresphontes is quoted together with the two preceding lines (frag. 449.4-6: 
“tov (jtuvra Bpvpeiv eig wr  ep%erau kokoJ  rov 8’ aZ Bavovra kou ttowov TreTtajjpevovI xaipovrcu; 
eitifyrxj/tuvTag kiatepneiv dofuov” —  ‘To mourn the baby for the ills to which he comes; but 
him that is dead, and from his labours rests, to send from home with joy and cheering 
words’). So those two preceding lines are themselves enough to show that this context is 
very different from that of Timon’s party, and that the party version turned some deep 
and sombre lines to a much more frivolous application. The citation does not serve any 
more just as part of an image, as at 615D-E, but instead signifies a substantial point of a 
more detailed and ‘engaged’  discussion, providing the reader with advice of particular 
philosophical value. Plutarch’s argument there (36F) is that if a young man is already 
familiar with poetry,  suggesting as it does general doctrines for life such as the ones 
implied in the quoted lines, then he will certainly be more perceptive of philosophical 
lessons later on in his life. In this specific case he will familiarise himself with the idea 
that death is not a misery -  in Epicurus’ words, ‘death is nothing to us’ (37A). Comparing 
it to the quotation  in the  Table  Talk,  it seems that in How  a young man...  the same 
Euripidean fragment attracts more of Plutarch’s attention, and seems to play a structural 
role  in  his  argument  than  to  be  just  an  embellishment,  while  emphasising  the 
propaedeutic role of poetry towards a deeper understanding of philosophy. However one 
has to note the absence of clear identification of these lines in both essays.
A less ‘neutral’ theatrical reference, in the sense that it underplays the image of theatre, 
attracts our attention later, in the Table  Talk’s same discussion of the second question. 
Plutarch’s brother,  when  describing the  role of the banquet host, refers, among other 
points, to the vanity of his task of allocating his guests, and to the ineptness,  for the 
purposes of a dinner, of deciding who is more important than another, which is really as
107if one were transferring empty fame from market-place and theatres to social gatherings 
(“oAAa tv jv  Kcvrjv  c k  rrjg aryoptig kou rwv Qearpwv eig ra ovyuxoom yuerarfovTaF, 616D). 
Although the reference to theatre comes into the discussion as only a term of comparison, 
it  is  suggestive that theatre  is the place where  conceit and  selfishness are nourished. 
However,  the  phrase  “nevy/v  B6£av”  is  ambiguous;  is  it  referring  to  a  somehow 
disingenuous attitude concerning the  ‘placings’  in the audience,  or is  it suggestive of 
show and pretence on the actors’ side, while also making the point that there is pretence 
and emptiness in the agora, too (“tijv kcv^v Bo^av ck rrjg ayopdg”)?44 Whatever the case 
may  be,  the  phrase  is  pointing  out  what  side  of  ‘theatre’  should  certainly  not  be 
transferred  into  real-life  contexts,  thus  emphasising  the  significant  ambiguities  and 
complexities of the usage of theatre and tragedy, in this essay and also generally.
In this long discussion of the second question another quotation, from  Sophocles this 
time, is put into the mouth of Lamprias, and aims to highlight the mood and psychology 
of the participants at a banquet:
(6 1 9 A) o v v a ty to   Be  kou  n oriK O vg  e ig   t o u t o   kcu   ep a ru K o v g ,  o v   yjo vo v  “ ooxng  ep a rro g   B vjyp ,a  
nauB iK tov  n p o c re o riv”  (TGF, frag. 841) cog  (frrjo-i  X o fa K X ijg ,  aAAa kcu  ro u g   e n i  y v v a u Q  
kou  Toug e n i  n a p S ev o ig  B aucvofievoug'
And I shall put together men who like to drink, -  and lovers too, not only those 
Who feel the bite of love for lads, 
as Sophocles says, but also those bitten by love for women and for girls. (619A) 
Lamprias makes his own contribution to the discussion about the seating of guests at a 
drinking-party. Among other points he suggests that it is good to place men who are 
temperate  and  gentle  among  contentious  men,  or  to  put  together  people  who  have 
something in common, not only lovers of young men but also lovers of women or girls, 
since these are expected to understand each other well. In their case the risk of strife is 
quite limited, as compared to poets or orators who are usually highly competitive, and 
whose discussions may therefore become problematic (618E-F).  Sophocles’  words are
44 Cf. 709C, where it is explicitly the actors who display a kind of empty fame. Cf. also a similar reference 
to the agora as a place of empty fame in On Progress in virtue (80  A).
108identified  by  Lamprias  (“a>$  fam  So^okA^”)  and  are  completely  integrated  in  his 
argument since he adopts them as his own.45
In the third talk of book 1  there are two things that strike the reader as curious; the one is 
its short length and the other the absence of dialogue, for Plutarch uses only reported 
speech.  Yet,  within  this  brief discussion,  tragedy  is  present;  a  line  from  Aeschylus’ 
Supplices (v. 770) is cited at 619E:
(619E) ov yap yJovov “drffiva rucrei  KvfZepvyTj) owfxp” Kara rov Aio^uAov,46 aXka 
kou ttotov naera kou aveaeon; &pa OTparr)yq) kou ap%ovri fypoirr'rfkx; aJjjtov epyov.
For not only does ‘night bring anguish to a skilful pilot’, as Aeschylus says, but 
also every hour spent in drinking and in relaxation brings to a general or governor 
some business worthy of close attention. (619E)
Here the question is about the allocation of places at a banquet, and more specifically 
about  the  so-called  ‘consul’s  place’  (“u7rari#co^”).  Aeschylus’  words  are  recalled  to 
support the argument that for a consul or general there is no time for complete relaxation 
and entertainment; even at dinner-parties he has to take things seriously and remain alert 
at all times. Thus the poet’s line, which is quoted here, supports this argument since it 
asserts that night rightly stirs the feeling of fear in a governor’s actions or words.  In 
addition, the application of the image is made easier by the general familiarity of ship-of- 
state figuring (uKv^epvrprjj’\ “orpaTvjyq)”, “ap%ovti”).  One notes that here, as well as in the 
preceding 619A, the poetic text is used as a starting point to make further thoughts; it is 
either corrected or extended with supplementary comments. It may also be noticed that 
the poet’s name,  which here, exactly as in the previous quotation from  Sophocles,  is 
provided by Plutarch, may add some more gravity and importance to the argument.
45 The same line is again cited at 77B of On Progress in virtue, where it is employed as a metaphor to 
describe the growing love of a young man for philosophy. If he is made to stay away from philosophy after 
he has been introduced into the world of philosophy, he feels troubled and uneasy, exactly like a lover who 
is  separated  from  his  beloved.  Pelling  points  out  that  Sophocles’  quotations  and  imagery  are  more 
embedded in that essay (2007).
46 Cf.  1090A of It is not possible even to live pleasantly according to Epicurus. It is worth noticing that in 
Plutarch the Supplices is by far the most popular of all Aeschylus’ plays, and generally of all tragedies -  
see Helmbold and O’Neil (1959).
109In the fourth talk, Theon, one of the three interlocutors (with the other two being Plutarch 
and Crato),  discusses die  character and the  role  of the  president of a drinking-party 
(“ovtnro<rlapzo<;”). According to him, the symposiarch must lead all participants to display 
their talents, so that the banquet may be both profitable and entertaining.47 Moreover, 
every man, no matter if a philosopher, an orator, or a performer of arts, is (or, so one 
expects) gladly and eagerly led to that activity (‘S ^ecos yap  e ls  rouS’  eKaurro^ ayerai  kou 
npoSufiMs”) ‘where each person is at his strongest’ (622A); in Euripides’ words: 
i'v’ aura; avroD rvyxavj) Kpariorog atv.  (Eur., Antiope, frag. 184.4)
The line is of general value and can serve different rhetorical purposes according to the 
context in which it is put; it is perhaps then for this reason that Plutarch repeats the same 
quotation in other essays, too: at 43B of On listening to lectures the line is adapted to 
make the point that each man likes to be asked and to talk about matters which he knows 
best, as  is also the point at 630B  of book 2 of Table  Talk;  however,  at 514A of On 
talkativeness the context is different as it is meant to signify the general attitude of the 
chatterer which should be avoided:  instead of displaying our knowledge in a specific 
topic, thus intimidating others, we should engage into conversations which can teach us 
new things. The quotation from Euripides above, at 622A, is apposite in its new context. 
We cannot recover the original, since we only have fragments of this Euripidean play, 
and  so  we cannot be  sure whether (as  so often  in this essay) the  original  context is 
forgotten.  Yet the poet’s wording  seems to  suit perfectly the  general  point made  by 
Theon, thus offering to his argument a somewhat proverbial value.
The discussion of the fifth question of book 1  on why it is said that ‘love teaches a poet’ 
is  introduced  by  the  use  of a  Euripidean  quotation,  or,  rather,  the  first  part  of the 
quotation  offers  the  particular  topic  for  conversation.  The  name  of the  poet  is  not 
provided but, still, the quotation retains its importance for it sums up the debate on the 
power of poetry -  in that sense it is also of conclusive character:
Troi'Tfrijv #’  apa
47 Cf. 621B-C, 713F, and 717A.
110”Epa)$ Bida/rKei, kov afiovorx; %  to npiv**  (Eur., Stheneboea, frag. 663)
Love instructs a poet then,
though he before was songless (unmusical).  (622A)
Beyond all changes which Love causes to man’s character and behaviour, he inspires 
poets and makes them more creative. An interesting anecdote, which is mentioned as 
evidence for that view, says that Aeschylus wrote his tragedies under the influence of 
wine  (622E).49  Plutarch  is here  exploiting  a cliche (yXuKismKpos  epax;),50  according to 
which  love brings both happiness and  sorrow, joy and pain, and may evoke extreme 
feelings which, however, lead to poetic creativeness.5 1
There  is  a  simile  introduced  here  (623C:  “aAA’  axmep  rrfv  'LofanXeous  tc o Xiv  awbpix; 
eparriKov  ipu% v)v”)  to  describe  all  that  Love  may  contain.  The  image  is  taken  from 
Sophocles’ OT, where at the opening of the play Thebes is presented as a city filled ‘at 
the same time with incense and with the sound of paeans and lamentations’ (623C-D); in 
the tragedian’s words:52
“ofiou fiev %fuo4JMT(t)v'>  
yefiovcrav
“ofiov be TTCuavoov re kou  o reva /yficL T a iv” .53  (Soph., OT 4-5)
The simile compares, on the one hand the soul of a man in love, and, on the other hand, 
Thebes, and aims to show, on a first reading, the contradictory feelings that prevail in 
both  places,  namely,  turmoil  and  relief,  misery  and  happiness,  lamentations  and 
celebrations.  Yet,  as  Pelling  has pointed  out,  when  discussing the  very  quotation  in
48 The same quotation is again cited at 405F of Why does the Pythia no longer give oracles in verse, and at 
762B  of Dialogue  on  love,  where  the  power of love  is  exalted  and  discussed  in  depth  -   about the 
Euripidean citation in the latter essay and its parallel in Plato’s Symposium (196e) cf. Billault (1999), 206.
49 The same anecdote is repeated at 715D-E of book 7, with die remark that all of his tragedies are full of 
Dionysus -  thus the connection between the god and wine is here straightforward. Cf. what Athenaeus says 
at 10.429a, namely that ‘Alcaeus the lyric poet and Aristophanes the comic poet also were drunk when they 
composed their works’ -  see Sidwell (2000), 141.
50 In lyric poetry it is a motif -  see Campbell (1983).
51  Earlier,  at  623A-B  Sossius  (one  of the  participants  of the  conversation)  quotes  Theophrastus  who 
similarly considers the sources of music to be sorrow, joy, and religious ecstasy for all those emotions 
make one’s  voice  change.  The example  given  here  refers to  oratory,  as well  as theatre.  The orators, 
especially at the end of their speech {peroratio) raise their voices so that it resembles a song, exactly as 
actors do when weeping -  reference here is obviously made to the members of a tragic chorus.
52 There is an adaptation of Sophocles’ U yeyuein into “yeiioixrav”, required by Plutarch’s sentence structure.
53 The same citation in On having many friends 95C, On superstition 169D, On moral virtue 445D, as well 
as in Antony 24.3.
IllAntony, the Sophoclean lines are misunderstood by Plutarch. Plutarch uses ‘paeans’  as 
triumphant  hymns  of joy,  to  counterbalance  lamentations;  thus  he  wants  to  draw  a 
parallel  between  the  contradictory  sides  of love  and  the  (supposedly)  contradictory 
feelings which prevail  in Thebes, too.  But clearly there are no contradictory feelings, 
there can be no celebrations in the city of Thebes in this play. Its citizens call upon the 
gods to end the plague, thus ‘paean’, as Pelling has suggested, must obviously mean a 
hymn to Apollo for healing.54 So, in both cases, at 24.3 of Antony as well as here, in the 
Table Talk, Plutarch interprets the quoted lines so as to suit the context of his argument. 
Once again tragedy simply offers the ‘tag’ in which the original context of the quotation 
is forgotten.
The seventh and eighth question of book 1  discuss rather trivial issues, the habits of old 
men. At the opening of the latter question there are two quotations, one after the other, 
the first from Aeschylus and the second from Sophocles. Their role is explanatory, but 
they also have a didactic hint.  What they are trying to explain here, Plutarch and his 
interlocutors (however, notice that there is no dialogue in this question), is ‘why old men 
hold writing at a greater distance for reading’  -  obviously this describes  ‘presbyopia’ 
(long-sightedness). Both quotations are identified concerning their source (the name of 
the tragic poet is in each case provided —  “ kcu toCto napaJBvjXwv o A /<7% uA © s (fyyrtv.. a n d  
“hsBvjXorepov Be 'LofyoKkifc to ouno rrepi t&v yepovrcov..”) (625D): 
ov #’ ££ oujtotttou aunov, ou yap eyyuBev 
Buvauo y* av yepant Be ypcqifiaTev$ yevou
<r*hs.55  (Aesch., TGF, frag. 358)
But you must read it far away, 
for close up you could surely not, 
and you must be a lucid scribe, 
though old.
fipadeia fiev yap ev A byoim TrpoofioXr)
54 Pelling (1988b), 178-179. Extensive material on what ‘paean’ means now in I. Rutherford (2001).
In Aeschylus: “<ru Be? amo[Bev\ atirrov, ov yap eyyuQev/ [)SaAcf? ] yepcnv Be ypaftftarevq yevou caujry;”.
112/aoAj£ * ’  a r m s  ep% erau  p u n u ytevo u -
rtpoaw Be Xevorrwv, eyyuOev Be rrau; ru^Ao^.  (Soph., TGF, frag. 858)
The sound of words falls slowly,
and hardly penetrates the stopped-up ear;
but each man sees far, is blind when from close distance. (625D)
The quotations are chosen for their aptness, since they both describe the weakness of the 
eyes, literally (first quotation) or metaphorically (second quotation), as man grows older, 
and thus introduce the subject of the discussion to follow, but they are of no  special 
interest for Plutarch passes no comment on them.
To conclude, there is a kind of ‘paradox’ in the way Plutarch uses theatre and tragedy, 
both generally, and specifically in this essay. In the Essays, literary quotations are more 
frequent than tragic metaphors, thus we could say that there, the use of tragedy is more 
specific; on the contrary, in the Lives the ‘tragic’ is certainly more complex a term: it is 
more  about  theatrical  atmosphere,  people  who  behave  at  certain,  usually  important, 
moments in a theatrical way, and when that happens the signs of the disaster-to-come are 
felt even more strongly. The first book of the Table Talk includes both tragic quotations 
and metaphors, and thus offers a good example of the general ambiguity of the use of 
tragedy in Plutarch. Tragic citations are employed here mainly to elaborate and support 
Plutarch’s (or, at each case, the speaking person’s) point, to borrow some authority from 
the tragic poets or to sum up the argument, since tragic lines have a proverbial value, or, 
at least, offer an economical and effective way of presenting ideas or images -  however, 
the poets’ sayings are not always accepted by Plutarch but adapted or interpreted so that 
they suit the context. Regarding the use of tragic imagery and the use of theatre as a 
metaphor, it rather implies preposterous behaviour, and we have already seen a few cases 
where Plutarch uses them to attack or castigate theatrical behaviour in a ‘real-life’ context 
-  here, in the context of a banquet. Thus one could argue that in the Table Talk we can 
see  Plutarch  in  microcosm,  swaying  between  quoting  tragedy  for  its  economy  and 
authority, and at the same time using it as a metaphor to indicate human behaviour which 
should be avoided -  though this second use becomes more obvious in book 7, on which 
the following discussion focuses. The Table Talk is an essay where the convergence of
113these two sides of the 'tragic’ in Plutarch appears at its best, and, for that, it is certainly 
worthy of our  attention  when  discussing  Plutarch’s  relation  to  the  tragedians  and to 
theatre.
114Table Talk. Book 7
In the introduction of this chapter we saw why the seventh book is important concerning 
the role of tragedy and of other genres in a symposium (cf. pp. 99-100, on 706B, 711D-E, 
712B ff.) -  a kind of late programmatic statement, even if the programme may not be 
fulfilled  in  Plutarch’s  Table  Talk.  In  addition, this book will  contribute some further 
points to our discussion of tragedy, since it includes not only quotations from tragic poets 
but also theatrical metaphors and allusions. Those are worth a closer look.
In the first question of this book Plutarch and his friends argue 'against those who find 
fault with  Plato  for saying that  drink passes  through  the  lungs’.  Euripides  is  quoted 
among others here (Eupolis, and Eratosthenes) as the one whose description of the lungs 
is more accurate for he seems the only one who has pictured the lungs as having cavities 
and channels through which they transmit the liquid (699A):
oTvog TTepaurau; nXevfAovaiv happoau;  (Eur., TGF, frag. 983)56
Wine, traversing the channels of the lungs 
The tragic quotation, as well as the lines by Eupolis and Eratosthenes quoted just before, 
are completely integrated into the discussion about the nature of lungs and their function; 
yet, interestingly, it is not important at all that the quotation comes from tragedy, in the 
sense that any genre could make the point provided that there was the right phraseology. 
The language which Plutarch uses to introduce each quotation indicates clearly which 
description  of  the  lungs  he  regards  as  more  truthful:  “EimoXiv...napes  &  KoAa£/v 
etTtovra...,  natpe^  kou  rov  KOfAipdv  ’EpaToaOevyv  Xkyovra...,  <ra4>ux;  frrpmv
Xey<tiv...bijXoq etrriv  EpaunarpaTov jSA errcuv n  otgurepov” —  ‘disregard Eupolis who says in 
his Flatterers..., disregard the elegant Eratosthenes, too, and his expression..., but when 
Euripides speaks in plain terms of...he shows that he has keener eyes than Erasistratus’ 
(699A).
56 Also cited at 1047D of On Stoic contradictions, where the discussion is exactly on the same topic and on 
the evidence which Plato takes from poets and physicians to support his view on the nature of the lungs.
115A simile taken from the theatrical world attracts our attention in the sixth question of this
57 book, where a quite long conversation takes place, focused on the so called ‘shadows’ 
and on whether one should go to one man’s dinner at another man’s invitation, and on 
what occasions, and to what kind of host.  So the discussion is here again centred on 
dinner matters. Plutarch’s advice is not to accept just any invitation for dinner but to pay 
attention to who is the person who invites one and for what reason:
(709C) ei yJev yap ov orfxtfipa ovvyO'rfc,  aXXa, t&v ttXouct'kov t i$ r} (rarpaniK&v, ox; ini 
OKyvdopv<j>opr)tJMTo<; Xapmpov de6ftevo$ vj naw %api^eaBat rjj KXnyrei nenetojiivo^  k o u 
TipJav, enayerou, naparvtjriot; ev9v;-
If it is someone not very intimate who invites you, but some man of wealth or a 
stately man who wants a splendid retinue as if he were on stage, or one who thinks 
that he is doing a great favour and honour by his invitation, you must at once ask to 
be excused. (709C)
When wealthy people and people of power were presented on stage, they were usually 
accompanied by attendants who were characters of no importance who would stay mute 
(Kaxf>a npooxona).5* The comparison between the wealthy person who invites people just 
for the sake of increasing the admirers of his wealth on one hand, and on the other hand 
the actor who needs mute attendants around him, casts the theatrical reality under an 
unfavourable light, since it emphasises a kind of pretentious performance taking place on 
stage. Again, the theatre here typifies a world which should not mix with the symposium 
if it is to be rightly organised.
We see something of the same at 710E, in the discussion of whether the music of flute- 
girls is proper after-dinner entertainment -  the point is here made by one of Plutarch’s 
friends, Philip, and it is one of the rare cases of explicit evaluation of the tragic poet and 
his work as a whole.59 Philip acknowledges that he is a great admirer of Euripides, yet he
57  What  is  meant  by  this  word  is  explained  at  707A:  ‘shadows’  are  called the  persons  who  are not 
personally invited but are brought along by the invited guests.
8 Cf. Teodorsson (1996), ad loc.:  The comparison of insignificant people, who accompanied important 
people of power, to the Kaxfia itpotrama on stage was quite common. Plutarch himself uses similar wording 
(“o 8’  axmep eni vKTprifc dopujtopupM xaxjnv ijv...”) when he talks about Aridaeus at 791E of Whether an 
elderly man should engage in politics, and, similarly, at 63A of How to tell a flatterer from a friend he 
alludes to the same image -  cf. chap. 2 , pp. 50-51.
59 Cf. Wardman (1974), 171.
116does not agree with the rules which the poet has set concerning music, and according to 
which the importance of music is reduced to scenes of sorrow and depression (710E). 
According to Philip, music ought to be regarded, together with other kinds of pleasure, as 
part of the dinner-entertainment (71 OF), and theatre should be taken as just a means to 
amuse the audience and not as something more serious than that.
This was actually the point which a Spartan made when he came to Athens and saw how 
much preparation and competitive spirit, how many expenses and efforts were put in 
theatrical productions (71 OF). This specific reference is worthy of our special attention 
for another reason too, namely because it illustrates the contrasting, even contradictory, 
use that Plutarch can put the same citation to, when he uses  it in different works or 
different trains of thought.  For the same remark is given different implications  in the 
essay Were the Athenians...?, where Plutarch uses the words of the Spartan to argue that 
the Athenians spent more time and money on theatrical performances than on political 
and military affairs which would bring them true, long-lasting fame and power (cf. 348F- 
349A, and the discussion of that passage in chapter 2, pp. 58-59).
Contrary to Philip’s statement, Plutarch himself, in the Advice to bride and groom agreed 
with  Euripides  (Medea  190-204)  in  censuring  those  who  employ  the  lyre  as  an 
accompaniment to wine rather than invoke music to mitigate turbulent emotions such as 
anger and grief (143D). Yet is has to be noted here that the view expressed at 143D of 
that essay is not Plutarch’s sole and final view on music, which he does not exclude from 
parties (712F-713F).60 Concerning music, what is mostly important for Plutarch is that it 
must always go together with words, that is, song -  this is a necessary condition which he 
sets for music in order for it to be welcomed at parties. At the same time he also sees that 
music has a role to play in difficult moments at a dinner-party, when strife and rivalry are 
rising (cf. 713F). Apart from this, one of the general rules which Plutarch sets concerning 
entertainment is to combine music with discussion. The co-existence of  and Aoyos at 
a party is necessary, Xoyo$ not only as in a form of a song but also as reasoning. In this 
aspect even philosophical discourse can be a source of entertainment for the guests at a
60 Cf. Teodorsson (1996), ad loc., and also Nikolaidis (1991), 158.
117party. The programmatic character of Plutarch’s views expressed here is evident: apart 
from the opportunistic use of the tragic citation he uses, he sets the terms in which a 
symposium  and  elegant  sympotic  conversation  ought  to  work,  and  makes 
recommendations about the character of the discourse at a symposium (what it ought to 
include and what not).
At 713D, a line by Euripides is introduced in favour of the opinion that the sources of 
entertainment should be sought first among the guests (e.g. philosophical discussions) 
and should not come from outside, in which case this could interfere with the guests’ 
amusement, in the sense that it could put an end to the kind of entertainment already 
taking  place  and  deriving  from  the joy  and  good  mood  of the  guests  themselves. 
Similarly, it would be unwise for those who are already safe at home to consent to take 
some other kind of safety from abroad -  in the poet’s words  OcXovmv eio-asydyyiiwv
XafieTv”  (TGF,  frag.  984).  Thus  the  acknowledged  quotation  from  Euripides  (“a>s 
Euptm&qs ehrev”) not only offers Plutarch a concise way of putting forward his argument 
but certainly also some of the poet’s authority. It also gives to his point a wider aspect by 
adding new implications from a different context.
Closely connected to this question is the next discussion of what kinds of entertainment 
are most appropriate at dinner. The sophist, one of the four speakers in this dialogue, 
refers  to  the  theatrical  world  suggesting  that  he  would  banish  all  the  forms  of 
entertainment to stage and orchestra (“e^j raXXa puev eni Tvjv OuiieXvjv kcu tvjv opxfiorpav 
e^eXauveiv') -  “BufieXyv” and “opxyorpav” are terms directly connected to theatre -  and 
introduce instead a new kind of entertainment, based on the dramatic character of Plato’s 
dialogues (711B-C -  cf. earlier, 62IB, discussed on pp. 95-96).6 1  Thus he seems to put 
forward  a  different  kind  of  dramatic  performance,  which  would  obviously  be  of 
philosophical rather than of merely poetic character.
61 The sophist mentions that slaves were taught the easiest and lightest (Teodorsson rightly, I think, corrects 
the Loeb translation of the word “eXtzbporwrovf’ so as to mean  ‘most easy/light to learn’, and not ‘most 
lively’) of those dramatic dialogues, so as to quote than by rote (711C). The interesting detail that Plato’s 
dialogues were performed in Rome (and not, for example, in Athens) (71 IB) makes their dramatisation an 
event of even greater importance. Cf. Teodorsson (19%), pp. 109-110.
118Euripides is again quoted (“cbanep Eupmihr^ el-nev”), freely this time, in the final lines of 
this book, when the discussion is on whether it was a good custom to deliberate over 
wine (716B-C). However at this instance the poet is brought into the discussion, not to 
confirm a statement but as a point of disagreement. In his effort to try to explain why 
Dionysus was given the names Eleuthereus (Liberator) and Lysios (Releaser), Nicostratus 
-  and perhaps also Plutarch himself, by using Nicostratus as his mouthpiece -  claims that 
such attributes were given to the god not because of his ‘bacchic and mad element’ (“ou 
ha. ‘to f&LKxevmiLov kou fjMvta&eg* chnrep Evpmifrq; ehrev” —  716B)62 but because he frees 
the  soul  from  its  slavish,  timorous  and  suspicious  nature,  and  makes  humans  more 
truthful and open to each other.63 The concluding part of the discussion, both with its 
eloquent style and the tragic quotation, becomes a good example of Plutarch’s rhetoric. 
Plutarch  exploits the  resonant rhetorical  impact  of tragic  quotation,  placing  it  at the 
conclusion of a discussion for maximum emphasis.64
Although the use of tragedy and theatre in this book is less extensive than book  1, our 
parallel examination shows that even in this book (book 7), Plutarch uses the tragedians 
in  multiple,  flexible  ways  and  exploits  metaphorical  aspects  of dramatic  vocabulary 
according to the needs of the highly theatrical setting of a symposium and according to 
the questions which the different interlocutors address. Plutarch never ceases to recast 
and  reinterpret tragic  lines and theatrical vocabulary to reinforce the authority of his 
speakers and beyond them his own.
62 Cf. Bac.  298-299 (“to yap {Zaucx,ev<riiun>  kou  to fiavi&h^ pMvrncqv -noKkijv e^ei”). The lines are quoted 
verbatim at 432E of the essay On the obsolescence of oracles.
63 Compare the reference to the gentle side of Dionysus at 613D, 614A, 615A —  see the relevant discussion 
on pp.  105-106. Plutarch provides his reader with a full profile of the god, by referring as much to his 
gentle as to his bacchic sides.
64 Cf. Teodorsson, ad loc. It is not uncommon for Plutarch to open or close a discussion with a quotation; 
there are abundant examples in this essay: 612C, 619A, 622C, 623C-D, 625D, 627E-F, 644D, 671B-C, 
672D, 700C, 701D, 739E, 741A, etc.
1195. Theatrical aspects of Pompev
oxjk av yevoiro z<*>pk eorQXa. kou  k o k o ., 
aXX’ ecrri r ovyKpa/nq.
(Eur. Aeolus, frag.21.3-4)1
The good and the bad are always commingled, says Euripides. The same applies when 
talking about the great men that Plutarch described in his Lives. Apart from all their 
distinctive qualities that brought them success and fame, there are also some darker sides 
in their character; apart from their achievements, it is worth noticing their failures. Their 
virtues  and  vices  are  interrelated,  and  qualities  which  make  them  great  can  equally 
destroy them.2 Plutarch is particularly interested in discussing not only his heroes’ natural 
flaws (or, potential weaknesses),3  but also die possible change of qualities into flaws, 
which inevitably leads them to less glamorous moments and to misfortunes in their public 
as well as private life. These kind of moments are valued highly by Plutarch, and are at 
times more worth noticing than the big events and the obvious virtues of these men, since 
they are not only indicative of their ethos but often also prepare the path to the end of 
their  career  and  life,  which  is  often  tragic  and  stands  in  clear  contrast  to  all  their 
achievements.4
1 Plutarch quotes the lines at 25C-D of How a young man should listen to poetry (and again at 369B of On 
Isis and Osiris, and at 474A of On tranquillity of mind). He has previously argued that sometimes theory 
may be different from action, that what we learn in schools is not all necessarily right or wrong; now he 
seizes the opportunity to defend the co-existence of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in life, and expand his thoughts on 
this matter: he believes that neither in men’s nor in gods’ lives can we find ‘good’ or ‘evil’ separately, and 
this is  also how poets present both men and gods -  cf. above, chapter  1, p. 42.  ‘Good’  and ‘bad’  are 
commingled, as is success with failure, the expected with the unexpected. See also in the Lives, Cim. 2.4-5, 
Agis-Cleom. 37(16).8.
2 Cf. e.g. Pelling (1997a)=(2002a), 398; also, id. (1986)=(2002a), 351, (1990d)=(2002a), 131 (on Nicias’ 
self-destruction), and (1997c), 215-216,218, and Duff (2004); about ‘great natures’ gone wrong (and about 
the reasons of their downfall) see Duff (1999b).
3 For example, in Pompey’s case his passivity may at times be a sign of modesty and mild character, and at 
other times, especially at crucial political or military moments, detrimental.
4 Cf. the well-known ‘programmatic statement’ of Plutarch’s general aim in his Lives, as phrased in the 
prologue of  Alexander (1.1-3); cf. also Nic. 1.1-5.
120Pompey is certainly not one of the most ‘popular’  biographies of Plutarch for modem 
scholarship; moreover, the work which has been done has had a pronounced historical 
emphasis. Matthias Gelzer in his monograph of 1949 on Pompey focused more on the 
historical  background  of his  era,  and  drew  a  portrait  of the  general  and  politician 
Pompey.5  Van Ooteghem in 1954 discussed in chronological order all the important steps 
in the career of the general and conqueror Pompey.6 Many years later, in  1979, Robin 
Seager, too, wrote a political biography,7 discussing in detail all the different phases of 
his career and all his achievements; he thus followed the path of Gelzer without deviating 
much from his historical analysis. The commentary by Herbert Heftner,8 largely based on 
material  used  for his Ph.D.  thesis,  is not only,  explicitly and  exclusively,  devoted to 
matters of historicity and reliability of sources,9 but it also stops at chapter 45, leaving out 
the second half of the biography, which is rich in material which is essential to get a full 
picture of Pompey, and in dramatic movement and motifs, a most important aspect for the 
purposes of the present analysis. This part is also left out in Watkins’ unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, another commentary on the first 46 chapters of Pompey, dated a few years earlier 
than the most recent by Heftner.10
This  chapter  will  not  examine  Pompey  from  a  historical  point  of view,  or  offer  a 
comparative analysis of this Life and discuss its place among the Lives in general -  this 
would be beyond the scope of the chapter, not to mention that it would replicate the work 
done  so  far  by  the  scholars  mentioned  above  and  by  others.  Instead,  the  present 
discussion aims to  show how rich  in tragic images and patterns the Life is so that it 
genuinely invites a theatrical reading.  Different versions of the ‘tragic’ and of what is 
reminiscent of theatre appear in this Life. There is not only a direct use of tragic material, 
but also patterns and themes recurrent in tragedy -  but not always exclusively connected 
to tragedy. A closely related question which is raised here is to see how Plutarch used his 
source-material to create a network of theatrical imagery, and also how that works in the
5 Gelzer (1949).
6 Van Ooteghem (1954).
7 Seager (1979).
8 Heftner (1994).
9 On the sources used in Pompey see Pelling (1980), and on the sources used only for the first half of the 
Life see Watkins (1984), i-ix, and Heftner (1994), 44-62.
10 Watkins (1984).
121Life as a whole. Of course, it may be particularly telling if in some cases we are in a 
position to know that what Plutarch describes  in a theatrical light did not necessarily 
happen in that way: in such instances we may be able to trace more sharply Plutarch’s 
technique of creating theatrical atmosphere out of his non-theatrical  material.  This  is 
exactly the point when we see Plutarch at work, and this makes it all the more interesting, 
both to understand his methods of work and to evaluate his personal way of presenting 
things.  In addition, the theatrical atmosphere of the Life  is emphasised by the visual 
setting of scenes, which transfers events and characters to the context of a theatrical 
performance.
Like other Lives -  Antony, Demetrius, Alexander, Pyrrhus, Marius, Crassus11 -  Pompey 
is replete with tragic themes, subversions and dramatic tension. It is not just Pompey’s 
personality which  is rich in tragic conflicts (at which Plutarch hints straight from the 
beginning  of this  Life  in  the  anecdotes  about  his  personal  life),  but  there  is  also  a 
theatrical atmosphere created by all those instances which Plutarch stages as if putting on 
a play, that makes Pompey so rich in theatrical moments and dramatic power, especially 
in its second half.12 There, self-destructive actions and external adverse factors co-operate 
in a nexus which leads Pompey to disaster. In Plutarch’s pairs of Lives one usually sees 
common themes and patterns being repeated, or being used in similar ways. And it is 
quite common in Plutarch that the first Life sets a pattern for the second Life. It is also
often the case that the first of the two Lives in a pair is more simple, whereas the second
1  ^ more complex.  That may also apply to the Agesilaus-Pompey pair of Lives. Pompey is a 
more intricate Life than its pair in many ways, one of which is also the theatrical aspect.
11  Those Lives have been discussed from various angles, with a special focus on their dramatic/tragic 
perspective by many scholars, e.g. by De Lacy (1952),  168-171, Wardman (1955) and (1974),  168-179, 
Bucher-Isler (1972), 80-82, Russell (1973),  135, Mastrocinque (1979), Mossman (1988) and (1992), 100 
and 103, Pelling (1988b), 21-22, (1999b) and (2002b), Andrei and Scuderi (1989), 78-82, Braund (1993) 
and (1997), Zadorojnyi (1997), and Duff (2004).
12 As de Wet puts it, Plutarch exhibits a strong desire to write dramatically ((1981), 119).
13  See Pelling on Synkrisis (1986)=(2002a), 349-363 passim -  esp. pp. 357-359 and (2005b), 337, and 
Stadter (1992). Also: Duff (1999a), 250-252, and esp. pp. 275-278 on Agesilaus-Pompey Synkrisis, as well 
as id. (2 0 0 0).
122Already in the prologue of Pompey (1.1) the reader realises that the tragic mindset is
going to be  important in the Life,  since  in the very first lines Plutarch uses a tragic 
quotation from Aeschylus, from the lost Prometheus Unbound: 
exfipov rrarpos fiot touto (fttXrarov tckvov.
The line belongs supposedly to Prometheus who hated Zeus, the father of Heracles for 
having fastened him to a rock, but was most grateful to Heracles for freeing him. Plutarch
father who was a most hated general, and the tragic quotation helps him to make this 
point. However the line will sound strongly ironic at the end of the Life, when Pompey 
will meet the same end as his father (80.1-2, see p. 156 below).
Tragic images, created by Plutarch either by explicit tragic quotations such as the one 
above or by tragic metaphors, form the background of many important incidents in the 
Life, and contribute to a fuller outline of Pompey’s character. At 31.10 Plutarch describes 
Pompey’s enmity to Lucullus, which drove him to extreme action  in many cases. He 
wanted either to show that Lucullus had no authority at all, or just to satisfy his base 
ambition  that  he  could  interfere  with  Lucullus’  settlements  and  even  subvert  them
(31.2).1 4  He also used to belittle Lucullus’ achievements, declaring that he had waged war 
against kings from dramas and paintings, whereas the real enemy, Mithridates, was left to 
him to fight:1 5
( 3 1 . 1 0)  Biaurupcov  r a   e p y a   efuf>avw ^  e k e y e   T pa/ytpB iouq  kou  <rKidypauj>'iou<;  TrenoXep^QKevou 
ficu rikiK au q  r o v   A eu K o X k o v,  aurrq)  Be  n p o g   a k vjQ tvrjv  kou  trearai^poviay.ei^Q v  to v  a /yG iva  
X em eo Q a t  B u v a p u v ...
The explicit reference to tragedy and painting (“i;p< vyq> Biau< ; kou  a-KtauypaujHou$”) to signify 
the fake danger which Lucullus sees and fights, makes the reader recall the dramatic 
context, and think about the dispute between Pompey and Lucullus in theatrical terms.
14 The harshness which Pompey showed towards Lucullus can easily be paralleled to Agesilaus’ treatment 
of Lysander.  In Ages.  7  Plutarch  stresses  how  annoyed  and irritated  Agesilaus was  about Lysander’s
popularity among the people and success as a commander in Asia Minor before him. He was also too 
ambitious and competitive not to fear that any success he might achieve would be easily attributed to his 
, Lysander (7.4). See also Lys. 23, and the relevant discussion of Meriani (2000). 
un rompey s command against Mithridates and die reallocation of the East see Seager (1979), 44-55, 
Kallet-Marx (1995), and Hoff (2005).
I hate the father, but dearly love this son of his. (TGF, frag. 201)
wants to present Pompey as a popular figure,  loved by the Romans in contrast to his
i
123The kings of the tragic myths are juxtaposed to the real enemy, king Mithridates and his 
troops. The former can only be a fictitious danger, but Mithridates is the true, lurking 
danger. Lucullus’ reply is in the same spirit; he reverses the charges objecting that it is 
Pompey who goes out to fight the image and shadow of a war appropriating to himself 
the victories and the glory of others (31.11). ‘Tragedy’ for the moment is contrasted with 
Pompey’s reality; but it will soon come to invade and take over that reality. Pompey at 
first resists anything ‘tragic’ but then his life offers the right stage, as it were, for a true 
tragedy to be presented on.
In the second half of the Life, and as the signs of Pompey’s downfall become clearer, the 
tragic atmosphere is intensified, theatrical scenes are created and theatrical vocabulary is 
more often employed to describe Pompey’s course to his end. After Caesar had decided 
to confront Pompey’s troops, we are told that his men were enthusiastic at his decision 
and were eagerly drawn up for battle, like the members of a chorus:
(68.7)  cotmep %opo$ (ivev BopufSou p&fj&XeTVftievax; ei$ to£iv kgu npquix; KaJBtoravro.
They took their places in the line with practised ease and composure, as if in a chorus. 
The simile is lucid, and the theatrical image (“axrnep xop%”) efficient and vivid. Pelling 
rightly  remarks  that  the  whole  image  is  close  to  tragedy,  with  Plutarch’s  style  and 
imagery  adopting  an  appropriate tone.16   A  visual  image  is  combined  with  theatrical 
vocabulary to produce a theatrical effect that transposes theatre into real-life.
Chapter  70,  too,  where  bystanders  (Roman  and  Greeks)  are  reflecting  on  human 
blindness and greed and  are deeply concerned about their future even  if they are not 
actively engaged in the war (70.1:  “oA /V o»  Pto^wwcov oi  taroi  kou  Ttve$  EAAijvaw 
Tcapovres e£ft>  /AOjtfTC, <*>$  kyyv$ vjv to deivov, eXoyt&vro tv)v izXeove^iav kou  <^fAov/K/av orrov 
<l>€povcra rijv 'qyepMma^ e§eftjK€v”), is very much in the manner of a choral ode, although 
here there is no explicit use of theatrical vocabulary.17 A group of onlookers that ponders 
on flaws of human nature can be compared to a chorus who is making reflections on 
similar issues on stage, and invites the audience to do the same. The parallel becomes
16 Pelling (1980)=(2002a), 101.
17 Pelling, ib. More on chapter 70 on pp. 144-145.
124even more explicit if one thinks that typically a tragic chorus is less closely involved in 
the  emotions  than  the  principals,  but  directly  affected  by  the  outcome  of what  is 
happening  on  stage.1 8   In  addition,  Plutarch  presents  his  personal  view  as  the  one 
supported by the oi fiekrioroi, thus conveying intellectual and moral authority.
The  same simile taken  from the theatrical world (“itxrnep x°P°s”)  is again used  in  an 
earlier instance. When Clodius accused Pompey of devoting much of his time to his wife 
and  neglecting  public  affairs,  Clodius  used  both  his  popularity  at the  time  and  the 
opportunity offered to him at a court case where Pompey was also present to reproach 
him publicly with several accusations.1 9  He posed questions such as: ‘Who is a licentious 
imperatorT, and ‘What man seeks a man?’. Such questions would fill people with anger 
against Pompey.  The people did not fail  Clodius; they gave him the answers he was 
expecting. The crowd, like a chorus trained in responsive song (amoebaea),  shouted out 
to each question the same answer: ‘Pompey’:
(48.12)  oi  £ ’  a x m ep   %opog  eig  afAOtfiaua.  ovyK€KpoTV)fi€vog,  CKefaov  rrjv  r r jte w o v  
avaureiovTog, e</>’  eKaurrq) yueya. fio& vreg ameKptvaano'  “Y\oy.T?r)iog\
Before more on this is said, a small but important point. It may be true that some of the 
incidents  which  Plutarch  describes  -   like  the  one  discussed  here  -   relate  to  what 
historically happened. That is to say, it is likely that some stage-managing (as we might 
call it) and orchestration of situations and audiences by people in public life actually went
on. But it is perhaps only due to Plutarch’s literary technique that the reader is invited to
01 think that politicians of that time saw their public life as a performance.  The explicit
18 Cf. J. Gould (1996), who explains how this particularity of the marginalised tragic chorus allows them to 
see the truth and develop more appropriate views on different issues than those who are too close to the 
events to see clearly.
19 By this time Clodius had started using his own power and popularity to destroy Pompey, whereas before 
he was his companion. Examples of the action he took against him are listed in the paragraph preceding this 
incident described: he sent Cicero to exile and Cato off to Cyprus, thus interfering with Pompey’s eastern 
settlement; he took away Tigranes, Pompey’s prisoner, by force; he prosecuted some of Pompey’s friends, 
and tried to repeal a part of his political measures which were taken to please the people (48.9-10). See 
again Pelling (1980)=(2002a), 98-100, who remarks that Plutarch’s treatment of Clodius is a further aspect 
to Pompey’s tragedy (p. 98).
20 On the function of the amoebaea as a lyric exchange between an actor and the chorus see e.g. Burton 
(1980).
21 Cf. here Cicero, Ad Q. jr. 2.3.1-4, where there is a quite different account of the same incident with no 
reference to theatrical imagery (compare the “oxmep xppbq' by Plutarch), which proves that foe theatrical 
dimension of the incident is a Plutarchan touch.
125theatrical pointers earlier in the Life may make it more legitimate to think of this string- 
pulling and manipulation in distinctively theatrical terms.
Such  an  instant  of stage-management and  orchestration  is the  passage  quoted  above 
(48.8-12), where Clodius manipulates the public reaction in order to achieve his political 
goal. Plutarch stages the scene vividly; one person, in this case Clodius, urges the crowd 
to  respond  to  his  questions  which  he  asks  in  a  provocative  and  stirring  way.  The 
‘dialogue’  as  the  means  which  Plutarch  uses  here  to  reproduce  the  scene  could  be 
considered as one further element that makes the picture more theatrical, both verbally 
and visually.  People react unanimously  (“oWep %opos”)  at this attempt of Clodius to 
ridicule Pompey and hurt his pride and prestige as imperator, perhaps also urged and 
carried away by the show that Clodius puts on in  front of them by shaking his toga, 
undoubtedly  another  theatrical  effect  which  works  against  Pompey  here.  However, 
Plutarch seems to play down the effect of the (people’s) unanimous response, by stressing 
that the crowd, which Clodius had gathered and incited to support him against Pompey, 
consisted of disreputable and contemptuous people, people of no respect for anyone or 
anything (“exow vtf aunqt itXijOos avSpwncov autrekyeiaq kou ohtytopiau; tiearov”) (48.11). It is 
at the  end  rather  a travesty of proper theatre than  a reproduction  of authentic tragic 
atmosphere; the reaction of the crowd is prearranged and directed by Clodius (“e% <ov ity’ 
omrq>”). In relation to the scene described before, with the people reflecting on human 
flaws (70.1), we find here one sort of set-up performance giving way to another. The 
joyful  chorus directed  for political purposes by Clodius will turn into a tragic chorus 
pondering in a tragic manner about the war. The link between die two scenes becomes 
telling, with the metaphor from the theatrical world (“axmep xop°s”) drawing a parallel 
between real life and stage life.
At  the  Clodius-incident  the  reader realises  that  there  is  a  change  of public  attitude 
towards Pompey. But Plutarch has already earlier (chap. 46) prepared the reader for that 
change. Chapter 46, a clear turning point in this Life, divides Pompey into two parts and 
marks the change of tyche in Pompey’s life. Plutarch tacitly sides at this point with the
126opinion of those people who saw in Pompey another Alexander,22 having so much in 
common  with  the  greatness  of the  famous  leader.  But  he  goes  further  than  this, 
expressing the wish that Pompey had ended his life at this moment of his career, when he 
had achieved the maximum he could, and also before he would become hated and his 
decline would start.23 Plutarch’s comment is a well-calculated injection of a negative tone 
at the  peak  of Pompey’s  career  creating  an  unnerving  atmosphere  which  forebodes, 
despite all appearances so far, a bad end. This makes us recall a recurrent theme which 
though not exclusive to tragedy is especially prominent there, namely the advice to ‘call 
no man happy until you see his end’24 This pattern is particularly clear, for example, in 
Oedipus’  case; he was considered to be the happiest of all men but the end of his life 
turned out to be most disgraceful and unhappy. In OT the chorus underlines this motif in 
their final words:
toore Birrjrov ovt ’ CKeivyv tt)v TeXevrauav IdeTv 
Tjfiepav btnrKonovvra ynfiev* oXfil^eiv, -npiv av 
repfia rou jSiou nepourjfj \krrjftev akyeivov Tiadkav.
And so, waiting for that last day, don’t rush
to call a man happy, before he reaches the end
of his life without suffering anything bad.  (OT 1528-30)
22 On Plutarch’s different view on the similarities (this time, physical) between Pompey and Alexander
(2.2) see below, p. 130.
23 Plutarch’s words here echo Cornelia’s similar words towards die end of the Life, where she, seeing the 
demise of Pompey, wishes that she had died earlier (74.6) -  Beneker (2005b), 79 n. 35.
24 See, for example, the famous Croesus-anecdote in Hdt. 1.30-33. Croesus, after showing to Solon all his 
wealth, asks the wise man whom he regards as the happiest of all men. When Solon does not name Croesus 
as the happiest, he goes on explaining that he does not judge happiness by a person’s wealth but by the way 
his life is ended. ‘For he’, says Solon, ‘who is very rich is not happier than he who has enough for the day, 
unless fortune so attend him that he ends his life well, having all good things about him’ (“...« /-m j oi rvxn 
brunrnro  iravra  koXiz  expvra.  ev  TeXeirrijerau  tov (2wv”). Plutarch seems here (chapt. 46) to have Solon’s 
perception of happiness -  and tyche -  in mind. Cf. Solon 27.6-9, esp. 27.8:  ‘This wisdom, such as it is, 
observing that human life is ever subject to all sorts of vicissitudes, forbids us to be puffed up by the good 
things we have, or to admire a man’s felicity while there is still time for it to change’. Cf. Pelling ((2004a), 
98-100) about this passage and generally about how difficult it is for Plutarchan characters to teach or learn 
a (philosophical) lesson.
25  Similar lines  in  Euripides’ Andromache  100-102, Phoen.  1687-1689  and  1758-1763.  However, the 
authenticity of the lines in OT is debatable. Dawe (1973b) suggests that it is possible that lines 1524-1530 
were composed at some veiy late period; but we cannot say. Cf. also Duff (2000), 160.
127Plutarch’s point is along the same lines as these closing lines of Sophocles’ OT. So far, 
Pompey had ‘enjoyed the luck of Alexander’  (46.2), Plutarch says, giving at the same 
time a hint that, since this is the best luck a general can enjoy, there is only the start of his 
downfall to be expected after this moment:
(46.2)  u)< ; (omjro y  av evravda. rou /3ioi> naiHrafievos,  a%pi ov rrjv  ’AXe^avfipou tv% v)v
€<J% €V’  O  £’  €TC €K €IV < 3 L %p6vO$ <WT(p TO$ fl€V €UTV%fag ^VCyKCV €7T I< j)96vO V < ;,  aV^jKCOTOV^ $€ 
raq (k)OTV%iou;.
How happy would it have been for him if he had ended his life at this point, up to 
which he enjoyed the good fortune of Alexander. For succeeding time brought him 
only success that made him odious, and failure that was irreparable. (46.2)
For, as Plutarch explains, thereafter he used the power he had gained in a legitimate way 
to favour other people illegitimately, a tendency that led him to his destruction, since he 
weakened his own power, while strengthening the power of his potential enemies (46.3). 
Plutarch describes this change of Pompey’s luck emphatically and underlines the irony: 
his very effectiveness and power, which made him great, will finally ruin him (46.3-4). 
He also provides us with a reason for his downfall, when he says that it was only thanks 
to Pompey’s compliance to his companions that Caesar gradually became more powerful 
than  Pompey himself (46.4);26  it seems that Pompey had  granted  him  more  than  he 
actually should. As soon as the passivity which Plutarch had spotted earlier in his private 
life started to pervade his political life as well, Pompey turned into a viewer of his own 
life, not being able to control it.27 Pompey, as Alexander (and Demetrius, and Antony) 
too, is destroyed, partly due to his own weaknesses and wrong decisions.28 Mossman’s 
analysis of Alexander’s end, that he is led to his downfall by himself (internal factor) 
rather than by others (external factor) applies, to a certain level, to Pompey, too, but in
26 Cf. Pelling (1995b)=(2002a), 226 n. 10, and Beneker (2005a), 317.
2 7 Cf. Pelling (1980)=(2002a), 112 n. 32, and pp. 96-102. Pelling notices that especially in the second half 
of Pompey great many of the leading themes cany on around Pompey without being directed by him: he is 
almost a passenger in his own Life.  ‘He is a man to whom things happen’  (p.  100) -  a remark which 
summarises all of Pompey’s passivity. Harrison (1995) also sees chapter 46 as the thematic centre of the 
Life; after this point ‘Pompey ceases to be the protagonist in his own life’ (p. 102).
28 Mossman ((1988), esp. p. 92). Marcone (1989/90) even calls Pompey a victim of himself (p. 56) -  a 
familiar pattern  in  tragedy:  a tragic character falls  victim  to  his own  decisions  and  failings  (see  e.g. 
Oedipus). It seems that the same model of self-destruction applies to Alcibiades as well -  Duff (1999a) 
brings that out well in his analysis of the Coriolanus-Alcibiades pair (cf. pp. 205-240, esp. p. 239). He 
compares Alcibiades to Pompey, since Pompey, too, caused his fall by using his power to help his rivals 
(46.3-4).
128the latter’s case things are more complex. It is his internal weakness that lets Pompey 
become such a prey to external forces.
Significantly, the image of Alexander is introduced by Plutarch already at the beginning 
of the  second chapter (2.1-4), where he  gives  us a detailed description of Pompey’s 
appearance. His kingliness and kindness hint at a person who was bom to become a true 
leader. He would win over his people not only by his qualities, but also by his noble look. 
To some people’s eyes he even resembled Alexander the Great,  an indication that he 
was to gain this title (‘Magnus’)30 for himself, too. Plutarch does not side with those 
people;3 1   he  thinks that  the  resemblance  to  Alexander  ‘was  more  talked  about than 
actually apparent’:
(2.2)  TTOtoua-a puaXhtv Xeyotievyv § ^auvopAvrpj  ofiotorvjra Ttpoq to£  ’AAe§a,v8pov  rod
(ZamXeax; eiKOva^?2
But  Plutarch  does  not  leave  us  for  long  with  that  positive  presentation  of Pompey; 
immediately after (2.5 ff.), he gives us a sign of passivity, even though restricted here to 
the domain of his personal life: he conceded the woman he loved, Flora, to his close 
friend  Geminius  (2.7:  “tov  oiuv  Uofimfjiov  brtTperpou  pev  T < p  Te/r^v/cp...”).33  Pompey’s 
passivity will later on play a significant role in his political career and will unsurprisingly 
be partly responsible  for his  fateful  end.  As  Stadter has remarked,  ‘sexual  behaviour
29 Heftner ((1994), 69-70) remarks that Pompey’s similarity to Alexander was not confined to his outlook; 
his  whole  life  and  career  show  that  he  wanted  to  succeed  Alexander in  every way.  Heftner rightly 
underlines that at this point Plutarch undermines this last aspect, and gives no hint for Pompey’s later 
gained  title  ‘Magnus’,  directly  reminiscent  of Alexander’s  title  (cf.  46.1-2).  Cf.  also  here  Antony’s 
resemblance to Heracles, mentioned at Ant. 4.1.
30 All his life Pompey dreams of being given the title ‘Maximus’, and, ironically enough, he is only given 
that title in his death by an anonymous Roman, who calls him ‘the greatest imperator’ (80.5).
3 1   See also the discussion of onlookers below, pp.  138-139, and n. 51; cf. also pp. 125-126. Cf. Beneker 
(2005a), who is right in arguing that ‘Plutarch, it appears, is highlighting the fact that Pompey fails to 
become an Alexander by beginning to construct a parallel Life, suggesting a possible pairing, and then 
demonstrating the reason for its rejection’ (p. 318).
32 Watkins ((1984), 18-19) argues that there is no proof of their physical similarity from the evidence we 
have  available  (surviving  portraits,  busts,  and  coins).  Kleiner  ((2005),  125)  rightly  speaks  about  an 
‘intended association’.
33  Stadter  (1995),  discusses  exactly  this  behaviour  of Pompey  in  relation  to  the  self-control  theme. 
‘Nevertheless’, Stadter remarks, later ‘he will be accused by his enemies of abandoning the public good to 
please his wives’ (p. 221) -  a picture which stands in clear contrast to his portrayal in the Flora-anecdote.
129reveals  character  flaws  and  strengths  which  surface  in  other  areas  as  well,  and  so 
contributes to a full and complex portrait’.34 And Pompey is no exception to that.
Later Pompey shows again some signs of passivity or of yielding to wrong advice and not 
defending his own will and opinion, a successful and most experienced general’s opinion; 
this time it will be in his political  career and not in his private life.  The motif of a 
commander yielding to bad advisers is one found in tragedy -  for example, Xerxes is led 
to his ultimate destruction because he yields to bad advice (Pers. 750-755) -  but also 
common in historiography (cf. Hdt. 7.5-9, 8.100-102: Mardonius is not a good adviser for 
Xerxes either). Pompey had decided to go out in pursuit of Caesar, but not to wage war 
against him;  instead,  his plan was to keep him under siege, so that he would finally 
surrender through lack of supplies (67.1-2). But again he was influenced by the views of 
others, who were less experienced in war affairs and, moreover, accused him of love for 
command and for always having attendants and guards who would rule the world in his 
name.
Tragedy  is  also  involved  in  the  the  name that Domitius  Ahenobarbus  always  called 
Pompey by, namely ‘Agamemnon’, and ‘King of Kings’, that made him even more hated 
among people:
(67.5)  AopuTio$  £’  c lu to v   1  Pi.*rf»6$ap&oq  ’Ayayienvova  Kcdxov  kou  {ZamXea.  f3ao-iXea)v,
em<f)9ovov enotei.
The theme of  and $Q6vo$ going together, picks up again on 46.2; happiness and
misfortune are indeed so close: the absence of the one confirms the existence of the other. 
Here, at 67.5, we also note a transposition of a tragic -  but not only tragic -  idea from the 
divine (at 46.2) to the human level: it is not his divine tyche but die names that people 
like Domitius attribute to him that evoke the envy of his enemies. It is interesting that the
34 Stadter (1995), 233-236. Stadter’s concluding statements that Pompey’s ‘lack of good judgement in a 
sexual relationship becomes a paradigm of his lack of  judgement in the political arena’ (p. 233), and also 
that ‘self-control and excess, violence and nobility are revealed in sex life as in political life, by a person’s 
actions’ (p. 236) concisely explain why anecdotes as this one -  even if only implicitly -  include important 
hints toward a deeper understanding of the Life in its entirety. On Agesilaus’ love-life see Ages.  11  and 
20.7-9: in his case Plutarch emphasises his homoerotic abstinence rather than his homoerotic passion. Self- 
control in personal life is a manly virtue which suggests Agesilaus’ self-control in public and political life, 
too.
130connotation  of Agamemnon’s  name  is  mainly,  if not  only,  negative  here,  connected 
obviously  to  his  authoritarian  character  as  a  leader.  At  the  same  time  the  name 
‘Agamemnon’ hints at Pompey’s expansionist policy and at his love to exercise power, 
which made him odious (“e7ri<j)9ovov emwei”). The envy that his victories and office caused 
among his supposed ‘friends’ and supporters was at the end one of the most important 
external  factors  that  led  him  to  disaster.  Interestingly,  in  the  pair  Life  of Pompey, 
Agesilaus too is compared to Agamemnon (Ages. 6.7-11) in a dream -  the two men were 
the only ones to whom the command of all Greece was given -  but Agesilaus, in contrast 
to his predecessor, will not make any human sacrifice on taking up that office.
Pompey is gradually led towards the wrong decision, and to the battle at Pharsalus, where 
he would be defeated by Caesar. So, the picture of Pompey created here, which describes 
a man who knows what is right but is unable to carry out his decisions for his own as well 
as his country’s benefit, backs up the tragic plot of the Life, and the argument about self- 
destruction.35  His  personal  failings  which  are  also  reflected  in  his  political  (non-) 
decisions will bring him down at Pharsalus.36 The imagery which Plutarch uses to prepare 
the reader for the disaster to come is indicative of the many internal combats taking place 
in the general’s mind. ‘Pompey himself approved of those physicians who never gratify 
the morbid desires of their patients, and yet he yielded to the diseased passion of his 
followers, for fear of offending if he tried to heal and save them’:
(67.8) o de rcav pev laurpwv rovg pnjdentrre %api^ofievovg raug emQupJoug errnvetrev,  aurrog 
de rep voovuvti rfjg orpanaug evedwKe*7 de'uraug era (rarrvjpiq. hjmtpdg yeveoQau.
Pompey’s  compliance  has  reached  here  its  climax,  and,  in  contrast  to  the  other 
occurrences described before (e.g. in his private life), in this case (battle at Pharsalus) it 
will be fatal.38
3 5 One thinks here of Medea’s parallel: she, too, knows what is the right thing to do, but she cannot carry it 
out, overcome as she is by her passion for revenge and justice -  as she perceives it (Med. 1079: “Gupta; de 
Kpetovaw * r* t» v  epdbv ^ouXeupbdraiv”).
36 Cf. Pelling (1980)=(2002a), 101.
37 The word evedauee emphatically stresses Pompey’s succumbing to others’ opinions and diseased passions.
38 Pompey’s willingness to gratify his friends (cf. “avdpa doting jjnwa, kou rfjg itpog rovg 4> D ut> vg audoug”, 67.7), 
as also shown at e.g. 39.6 and 47.4-10, which was first introduced at 1.4, finally ruins him -  thus Duff 
(1999a), 239 n. 100.
131Although Plutarch presents at times Pompey as a leader who was not able to defend his 
name  and  carry  out  his  own  decisions,  Plutarch  never  really  lets  us  forget  how 
exceptional he was. This is made clear, for example, earlier, at the ceremony where he 
was  granted the  right to  move directly  from  a knight to  a consul.  Plutarch  sees the 
ceremony  as a  spectacle  and  invites the reader to  see the  scene  as  such -  the word 
at 22.4 explicitly suggests that Pompey’s way of entering the forum was itself 
spectacular and unexpected, since the people, we are told, were very impressed to watch 
a general who had achieved two triumphs coming back as an ordinary man, obeying the 
laws and being even prepared to disband his army in order to show his devotion to the 
people (see 21.7):
(22.4) yBtorov Be SeapuL Ttp Bypup rtapeaycev airroq eaujrov ryv orpaTeiav TtapatToupuevo^.
But the most agreeable of all  spectacles was that which he afforded the people 
when he appeared in person and solicited his discharge from military service. (22.4)
Theatre is not explicitly involved here; one could rightly ask, at 22.4 as well as in the 
passages that follow, whether strong visuality is itself enough to suggest theatricality. Yet 
in a text so rich in theatrical allusions the theama-langaage naturally suggests the notion 
of public life as theatre. By implicitly making us think of tragedy, the passage suggests an 
important point: all these other sorts of ‘spectacle’ will give way to tragic theamata at the 
end of the Life (chap. 73 ff.), where Pompey appears as a tragic hero, who has suddenly 
lost everything, a very sad theama indeed.
Plutarch introduces the scene by presenting in full detail what was customary in such a 
procedure. Pompey makes a triumphal entry into the Roman forum; he does not follow 
the usual course of a Roman knight, leading his horse into the forum. Instead, he leads his 
horse by hand himself up to the rostra:
(22.5) eQog yap eon  Pojpuucov to?$ tTntevcnv, orav crrpaTeooxovrou tov vopufiov %povov, 
ayew ei$ a/yopav tov hrnov em vou$ Boo avBjpag oug rtpvyrag kclXovoi [...]. (22.6) Tore By 
Trpo€Ka9yvTo fiev oi rifiyrai TeXkio<; kou Aevrkoq ev Koojup, kou nabpoBo^ yv rcov irmecov 
e^era^ofievoiVf (ixj>9y Be <kou> Wop/nyio^ avtoOev err’ a/yopav KarepxofJbevo^, ra yJkv aAAa 
napouryfjuM, ryg ap%y$ e%(tiv, avroq Be Bia. %eipo$ ayoov tov nrrrov.
132(22.5) It is customary for a Roman knight, when he has served for the time fixed by 
law, to lead his horse into the forum before the two men who are called censors 
[...]. (22.6) At this time, then, the censors Gellius and Lentulus were sitting in state, 
and  the  knights  were  passing  in  review  before them,  when  Pompey  was  seen 
coming down the descent into the forum, otherwise marked by the insignia of his 
office, but leading his horse with his own hand.
This is what usually happens, says Plutarch. But Pompey does not keep to the beaten 
track; he goes against the eft*. Although Plutarch offers no explicit comment, the reader 
might think, again at this point, about Pompey’s end, since acting against normality and 
customs may imply imminent danger. Pompey’s deviation from ‘ethos’ could, of course, 
have positive implications, but in this case it actually turned against him, highlighting at 
the same time the contrast between good and bad revisions of normality, as well as their 
contrasting results.  What the passage undoubtedly demonstrates is Pompey’s sense of 
theatre; he sees his life as a performance and stages himself in front of onlookers.
The scene which follows is interactive and strongly resembles a theatrical spectacle with 
a person  in performance and an audience responding to him.  The crowd watches the 
scene in complete silence, astonished at Pompey’s daring (22.7), while the two censors in 
charge, Gellius and Lentulus, ask him whether he thinks that he has accomplished his 
assigned duty. Pompey replies positively and vay confidently, in a loud voice; he says 
that  he  has  performed  all  the  military  services,  and  all  under  himself as  imperator 
(22.8).39 The crowd bursts into cries of joy, whereas the censors escort Pompey home, a 
gesture which pleases the applauding crowd even more. So, in this case life merges with 
theatre favouring Pompey’s popularity and power.
The vocabulary used underlines the theatrical impact of the scene (22.6-9) -  one notices 
the word “ttopo& x;”  (referring to  all  the knights -  one  of which  was Pompey -  who 
presented  themselves  in  front of the  censors),  which  is  reminiscent of the  theatrical 
parodos, the entrance of the chorus on stage. The word is used again in the Political
39  On  how  accurate  this  statement of Pompey  is,  see  Heftner  (1994),  171-172.  After  examining  the 
historical evidence, Heftner concludes that Pompey exaggerates here while perhaps also hinting at his 
future image as imperator.
133precepts, referring to the entrance of a person upon the stage of public life.40 The most 
glorious entrance, Plutarch says, is achieved when one revolts against a bad man who by 
shameless audacity and cunning has made the city subject to himself:
(805C) to fievroi fyaJuXnv avBpomov, amovoiy  kou  Beivorrjrt totto it^ ic v o v  vfi aurq) rrp 
tto X iv (805D) [...] enavaoravra KaBe?\£?v kou ToneivaxraA Xapsrrpav Troieirau rvjv napoSov 
axrrtep ftpapunrx; rife tzoXitcio^.
On the other hand, to revolt against a bad man who by shameless audacity and 
cunning had made the city subject to himself [...] and to pull him down and humble 
him provides a glorious entrance upon the stage of public life. (805C-D)
Just before that Plutarch had used a simile from the theatrical world. He said that often 
the masses accept the 'beginner'  in public life with enthusiasm,  'just as spectators at a 
show are glad to accept a new performer’ (804D: “kom  yap dexovrau npoBufjubrepov oi noXXoi 
Kopqy rivi kou  T cX 'rp'iw vjj t& v  ovvyOtov to v  apxopevov, uxmep ayoiV ioT V jv Bearai [...]”).4 1
So, the theatrical vocabulary used at 22.6, exactly as in the passage at 805C-D, transfers 
us from the real (here, political) world to the world of theatre. The transferred use of 
parodos  occurs  elsewhere  in  the  Lives,  too.  For  example,  when  Plutarch  refers  to 
Alcibiades’  first  entry  into  public  life,  he,  strikingly,  uses  again  the  theatrical  term 
parodos  for  ‘entry’:  (Ale.  10.1):  “Trpwrrjv  8*  aurrcp  7ropodov  eig  t o   frrjpuMriov  yeveaBai 
Aeyouaf”.42 Alcibiades’ significant entry into politics is compared to the first appearance 
of the tragic  chorus  on  stage.  In  all  these passages the use of * parodos'  for  ‘entry’ 
powerfully  creates  a  visual  image  which  presents  a  political  procedure,  that  of the 
entrance of a person onto the political ‘stage’ or, generally, into public life, in theatrical 
terms. The parallel drawn here between a theatrical image and public life reveals all the 
more  clearly  another  piece  of  the  network  of  theatrical  allusions  which  Plutarch 
constructs.
40 Cf. Fuhrmann (1964), 241-242.
4 1   For the antithesis cf. Pomp.  14.4: at Sulla’s refusal of Pompey celebrating a triumph, Pompey replied 
that, ‘More people worship the rising than the setting sun’, implying that Sulla’s power was fading away 
whereas his own power was increasing. Cf. Political precepts 804F.
42 Cf. Demetr. 34.6. Alcibiades’ entry into public life is described as accidental, as he becomes part of an 
assembly of the Athenian people (cf. the Athenian assembly in theatre at theatrical contests). On ‘tragic’ in 
this Life, see Duff (1999a), 221 and 236-240.
134Quite early in the Life it is mentioned that Pompey had already started to behave in a 
very authoritarian way, and the fear of a tyranny was spread among the people (“tvjv de 
dvv&fuv  tov  Tlofj/mjiov fiapecog  (f&poirreg cog Tvpawffia  KaOicrrtifievqv”)  (30.3).43  Especially 
after he had managed to drive away piracy from the sea (chap. 24-29),44 he had gained 
even more power, and it was proposed (by a popular tribune, called Manilius) that he 
should be given all the territory and forces which Lucullus commanded up to that point. 
Although  everybody  could  see  the  danger  arising  from  this,  the  law  was  passed 
unanimously and Pompey was assigned new powers but, surprisingly, he did not react 
with delight. But people knew already about his thirst for power, and this is probably why 
they were not taken in by Pompey’s ostensible reluctance to take on more responsibilities 
(30.6-7). They all, even his closest friends, regarded Pompey’s reaction as disingenuous, 
and  Plutarch  himself,  in  the way  he  recounts the  incident,  reinforces the  impression 
created,  although  he  distances  himself  from  it  by  introducing  the  scene  with  the 
impersonal “AeyeTou” (‘it is said’, 30.6) 45
The implications are once again theatrical. Plutarch presents Pompey as an actor, a very 
bad one indeed, since he cannot even convince his closest friends that he is being honest 
and genuinely modest when uttering the following words:
(30.7)  “cfeu rwv  avyvvroov  aSXcov,  dig  apa. tcperrrov rp  eva tlov  aBo^wv  'yeveaOou,  ei 
fj/r$€TTore navovfiau orparevofievog firfie tov <f)9ovov tovtov endvg ev a/ypcp BiouTvpofiau 
fiera rijg yvvaiKog”.
‘Alas for my endless tasks! How much better it were to be an unknown man, if I am 
never to cease from military service, and cannot lay aside this load of envy and 
spend my time in the country with my wife’. (30.7)
The use of direct speech -  which by nature has scenic value -  makes the scene more 
dramatic and vivid at this instance.46 Pompey’s attempt to apply to himself the image of
43 For the role of the demos and its political power in Plutarch see de Blois (1992), Pelling (1995b), Prandi 
(2005), and Said (2005).
44 For more on piracy and Pompey’s command to fight it see Gelzer (1949), 74-86, and Seager (1979), 28- 
43, esp. pp. 32-39.
45 Cf. Heftner (1994), 218-219.
46 As Watkins remarks, Plutarch ‘combines detail of Pompey’s expression, action (ukcu tw (vqpw Tiaral-au”) 
and the use of direct speech so as to make his narrative more immediate’. Cassius Dio (Rom. Hist. 36.45.1)
135an ordinary man who does not really enjoy his greatness any more because he evokes in 
other people envy and hatred, but rather prefers the family life instead, is so simplistic 
and rhetorical at the same time, that it makes him appear quite preposterous. The scene is 
most  pointed  for  another  reason,  too:  behind  Pompey’s  disingenuousness  there  is  a 
version of the truth hiding. The readers know that Pompey speaks the truth, for he was 
indeed devoted to his family, as they can also see that he is unable to use the family-man 
argument  in  the  right way.  Plutarch  is  consistently  referring to  Pompey’s  family  or 
personal life, when he wishes to strengthen his positive image, especially when this may 
well serve as an effective counterbalance to a negative image concerning other activities 
(military, political affairs, etc.).47 Yet here the correct dynamics of oikos are somehow 
travestied, and the image of a good family-man, instead of acting in his favour, finally 
works against him.
The exaggerated pathos which Pompey shows here is negatively charged by Plutarch, 
and described as a sign of falsehood and pretence 48 Plutarch suggests that Pompey acts 
as if putting on a play; he is wearing the mask of modesty in order to hide his love for 
power and  not  excite  greater animosity  and  anger among the  people.  But he  is  not 
convincing  in his role.  The false play-acting is  for the moment the dominant sort of 
‘theatre’  in Pompey’s life, but this will change by the end of the Life, where he will 
become  a  true  tragic  character  in  his  own  life.  Plutarch’s  choice  of vocabulary  is 
revealing concerning his own view on the incident and on Pompey’s attitude towards 
power. He says that his friends knew about his innate ambition (“epufrmw (JnXoripJa^”,
also describes this scene, but with far less emphasis, which indicates that it is Plutarch’s own choice to 
embellish their common, less dramatic source (Watkins (1984), 258).
47  Chap. 53  could serve as an example of this pattern. After castigating the enmity developed between 
Pompey and Crassus and the beast fights which Pompey organised in his theatre (52.5) (for more on this, 
see p.  142 below), Plutarch changes the focus-point in the next paragraph, putting aside, for a while, his 
political mistakes and emphasising his conjugal devotion and love for his wife Julia.  ‘Even those who 
found most fault with Pompey’s friendship for Caesar could not blame him for his love for his wife’ (53.5) 
-  Plutarch leaves no space for criticism of Pompey’s successful marital life.
48 Exaggerated pathos, falsehood, theatrical ostentation, tragic or melodramatic twists, and the unreal, all 
describe here -  as much as elsewhere, too -  various forms of the ‘theatrical’ element, while at the same 
time their negative implications prepare for the downfall; cf. De Lacy (1952). For examples where the word 
‘tragic’ describes something false or contrived see Di Gregorio (1976), 170-172, O’Donnell (1975), 2, 24- 
29, 69, 73 and passim; and generally about the negative tinge which ‘tragic’ and ‘theatrical’ may have see 
e.g.  Wardman (1974),  170-173,  Mossman (1988),  84-85  (esp.  n.  6), Zadorojnyi (1997),  169-170, Duff 
(1999a), 123-126, Pelling (1999b); cf. also Most (2000), 20-21.
13630.8) and love for power (“^lAopfc/as”, 30.8),49 and that his enmity to Lucullus fuelled his 
ambitions  and  made  him  all  the  more  delighted.  Plutarch  passes  his  own  comment 
reproaching Pompey with innate ambition.50 He sides with the opinion of the public, and 
at  the  same  time  alludes  to  Pompey’s  tragic  end  which  is  presented  implicitly  as 
inevitable, since his love for honour was part of his nature. In this incident, on one hand 
we have the charge of over-ambition and uncontrollable love for power, and on the other 
hand we see Plutarch expressing his personal opinion through the voices of the internal 
audience, a very theatrical device indeed. It is not an uncommon technique for Plutarch to 
introduce  into  his  narrative  personal  thoughts  on  various  matters  using  a  group  of 
onlookers as mouthpiece, as he does in the passage discussed above, where he sides with 
those people who disapproved of Pompey’s reaction.5 1
A similar use of crowd as a group of onlookers is found in Marius, where again the issue 
about Plutarch’s own place among them comes into play. Plutarch’s phrasing tells us 
much, both about Marius himself, and about the people’s attitude towards him:
(34.6) hvioiq fiev  ovv  ypeane  toujtcl  npaTTUiv,  kou  Kartovre^  eBeanno  ttjv  JuXoniuaw 
ourvou kou to$ ofuAAo^, t (SeXnorots opaxnv oitcripetv ht'faei Tvps izXeove^iav kou trjv 
<J>iXo8o£ia,v on ‘ nXaumwra.roq ck nevynx; kou fieyurros €K puKpov  opov ovk oRkv
euTU£f'a£, oude Baujtia^ofievo^ atyamy. kou asnoXautov ev rjovxty nov irapovrwv [...].
49 At 31.4 Lucullus himself charges Pompey with love for power -  <fuXap%la. Cf. Watkins’ comment on 
both of these traits of Pompey’s character ((1984), 259), and Gelzer (1949), 186-187.
50 Philotimia may take various forms and become a dominant motif in the Lives, as Muccioli (2005) has 
demonstrated for the case of Lysander. For the role which philotimia should or should not play in the life of 
a politician see the Political precepts, and also Roskam’s discussion of the essay (2004/05, esp. pp. 93-98 
and 102-103). See Frazier (1988b) for an analysis of all the good and bad implications of  philotimia in the 
Lives. She aigues that philotimia can become a pathos and lead a person to base actions (p. 121). She also 
discusses the term in relation to philonikia, which is usually negatively charged by Plutarch (p.  120). On 
various interpretations of ‘ambition’ and ‘contentiousness’ see Pelling (1989), 212, and (2002a), 182, 242- 
247,292-297, 341 ff., and passim (cf. Index, s.v.); cf. also Wardman (1955), 105-107, Bucher-Isler (1972), 
12-13,  54-55,  58-59,  for  a  list  of all  the  vocabulary  connected  with  arrogance,  boast,  and  ambition, 
Scardigli, (1995b), 9, and Duff (1999a), 83-87,  179-180, 214-215, 229-230, 267, 308. The term is very 
common in the Lives: see e.g. Demosth. 2.2 and 4.1.
51  Cf. pp.  125-126 above. It is usually the ‘sensible’ onlookers with whom Plutarch sides (cf. Mar. 34.6: 
“tw? f$eXrurmi<;n) —  I borrow the term from Duff (1999a),  55. Onlookers also serve as mouthpiece for 
Plutarch and as guide on how the reader should react -  see again Duff (1999a), 55, 120 (on Marius), and 
passim; cf. Pelling (2005a), 289-290. The onlookers offer a different focus on events. Thus the readers see 
things happening not only as described by the narrator but also through somebody else’s eyes; on narrators 
and focalisers cf. de Jong (1991) and (2004).
137Some people were pleased to see him doing this, and they used to go down and 
watch his ambition and struggles. But the best people, when they saw him, were 
moved to pity at his greed and love of glory, because, although he had become very 
rich from being poor and very powerful from being powerless, he did not know 
how to set a bound to his good fortune. He was not content to be admired and to 
enjoy in peace and quiet what was present.  (34.6)
On a first reading we see that Plutarch divides the people watching Marius going out on 
new expeditions into two groups with different, if not opposite, reactions to his decision. 
However, his choice of words to distinguish the two groups reveals much about his own 
view.  He  says  that  some  (“ev/oi^ fiev”)  were  happy  about Marius’  decision,  whereas 
others,  the best people  (“rofc Be fZeXtiV tois”)  felt pity  for him.  One  notices  the  stark 
contrast between the two views (fiev -  Be). Plutarch clearly sides with those who think 
best and can see further in future. He is one of those (the ‘best people’) who feel sorry 
about Marius’  insatiable love of glory, and whose fears are not far from reality. It is 
interesting to notice Plutarch’s short comment on the formers’ view, and his much longer 
comment on the latters’ view, which he favours as wiser and closer to the facts.
The connection between  ‘love for power’  and a bad end of life is not uncommon in 
Plutarch’s Lives.53 Again Marius offers a good parallel here. He is clearly another similar 
case who sought glory and honours and was not happy with what he had achieved in life, 
when he admittedly had achieved so much. He becomes the object of criticism, too, for 
his unfulfilled ambitions and his love for power, which were never enough to make him 
stop asking for more. Already at 2.2-4 there is foreboding of Marius’ ill end. He would 
not have ruined himself if it were not for the influence of passion, an untimely love of 
office (^iXapxta)54 and uncontrollable greed, and if he -  and this is quite an interesting 
point -  had not showed contempt for, and therefore rejected, Greek education.55 Later 
Plutarch again points to Marius’ love for power and honours. Whereas he had achieved
52 Duff’s translation is used here ((1999a), 120).
53 Cf. e.g. Ale. 2.1-7,6.4,23.8,27.6 and 34.3.
54 The word is again used shortly before Marius died, while he was on his deathbed (45.11): Marius is in 
great suffering, as his love for office (4 iA apxia.) makes him strive to obtain, even in the last minute, the 
Mithridatic command.
55 For more on 2.2-4 see Duff (1999a), 109-110 and 120.
138many military victories, he was, evidently, never quite satisfied. The quest for power is a 
common theme in tragedy and regularly leads to disaster -  see, for example, Creon in 
Antigone, Xerxes in the Persians, Clytemnestra in Agamemnon, Lycurgus in Aeschylus’ 
Edonians,56  Pentheus  in  the  Bacchae,  and  of course  the  famous  strife  for  kingship 
between Eteocles and Polyneices in the Seven, as well as the debate about justice and 
power between the two brothers in the Phoenissae. In all these cases, excessive ambition 
and desire to exceed the human limits, often together with neglect of divine warnings, 
lead the characters to their personal -  but not only personal -  ruin. Though the theme is 
not exclusive to tragedy, the tragic antecedents are brought to the fore when the idea of 
the  overreacher  is  combined  with  the  presentation  of politics  as  spectacle  and  the 
phenomenon of the internal audience.
In another incident Pompey shows another side of his character, not his ambition and 
quest for power but his kindness and pity. King Tigranes arrives at Pompey’s palace to 
surrender,  after being defeated by Lucullus, helped by Tigranes’  own son.  The  scene 
displays strong visual similarities with the consulship scene before (33.2-5-22.6); they 
are like tragic ‘mirror-scenes’, both underlining Pompey’s wish to present himself as an 
ordinary man.57 King Tigranes, defeated and humiliated, not only obeyed the instructions 
of Pompey’s lictors to dismount and approach on foot, but he also, out of his own will, 
surrendered his sword to them, a clear sign of complete allegiance to Pompey. Moreover, 
he took off his royal tiara, and was ready to lay it at his feet, throw himself down and 
clasp his knees in supplication. Pompey, however, did not let Tigranes go as far as that, 
but treated him almost as a friend, by seating him next to himself, and offering him a fair
56 Cf. Cropp (2005), 275-276: he describes how Lycurgus incurred divine punishment by trying to suppress 
the worship of Dionysus.
57 For more on ‘mirror-scenes’ see Taplin (1978), 122-139, where he discusses typical examples of ‘mirror- 
scenes’  in tragedy, and remarks:  ‘The mirror-scenes are individual within the complex,  and of shifting 
significance; and by being single and well-marked they are, in fact, much more effective as drama than any 
unaccentuated regularity would be’ (p. 123). From his discussion it becomes obvious that ‘minor scenes’ 
have a special dramatic effect; cf. also id. (1977), 100-103. It is then perhaps for this reason that Plutarch 
uses  them,  too.  For  mirror-scenes  in  Plutarchan  context  see  Pelling  (1990c)=(2002a),  159-160, 
(1990d)=(2002a), 126,138 n. 33, (1995a)=(2002a), 243, and (2002a), 403-406. However, mirror-scenes are 
not of course confined to tragedy; they are as early as epic and historiography -  see e.g. Hdt.  1.8 ff. and 
9.110-113 about Candaules’ wife versus Masistes’ wife.
139military  settlement.58  Again  we  see  Plutarch  adding  some  dramatic  colouring  to  his 
description of an important scene. The scene shows how respected Pompey was by the 
famous King Tigranes, while proving how lenient and gentle Pompey was (“tftiepov Be 
riva Tip Tponq) kou 7rp$tov”) (33.2). At this instance Pompey shows pity to the former king, 
remembering his past and refusing to let Tigranes humiliate himself.59 Plutarch’s vivid 
narration transposes into theatrical boundaries, as it reveals traits of a theatrical scene, 
where the regal paraphernalia makes it rpcuyiKov in a more Plutarchan sense.
Theatre as physical building -  not as imagery as we have seen so far -  plays a further role 
in the Life of Pompey, especially after his third triumph, as the celebrations which took 
place to honour him and to welcome him back as the only imperator who had achieved 
three  triumphs  in  three  different  continents  (Europe,  Asia,  Africa)  were  of unique 
magnitude and generosity. The triumphal procession also included the parade of banners 
presenting all the countries and nations over which he triumphed (chap. 45). It was as if 
all his expeditions and extensive conquests unfolded on those placards. Pompey, some 
time after his third triumph in 61, started building the famous and beautiful theatre of 
Rome (40.9). The design and plan of his theatre was based on the theatre in Mitylene, 
which he had visited when he gave the city its freedom.60 He was so impressed by this 
theatre that he decided to build his Roman theatre in the same style, only in a much larger 
scale and more impressive. He also had the chance to attend the traditional poetic contest, 
which took place in this theatre and had as its one theme his exploits. Pompey’s life has 
become a theme of dramatic art, and this while he is still alive.6 1  It is impressive that a 
great,  living personality offers material (his actual life and career) for such a theatre, 
exactly as big mythical families were the basis for the material used in Greek tragedies 
and in much Greek art before.
58 A very similar scene at Aem. 26.9-12: Interestingly, Perseus’ self-abasing is not welcomed by Aemilius 
Paullus either, because it undermines his victory over him.
59 Cf. Aem. 26.7-12. Pelling ((2005a), esp. pp. 286 and 296-300) gives a full analysis of all the different 
dimensions and forms of pity in Plutarch.
60 The city had been harshly punished by Lucullus for aiding and supporting Mithridates. Cf. Luc. 4.
61 Another example of the stage-management theme made earlier in this chapter -  see pp. 126-127.
140There is an interesting detail at the opening of Pompey’s theatre in Rome. Apart from the
•  62 athletic and musical contests which Pompey held, there was a combat of wild beasts. 
The  most terrifying  spectacle  was  an  elephant  duel  (52.5).  Cassius  Dio  (Rom.  Hist. 
39.38.2) mentions eighteen elephants, not two. Plutarch’s deviation from Cassius Dio 
may not be accidental. The battle between two elephants may be understood as a hint for
•  •  •  63 the upcoming personal conflict between Caesar and Pompey, a truly terrifying conflict. 
Already from its opening day Pompey’s theatre itself is not presented as the place for 
celebrations and performances only, but as a place for battles, too. Thus the reader may 
see in this battle-picture something dark and ominous which is connected to Pompey’s 
fate at the tragedy of Pharsalus.
Apart from the allusion to Pompey’s fate, the battle-image includes a cross-Life hint to 
the killing of Caesar, too. At the end of the Caesar Plutarch describes in every detail the 
scene of Caesar’s murder (66.1 ff. -  see pp. 167-168): it all happened in front of a statue 
of Pompey, in a building which was attached by him to his theatre. In fact, Plutarch says, 
it seemed that a higher power was responsible for what happened there. There are two 
striking details in Plutarch’s description of Caesar’s murder; the one is that Cassius, just 
before the attack started, looked at Pompey’s statue as if invoking his approval and aid; 
and the other one is that, after being violently struck by his assassins, Caesar fell to the 
ground by the pedestal of the statue of Pompey, drenching it with blood, so that it seemed 
that Pompey himself was leading the attack and taking revenge on his rival. Notably, still 
at this point Plutarch obviously thinks about the battle between beasts, for he describes 
the  fall  of Caesar as  similar to  the  fall  of a  wild  beast:  “foeXauvoftevog  axmep  Bvpiov 
evetXerro tou$ izawrcov %epmvn (66.10: driven this way and that way like a wild beast he was 
entangled in the hands of all). The link between theatre and death is certainly one to keep 
in mind.
62 Cf. Pelling (2004c), pp. 325-326, where he suggests that all these athletic and other contests add to the 
ostentatious behaviour of Pompey and link with theatre which is important for the tragic texture of his fall -  
cf. also 69.5, where Pompey’s troops are described as m/ppixurrau: dances like these might naturally take 
place as part of a contest or festival or theatrical display.
63 Cf. Beneker (2005a), 320.
141Much later, just before the battle at Pharsalus,64 the theatre represents again a bad sign for 
Pompey. This time it was in a dream that Pompey had. He entered his theatre, die dream 
goes, as the audience was applauding, and decorated the sanctuary of Venus Victrix with 
many spoils (68.2-3). Although he might have been encouraged by some aspects of the 
dream,  he  was  generally  disturbed;65  for he  interpreted  the  dream  as  indicating that 
Caesar,  whose  descent  was  traced  back  to  Venus,  would  soon  receive  glory  and 
splendour through him.66 Dreams play a significant role as hints for what is going to 
happen in the future in tragedy, too. Tragic dreams may guide or encourage conduct, but 
like oracles they also tend to suggest disasters that will happen anyway, no matter if the 
characters try to avoid them -  and indeed it is often the case that the attempt to avoid 
them will bring them on (cf. the oracle in OT); or they can portend impending disasters 
(Atossa’s dream in the Persians, Hecuba’s ominous dream for Polyxena’s end in Hecuba, 
Clytemnestra’s dream in the Choephoroi) 67 Appian provides us with another important 
detail, for he mentions that Caesar’s password at Pharsalus was actually ‘Venus Victrix’ 
(Bell.  Civ. 2.11.76). The learned reader is able to realise at the end that the dream is 
ominous of Pompey’s defeat by Caesar, and that his theatre does not stand here for a sign 
of victory for Pompey. However, one has to acknowledge that, again, the dream would be 
even more significant if the reader recalled at this point that this theatre was also the 
location of Caesar’s own death. Later, in the Synkrisis of Agesilaus and Pompey, the talk 
is again about theatre, this time the theatre (Qearpov) being Pharsalus (84.4-6), ‘a theatre 
which Pompey should have avoided’.68 In this case ‘theatre’ is used as a metaphor for the 
‘battlefield’, where Pompey was to be defeated by Caesar. Plutarch strengthens in a way 
the negative charge of theatre for Pompey; in his dream theatre was at the end a bad sign, 
and now it describes the very place of his defeat.
64 More on the actual battle and its different stages in Gelzer (1949), 228-263.
65 For a discussion of Lucan’s recount of the dream (7.7-7.28), which is explicitly described as ambiguous 
(in contrast to Plutarch’s recount, where the ambiguous nature of the dream is only vague) see Pelling 
(1997b), 204-205 and 210.
66 Cf. Beneker (2005a), 320.  See also Brenk (1977), 225, and (1998),  115, who, moreover, gives other 
examples of ‘demoralizing dreams which at first sight seem propitious and uplifting, but are quickly seen as 
ill-boding and crush the dreamer’.
67 See also in the chapter on Caesar, pp. 165, 172-173, and 183-186.
68  Thus Pelling (1980)=(2002a),  101-102,  112 n.  36, where he remarks that ‘the 6ea,Tpov image is also 
woven into the texture of the athletic imagery which pervades the Life (cf. esp. 8.7, 17.2, 20.2, 51.2, 66.4, 
84(4) passim): Pharsalus is ‘the stadium and theatre for the contest” . See also Harrison (2005), 59, Pelling 
(2004c), 325, and n. 33, and Beneker (2005a), 320.
142In the last chapters of Pompey (chap. 70-80), and as we are approaching Pompey’s end, 
theatrical imagery runs through all the important moments of the general’s life and of the 
circle of people around him.69 At the same time, what might have been sensed before as 
ominous and as a sign which was foreboding disaster, now comes true. Tragedy invades 
and pervades Pompey’s reality. The narrative from this point onwards is dense in the use 
of theatrical motifs. Plutarch here, more frequently than before,70 is narrating the events 
from a viewer’s point, as it were, passing more often personal comments (such as the one 
discussed below) and evaluating conditions and characters.
At 70.1-3 Plutarch describes some of the effects of the internal conflict between Caesar 
and Pompey: the city was divided into two parties, families fought against each other, and 
hatred developed among members of the same family.7 1  Plutarch’s comment that ‘it only 
proved how blind and insane human nature is when passion reigns’ (70.2: “btitieiKwtiew) 
TTjv  au/9p a m ivr)v  < f> 6m v   d>$  ev  n a 8ei  yevo fievr)  T v $ k o v   e o n   kou  fta v ic o tie ^ ) is of general value. 
The question of how people think or act under the influence of passion (of love, or for 
justice) is also central for tragedy (see Phaedra-Hippolytus, Orestes, Medea, Philoctetes,
69 Cf. Harrison (2005), 56 and 59.
70 Very selectively I list here some representative passages of narratorial interventions: 2.11 (“rifr tie rcepi 
Trjv  titaurav  evKoXiag  kou  Xnvrtfmq  ev  aTvofivr/fLovevput  Xeyerau  tou> 0 tov”)  (‘as  regards  his  simplicity  and 
indifference in matters pertaining to the table, a story is told as follows'), 8.7 (“7rpa&ig...avTog xaff eai/rag 
irnepijfveTg outrag, liMfiei tie kou fteyeOet raw uorepov a/ydivwv kou imheftan> KaraKe%<aafikva^, etietiieiv KtveTv, fjui) 
Ttept ra TTpdrra, TioXk'fy; titarcptfSnte yevofievr^, raw fieykmov kou fiaXuna tivfawruw to Jfioq epyutv kou najhtfiaroov 
toO  avvtipog cvnofatffl&fiev”) (‘deeds...which were extraordinary in themselves but were buried away by the 
multitude and magnitude of his later wars and contests, and I am afraid to revive them, lest by lingering too 
long upon his first essays, I should leave myself no room for those achievements and experiences of the 
man which were greatest,  and most illustrative of his character’),  10.9 (“aAA’  ’Ormiq) nev...o-<f>otipa tieT 
moreuetv fier ’ 6uAo06to£”) (‘but when Oppius discourses about the enemies or friends of Caesar, one must 
be very cautious about  believing them’),  14.9  (“tivjXav  ti’  eoriv  oti  Kai {3ouXifc  av  eBeXijcras Tore pqutiicog 
eTujcev”),  17.4 (“...cog CLfufxrrepov^ -roug to®’  unoreuovTog ouSevog a^M »ug ovTag”) (‘...implying that both the 
consuls of that year were good for nothing’), 23.6 (“e&jAoxre ti’  out* ta. Trpayfiara fiet* oXiyov xpovov”) 
(‘how true this is, events themselves soon showed’), 28.5-6 (philosophical reflections on human nature and 
on  man’s  change  of habits  under  specific  circumstances),  42.13  (“ev  ti’  kmrcokauq  KiKepwvog  r)  curia. 
yeypa.TTTcu”)  (‘but  the  reason  is  stated  in  Cicero’s  letters’),  etc.  Plutarch’s  comments  serve  to  clarify 
something, to give a hint to what is expected to happen next, to communicate his personal attitude to an 
event, behaviour or uttering, or even to create a more immediate and dramatic ‘dialogue’, as it were, with 
his readers.
71 On the outbreak of the Civil War of 49 B.C. and its background as well as its results see Gelzer (1949), 
193-227, and Seager (1979), 164-184.
143Antigone). A little later (70.6-7), Plutarch again castigates the Romans’ over-ambition for 
leadership, which led them to a Civil War:
(70.6) Tore £’  aXkrqKoi<; iLa%ovp£voi crwf)<rav, ovBe tt)v  airran/, Bi’ ni}v rffe itarpiBo^ 
'fyjxiBouv,  oiKTtpavres,  aj%pi  Ty; 'fftiepau;  eKciv^g  avucrfrwv  TqxxrayopeuopAvwv.  (70.7) v) 
puev yap yevofievi) ovyyeveta kou  ra  TouA/a$ fatkrpa k o u  yajpjo$ c k c iv o$ evBu$  anarrjka, 
kou  VTTOTrra  K o tv o iv to ^   erci  zpefa  a w ia ra p sv^  op^peupa,ra,  <^/A/a^  aXyQivrfc  oh 
p£T€(r%ev.
But now they were about to join battle with one another, nor were they moved even 
by compassion for their own glory to spare their country, men who up to that day 
had been called invincible! For the family alliance which had been made between 
them, and the charms of Julia, and her marriage, were now seen to have been from 
the first suspicious and deceptive pledges of a partnership based on self-interest; 
there was no real friendship in it. (70.6-7)
The partnership between Caesar and Pompey, two great leaders, lacked in true friendship 
and love for the common good, says Plutarch. In addition, the passage raises the point 
that political matters are interlinked with family matters. The same point about the oikos 
and  its relation to the state is made at Caesar 23.5-6, where Pompey’s mourning for 
Julia’s death and the consequent break of the link between himself and Caesar (which 
was achieved via Julia) becomes a sign of the political upheaval to follow and of their 
personal conflict.
Towards  the  end  of Pompey,  where  everything  seems  to  lead  to  his  tragic  end,  the 
biographer Plutarch tries to gauge more Pompey’s psychology and thoughts, sharing at 
the same time his personal reflections with his readers -  more openly than before. After 
the defeat of Pompey’s  infantry (72.1), Plutarch tries to understand why Pompey just 
walked away from the camp.72 He says, ‘it is very difficult to say what thoughts passed 
through his mind’ at that very moment (“< p pev expqcraro Xoyiopup xaXe-nov erneTv”). To the 
reader’s surprise, a few lines further down (73.1-2), Plutarch speaks as if he knew what 
crossed Pompey’s mind -  one notices the repetition of the word hyyifrpog here, referring 
to his calculations, as is also the word ewoovp^vov. The full passage reads as follows:
72 Contrast here Agesilaus’ attitude: although wounded, he refused to retire to his tent ( A g e s . 19.1).
144(73.1)  Wopmdpo^ Be [...] amnet k o lB’ yovxicLV, ev BiaXoyiopuHC lov diovq ciko$ Xaqjfiaveiv 
avBpamov ervj Terrapa kou rptaucovra vikav kou Kpavretv amaurrmv eiOtoy^vov, ym ft Be 
kou  < }> V Y*k Tore npdrrov  ev  yqpg. XaLpfiavovra,  iteTpaui,  (73.2) ewoovuevov  B’ ’  et;  oawv 
dydiveov kou TToXefiaiv Tjv^ievrjv amo^aXmv copg. pug. Bo^av kou Buvotpuv, [•$] npo puKpov 
Toomnroi$ onXoig kou 'irrrxoiq kou ot6Xdi$ Bopvfapovpuevos, amep%erou puKpoq ovrco yeyovax; 
kou orvveaTaXfievo^, ware Xa.v9a.veiv Qrfrovvrau; rovg rmXefjuov^.
But Pompey [...] went quietly away, indulging in such reflections as a man would 
naturally make who for thirty-four years had been accustomed to conquer and get 
die mastery  in  everything,  and who now  for the  first time,  in  his old age,  got 
experience of defeat and flight; he thought how in a single hour he had lost the 
power and glory gained in so many wars and conflicts, he who a little while ago 
was guarded by so many arms and horses and naval resources, but was now going 
away so insignificant and humbled as to escape the notice of the enemies who were 
in search of him. (73.1-2)
However,  apart  from  Pompey’s  reflections,  Plutarch  tries  to  understand  Pompey’s 
psychology and feelings, too. So, the words “puKpos oimo yeyovax; kou ovveoraXpukvod'* are 
actually meant to describe how he must have felt when he was at some distance from the 
camp, completely humiliated and insignificant (cf. Caes. 45.8). Pompey must then have 
felt  as  every  man  would  feel  if,  after  thirty-four  successful  and  glorious  years  of 
leadership,  he  were  to  lose  so  much  in  so  little  time.73  At  this  point  the  reader  is 
encouraged to make an overall assessment, as it were, of the general’s life and see in him 
the man who best incorporated the two extremes, the maximum glory and the utter defeat. 
Pharsalus marks the most dramatic turn of fortune for Pompey.74 This sudden change of 
luck in one’s life is also common in tragedy (and is singled out by Aristotle {Poet. 1452a 
22 ff.; cf. 1453a 7-10, 13-17) as an essential element in the tragic plot), the most striking 
example perhaps being that of King Oedipus, whose status changed dramatically in one 
day: from the king and saviour of his people he became the city’s most cursed man and 
an exile, or rather, self-exiled.
73  See Marcone (1989/90), 59-60, who reasonably infers that it is Plutarch himself who introduces and 
sustains this picture of the extremes in Pompey’s life.
74 Cf.de Wet (1981), 129.
145Plutarch’s  use  of vocabulary  relating to  emotions  and  thoughts  confirms his  general 
concern about understanding in depth his characters’ psychology and reasoning (see here: 
“ev  tiio&oyiopoTg”  and  “evvoov/aevov”).  The  reader  may  understand  the  use  of  such 
vocabulary  as  another  indication  of Plutarch’s  suffering  together  with  his  character, 
reaching perhaps at this point the climax of (narratorial) empathy. Especially the sense of 
the loss and Pompey’s change of status among his army as well as the sudden, extreme 
change of his fortune in one single moment (cf. the tragic peripeteia) make the narrative 
more  intense  and  his  fateful  end  unavoidable.  The  dramatic  turning  of the  story  is 
reflected in Plutarch’s style. Reflections here, at a critical moment, are reminiscent of 
tragedy.  Plutarch  shares  his  interest  in  looking  into  the  human  soul  with  the  great 
tragedians.  By describing the inner thoughts of Pompey,  Plutarch draws his audience 
deeper  into  his  character and  his  psychology,  rather as  happens  in  tragedy.  There a 
character’s soliloquy might be the natural tragic mode of articulating something similar to 
Pompey’s reasoning, while at the same time the soliloquy might be a direct way for a 
character to share his thoughts and dilemmas with the audience, and talk about himself 
(cf. e.g. Ajax 430-480, 646-683, where the hero articulates thoughts about his fate; Medea 
disclosing  her  evil  plans  (364-409,  764-810);  Choeph.  269-305,  where  Orestes  in  a 
monologue similar to a soliloquy decides to take revenge hoping to receive help from 
Apollo).
In the passage quoted above (73.1-2) what seems to trouble Plutarch is the reason why 
Pompey  withdrew  without  saying  anything  and  without  being  able  to  do  what  the 
situation required. However, the situation does not concern only Pompey the Great and 
his failure to behave as somebody who deserves his title. The issue involves all those 
great leaders and epic heroes, like Ajax, who failed to act as such. The example of Ajax is 
explicitly mentioned by Plutarch in the following lines (72.2),7 5 offering a direct parallel 
to Pompey’s decision to withdraw, since Ajax, too, was taken by fear at the sight of the 
Trojan troops and retreated, unable to defend both his name and fame. Appian (Bell. Civ. 
2.11.81) refers to Ajax too, when describing this moment, but, interestingly enough, he
75 The quotation is verbally reproduced from Homer, II.  11.544-546. Between epic and tragedy there is a 
strong link -  Mossman (1988), 85 (and the relevant n. 11) and 8 6; so, even the epic element in the Life may 
point to tragedy.
146only mentions that Pompey resembled Ajax, and not that Pompey quoted Homer on Ajax. 
Possibly, as Anderson points out, ‘the whole scene is a topos with no historical basis, a 
means of emphasising the dramatic poignancy of the moment.’76 To return to a point 
made earlier (see p.  129 n. 28, and pp.  130-132), Plutarch creates the image of a tragic 
hero, as it were, who self-destructs. However,  Pompey’s entourage is significant, too, 
later on (chap. 74 ff.), and, in this, Pompey shares more common points with Sophocles’ 
Ajax. For, exactly as Ajax fails to realise how dependent both the chorus, consisting of 
his fellow sailors, and Tecmessa are on him, and heads towards his death, in a similar 
way Pompey can do little to support and understand fully the feelings and the fate of his 
wife and friends. However, in the final scenes his last meeting with Cornelia will show 
that Pompey and Cornelia are emotionally closer than the Sophoclean Ajax and Tecmessa 
-  so, Ajax as a point of valid intertextual background which reveals parallels but also 
points of contrast may be here a choice of Plutarch to encourage the reader to think 
‘tragic’.
Not only does Plutarch so often towards the end of the Life implicitly invite us to think of 
Pompey  in  tragic  terms  but  he  also  quotes  directly  from  tragic  plays.  Pompey’s 
withdrawal both offers another example of passivity and signals the course towards his 
end. The defeated imperator was finally taken on board by a man called Peticius, who 
provided him with all he needed. It is the same man whose ominous dream forecasts the 
sad end of Pompey, for it happened that in his dream, just the night before, he had seen 
Pompey, not as he had often seen him, but as a humble and downcast man, addressing 
him (73.4-8). Ironically, as he was finishing telling his dream to his fellow sailors he saw 
Pompey in a boat, exactly the way he had appeared in his dream, thus making the scene 
which takes place in reality seem to have been brought on by Peticius’ dream (cf. above 
p. 143, with examples of the pattern of tragic dreams which are fulfilled despite the effort 
of tragic characters to avoid them).
Moreover, one of Pompey’s attendants, Favonius, who was a free man, behaved to him as 
if he were his slave, letting Pompey live the illusion that he was still his master (73.4-11).
76 W. S. Anderson (1963), 61 n. 16.
147It seems that a kind of acting on both sides is going on here. The attendant is playing the 
role of Pompey’s  slave,  and Pompey himself pretends to be  still the king.  The role- 
playing transposes the scene from the real world into the theatrical world. The attendant 
even washed his feet and prepared his meals, thus confirming in a way that ‘to generous 
souls  every  task  seems  noble’  (“<feu  rdim  yewauoio-iv  anav  koAov”  -  73.11)  (frag. 
961),77 a tragic verse which Plutarch quotes from Euripides, and which gives at this stage 
an even stronger tragic texture to Pompey’s life and career. The downfall of Pompey, 
though, is definitive. Direct quotations from tragic plays, used at critical junctures like 
this one, reinforce the tragic element in Pompey which is created by strong theatrical 
patterns and metaphors.
Anderson makes a similar point when he notices that, ‘Both Plutarch and Appian describe 
Pompey  as  quoting  Greek  poets  to  himself at  certain  highly  dramatic  occasions’.78 
Indeed, Pompey cites Sophocles at one of the most crucial moments of his life, when he 
sees  his  wife  for the  last time,  thus  effecting  a direct  comparison  between  the  two 
characters. The lines are from an unknown play of Sophocles: 
ooTiq fie 7ipo£ Tupawov efnropeverau,
Ke'tvov ’<rri  koL v eXevQefxx; poXy.  (Soph., TGF, frag. 873)
Anyone who goes to traffic with a tyrant
is his slave, even if he goes there free.  (78.7)
Although the formerly powerful imperator finds, at last, shelter -  however, in words only 
-  in Ptolemy’s land, and freely decides to embark on his boat,79 he realises that, after he 
will have done that, he will be a slave in Ptolemy’s hands, and a pawn in the hands of 
Fate.80 As Pompey approaches his tragic end, he resembles tragic heroes (like Ajax) more 
often than before and  sets himself, with his words and actions,  into a Greek tragedy
77 The same line is again quoted at 85 A of On progress in virtue, where Plutarch gives examples of virtuous 
people and argues that such people always need to be honoured.
78 W. S. Anderson (1963), 61.
79  ‘Freely’,  in  the  sense  that  nobody  really  forces  him  to  do  so,  but  in  reality  he  is  forced  by  the 
circumstances; it seems that he has no other choice.
80 Cf. 75.4, where he is taken by metaphysical fears, as it were, and expresses his worries on philosophical 
matters, such as the role of Providence, and complains about his fair treatment by Providence in a friendly 
discussion with the philosopher Cratippus. Cf. Pelling (2004c), 322. On tyche and providence in Plutarch 
see, among others, Swain (1989b).
148context. It is within this context that he remembers the Sophoclean lines quoted above, 
which reveal his inner conflicts and feelings at that moment It is certainly not without 
importance that his last words to his friends and wife are quoted from Sophocles. Pompey 
is clearly aware of the tragic implications of his ‘submission’ to Ptolemy.
Plutarch, too, encourages us to think about this moment as the start of the last ‘act’  of 
Pompey, firstly, by putting in some tragic lines, and secondly, by describing Cornelia as 
already lamenting Pompey’s death, fully aware of the approaching end: “'npoamodpyvoQo-av 
aurrov  t o  *reA o$” (78.7). One notices the mirroring of the story-denouement in Plutarch’s 
choice of words. Cornelia is lamenting in advance, as Plutarch is disclosing Pompey’s 
end in advance. This ‘lamenting in advance for somebody who is still alive’ alludes to a 
common topos in tragedy, or epic, which Plutarch’s learned reader can easily recognise: 
Hecuba (II. 24.200-216) is weeping for Priam while he is still alive; Andromache does 
the  same  for  Hector  (P.  6.405  ff.);  Antigone  (Ant.  839-851,  858-871,  891-928),  or 
Polyxena (Hec. 402 ff.), too, lament for their own death in advance.
The downfall of Pompey has a strong impact on the political state,  as it also has an 
impact on those closest to him. So, Plutarch engages in describing Pompey’s downfall 
from the angle of the circle of people surrounding him, since those are equally affected. 
His wife, Cornelia, after finding out from a messenger about Pompey’s sufferings, throws 
herself onto the ground and laments, thus generating an authentic tragic scene, since the 
same reaction of a character occurs in tragedy as well, as is shown below. The scene is 
rich in emotions, and the characters involved are overwhelmed by their feelings for the 
disaster which has struck them. Even the messenger -  whom Plutarch here turns into a 
character of dramatic dimension -  delivers his speech in tears (74.3). He reminds the 
reader of the messenger who appears in tragedies towards the end of the play to give 
details of something, usually bad, which happened off stage and which the characters on 
stage (here, Cornelia) are ignorant of.8 1  Cornelia cannot believe her misfortunes and the
81  (74.3): “ev  t o u t o h ;   ovaav avnjv koroAajSaiv o  a v y y e h o q ,  aurmuraaBau fiev  o u %   ime/ietve, ra $e -nkeurra  k o u  
lieyurra. raw kok&v roTq ticucpvtrt paAXov 4} rf) <jxDv$  [...]” (‘The messenger, finding her in this mood,
could not bring himself to greet her, but indicated to her the most and greatest misfortunes by his tears 
rather than  by his  speech  [...]*).  De  Jong  (1991) in her book on the  Euripidean  messenger-speeches
149serious impasse to which her husband has come, and remains speechless for quite a long 
time (‘Sj #’  OKOutra/ra TrporjKa.ro  pub  auurifv  kou  ttoX vv  ypovov  eK^pcov  kou  a,vavdo$
eVerro”) (74.4).82
This first part of the scene, in which Cornelia throws herself to the ground, presents 
significant analogies to tragedy. Plutarch helps us understand the scene in theatrical terms 
by the vocabulary  he employs  in  his vivid  description  of Cornelia,  evoking  feelings 
among his readers, partly by the stirring visual image and partly by the actual disaster that 
has caused Cornelia’s laments.83 A parallel which comes to mind is Euripides’ Hecuba. 
There the protagonist also throws herself to the ground, covers her head with her clothes 
as a way of lamenting (486-7: (chorus) “aim? Tzekau; trov Wot’  e%ova  km xfiovi, / TaXBufZie, 
K errau  o vyK C K X w ikvr)  renAo^”),  and  lies there for some time  (from v.  438 to v.  500), 
overwhelmed by the new misfortune that has fallen upon her. Hecuba laments over her 
daughter’s fate (Polyxena), and over her own fate, bereft of children and of any divine or 
human (here, Odysseus’) mercy. She will raise herself from the ground only to find out 
the details of her daughter’s brave death, which Talthybius, a Greek herald, reports to her. 
Cornelia, too, in the second part of the scene, regains her senses after some time, realising 
that this is not the time for tears and lamentations but time to proceed to action.84 The 
connection may be not explicit, yet the Comelia-scene echoes the Hecuba-scene, the link 
between the two being the (tragic) pattern of lamenting.
Concerning this second part of the image, which refers to the change of Cornelia’s mood 
from passive into active, the words used by Plutarch are again reminiscent of other tragic 
plays,  such  as  Sophocles’  Electra  or Euripides’  IT.  Cornelia realises  by  herself that 
crying is of no use and comes to her senses again:  “/aoA/£  ftk tcox; epufapwv  yevojieinq,  kou
demonstrates  how  important  the  messenger’s  presentation  and  own  reaction  are  and  how  they  may 
influence the reaction of other characters on  stage.  The messenger-speech,  as  ‘narrative’  and  ‘drama’, 
awakens emotions in other characters and also among the audience; see pp. 77-78, 105, 108-110, 115, 136- 
139 and 173-177.
82 The word  is again found in a genuine tragic context, in Euripides’ Bacchae, v. 633.
83 For more on ritual lament see Alexiou (1974).
84 Cf. Foley (1993) on lament as stimulus to action, especially vengeance, e.g. in the Choeph. Electra and 
the chorus stir the returning hero Orestes to complete his revenge for his father through their lamentations 
at the hero’s grave (p. 107); and Sophocles’ Electra uses lamentation to stir up others to desire revenge on 
Agamemnon’s behalf (p. 113).
150ovvv(yr)€rcurcL xov Kaupov ovk ovtcl Qpvjvtov kou ftoKpvan>, e^efipaLfjLe Bid. rife noA ea>£ em &*Aottcw” 
(‘However, and with difficulty, she regained her senses, and perceiving that the occasion
Of
was not one for tears and lamentations, she ran out through the city to the sea’) (74.4). 
In the tragic plays mentioned above the main characters need somebody else to incite 
them to action. In Electra it is the paidagogos who incites Orestes and Electra to act 
quickly, without any further delay (1326-1335,  and  1364-1371)86 -  Clytemnestra and 
Aegisthus must be killed if the brother and sister do not want to get into danger. In IT it is 
Pylades who takes up that role, inviting Orestes and his sister back to reality to do what is 
needed  (902-908).  What links the tragic  scenes with Plutarch’s  scene  is the common 
acknowledgement that there is no time for tears and lamentations, and that the situation 
requires  action.  Although  it may be  impossible to know whether Plutarch  employed 
theatrical imagery and vocabulary with Euripides or Sophocles’ play in mind, Cornelia’s 
reaction shows significant similarities with that of the tragic characters. Plutarch’s reader 
is again made to recall the authentic tragic context which resembles Cornelia’s situation.
In addition, the extended dialogue between Pompey and Cornelia makes the scene all the 
more ‘theatrical’. In that dialogue Cornelia blames herself for the bad fortune which has 
now fallen on her husband, and wishes that she had died after the death  of her first 
husband,  Publius,  or  even  killed herself (74.6).  The  sense  of sophrosyne  and  shame 
which  drives  Cornelia’s  words  and  behaviour reminds the  reader  of e.g.  Phaedra  in 
Euripides’ Hippolytus (or, even Creon’s wife in Ant. 1301 ff.).87 When Phaedra could not 
fight any longer her passion with her reason and good sense (sophrosyne), she thought it 
would be best to commit suicide (Hip.  398-402).  So, in her case too, it is sophrosyne
85 Note here the word ‘lament’ (“Qpvjvog”) which reinforces the tragic element -  cf. 78.7: unpo*Tm6prpoO<rcw 
avroQ t o reA oj” .
86 “ffow  vvv aTraJ\Xa%fievTe t& v naucpmv Xoyoov/  kou t % auduqtrmu  Ttjark avv Xf*P7>  novpekQ',  <o$ to  pvev 
H & Xetv k o k w / ev to% to io v tw ^ e a r'  a m jtiw x fk u ” (‘And now get clear of your long speeches and of the cries 
of joy of which you are never weary, and come, since on such occasions delay is dangerous, and it is the 
moment to make an end of it’ —  E le c .  1335-1338),  and:  udpKe?v  fa c e t (juh  [...]. cr<f>q)v f   ew em o  ,yo i  toTv 
irotpetrrarmtv o ti/ vvv Koupog epdetv vvv KXuTaufi/r/oTpa fjvovrrj'/ vvv ovrtq dvSpwv h jfa v ’  el S '  etjte^erovj foovrl& Q ’  d)$ 
toutoi<; re  kou orxjtarrepoig/ a& Jwtrt tolttoov itkeioaiv iJunffftvtievoT (‘I think that is enough [...]. But I say to you 
who stand here that now is the time to act; now Clytemnestra is alone; now none of the men is inside; but if 
you hold back, consider that you will have to fight with these and with others more numerous and better 
skilled’ -  E le c.  1365, 1367-1371). Note the emphatic repetition of “vw” in the verses quoted above (1335, 
1368,1369), that puts the sense of present (‘now’) at the centre of interest and marks the starting-point for 
further action.
87 Cf. Loraux (1987), 23.
151which leads her to suicide. Pompey’s reply to Cornelia’s words is calm, and his thoughts 
have a philosophical value: we are human, and good fortune can be followed by bad 
fortune, in which case we should bear it and hope for good fortune to return (75.1-2). 
Pompey courageously receives his tyche, and hopes for a change towards better:
(75.2)  “aAAa. kou rouha tie? <f>ep€iv yevopkvrnq avBpaynovg,  kou rvfc  ert  -neipareov. 
ou yap avekmarov ck toutoov avoka(3e?v cKeTva rov  eKeivoiv ev tovtok; yevopevov. ”
‘But this reverse also we must bear, since we are mortals, and we must still put 
fortune to the test. For I can have some hope of rising again from this low estate to 
my former high estate, since I fell from that to this.’ (75.2)
The fall will come after the culmination of success and good luck. That human nature is 
changeable and that people who have reached the highpoint of happiness may soon meet 
unhappiness and vice versa is a recurrent theme in Greek tragedy {peripeteia). Being 
mortal means that you will experience both good and bad tyche. Moreover, this is what 
the inscription written on the inside of the city gate of Athens and addressed to Pompey 
reminded him of, when he was achieving the one success after the other: ‘To the extent 
that you are aware of your mortality, you are divine’ (27.5):  wrov mv avSpamog oBo^y
em toovvtov el 9eo^\
How wrong the decision of Pompey to ask for Ptolemy’s help was, is already shown by 
the fact that people with less experience and inferior to him directed him towards this 
path of action, as Plutarch suggests (76.7 ff.). One clear example of bad influence was 
Theophanes, a friend of Pompey, but a person with poor judgement, whom Plutarch, both 
here  (76.7-9)  and  before  (37.4:  “KoucorqBevpa tdu  Qeo^avouq”,  49.13-14:  “tj  Seo<j>avov<; 
poxfapia”) counts among the untrustworthy, cunning, and malicious advisers.88 It is not 
only at this  final  stage that Pompey trusts his  friends for what is best to do.  Earlier 
Plutarch had found another opportunity to stress the former imperator’s passivity and at 
the same time point to a factor that would lead to his downfall. Pompey, as he had rushed 
away after his defeat at Pharsalus, was even ignorant of Cato’s success at sea (76.2). He 
now blames himself for having listened to others and having joined battle on land, and for
88 One must not forget that Theophanes was also a historical source for Plutarch when he came to write the 
Life of Pompey. Cf. Meriani and Gannattasio Andria (1998), 544.
152neglecting his powerful fleet which could have served as a backup for the infantry in case 
something went wrong on land, as it actually did.  ‘This was his worst mistake’,  says 
Plutarch,  ‘but also Caesar’s best piece of tactics’: “ou& ev yap apAprrjpuL Hotnrqiov iiei&v 
ovde  deivorepov  o^paTvyyTjp/L  Kaitrapo^  (76.3).  The  contrast  is  remarkable:  Pompey’s 
propensity to self-destruction becomes the strongest advantage for his enemy. He is not 
acting as an imperator but as a soldier who obeys others’ orders, making his passivity 
appear not only as a personal shortcoming but as a military and political shortcoming 
which provokes Fate -  and catastrophe will not be slow in coming.
But it is not just Pompey’s weaknesses that bring him more misfortunes and lead him to 
self-destruction; other people’s mistakes will also partly contribute to his bad end, and he 
can do little to avoid them. At 77.3-5 it is implied that on the other side, Ptolemy’s side, 
the decisions are also taken by the wrong people. Ptolemy, too young to take decisions by 
himself, asks the men of his court for advice:
(77.3)  rjv  ouv  deivov  irepl  Uop/mjiov  Ma/yvov  fHovXeveaflau  HoQeivov  rov  euvo\j%ov  kou 
SeoSorov  rov  XTov,  erfi  putrSq)  pryropiKcov  Xoycov  BtSourKOtXov  au/eiX'tyitievov,  kou  tov 
AiyvTmov ’A^iAAav  KopwfxuoraToi  yap •fyrav ev Kareuvounouq kou rtBvjVoTq roTq aXXoiq 
ovroi  ovpflovXoi.  (77.4) kou  toiovtov BiKourrrjp'iou  \fnfam  Yioumqtoq erf  ayKvptov "npoaoi 
Tvjq %(opaq airooraXevcov rrepiefievev, ov Kaitrapi (rtarqpiaq %apiv ovk  a&ov o< f> eiXeiv.
It was  certainly  a dreadful  thing that the  fate  of Pompey the  Great was to  be 
decided by Pothinus the eunuch, and Theodotus of Chios, who was a hired teacher 
of rhetoric, and Achillas the Egyptian; for these were the chief counsellors of the 
king among the chamberlains and tutors also gathered there. And it was such a 
tribunal’s verdict which Pompey, tossing at anchor some distance off the shore, was 
waiting for, a man who was not worthy to be under obligations to Caesar for his 
life. (77.3-4)
The full title of Pompey is not accidentally mentioned here, and it certainly adds some 
more emotional tension to the passage. It also stands in contrast to Ptolemy’s counsellors, 
men of no experience in war, as the brief description of them shows. The course of things 
concerning  Pompey  seems  to  be  highly  dependent  on  Ptolemy’s  non-experienced 
advisers, who will however play an important role towards his tragic end. Theodotus’
153suggestion that the safest plan for them was to send for Pompey and kill him (77.7) is 
finally approved, and Achillas is chosen to execute Pompey (78.1).89 As soon as Ptolemy 
adopts the views of those people who are much inferior to him to find out what is the best 
thing to do concerning Pompey’s petition for refuge in his land, the future of Pompey the 
‘Great’  can be nothing but adverse —   ovv  feivov” (77.3) are die actual words which 
Plutarch used at the start of the passage quoted, offering by this personal comment a clear 
hint at what the reader should expect for Pompey thereafter.
Pompey’s  murder  is  particularly  charged  with  a  theatrical  tone.90  As  the  boat  with 
Pompey,  a few attendants, and his future killers is rowed in silence to the shore, the 
former general tries to be friendly breaking the silence and addressing Septimius -  an old 
familiar and comrade-in-arms -  but gets no response. So he takes his roll with the speech 
he had prepared to deliver to Ptolemy, written in Greek (79.2-3). The irony is evident; the 
dark atmosphere prevailing gives the reader a hint that the speech will not be used (cf. 
Caes. 65;  see below, p.  167).  Silence and anxiety together, mainly on the side of the 
viewers,  illustrate that the  situation  is  beyond  control.  Cornelia,  naturally  chosen  by 
Plutarch as the most important person among the viewers to focus on, is full of anxiety 
about what is going to happen next. For a minute the anxiety gives its place to hope, 
when she notices all those people of the king gathering at the shore, as if they were to 
give an honourable welcome to Pompey. But soon the positive picture is again reversed -  
a kind of tragic peripeteia.9 1
The time for the final act in Pompey’s life has come. Septimius approaches Pompey and 
runs him through with his sword; Salvius, and then Achillas also stab him. Ironically 
enough, now that he has lost all his power and committed serious tactical errors, Pompey 
behaves  as  a  true  imperator.  He  endures  their  blows  with  patience  and  in  silence, 
‘without an  act or a word that was  unworthy  of himself,  but with  a groan  merely’,
89 Cf. Brut. 33.
90 Cf. Pelling (1980)=(2002a), 111 n. 24. Pelling remarks that in describing Pompey’s death Plutarch uses 
an extremely visual technique, ‘describing events from the viewpoint of Cornelia and the rest of Pompey’s 
followers, still at sea’. Cf. also Hamilton, who remarks that Plutarch has generally ‘a remarkable power of 
visualizing a scene and a keen sense of dramatic effect’ ((1969), lxviii).
91 Cf. Pelling (1988a), 273-274 about the reversals which generate peripeteia (as well as about other aspects 
of tragedy) in Lysander.
154remarks Plutarch, ‘after drawing his toga down over his face with both hands', a very 
theatrical  scene:  “o  de  rcug  xepaw  ap^xrrepauq  tt]v  rvfiewov  efaeTuaxraqhevos  Kaura  toC 
npooxjonou, fi/rfiev elndiv ava^tov eairrou p/ijde not'fyra*;, aAAa. orevaJ^at; fiovov, bseKaprepryre toa$ 
TihrfYau^  (79.5).  The  move  of Pompey  to  pull  his  toga  over his  face  bears  striking 
similarities with Caesar’s final move on the Ides, at his assassination -  they are indeed 
mirror-scenes:  Caes.  6 6 .6 :  “o  tiev  TtXkio$  ttjv  rvfiewov  currou  rauq  %epariv  afujtorepats 
ovXkafiaiv  o u ito toC Tpaxpjhov Karij/Y€v,\  and later, at 66.12: “efeiXxua'a,to Kara, rffc KetfxtX^ 
to if/MTiov kou TTaprjKev eou/rov” —  ‘he pulled the toga down over his head and sank’. In their 
death the two men appear so similar. The scene has also its tragic parallel in Hecuba, 
where Polyxena covers her face and silently follows Odysseus to her death (.Hec. 432-7: 
’Oduirarev, //.’ ap^iQeiq Kapq. 7i€7iAou^...” —  ‘Muffle my head, Odysseus, and lead 
on... ’). The parallel may not extend beyond these details but if the initial tragic context of 
the scene is recalled, then Pompey’s end is cast under a tragic light that presents him as a 
Euripidean character, as it were.
That is the expected end of Pompey,  for which Plutarch has already prepared us. His 
tragic  death  is  followed  by  the  abuse  of his  corpse,  as  the  Egyptians  even  cut  off 
Pompey’s head and throw the naked body into the sea (80.2). It was a terrible spectacle -  
“0ea#Aa” is the word that Plutarch uses, setting the viewers of the scene into a theatrical 
context. What is more ironic is that Pompey, a man who was much loved by the people 
for all his qualities, as stressed in the prologue -  a full  list is given:  his modest and 
temperate  way  of living,  his  training  in  the  arts  of war,  his  persuasive  speech,  his 
trustworthy character, his tact in meeting people (1.3-4f 2 -  had the same end as his 
father, who was one of the most hated commanders due to his greediness for money (1.2-
4), and whose body was abused both by people and by nature itself, as it were, since his 
body was struck by a thunderbolt -  perhaps a sign of divine vengeance?
There is an interesting detail in the burial of Pompey’s body. As Philippus, one of his 
close attendants who were with him at the time of his murder, pays to Pompey his last
92 More about Pompey’s qualities listed here and about Plutarch’s motives in advertising them already at 
the beginning of the Life, as well as about their historical basis, see Watkins (1984), 8-12, and Heftner 
(1994), 67-69.
155rites, an old man comes up to him and offers to help him. The Roman man remains 
anonymous, but we are told that he was an old comrade-in-arms of Pompey. The person 
who took Pompey’s life, Septimius, had also been his comrade-in-arms in the past. The 
coincidence puts more emphasis on the tragic texture of the Life’s end. And it is the same 
anonymous Roman who attributes to Pompey the title which he had sought most in his 
life: ‘Maximus’.93 Whereas a few minutes ago he had asked Philippus who he was to give 
burial rite to Pompey the Great (“tiV <wv  avBpum'  Bamreiv Biavojj IAarwov Hopmqtov;” —  
80.4), now he acknowledges him as the greatest Roman imperator ever (“Katie £’ ilxmep 
evfrqpasrog eucrefioug  au Kotvtovov [...] OApatrBat kou TrepurreiXou Toug epuug % ep<ri tov fieytarrov 
auroKpoLTopa. 'Poj^aoiW”) (‘Let me too share in a pious privilege thus offered [...] to touch 
with my hands and array for burial the greatest of Roman imperator  s') (80.5).94
Pompey closes with a series of deaths -  a common pattern in Greek tragedy too (cf. e.g. 
Antigone, Hippolytus):95 Lucius Lentulus the next day, after Pompey’s burial, happened 
to be sailing along the coast, when he noticed the funeral pyre -  again here a visual 
image; shortly after approaching the scene he was arrested and put to death; Achillas and 
Pothinus are put to death by Caesar; Ptolemy mysteriously disappeared after a battle he 
lost along the Nile; Theodotus is put to death by Marcus Brutus, Caesar’s murderer (80.8- 
9).
The tragic end is just the final touch to a Life which is rich in theatrical atmosphere, 
tragic texture, and dramatic incidents, as a close reading of Pompey proves. For in this 
Life Plutarch  shares with tragedy common material and also exploits material that is 
reminiscent of theatre. Themes and figures that in themselves may not be distinctively or 
exclusively  ‘tragic’  can  nevertheless  be  seen  in  this  light,  as  the  insistent theatrical 
figuring  encourages  a reader to  adopt  a tragic  mindset and  think  in  dramatic  terms. 
Visuality and tragic language which at the beginning of the Life point to phenomena 
which we might rather describe as merely theatrical are gradually overtaken by a true
93 Cf. the anonymous Roman onlooker in Philop.  1.
94 Vaguely similar to Ant. 84, where Cleopatra makes libations for Antony.
95 Pelling discusses in detail the closure in Plutarch’s Lives, which is often marked by a series of deaths 
((1997a)=(2002a), 365-386).
156tragic  feeling.  That  feeling  emerges  from  human  misfortunes  and  passions,  so  that 
Pompey presents, at points, strong similarities to tragic heroes -  and this is perhaps the 
image  which  Plutarch  wants  his  readers  to  have  in  mind  when  reading  the  Life  of 
Pompey.
1576. Theatrical imagery in Caesar
The Lives of Caesar and Pompey are not only rich in cross-references, but also reveal 
many ways in which the careers and lives of those two great men actually crossed. Their 
friendship  developed  into  a  fatal  rivalry  and  into  no  less  a  danger  for  the  Roman 
constitution itself. Their parallel ambitions, the many triumphs which they achieved in 
their  career,  the  circle  of advisers  who  surrounded  and  influenced  them  at  crucial 
moments, the contradictory feelings of the people towards them at various points, the 
intense  rivalries  and  paucity  of friendships  -   especially  if one  thinks  of the  much 
questioned friendship between Caesar and Brutus, who later became the former’s assassin 
-  which  affected their political  success  as well  as  their life:  all  these  sides  of their 
character and different stages of their career show how fundamental the relation between 
Pompey and Caesar was, the former being the great imperator {Magnus), and the latter 
the figure which is paired by Plutarch with Alexander the Great, although probably one 
would expect Pompey and not Caesar to be paired with Alexander.1  In fact, the imitatio 
Alexandri is one of the most important aspects of Pompey’s politics, more in the first half 
of his Life where he figures as the most successful Roman conqueror,2 and clearly less in 
the second half where his tactical errors or personal failings lead him to his destruction. 
So, though not formerly paired with it, Caesar offers a good parallel to Pompey in many 
ways, and especially in the tragic atmosphere and theatrical moments which those two 
Lives share. Caesar may be poorer (than Pompey) in direct references to and quotations 
from tragic plays, yet the theatrical background (strong visuality and theatricality of some 
passages, tragic texture and tragic parallels), even if less explicit, emerges as equally 
important.
1 Pompey is dated later than Caesar, as it is referred to in the future tense at Caes. 35.2 (“a* ev toi$ -nepi 
eneivou  'YpaufyiqavpLvoi^  t o ,  tcaff  eKcumv Ihjkto&vpeTaA”). Yet, if Pelling’s assumption is  right ((1979) and 
(1980)) that the Lives of Crassus, Pompey, Caesar,  Cato Minor, Brutus and Antony were prepared as a 
single project, then Plutarch would still have the option of choosing Pompey and not Caesar to pair with 
Alexander.
2 This is attested by Greek historiography:  see, for example, the work on Pompey (or a section of his 
Historian) by Posidonius and book XL of Diodorus of Sicily (with the fragments concerning Pompey, e.g. 
38/39.9-10, 20; 40.2, 40.4); Appian, too, gives an extensive comparison between Alexander and Caesar 
{Civil  Wars 2.149.619-2.154.649) but he does not mention Pompey (Pelling (2006b), 265); cf. Carsana 
(2005). About the imitatio Alexandri see, inter alios, Michel (1967), Weippert (1972), 56-104, and Bellen 
(1988).
158As will be shown, in this Life Plutarch uses theatrical imagery at important moments in 
Caesar’s life and career in a way which adds dramatic tension to the biography and draws 
parallels to tragedy. One such important point in Caesar’s career was certainly the battle 
at Pharsalus, which may have been the darkest moment in Pompey’s career, but it was 
one of the most glorious moments for Caesar. Although at that crucial battle -  during the 
time of preparation (chap. 39 ff.) and in war -  Caesar showed impressive confidence and 
determination in confronting a much bigger army than his own and in winning a battle 
against heavy odds, he perhaps behaved with over-confidence or ill-judged generosity to 
some people who came in his way. Either way, Plutarch makes it clear that it was a 
wrong move, not in the moral sense but in the sense that it was against his own interest: 
(46.4) miXkoiq de kou tG > v eni^avmv aukiav e&ojcev, wv kou Bpwroq rfv o icretva£ aurrov 
vtrcepov, etj)’ $ Xeyerau yuf) fauvofievq) puev auytovtaujvu, <ru)9evro$  kou TTaparyevop^vov 
TTpd$ ourrov 'rpOvjvau ditujtepovTtoq.
And to many men of prominence he granted immunity. One of these was Brutus, 
who afterwards slew him. Caesar was distressed, we are told, when Brutus was not 
to be found, but when he was brought into his presence safe and sound, he was 
pleased beyond measure. (46.4)
Irony is prominent in the passage and is intensified by Plutarch’s emphasis on Caesar’s 
feelings.  Plutarch  reminds  us  that  Brutus  is  the  least  suitable  person  to  be  granted 
immunity.  As  in  tragedy  on  stage,  tragic  irony  emerges  from  the  cognitive  divide 
between participants and viewers (the disparity between the knowledge of the protagonist 
and that of the audience),4 here too, the fact that the reader knows more than, obviously, 
Caesar does produces the feeling of tragic irony. His comment, that Brutus was going to 
be Caesar’s murderer at the end, is rich in irony.5 Plutarch presages Caesar’s tragic end 
and at the same time intensifies the dramatic texture of his Life and shows to his readers 
how the qualities of the person -  here, his famous epieikeia -  can ruin him.
3 A similar wrong move was made by Brutus when sparing Antony on the Ides; see Ant. 13.2-3, and Brut. 
18.4-5,29.10, together with the ad loc. comment by Pelling (1988b), with reference also to Cic. 43.1.
4 On tragic irony see e.g. the examples which Kitto (1973) gives for Aeschylus (pp. 51 and 75), Sophocles 
(pp. 123,133,139 and 163-164) and Euripides (pp. 254,275 and 327).
5 This is what is called prolepsis in narratology -  see Genette (1980), 33-85, esp. pp. 40 and 67-79; cf. de 
Jong (1999), 451,459 n. 44, and (2004), 81-87.
159Epieikeia is a recurrent theme in this Life, and it often describes Caesar’s character and 
treatment of friends who no longer treat him in an honest or fair way. In chap. 34, for 
example,  epieikeia  is combined with philanthropia (34.7:  “fiet ’  oXiyov  B’  aKouaac,  tov 
KaJurapa  Baupaoryj  tivi  (juXavSpanriy.  %pvjoQau  npd$  rov$  eaXojKoraug”  —  Caesar  showed 
incredible clemency to his prisoners) when Caesar shows his kindness and magnanimity 
to Domitius, who had betrayed him to Pompey. Later again, after the end of the Civil 
War,  Caesar pardons Brutus and Cassius among others who had  fought against him. 
Moreover, he goes one step further than that: not only does he pardon them, but also 
grants them honours and offices (57.5: ukou yap aufrfjKe -noXXovq Ttov nercoXeprrjKcrrtov 7tpd$ 
aurov, evioig Be  kou  apxfe  kou  Tipo$ ,  a>$  Bpourtp  kou Ka/rtritp, TTpo& eOvjKev”) —  Brutus and 
Cassius become praetors. While we are gradually led towards the betrayal of Brutus and 
his planning of the conspiracy against Caesar, Plutarch intensifies the tragic irony (62.2-
5): it was Brutus whose life was spared by Caesar together with many other friends of his 
at Pharsalus; it was Brutus who always stood high in Caesar’s trust;6 it was he who had 
been given the most honourable of the praetorships for that year;  it was he who was 
chosen by Caesar to become consul three years later in preference to Cassius; and yet it 
was Brutus who set the conspiracy against his benefactor in motion. The irony emerges 
even stronger as the passage (62.2-5) is closer to the moment of Caesar’s murder. But the 
pattern is the same: Caesar’s clemency is not appreciated as it should be by the people 
whom Caesar repeatedly treats with generosity; instead, Brutus and Cassius will grow to 
become his future assassins.
However, Caesar is not totally ignorant of the danger at this stage, even if he is presented 
as fearing only Cassius (62.9: “eT% e pevroi kou B i’  imoij/ia^ o Kau&ap aurov  [sc. Cassius], 
iocrre kou npog rovg tj)iX ou<; ehteTv t t o t c   ‘t i  <f>auverau j 3ouX6fievo$ upuv Kaurmo$; epoi pev yap ov 
A/av apeoKei, Alav (& xp6<; tov’ ”), and to refuse to see the danger coming also from Brutus: 
“koi -norre kou BiafiaXXovrtov tiv c o v  t o v  avBpa [sc. Brutus], TTparropevTj^ rjfrr)  ovvcopoo-iag, 
oil rcpotretrxev, atA A a rod trtopartx; ryj %eipi Oiytbv etfn) Ttpo$ t o v$ BiafiaXXovras' iavapeveT t o v t o
6 Cf. Brut.  8-9. Compare here also Caes. 51, which suggests that Caesar recognised the dangers, not yet 
specifically those coming from Brutus, but felt forced to act in ways that made the dangers worse -  on this 
see Pelling (2002b), 258.
160to   BcpfiuL  Bpourog’  ” (62.6). Nonetheless,  Plutarch  leaves no doubt as to  the  influence 
which Cassius had on Brutus: it was Cassius who urged him to betray Caesar, when he 
suspected a lack of confidence in Brutus to carry out the conspiracy plan (62.8: “/aoXAov tj 
■nporepov eveneno kou Tzapa&vev”). Although his friends see the imminent danger and try to 
warn him of a possible conspiracy against him, organised by Brutus, Caesar demonstrates 
his  full  trust  in  Brutus  by  defying  the  warnings  and  laying  his  hand  on  his  body, 
obviously implying that Brutus would wait for his natural death and only then would he 
succeed him. But at the end of this chapter Plutarch makes it clear that Caesar came to 
sense that actually both Cassius and Brutus were plotting against him (62.10: “ ‘ov naw' 
(fravou  ‘rourovg [sc. Antony and Dolabella] BcBoiko. rovg not^eTg kou Kop^ra^, /aoAAov Be tov$ 
(b%povg kou 7vettto\j$ €K€ivou$\ Koujviov Aeyaiv kou Bpourov”)?
Yet Caesar’s ‘ignorance’ as presented at 46.4 is important and points the reader towards a 
tragic  context,  as  there,  too,  ‘ignorance’  may  lead to  error,  hamartia  (and  may  also 
contribute to the change of tyche -  cf. peripeteia), a recurrent element of tragedy.8 A 
particularly pertinent example, because it too projects mistaken lenience, may be found in 
Euripides’ Medea, when Creon decides to grant Medea permission to stay one more day 
in the city, showing pity to her and taking her words in good faith. He had good reason 
not to yield to her pleas for mercy, and at first would not let his feelings of pity and 
compassion take over his mind (Med. 282-291,  316-323 -  Creon, here, only thinks of 
Medea  as  a  dangerous  and  cunning  woman  who  will  harm  him),  but  at  the  end  he 
succumbed to Medea’s terms: “kou  vvv opw pkv e^oLpapravtov, yvvauj opuo<; Be rev^rji rouBe” 
(‘And now, though I see that I am making a serious mistake, nonetheless, woman, you 
shall have your request’) (Med.  350-351). The phrasing is striking.  Creon knows that 
what he is about to do  is wrong and against his personal  interest, and yet he does it. 
Caesar, on the other hand, can perhaps never imagine at this point that Brutus, his close 
associate, will be the one who will later plan his murder, but he gives him the ‘chance’ to
7 The same story is told by Plutarch at Ant. 11.6 and Brut. 8.2; see Pelling (1988b), 143-144.
8 Cf. Arist. Poet. 1452a 22 ff. (see p. 146); when discussing peripeteia (reversal), he refers to OT, where die 
messenger reveals Oedipus’ true identity thinking that in this way he will rid him of his fear but actually, 
and out of ignorance, he effects quite the opposite (OT 924-1085):  interesting is here the focus on the 
messenger’s  (instead  of Oedipus’)  perspective.  For peripeteia  as  reversal  of intentions  arising  from 
ignorance cf. Oedipus himself and also Deianeira in the Trachiniae.
161harm him -  exactly as Creon does with Medea -  by treating him with generosity and 
tolerance. Both Creon and Caesar fall victims to their kind and generous feelings. As 
soon as they stop behaving as kings, they start provoking their fate -  although one must 
acknowledge  here  that praotes,  together with  epieikeia,  eleos  and philanthropia,  are 
important qualities for a king, already in Greek archaic times, and onwards.9
A series of bad omens for Caesar’s fate comes into play but he refuses to see them. Apart 
from the unusual natural phenomena (lights in the sky, crashing sounds, birds coming 
down to  the  forum,  63.1-3),  there were also  miraculous things  happening to various 
people, and, most importantly, to Caesar himself.1 0   For example, there was an incident 
where Caesar was performing a sacrifice and the heart of the victim was nowhere to be 
found, a very terrifying omen for Caesar (63.4). However, there was another even clearer 
sign that Caesar’s ruin would not be long in coming. Namely, there was a story, told by 
many, that a seer warned Caesar to be on his guard against a great danger on the Ides of 
March (63.5-6). The seer, as Calpumia too in the same chapter (63.9 -  see below, p. 165), 
appears here as a kind of ‘tragic wamer’ whose advice is defied.1 1  When Caesar saw him 
on that day he told him sarcastically: ‘Well, the Ides of March have come’, and the seer 
replied: ‘Yes, they have come, but they are not yet gone’ -  history proved how prophetic 
those words were. Caesar’s fate seems to be both unavoidable and unexpected. Strangely,
9 The literature on these qualities of the kings is extensive -  as a starting point of the discussion about 
praotes see Martin (1960), about clemency see Schettino (2002), esp. p. 205, and concerning all these 
virtues see de Romilly (1979), 275-292, and esp. pp. 282-283 on Caesar’s epieikeia, Frazier (1996), 231- 
239, and the recent discussion by Pelling (2005a).
10 63.3: ‘Strabo die philosopher says that multitudes of men all on fire were seen rushing up, and a soldier’s 
slave threw from his hand a big flame and seemed to the spectators to be burning, but when the flame 
ceased the man was uninjured’.  The motif of portents and oracles, often foreboding something bad, is 
regular in both Greek and Roman historiography; see, e.g. Hdt. 1.34-44, 3.64, 7.16-19, 8.36-38, 77; Livy 
1.7,  16, 19, 31, 43.13; Tac. Ann.  13.58, 14.12. In tragedy see e.g. Sophocles’ Ant. 417 ff. (strange things 
happened while Antigone was burying Polyneices), 998-1032 (Teiresias warns Creon of the bad omens he 
saw: birds produced a strange sound), and Euripides’ Bac. 585 ff. (that Pentheus is doing something bad 
provoking at the same time the rage of  the god is shown by Zeus’ lightning and by the earthquake which 
shatters Dionysus’ prison).
11  In tragedy as in epic, too, we often come across the pattern of people giving prophecies or strong 
warnings against an impending danger, but equally often their advice is ignored; cf., for example, the wise 
Teiresias in OT 316 ff, esp. 350-353, in Bac. 266-342, Cassandra in Agam. 1072 ff.; cf. also Odys. 2.157- 
207 (the old hero Halitherses warns the suitors about Odysseus’ returning home soon but one of the suitors, 
Eurymachus, defies him), 20.351 ff. (the prophet Theoclymenus foretells the death of the suitors but they 
merely laugh at him), II. 18.249 ff. (Polydamas wisely suggests to Hector that the Trojans return to the city 
and do not await dawn on the plain beside the ships), and 22.37-76 ff. (Priam tries in vain to dissuade 
Hector from fighting a duel against Achilles). Cf. below, p. 166 for wise advisers in historiography too.
162the day before at a dinner at Marcus Lepidus’ house, Caesar acknowledges that the best 
kind of death for him is ‘that which is unexpected’ (“o a.'npo<rB6icrjTog,\ 63.8) -  and was 
this perhaps the reason why did  Caesar not protect himself against all the bad  signs 
pointing to his death?
Interestingly, Plutarch has already at 63.1 responded to Caesar’s words by saying: “aAA’ 
eoiKev ov% ovt< o$ a^npoordoicrjrov cog cuffuXaucrov elvau to 7re7rpo> /L tev© v’’; destiny is not so much 
unexpected as it is unavoidable.1 2  It is perhaps more difficult to say the same for Pompey, 
who is gradually led to self-destruction, yet in Caesar’s case Plutarch suggests that he 
could do little to avoid his fate. All these bad omens foreboded his death, and many 
people  around  him,  except  for  Caesar  himself,  could  see  it  coming.  So,  to  apply 
Plutarch’s  words  to  Caesar,  his  death  was  indeed  not  so  much  unexpected  but 
inescapable. Caesar is trapped in his past, because it is his past politics, his past mistakes 
(cf. the tragic hamartia) that have led him to his present impasse.1 3
A protagonist being trapped by his past is a common theme in tragedy too: Agamemnon 
has to pay for having sacrificed Iphigeneia (Agam.); Oedipus suffers the consequences of 
his parents’ decision to expose him, of the herald’s decision to save him, and later of his 
own decisions to go to Delphi to consult the oracle and then to move to Thebes and kill 
Laius on his way there (07); in Track. Heracles is trapped in his past, too, since he is 
poisoned by the blood that the Centaur Nessos gave to Deianeira when he was killed by 
Heracles. Caesar may try to cure his current fears, yet he is not able to change his past 
mistakes -  and he is aware of that. He is led to his downfall by external factors (troops, 
friends,  popular  reaction)  rather  than  by  his  own  vices.14   Unlike  in  Alexander,  or
12 Cf. Pyr. 30.2: “o^ vktov”; Pyrrhus’ fate was inescapable (cf. also  16.14). Duff (1999a),  123-124 talks 
about tragic  irony  as  a pre-eminent  feature  of this  Life.  Pyrrhus,  as tragic  heroes  often  do,  ignores 
significant bad portents and, driven by extreme ambition, wages war against Argos declaring that ‘One 
omen is best: to fight for Pyrrhus’  (“e?j oicovog apitrrog  ofivvecrtiai nepi TIuppou”, 29.4), adapting Hector’s 
words at II.  12.243 (“eTg oionvog apurrog atiuvetrOai -nepi irarpyg”). The association with Hector is of some 
importance here, as it reminds die reader of the hero’s foolhardiness in fighting with Achilles against all 
warnings (by Polydamas and Priam -  II. 22) and thus challenging his fate. Pyrrhus behaves in a similar 
way; Duff remarks that ‘Pyrrhus has been so far in the Life linked consistently with Achilles; the change to 
Hektor is highly charged’ (p. 124). Pyrrhus, like another Hector, is now walking to his fated end.
13 Pelling (1997c), 218; cf. id. (2006a), 12 ff.
14 See below, p. 165 n. 18 and p. 177 n. 41.
163Demetrius and Antony, the tragic pattern of tragic heroes who self-destruct does not quite 
fit into Plutarch’s conception of Caesar’s downfall.1 5  Tragic themes, however, are still an 
important influence on the narration.
Dreams,  too,  are  added  to  this  series  of bad  omens.16  The  night  before  his  death, 
Calpumia, Caesar’s wife, dreamed that she was holding her murdered husband in her 
arms  and  weeping (63.9).  In  another version of the dream  Calpumia  saw the  gable- 
omament, attached to their house by vote of the senate in order to give it adornment and 
distinction, tom down, and this is why she was weeping in her sleep (63.9). This is why 
she also asked him the next day to stay at home and not go to the senate-meeting. Her 
dream explicitly foreshadowed the bad end of Caesar, but it seems that at this stage it was 
too late for Caesar to act as to avoid his fate foretold by the dream.1 7  So, although his first 
decision was to dismiss the meeting of the senate (63.12), at the end he was convinced by 
Decimus Brutus to go, who, moreover, minimised the importance of Calpumia’s dreams 
and considered it as a frivolous excuse for Caesar to abstain from the senate-meeting on 
that  day  (64.4).  Although  Decimus  Brutus  is  undeniably  motivated  by  his  personal 
interests and acts as required by the conspiracy-plan, which he himself along with others 
have contrived, his words present to Caesar the truth of the situation at that moment, 
namely that it was Caesar himself who had requested the meeting, and that his possible 
absence would foster political enmities; it is then perhaps for this reason that they are so 
convincing. The tension between Caesar’s fear for his future and his trust in Calpumia’s 
warnings  intensifies  the  uncertainties  of the  moment.  Cleverly,  Brutus  drew  on  the 
political argument, which he knew would certainly persuade Caesar: the senate would 
feel  mocked,  since  Caesar himself had  requested the meeting  (64.3),  and his  friends 
would not be able to show that this was not all about slavery and tyranny (64.5).1 8
The image of a king or a commander being carried away either by short-sighted advisers 
or by  people  who  give  misleading  advice  because  they  serve  personal  interests  is  a
15 Mossman (1988), 92; cf. Pelling (1997c), 216.
16 On other dreams in Caesar see also p. 183 ff.
17 For the role of dreams in Plutarch in general see Brenk (1977), 16-27,214-235, and (1998), 104-117, and 
esp. p. 105 on Calpumia’s dream; cf. also Pelling (1997b), 201.
18 Pelling (1997a)=(2002a), 380. More on ‘friends’ in id. (1997c), 217 ff, and (2002b), 258.
164recurrent motif in historiography (cf. e.g. Hdt. 8.67 ff, and 8.100 ff.) and is also found in 
tragedy.  Xerxes,  for example,  in  the Persians,  as a weak commander,  yields to  bad 
advisers {Pers. 753 ff); by exploiting Creon’s good qualities and vulnerable nature {Med. 
348-349: “$w<rra rovyuov  e(j>v  rvpavviKov,  aJfovfievog  7roAAa far)  8ie<f>9opa.”) Medea, 
again, finally manages to persuade Creon to grant her die crucial extra day which she 
needs to carry out her atrocious plan {Med. 291  ff.); Dionysus persuades Pentheus to 
dress as a bacchant so that he will be able to spy on the maenads {Bac.  821  ff);  in 
Agamemnon  (906  ff) persuasion plays  a major role  in  the denouement of the story: 
Clytaemnestra, just like Brutus, uses political arguments -  What will the demos think? 
(937) -  to persuade Agamemnon to come into a doomed place, the palace, walking on the 
purple tapestries laid for him.1 9  In Caesar’s case his persuasion by Decimus Brutus marks 
a very crucial moment for his life, with Brutus manipulating the truth of the situation so 
that he may achieve his goal, namely to lead Caesar to his assassins. Having in mind the 
destructive  effect  which  persuasion  had  for  tragic  characters,  Plutarch’s  readers  are 
perhaps expected here to think about all the possible implications of Caesar’s persuasion 
by Brutus  in  tragic terms  in  order to  comprehend  fully the consequences which this 
moment will have for Caesar.
The  ‘inevitability’  of Caesar’s murder is emphasised at the scene where Artemidorus 
tried, by every means, to come close to Caesar and make him read himself the roll that he 
had written, and which warned him of the conspiracy planned against him (chap. 65).20 
Even if he finally manages to speak to Caesar pointing out to him how important the 
message is, and despite the fact that Caesar repeatedly tried to read it, the crowd was too 
big to let him do so. Artemidorus’  ease of access to Caesar is finally not helpful here 
since it is counterbalanced by the ease of access to him of the crowd (among them the 
assassins) -  yet approachability to people is generally a typical characteristic of a good 
king. However, Caesar entered the senate holding the roll  in his hand and retained it
19 On persuasion in Greek tragedy see Buxton (1982), esp. pp. 105-114 and 153-170. In Agam. Aeschylus 
plays with expectations, as Clytemnestra is tempting Agamemnon to walk on the red tapestries, and the 
audience’s fear for the king’s future is prolonged by his initial reluctance to yield to his wife’s request and 
by the choral ode where the members of the chorus express their wish that their expectations may be false 
(998-1000).
20 In a different version of the story, which Plutarch offers at Caes. 65.4, somebody else handed the roll to 
Caesar, since Artemidorus did not manage to come close to him because of the crowd pushing him aside.
165throughout the meeting. The irony is striking; the importance of the message is certainly 
evident to both Caesar and the viewers/readers, yet the readers, unlike Caesar, know that 
he is never going to read that roll.
The scene has its close parallel in Pompey, where the protagonist, exactly like Caesar, 
shortly before his assassination, rehearses his speech (written in Greek), which the dark 
atmosphere of the moment shows that he is never going to use (79.2-3; cf. above, p. 155) 
-  and this is only one of the many instances where Caesar and Pompey interact to prove 
that the two Lives complement each other and are meant to be read together (see below). 
Caesar came so close to being spared but it seems that nothing can stop him from walking 
to his death. The theme is well-known in literature;2 1  in the Iliad Patroclos came so close 
to taking Troy (16.698 ff.), in the Odyssey, Odysseus’ identity is almost exposed at the 
athletic contests of the Phoenicians when he throws the discus too far (8.186  ff);  in 
historiography, Athens was so close to winning in Sicily and yet lost; in tragedy, Medea 
was very close to sparing her children but she finally did not manage to control her rage, 
or resist the necessities which dictated her deed.
The Life’s tragic register reaches its climax, as perhaps expected, towards the end. In 
describing  the  assassination-scene  Plutarch  also  refers  to  Pompey,  choosing  the 
vocabulary very carefully, so that he does not really favour the one general against the 
other, but, instead, he leaves the scene open to various judgements on different levels 
(human tyche, divine providence, etc.). The scene is described as follows:22
(66.1)’AAAa  t aura,  pev  ydy  rcov  tfxpet  kou  to  adrv6pa.rov  o  < $ e  tietgapevog  tov  <£ovov 
€K€tvov  kou  tov flvycov a %(opog, eig ov  (ruyKkrfrog yOpoiofrq totc,  Ylopirrjtov fiev eiKova, 
K€ifievr)v  e%(ov,  IlofiTnjtov  avadrjfjua  yeyov<og  r&v  npoo'KeKoop/^fievuiv  T<p  Bearpq>, 
Ttaunama/nv amefauve daufiovog rtvog vfayovfievou  kou  KaXovvrog €K€? tv)v npa^tv epyov 
yeyovevcu.
21 For the ‘epic almost’ see Kullmann (1956), 42-48, Reinhardt (1961), 107-110, Nesselrath (1992), esp. pp. 
1-38, and de Jong (2004), 68-81 on what she describes as ‘if-not situations’.
22 Pelling (1997a)=(2002a), 381  comments extensively on this passage, and it is his translation that I am 
citing here; compare also (1997c) -  see following note (p. 168 n. 23).
166(66.12-13) err’  arro  eii9’  i/rro Ttov icreivomwv amaxrQeis itpog tv)v fia/riv e<^’  o
JJofLirrjtov  j3ef3v)K€v  avBpiau;.  kou  mikuq  KCL&jfjpui^ev  aurrrjv  o  <f>ovo*<b$  doxeTv  avrov 
e^earavau rjj Tipuop'tqi t o C TcoXepJov Ylofjnrrjiov, into tto^   k € kX i[A€vou kou TtepioTtatpovro^ 
into TtkyQous TpoujfiaTUiv.
All that [sc. the story of Artemidorus, and his failure to force his way through to 
Caesar with news of the conspiracy] might simply be the result of coincidence, but 
it is harder to explain the choice of the place where the senate had gathered on that 
day, the scene of the murder and the violence. For it had a statue of Pompey lying 
on the floor, and the whole building had been dedicated by Pompey as one of the 
additional decorations to his theatre. That gave an indication that there was some 
heavenly power directing events and guiding the plot into action at this very spot. 
(66.1)
He  fell  by  the  pedestal  on  which  Pompey’s  statue  stood,  perhaps  by  chance, 
perhaps dragged there by the assassins. It was drenched in streams of blood, so that 
it appeared that Pompey himself had presided over the vengeance inflicted on his 
enemy,  lying there  beneath  his  feet,  still  writhing convulsively  from  his  many 
wounds. (66.12-13)
In this scene which has a particularly strong visual impact there is a shift from the human 
level  (cf.  before,  at 63.11  Caesar’s fear caused by Calpumia’s reaction to the omens 
rather than by the omens themselves) to the acting of some divine power (more on the 
supernatural element below, p.  170 ff.).23 The statue of Pompey presides over Caesar’s 
murder. Caesar falls at the pedestal of Pompey’s statue, thus making the scene seem like 
a duel between the two rivals -  the word ouy&va, at 66.1  as part of the athletic imagery 
straightforwardly hints at the context of contest.24 The fact that Pompey even if dead is 
presented as directly involved in Caesar’s own death brings to mind a tragic parallel in 
Ajax. Standing in front of the corpse of Ajax after his heroic suicide, Teucer points out 
the irony that even if dead, Hector has finally become the killer of his brother, since Ajax
23 Cf. Pelling (1997c), 227 and 229.
24 Beneker discusses the terminology from athletic contests in Caesar ((2005a), 321). Generally, for the use 
of arydiv and cvyuivi^eoQcu as part of the athletic imagery see, for example, C.  min.  10.3, 22.1, 26.5, 27.8, 
41.3,41.8, 45.7, 54.9, 67.3, 73.5, Phoc. 1.4, 3.4, 6.2 and 14.8 -  Pelling (2004c), 324 n. 29; cf. also ib. 325, 
esp. n. 33, and id. (1980)=(2002a), 101-102, and p. 112 n. 36 on the more important role of athletic imagery 
in Pompey and its connection to theatre (see Pompey-chapter, p. 142 n. 62, and p. 143 n. 6 8).
167killed himself with Hector’s sword {Ajax 1026-1027: “elfeg  ux; xpovq* / epeXXe <r’  "Ekto^j 
k ou   Qavuiv  anwftdtaetvf).  The building attached to the theatre which Pompey had built 
offers  the  stage  for the  actual  murder  scene,  although  it  seems to  host just  another 
gathering of the senate. One notices here that the theatre which in Pompey was often a 
bad omen and signified for Pompey disasters-to-come (cf. Pomp. 52.5, 68.2-3) now turns 
out to be a bad sign for his rival too, since it offers the place for Caesar’s murder. The 
reader is certainly meant to pick up the cross-reference, one among the many which bring 
the two Lives closer and underline that the path to understanding Caesar goes through 
Pompey, and vice versa.
However, theatre does not have bad connotations only for Caesar. When Plutarch refers 
to Caesar’s confronting Pompey’s sons, who had meanwhile succeeded their father in 
fighting Caesar, we have a clear case of theatre acting as a good sign for Caesar (Caes. 
56). He confronted them at a battle during his campaign in Spain. It was a hard battle for 
Caesar to win -  Plutarch mentions that, after his victory, Caesar acknowledged that it was 
the first time he had fought for his life (56.4). There is an interesting detail concerning the 
time  of that  battle.  It was  fought and won  for  Caesar on  the  day  of the  festival  of 
Bacchus, Plutarch remarks. On the same day, four years previously, Pompey had also 
gone out to war against Caesar. The god of theatre, Dionysus, thus becomes another bad 
omen for Pompey and a good one for Caesar (cf. the fall of the statue of Dionysus from 
the  Acropolis  down  to  the  theatre  as  a  bad  omen,  one  among  many,  for  Antony’s 
imminent defeat by  Octavianus  in Ant.  60.4-5).  The  coincidence of events described 
above creates a feeling of closure, which furthermore implies that what follows will this 
time go to a different direction —  Plutarch’s words “tovtov eoxavrov Koucrap  tov
TToXeiwv”  at  the  beginning  of the  following  paragraph  makes  it  explicit  (56.7).  Yet 
Plutarch does not see in Caesar’s triumph in the Civil War a proper reason to celebrate, 
but instead, he presents it as a victory which was sadly against Rome itself rather than 
against an external enemy; and this was why it vexed Romans so much.
168The  Life  does  not  end  with  a  single  death,  that  of Caesar.  Pelling  has  pertinently 
questioned whether ‘death is the end’  in many of Plutarch’s Lives.25 In Pompey's end, 
apart from the principal’s death, we are also told about the tragic aftermath of people 
involved in Pompey’s murder: Achillas, Pothinus, as well as Theodotus were all killed by 
Caesar (80.7-9) -  a kind of vengeance for Pompey’s undeserved death? It might well be 
so; yet things are clearly more complex than that in Plutarch’s epilogues, as Pelling has 
pointed out.26 Caesar’s tragic end is followed by the death of others, too. Cassius meets a 
remarkable death, in Plutarch’s words: he commits suicide using the very same dagger he 
used to kill Caesar (69.3) -  thus the dagger, apart from a common pattern in murders, 
hints perhaps at some supernatural power acting behind these deaths, some kind of divine 
punishment again. The use of the same instrument for killing reveals a kind of fateful 
power attached to the weapon and emphasises the ‘tragic’  element in this death, as in 
others too:  Ajax killed himself with his enemy’s  sword (Ajax 815-822;  cf.  661-662), 
which he had received  at the exchange of battle-gear with Hector before their single 
combat (77.  14.379 ff.); after Orestes kills Clytemnestra he displays the cloak (Choeph. 
980-1017), as she had also done after killing Agamemnon by using it as a net to trap him 
in (Agam. 1381-1383; cf. 1115-1129, and 355 ff.: even Troy was caught in an inescapable 
net).27 Brutus, the assassin and former friend, meets an Ajax-like death by killing himself 
with his own sword, and, in contrast to Ajax, in his case, he is helped by a friend (“afta 
kou <f)lXov Tivoq ax; tjxmi mjvemppa)(ra.vT(x; t v)v nXv fffp j”  ~ 69.14).28
25 Pelling (1997a).
26 Pelling, ib.
27 On the scenic repetition of the net-image see Taplin (1977), 314-315, 325 and 381. Cf. also McLeod 
(1983) about the various implications of the clothing in the Oresteia.
Compare Soph. A j a x  826-834:  ‘W /ai/w  t iv ’  %puv  a^yeX ov,  Kaucrjv  ^ a t m v l Tevxpqt  fepovra.,  rcpurro^  ax;  fie 
fiaorourj)/  n en ru ira  rq&e  “ nept  veoppaump  Z ife tj  kou  p.'fj  npa;  e%8pwv  tow  Kartm revBei$   naptx;/  pt$b&   k w i v  
Txpoffhflqroq oluivot; B*  eXwp  ...  nXevpou/ S iappr^ avra Tq&e (jujur'yawp” (‘I pray you send some messenger to bear 
to Teucer the sad tale, that he may come to lift me where I lie a bleeding corpse, fallen on this gory sword, 
lest I be first discovered by some enemy and cast forth, a prey to dogs and birds...when into my side I 
plunge this sword’).
169There  is  something  supernatural  in Brutus’  death;29  it seems that he  is  caught  in  an 
inevitable divine plan, which he finally recognises and does little to escape. The passage 
is certainly worthy to be fully quoted here:
(69.6-14) MaAiorra fie t o   Bpovrq) yevofievov (jxzojia tt]v KaJoapog efir)Xmoe a<jxiyr)v ov 
yevofievqv BeoJg apeorvjv'  T)v fie t movfie.  fieKkmv r ov arpa/rov e£ ’Afivfiou fiiafiifiaJ^eiv eig 
TTjv erepav •rpreipov,  avenavero  wicrog axrrcep eimQei  Kara (ncrpsrjv,  ov  KaBevfimv,  aXXa 
(j>povTi^u)v  nepi  rov  fieKkovrog'  Xeyerai  yap  ovrog  avqp  ojKtura  fir)  rmv  orparrfymv 
imvmfirjg  yeveoOat  kou  nXeTorov  eauurtp %povov  eyprjyopori  %pijo9au  nerfrvKmg'  rpo^ov  fie 
rtvog  aiuQeoQai  nepi  tt)v   %pav  efiolge,  kou  npog  t o   to o   Xv%vov  (fnog rjfir)  Karafepofievov 
OKeipdfievog,  o\J/iv  elfie  <}>of3epav  avfipog  €K<j>vXov  t o   fieyeSog  kou  %aXenov  to  elfiog. 
etatXayeig fie to npmrov,  mg empa pAfre nparTovra rt pAfre 4>9eyyofievov,  aXX’  koruna 
otyjj Txapa. rrjv kXjwjv,  rpana  [oa\rig eortv.  amoKpiverai fi’  aurq) to fya/rfia-  “ o  oog m 
Bpovre  fiatfimv  Kotcog-  oipet  fie fie  itepi  QtXhrrrovg”  Tore  fiev  ovv  o  Bpovrog  evBatpomg 
“oifjofjwu” eTne, kou to fiaufioviov evOug kicrcofimv awfei.  rtp fi’  iKvovfievrp %povtp irepi rovg 
QhXttmovg avrtra^etg  ’Avrmvtqi kou  Katoapt,  rjj fiev npunyi fiatfflf)  Kpar^oag to  naff 
eavrov  erpeif/aro,  kou  fiie&fjXaure  nopdmv  to  KaJuapog  OTparomefiov  rvjv  fie  fievrepav 
avrrp fiaL%€(r9ai fieXXovn fang, to avro <f>aofia rijg wicrog avQig, oi>%  more ti npooemeTv, 
aXXa ovveig o Bpovrog to neirpmfievov, eppixpe <f>epmv eavrov eig rov Ktvfivvov.
Ov  fvi)v  eneoev  aymviCpfievog,  aXXa  rijg  rpornjg  yevofievyg  ava^vymv  % pog  ti 
Kpvffivmfieg,  kou  T(p  §f<fci  yvfivtp npoojfiaXwv to  orepvov,  afia kou  < j> [X ov rtvog mg < J hioi 
ovvemppmoavrog rijv nXyyvfVf ameOavev.
More than anything else, it was the phantom that appeared to Brutus which gave a 
particularly clear sign that Caesar’s killing had been unwelcome to the gods.  It 
happened like this. Brutus was about to transport the army from Abydus to the 
other continent: it was night-time, and he was resting as usual in his tent. He was 
not asleep, but deep in thought about future. They say that this man needed less 
sleep than any other general in history, and spent many hours awake and alone. He 
thought he heard a noise by the door,  and  looked toward the lamp, which was 
already burning low. He saw a terrifying apparition of a man, a giant in size and
29 Cf. Brenk (1977), 62-63 on the credit which Plutarch gives to the visions of the principal characters’ 
impending death in the Brutus-Dion pair.
170menacing to look at. At first he was frightened, but then he saw that the apparition 
was doing and saying nothing, but just standing silently by the bed. Brutus asked 
him who he was. The phantom replied:  ‘Your evil genius, Brutus. You will meet 
me at Philippi.’ For the moment Brutus calmly replied ‘I will meet you there’, and 
the phantom immediately went away.
In the following months Brutus faced Antony and the young Caesar in battle at 
Philippi. In the first battle he defeated and forced back the detachment stationed 
opposite himself, and drove on to destroy Caesar’s camp. When he was about to 
fight the second battle the phantom visited him again at night. It said nothing, but 
Brutus recognised his fate, and plunged into danger in the battle. Yet he did not die 
fighting. After the rout he took refuge on a rocky prominence, and forced his breast 
against his naked sword, with a friend, they say, adding weight to the blow. So he 
met his death.30 (69.6-14)
We saw earlier some supernatural power acting at the scene of Caesar’s murder, when he 
fell by the pedestal of Pompey’s statue (pp.  167-168). Divine powers suggest a fateful 
chain of events  and  in the passage quoted above we can  see them taking control of 
Brutus’  fate  -   Plutarch  is  here  unusually  explicit  about  divine  involvement  (69.6: 
^paXtora, $€  t o   Bpovrq) yevopevov (jwurfLa rijv Kai(rapo<; eftqXcwre oxfxi/yrjv ov yevofievyv 9eo?$ 
apeorvjv”). The phantom which appears to Brutus gives the sense of impending doom and 
makes the scene more atmospheric; one could say that it incorporates his fate itself, while 
adding  more  dramatic  tension  to  Brutus’  encounter  with  supernatural  powers.3 1   In 
addition, the fact that Plutarch stresses that Brutus was not asleep creates a reality which 
merges with the dream, making the dream appear more real.32
30 The translation is again Pelling’s ((1997a)=(2002a), 378-379), who quotes the passage when discussing 
death as an (non-)end in Plutarch’s Lives. Plutarch tells the same story at Brut. 36.
31 Brenk ((1977), 184-213), too, sees visions and dreams as part of Plutarch’s technique to dramatise his 
Lives -  he talks about ‘subordination of the portents to the dramatic needs of the Lives’ (p.  191). Brenk 
discusses Brutus’ vision in (2002), 70-72.
32 Cf. Alex. 50.2, where ‘some inexorable divine plan’ affects both Cleitus and Philotas -  thus Mossman 
(1988), 8 8.
171The pattern of mortals being caught in a divine plan, despite all effort they may make to
33  • avoid it, is a favourite theme of tragedy, though it is not confined to tragedy:  Hippolytus 
is  controlled  by Aphrodite;  Oedipus  in  OT has  to  fulfil  the  prophecy;34  Pentheus  is 
punished by Dionysus in the Bacchae; Xerxes fulfils Atossa’s ominous dream about his 
destruction, as also Darius’ spirit portends the defeat of the Persians at Plataea (Pers. 176 
ff., and 516 ff).  So, once again, at Brutus’ encounter with the supernatural, Plutarch’s 
reader may think about or compare it to tragedy, and understand Brutus as another tragic 
character who  can  do  little to  resist  his  fate -  at  least  at this  moment.  There  is  an 
interesting detail in the narration of this strange encounter. Both times the phantom says 
nothing to Brutus (69.10:  ‘he saw that the apparition was doing and saying nothing’; 
69.13: ‘it said nothing’), until he asks him to speak. Thus, the fact that Brutus makes the 
apparition speak may signify that he is the one who -  provoked in the past and still now -  
provokes his fate.35 He evidently recognises his tragic fate, but does not hold back from 
battle (69.13: “ovveig o Rpovrog to TxeTtpwy^evov, eppnfa (jtepwv ecurrov eig tov Kivftuvov”), and 
consciously heads to his demise.36 Exactly as Brutus, Caesar, too, faces the same kind of 
impasse; he, too, sees the danger but cannot act as to avoid it any longer (Caes. 63 ff).
So much concerning the conspiracy, the assassination, and what followed thereafter, and 
on their analogies to tragedy and to theatrical performance. Yet, apart from tragic patterns 
in events there are also tragic patterns in Caesar’s character, and therefore it is worth 
examining what other aspects of his personality Plutarch brings to the foreground and 
how those are related to what is ‘theatrical’ or ‘tragic’, at various levels and intensities, in 
this  Life.  At  the  beginning  of the  Life  Plutarch  draws  a  portrait  of Caesar  which 
illustrates  his talented personality and  charisma in  gaining popularity  and  admiration
33 The pattern is common in historiography (e.g. Hdt. 1.35 ff.: the story of Adrastus) (cf. Mossman (1988), 
8 8), or epic poetry: epic heroes are also caught in divine plans, or act as their protecting deities want them 
to -  cf. Gaskin (2001) and Lesky (2001).
34  On  how  Oedipus  meets  his  fate  see,  among others,  Reinhardt  (1979),  94-134,  Winnington-Ingram 
(1980), 150-178 and 179-204, and Segal (2001).
35 Apparition of ghosts, whether bidden to speak (cf. Pers. 619 ff., where Atossa, together with the chorus 
of Elders, summons the ghost of Darius to appear) or not (cf. the ghost of Clytemnestra in Eum. 94-139), is 
also a tragedy-theme.
36 The prophetic words of the phantom, ‘You will meet me at Philippi’, bear a striking similarity to the 
parting words of Calanus, an Indian sage, who killed himself in Alexander. He says about Hephaestion, 
Alexander’s closest friend, who has just died: ‘He will meet Alexander soon, at Babylon’ (Alex. 69.6) -  
thus Pelling (1997a)=(2002a), 3 7 9 .
172among the masses rather than his bad sides, such as his propensity to tyranny. He creates 
an  image  of Caesar as  a  leader who  is  not  only  very  powerful  but  also,  and  most 
significantly, sees himself and acts as potentially an imperator. The theme of Caesar’s 
ambition  is introduced as early as chapter 2, in the anecdote about the pirates, which 
underlines that he was exceptional and, moreover, conscious of his power; however, what 
he was not aware of was that his highly ambitious nature would ultimately destroy him. 
Plutarch  describes  the  pirate  adventure  in  every  detail  in  reported  speech  which 
supposedly reproduces the exact exchange of words between Caesar and the pirates, and 
on the whole makes the  anecdote a very theatrical way of looking  into the  issue of 
Caesar’s influence and power at that early stage of his career. There is indeed a lot of 
display  and  exaggeration  in  Caesar’s  behaviour  while  he  was  in  the  hands  of the 
Cilicians, who were notorious for their harshness and bloodthirstiness.
Caesar’s final victory over the pirates is anticipated by his attitude while still a captive, as 
well as by the absolute superiority and recklessness he demonstrates. He used to behave 
as if they were his captives and he the ruler:  he treated them with disdain (2.2), and 
mocked at them by offering more money than they required for his release (2.1). He used 
to  read  out  to  them  his  writings  using  his  captors  as  his  audience,  he  called  them 
‘barbarians’, if they failed to appreciate his poems and prose pieces, and went as far as to 
threaten to hang them: “kou rton^iaTa ypaujxtiv kou Xoyovq rivou; aKpoa/raut; eKeivoiq e% pr}ro, 
kou  rovg p*rj  douufia^ovra^  avrtKpuq  amaritevrovs  kou  fZapfZapov$  ameKaXei,  kou  ovv  ykXum 
TTohXaxis 'rpreiXycre Kpefiav  aurrous” (2.4) -  Plutarch’s words are important here as they 
create the image of a captive Caesar who performs, as it were, his role in front of his 
audience, his captors. That Caesar is fully in control of his ‘barbarian’ audience shows his 
confidence  and  determination  always to  be  superior under any  circumstances.  These 
qualities of his character will become clearer later in his life and career, but the incident 
with the pirates is certainly a pointer to his becoming a self-confident and ambitious 
person. The reader forms here the picture of a Caesar who, apart from any element of 
self-aggrandisement,  constructs  his public  image,  his  fame,  but at the  same time the 
reader senses perhaps that he is going one step too far -  as he also does, for example, 
later at the incident when he remains seated in front of the senate (60.4).
173Caesar, then, increasingly gained popularity as a political orator (3.2) -  it is said that the 
encomium he wrote and pronounced for Julia, the deceased wife of Marius, met with 
general approval and applause —  as well as public influence, by giving lavish dinners and 
banquets (4.4-5). Although Caesar was in heavy debt (5.8: “AeyeTaw npiv eig apwp riva 
KaSiaraurBau xtXttov kou rpioKooiaw yevefrQat xpeaxfietXeTrjg raXavraiv”) before even running 
for any public office, he spent considerable amounts of his own money on organising 
spectacles, such as shows with gladiators, processions and theatrical performances (5.8- 
9). The reference to theatre is significant here. Although theatrical productions are listed 
among lavish and extravagant expenses, Plutarch’s point may be here on the whole in 
favour of Caesar, in the sense that it shows that his tactics to gain political power were 
clever and  successful —  5.9:  “...  rag repo  ainov KarexXvoe (friXorifuag, ovrco dteSvjKe rov 
dijfiov, (bg Kauvag fiev ap%ag, Kotvag fie rtfiag Qryretv eKourrov cug airrov afietipatvrb” (‘... he 
obliterated all earlier ambition; by these means he put the people in such a mood that 
every man of them was seeking out new offices and new honours with which to requite 
him’).37
Interestingly,  in the Political precepts Plutarch  says that the person who favours and 
flatters the masses by giving them theatrical performances and making distributions of 
money will only be granted ‘ephemeral and uncertain reputation’ (822F: “e< jyf)fiep6v riva 
kou afiefkuov Boi;av”). If applied to Caesar, Plutarch’s view in the Political precepts carries 
certainly an ominous insinuation about his popularity which will later work against him 
as much as it favours him now, at this early stage of his career. On the whole, chapter 3 
gives a heavy hint of how much he had to sacrifice to develop his career as a statesman38 
-  indeed, this aspect of Caesar stifling other parts of his talented personality might strike 
at  least  a  modem  reader  as  especially  ‘tragic’  an  element  in  Caesar’s  life  -   while 
anticipating his rise in the political arena. He was to achieve much more as a commander
37 Compare the totally opposite angle from which Plutarch sees Antony’s debts, already at the beginning of 
his career and of the Life (chap. 2).  They are part of his image and an indication of character which 
Plutarch disapproves.
38 As Pelling remarks, much in the Lives is about choices ((2004/05), 80-81) -  and the same goes for 
tragedy, too (cf. id. (2004c), 318).
174than as an orator, even if his natural talent could clearly give him the first rank among all 
political orators.
Another way in which Plutarch brings out the potentially tragic nature of Caesar’s Life is 
through reference to Alexander the Great.  In Pompey we are told that people saw in 
Pompey’s physical appearance many common traits with Alexander. Although Plutarch 
himself questions the similarity,39 the fact that Plutarch mentions it makes the point that 
the (true or imaginary) resemblance of the two men had a certain impact on the people. 
So, there the comparison aimed to presage that Pompey was going to become a great 
ruler, an imperator to be compared with Alexander the Great. In Caesar we have the 
commander himself -  and not the external environment, other people -  reflecting on his 
achievements as compared to those of Alexander, after being assigned the province of 
Spain (11.5-6).40 He is so demoralised that he even bursts into tears. When he is asked by 
his  friends  to  explain  his  distress,  his  words  reveal  sadness  for having,  supposedly, 
achieved nothing at an age when Alexander had achieved everything.
The actual  dialogue between Caesar and his friends is reproduced to create a greater 
impact on the reader. The agony of Caesar to succeed and fulfil his ambitions seems to be 
mainly, if not exclusively, a personal matter. His external environment, his friends seem 
rightfully unable to understand his internal battle, or even more, see in him the image of a 
failed general. He is the only one to set himself against Alexander, the most successful 
general ever, and considers his own achievements, as compared to Alexander’s, of no 
importance. The dynamics of success and failure create emotional distress to Caesar and
(2.2)  ‘Sjv  de  rif  kou  avaurroX'f)  rrfc  KOfi/tj/g  kou  t o w   Ttepi  to,  ofAputra  puBfuav  uyporrfc,  t o D  npoaumou
rcotoxkra. fiaAXov Xe'yoftevrjv q  fauvoftevrjv o fw io rrjra  irpo$ to$ ’AXe^avdpov rov l&uriXeax; e ’ tKovctg” (‘His hair was 
inclined to lift itself slightly from his forehead, and this, with a graceful contour of face about the eyes, 
produced  a  resemblance,  more  talked  about  than  actually  apparent,  to  the  portrait  statues  of King 
Alexander’).  Plutarch’s  comment (‘more talked  about than  actually apparent’) reveals  his  wariness  to 
believe the common view that Pompey’s physical appearance resembled that of Alexander the Great (cf. 
Pompey-chapter, p. 130).
40 About this anecdote and its variations in different sources see Green (1978), 3 (and passim), and the 
relevant notes. But as Pelling remarks, the fact that Plutarch presents Caesar reading from the history of 
Alexander -  as opposed to the version of Suetonius (Div. Iul. 7.1) and Cassius Dio (37.52.2) where Caesar 
is seeing a statue of Alexander -  is of importance here as it may work on more levels than one, suggesting 
the inspiring moral value of written narrative for Caesar as a reader, in the same way as Plutarch’s readers 
may have been inspired by Alexander in the paired Life ((2002b)=(2002a), 257).
175at the same time emphasise the dramatic register of the Life. The high ambitions and 
standards  he  himself sets  for  his  political  and military  career  will  drive  him  into  a 
struggle to exceed himself and surpass all his predecessors. This struggle will bring him 
much success and glory, as it will equally make him odious and hated by his enemies, 
and will finally destroy him.
In the portrait which Plutarch draws of Caesar after the end of the Civil War, this battle 
within Caesar himself to exceed his past achievements appears even more tense. Instead 
of enjoying the fruits of what he had worked so hard to achieve, he emulated himself and 
made himself his own rival (58.4-5). Thus he decided to pursue his further ambitions and 
go out against many other lands, wishing to become the absolute king. It is exactly this 
lust for kingship which will finally work against him and drive him towards becoming 
less popular among the masses, and towards boastful behaviour (60.1; cf. 62.1). A good 
example of this kind of behaviour is offered at an incident at the rostra, where he did not 
rise to receive the members of the senate together with the praetors and the consuls but 
remained seated (60.4). It seems, though, that Caesar’s decision not to stand up in front of 
the senators is not exactly his own.
At the end of that chapter (chap. 60) Plutarch mentions that a friend named Cornelius 
Balbus stopped him  from receiving the  senate standing,  although Caesar himself was 
eager to do so (“wavy f& ovTw tJuevov aurov vTze^avcurrrjvau rfi jSouA fl”, 60.8), by saying to him: 
‘Remember that you are Caesar, and permit yourself to be treated as superior’  (60.8). 
Plutarch presents here Caesar as yielding to wrong advice, just like Pompey listened to 
bad advisers at crucial moments in his life and career (cf. Pomp. 67.1-2, 67.8). Yet in 
Caesar’s  case  it  is  an  interesting paradox  that  apparently  sensible  and  well-founded 
advice may come from an enemy (e.g. Decimus Brutus -  chap. 64; cf. above, p. 165), and 
really bad advice may come from a friend, in this case from Balbus, who is, however, 
presented as a flatterer, wishing to flatter somehow his commander at this instance.4 1  So, 
it is not just his personal faults, his over-ambition that will destroy him (60.1). As the
41 See Pelling (1980)=(2002a), 104-105, (1996), 324-325, and (1997c), 217 ff.: friends, along with troops 
and the popular reaction are the main elements in building Caesar’s power, and the very same forces which 
drive him to his fall (esp. chap. 57 ff.).
176incident at the senate shows, Caesar is also destroyed by others, who however follow the 
lead that Caesar himself has given by his politically hazardous moves. On this occasion 
as also at the crowning (61.5-7 —  see below, pp. 179-181) Caesar is encouraged by others 
to expose his ambition in public, and thus he himself in a way encourages people to see in 
him a potential danger for Roman democracy.
The vivid visual image and the detailed description make the scene appear as part of a 
performance, a political performance in this case. Caesar’s conduct towards the senate 
was considered by the people to be offensive, since it also insulted the state as a whole in 
the persons of the senators (60.5).42 But when some of the people left, Caesar realised his 
mistake and turned to go home. In a symbolic gesture he pulled back his toga so that his 
neck was exposed; he cried out to his friends that his throat was available for anybody 
who would like to kill him (60.6: “k o u jSoav npog rov; < f> iX ou; anovyovyovra toO  Tpa%rflau to 
ipAriov,  ax; eroifj/x; eh)  rtp {ZovXofievq)  rvjv  (r^ayrjv  t tatpezeiv”).4*   The  gesture  of Caesar 
pulling back his toga has a double value, first as a theatrical image of Caesar actively 
dramatising his own life, and secondly as an ominous allusion to the actual scene of his 
assassination.44
The ‘mirror-scene’ in chapter 66 bears striking similarities, only there it is Tillius, one of 
Caesar’s assassins who takes hold of Caesar’s toga and pulls it back signalling for the 
attack to begin (66.6: “o fiev T/AA/o$ rr)v t vjjiewov aurov rau; %epmv afi^xnepoug avXkafiwv 
am rov rpa%yhov Karryyev, onep r\v ovvBrjfia t ffc emxeipvyreux;”). The similarity between the 
two scenes is evident, and the reader as a viewer can compare them in his mind and
42  Pelling  ((2006b),  269,  and  275  n.  6 6 )  points  out  the  striking  similarity  in  Plutarch’s  phrasing  in 
describing a similar offence against the senate at Rom. 27.3: “e8o£e KOfufrfi -njv yepoixriav 7rp© 7njXow«£eiv’’ 
(‘[Romulus] seemed to be inflicting total humiliation on the senate’); cf. Caes. 60.5: “a* ev tjj fiovkfi ko u -rife 
TrnXeax; irptm^auci%tHJi£Vf)s” (‘as if the senate’s humiliation formed an insult to the whole city’) -  another 
indication that several Plutarchan Lives must be read together, if not taken as a sequence of a coherent 
whole.
43 Compare again here the Decimus Brutus scene, where he takes Caesar by hand and leads him along, 
64.6. The taking-by-hand-image is linked with imminent death also later, at 68.3, in the dream which die 
poet Cinna had, and which was fulfilled the next day at the forum, where he went to pay tribute to his 
friend,  Caesar,  and was murdered  because he was mistaken  for one of Caesar’s assassins. Cf. Pelling 
(19%), 330, and (1997c), 227-228.
44 On gesture as a feature of tragedy, and its dramatic effect on stage see Taplin (1978), 58-76, and on 
gesture in Homeric epic see Lateiner (1995), esp. pp. 19-29. On the link between robe and death see again 
Agam. 1381-1383,1492, Choeph. 980-1017, and Med. 786-789,982-989, and 1156 ff.
177realise the extra hints that the earlier scene (Caes. 60) gives of the later scene (Caes. 66); 
the one scene foreshadows the other, for one naturally recalls the actual murder scene 
when  reading  the  passage  at  60.6.  It  seems  that  Caesar prepares  his  own  death  by 
neglecting the senators and acting as a king. The allusion to his death in the theatrical 
imagery used at this significant scene, is certainly of tragic texture: Caesar pulls back his 
toga himself in an attempt to show that he acknowledges his mistake, but it seems that he 
has already gone one step too far, fuelling at the same time the plans of his rivals to 
attack him (cf. Brut. 52.6-8, and Caes. 69.14, where Brutus forces his breast against his 
naked sword -  see above, pp. 171-172).45
However,  it  is  important to  stress that  it was  not only  Caesar’s  lust  for power that 
gradually made him disliked among the masses. In what follows, public reaction and 
bystanders  play  a  major  role  in  defining  Caesar’s  downfall.  There  was  a  group  of 
supporters of Caesar that was always encouraging the idea of him being named ‘king’. At 
60.2 Plutarch tells us that his followers went even as far as spreading the rumour in the 
city ‘that from the Sibylline books it appeared that Parthia could be taken if the Romans 
went up against it with a king, but otherwise could not be assailed’. They also greeted 
Caesar as ‘king’ as he was coming into the city, which disturbed those present. Despite 
his passion for royal power (60.1: “o tv )$  { k u n k e ia q  ep*o$”), Caesar clearly does not want to 
present himself in front of the people as a king and thus refuses the title. In this way he 
mitigates the reaction against him which his own supporters had fuelled by prematurely 
attributing to him that title.
Bystanders  also  play  a  significant  role  at  another  incident  which  happened  at  the 
celebration of the Lupercalia {Caes. 61). Antony came forward upon the rostra where 
Caesar was  sitting, and offered him a diadem three times, and all three times Caesar 
rejected it. The scene is of particular theatrical value -  as well as of political interest -  
since it resembles in its process a performance, with the forum serving as the stage, as it 
were, on which the spectacle takes place, yet in reality it was meant to stage a coronation 
ritual:
45 Cf. Pelling (1979)=(2002a), 15.
178(61.5-7) wg © 3v eig rijv a/yopav evefiaXe  kou  to  nXfjQog avrq) Bieerrr), (f> epw v BiaBrqfia 
crreefxzvq) Ba^vrfg TTepnrenXe'Yfievov cope^e rep Kcutrotpr  kou  'yiverou Kporog ov Xoufntpog, 
aXX* oXiyog ek noLpourKevijg. anaxrafievov Be rov KaJerapog, a/nag o Bvjfiog aveKporvyrev 
aZBig Be npotr^epovrog, oXijoi,  kou firj Befgafievovy  naXtv amavreg.  ovra) Be rvjg nelpag 
e^eXeyxofievyg,  Kouaap fiev  avioraurou,  rov areefxwov eig  t o   KarrrrcoXjov  (vneve% ftrjvau 
KeXjevo-ag.
After he [Antony] had dashed into the forum and the crowd had made way for him, 
he carried a diadem, round which a wreath of laurel was tied, and held it out for 
Caesar. Then there was applause, not loud, but slight and prearranged. But when 
Caesar pushed  away  the  diadem,  all  the  people  applauded;  and  when  Antony 
offered  it  again,  few,  and  when  Caesar  declined  it,  again  all  applauded.  The 
experiment having failed, Caesar rose from his seat, after ordering the wreath to be 
carried up to the Capitol. (61.5-7)
Indeed, Caesar’s experiment to see whether people liked the idea of him being named 
'king’ had utterly disappointed him in his hopes. His attempt at manipulation of the scene 
and of the audience is unsuccessful, and demonstrates that in real life a possible attempt 
to stage-manage audience and events can be more dangerous than in theatre.46 The first 
time that Antony offered the diadem to crown Caesar, very few people applauded, and 
even that applause, Plutarch says, was prearranged (“«c napourKevijg^). This first part of 
the scene was obviously set up by Caesar’s supporters, and aimed at a general approval of 
Caesar’s kingship. Yet the crowd clearly showed its dislike for that idea. This is why, 
both  the  second  and  third  time  that  Antony  offered  the  diadem  to  Caesar,  he  was 
applauded by only few people, whereas Caesar’s refusal of the title was met with great 
applause.47 The scene should mark a glorious moment for the main character; Caesar was 
supposed to be the only protagonist, and the bystanders were expected to act in favour of 
him. Caesar, as if a character in a play, tries to turn the crowd (the people outside the 
play) into the chorus in his own drama and make them respond in such a way as to help
46 Compare similar stage-management by Clodius who attempts to manipulate people against Pompey at 
Pomp. 48.8-12; see above, pp. 126-127.
47 Compare the similar scene at Caes. 47, where, shortly before his final win, a seer, Gaius Cornelius, told 
Caesar that all portents were in favour of him (‘Victory is yours, Caesar!’, 47.6), whereupon the bystanders 
were pleased and amazed, yet he took the garland off his head and told them that he would not wear it 
again until the actual facts confirmed the seer’s words. The people are ready to see and honour Caesar as a 
conqueror, but not as a king.
179him achieve his personal goals. Yet it turns out that he is unable to impose himself; the 
public political view controls the scene here, and the common people hold the stage.
The Lupercalia-episode is also told by Plutarch in the Life of  Antony {Ant. 12), only there 
the emphasis is different concerning the person responsible for the unpopularity of Caesar 
that started to grow from that point onwards. It is implied that it was Antony’s fault rather 
than Caesar’s, whereas in Caesar Plutarch presents the incident as Caesar’s own arrogant 
attempt to  fulfil  his  over-ambition  by  carrying  out  an  experiment to  test the public 
reaction to his possible claim of the title of king.48 What followed the incident showed 
how distressed Caesar was and how powerful the people were. Namely, Caesar’s statues 
were found crowned with royal diadems, which vexed the tribunes, who went up and 
pulled them off (61.8)49 -  a symbolic action which demonstrated how strong the feelings 
of the people against monarchy were. The crowning (of statues or people) as an action 
which may possibly cause, consciously or unconsciously, wrath and destruction, or may 
point to tragic irony by standing in contrast to its honorary and festive character, is a 
theme which appears in tragedy; Hippolytus angers Aphrodite by offering garlands to 
Artemis and honouring her statues only {Hip. 73-87; cf.  114-120) and thus he provokes 
his punishment (by Poseidon) {Hip. 1173 ff.); Oedipus is offered garlands too, in order to 
save his city, but at the end he is utterly destroyed being totally ignorant of the truth (OT 
1  ff.; and later Creon himself enters the stage crowned thinking that he brings good news 
for the people of Thebes -  v. 113 ff.). The end of the episode in Caesar is decided by the 
influential public opinion: those who first hailed Caesar as ‘king’ were led off to prison 
by the tribunes Flavius and Marullus, at which moment the crowd cheered and called 
them ‘Brutuses’, the implication being that they were protecting the democracy, exactly 
as the first Marcus Brutus was the one who had replaced monarchy with a system of
48 Pelling (1988b), 144-145.
49 Compare Pomp. 57: after Pompey’s recovery from a dangerous illness, he returns to Rome, and people in 
all cities welcome him with garlands on their heads and torches in their hands -  interestingly here, too, 
there is a negative touch in garlands and celebrations since Plutarch presents the public rejoicing as a factor 
which  led to the  Civil War;  Pompey became  arrogant towards  Caesar and underestimated his power. 
Pelling  discusses  the  pattern  of flower-throwing  in  similar  passages  in  Pompey  and  Appian  (Pomp. 
57.3~App. 2.27.106); the passages at the same time provide a link between Curio and Pompey. The use of 
the flower-imagery rightly leads to the assumption that ‘each [sc. Plutarch and Appian] is taking elements 
from the complete system in Pollio’s original’ -  Pelling (2006b), 273 n. 45.
180government where the  senate  and  the  people  were  most powerful  (61.9).  Infuriated, 
Caesar denounced both tribunes and deprived diem of their office.
As Caesar starts acting as a king, die political dangers for him and for Rome itself come 
to the surface. Earlier in die Life Plutarch hinted at these dangers with an incident of 
tragic  coincidence  in  Caesar’s  life which,  however,  had  more  complex  implications. 
When Caesar was about to sail to Gaul, a message arriving from Rome informed him 
about the death of his daughter in childbirth, who was also Pompey’s wife at that time 
(23.5). However, there is another important aspect of Julia’s death, as it marks die start of 
a serious threat for the Roman constitution.50 Yet at Caes. 28.1 and most importantly at 
Pomp. 53.8 Plutarch underscores the link between the death of Crassus and the start of 
political upheavals for Rome, since it was Crassus who had managed to constrain both 
Pompey’s and Caesar’s ambitious plans for as long as he was alive. The friends of Caesar 
and Pompey were obviously able to see the link between the two levels of personal and 
political tragedy: the grief was common for the two generals, but their friendship, which 
was up to that moment a factor of stability, peace and concord for the state, had died 
together with the death of Julia’s and, a few days later, of her child. In Plutarch’s words: 
(23.5-6) Tekevrg. tie tiktovoxl napa Ilofnn)i<p. kou pueya fiev aurov ea% e Ylofiivrjiov, fieya 
Be Koucrapa. 7rev#o$, oi Be (j)iXoi (njveTapa%0r r)< rav, ox; rife ev eiprjv'f) kou opM voiqu raXXa 
voaovtrav rijv noXireiav ^/uXcbrrovtrqq oiKeiorwjroq XeXupGWfc'  kou yap <kou>  t o   J3p€< fo$ 
evQvq ov noXXa£ 'rjpApau; fiera, tt)v pwrjrepa. BiaQfyra.v ereXevrrjo-e.
She died in childbirth at Pompey’s house. Great was the grief of Pompey, and great 
the grief of Caesar, and their friends were greatly troubled too; they felt that die 
relationship which alone kept the ailing state in harmony and concord was now 
dissolved. For before long die baby died too, after surviving its mother a few days. 
(23.5-6)
Julia was one important link between Caesar and Pompey, and her death marked not only 
a new era in the relationship between the two generals, but also a new era for Rome.
50 Plutarch develops in his Lives different views on the importance of the marriage between Pompey and 
Julia for Roman politics, which are not always consistent and focus on different aspects according to the 
purposes of each Life (cf. Cato Minor 31.6, Caes. 14.7-8, Pomp. 47.9-10); see Pelling (1995b), 324-326, 
esp. 324 n. 13 (he also discusses Plutarch’s adaptation of his source, Pollio, about the Roman crisis).
181Family stability is lost together with Rome’s stability. The break of the Civil War and die 
personal conflict between Pompey and Caesar will not be long in coming. The passage 
mirrors Pomp. 53, with die important repetition of the word “otKeton^”:
{Pomp.  53.7) ev8u$ yap eKVfiauvev i)  noXig,  kou  navra to, Ttpa/yfJ-ara traXov el%e  kou 
Xoyov;  fitaoTaTiKovg,  ax;  v)  nporepov  TtapaucaXxmrowra  puaXXov  vj  Kareipyouaa  rmv 
avtipwv Tvjv <j)i\ap%iav oiKetomy; avjjpvjrau.
For the city became at once a tossing  sea,  and everywhere  surging tumult and 
discordant speeches prevailed,  since the  marriage alliance which had  until then 
veiled rather than restrained die ambition of the two men was now at an end.
The vocabulary, and especially the word “oiKeiorrj;”, strengthens the oikos-point as an 
important element in die Life,  suggesting that what is happening inside the family is 
reflected in the turbulent political situation. {Pomp. 53.7)
Dreams  are  a common  motif of foreboding  die  future  in tragedy,  a role which they 
sometimes play in Plutarch, too -  significantly, in both Pompey (cf. 68.2-3) and Caesar 
(see below) dreams are presenting in a very visual manner the protagonist’s agonies and 
the ambiguities at most crucial moments.5 1  Thus, apart from their role of alluding to what 
will happen to the main character in near or remote future, they also intensify die feeling 
of suspense, since the reader is intrigued to check their truth by the actual outcome. At 
32.9, just before his attack against Ariminum, Caesar had a strange dream of incestuous 
intercourse with his mother (“eBoKei  yap  auro; rtf eaurov purppt iie'iywcrQai rip  appvpov 
fieitziv” -  ‘the unspeakable union’). It might, or might not perhaps be accidental that this 
dream comes almost half-way in the Life (32.9) -  Caesar’s murder comes in chap. 66. At 
a moment when everything goes well for Caesar and he is about to cross the Rubicon, 
this dream raises unsettling ambiguities, suggesting that die situation is less auspicious
51  In tragedy there are many examples where dreams foretell die future or trouble characters with their 
ambiguous or deceiving meaning -  Aeschylus’ Pers.  176-231, Agam.  410-416, 491-492,  891-894,  981, 
Choeph.  32  ff.,  523  ff,  Sophocles’  Elec.  417-430,  459-460,  479-481,  498-501,  644-7,  1389-1390, 
Euripides’ Hec. 68-97, IT 150 ff, 348 ff, 452-455, 569. Cf. Dodds (1951), 102-134, and Devereux (1976), 
who discusses some of these dreams in Greek tragedy. Dreams are a common motif already in Homer (e.g. 
Odys. 4.795-841, 6.15-41, 19.535 ff, II. 2.60-70) but also in historiography, especially in Herodotus: e.g.
1.209,6.107, 7.12-19.
182than  Caesar’s  military  superiority  may  suggest52 -  a kind  of dramatic  device  which 
creates suspense and prepares the reader for a possible reversal of good luck {peripeteia). 
Although the language of dreams often throws die people that it concerns into confusion, 
it is usually clear to the viewers what it signifies. Bearing this in mind one could say that 
this unnatural dream (“ovap ei&eopov”, 32.9) reflects in the reader’s mind the reversal of 
the natural order in Roman politics and history; Caesar will take possession of his own 
country by force. But even if die dream signifies in this way a disaster to come for Rome, 
it could also be interpreted in a positive way for Caesar, that is, if one infers that die 
mother symbolises die earth and the conquest of lands by Caesar which is yet to come. At 
the same time the dream could be interpreted as a pointer to a more personal misfortune 
which will fall upon Caesar -  and Plutarch’s choice of vocabulary (“appvjrov fiefav”, 32.9) 
sounds ominous on that (personal) level, too.
So,  the  incest-dream  has  undeniably both positive  and  negative  suggestions  for both 
Caesar and the reader, while it also carries tragic weight as an important recurrent theme 
in tragedy. In any case, as Pelling has remarked, it is certainly an example of Plutarch’s 
subtly  insinuating  of an  ominous  note  at  a  moment of success.53  At  a  very  crucial 
historical moment, that of the crossing of die Rubicon, some more dramatic tension is 
added due to all the possible implications which this ambiguous dream may convey for 
Caesar. Yet Caesar went ahead with his plan to cross die river and then attack Ariminium 
-  as if following Jocasta’s advice to her king, after a similar dream he had: ‘Many have 
lain with their mothers in dreams too. It is he to whom such things are nothing who puts 
up with life the best’  (OT 981-983).  There must also certainly be a link between this 
dream (32.9) and Calpumia’s dream the night just before Caesar’s assassination (63.9); 
both dreams prepare for the disaster to come, and gain even more significance from the 
fact that they are connected  with two persons  (his mother and his wife) that are the 
closest to him.54
52 Pelling ((1997b), 200-201) comments about the uncertainties which the dream both derives from and 
creates; cf. id. (2004c), 317-318.
53 Pelling (1997c), 220. He also points out that at this instance ‘the audience might well think of Hippias’ 
famous dream before Marathon (Hdt. 6.107.1), and what that portended for the hapless dreamer’.
54 See also p. 165.
183The image of a dream appears again in a simile shortly after Caesar’s conquest of Gaul. 
The Gallic army, despite its great force, vanished like a phantom or a dream (27.7: “ourajg 
o^eux; v) too'cujtt) duvafug axmep efiktiiXov nj oveipov 'fyftaviaro kou dienejwprjTo”)55 —  the simile 
presents us with the image of the Gauls being routed and at the same time emphasises 
how  great  Caesar’s  win  was;  it  also  perhaps  adds  a  tone  of  vanity  in  human 
achievements, and gives a hint that the whole of the Gallic challenge might later seem as 
a kind of unreal past. Yet most striking is die moment of the surrender of their leader, 
Vercingetorix (27.9-10). Having put on his most beautiful armour and having decorated 
his horse, he emerged from die city gate on horseback. He rode around Caesar and then 
dismounted,  stripped  off his  armour  and  sat  quietly  at Caesar’s  feet,  this  being the 
ultimate sign of defeat. The scene is strongly reminiscent of a similar scene in Pompey, 
where King Tigranes surrenders his sword and his royal tiara to Pompey, completely 
humiliated and powerless (33.2-5). The visual similarities, which the two scenes present, 
make the reader recall the ‘mirror-scenes’  in drama, and particularly in tragedy, where 
they are a recurrent pattern of special importance, as Taplin has shown.56 However, the 
staging  of these  two  ‘mirror-scenes’  also  reveals  perhaps  a  difference  in  character 
concerning die winners of the war. Whereas Pompey did not let Tigranes throw himself 
down as a suppliant, and treated him as an equal by even offering him a seat next to him, 
Caesar, on die other hand, acted as the absolute conqueror and ordered for Vercingetorix 
to be kept in custody until the final triumph. Significantly, die similarity between the two 
scenes points again to the  fact that die two Lives are closely interlinked and that die 
readers  can  understand  these  extra  synkrisis-points  only  if they  read  the  two  Lives 
together.
It is not only Caesar who is visited by ominous visions; Pompey too, shortly before the 
battle at Pharsalus had a dream of entering his theatre in Rome and being applauded by 
crowds:
55 Appearance and disappearance of phantoms in dreams is a recurrent theme in epic, as much as in tragedy 
-  see, for example, Anticleia (Odys.  11.152-224), who appears to Odysseus in Hades and then vanishes 
‘like a shadow or a dream’ (207-208); and again in Ajax 121-126 Odysseus is reflecting on life, expressing 
the view that all those who live are nothing but ghosts, or a fleeting shadow.
56 For ‘mirror-scenes’ and their role in tragedy cf. Pompey-chapter, p. 140 n. 57, and passim.
184{Caes. 42.1) en kou < f)aujpAra> v ovk auataiv rtpoayevofievaiv kou koJF rmvov otftea> £* eftoKei 
yap iaujTov opav kv rqi Bearpq) Kporovpuevov imo 'P<o/aaJa)V.
There  befell  him  unlucky  appearances  and  a  vision  in  his  sleep.  He  dreamed, 
namely, that he saw himself in his theatre applauded by the Romans. {Caes. 42.1)
In this Life Plutarch says no more; yet in Pompey, where he again refers to the same 
vision, he gives a fuller reference and explanation of the apparition {Pomp. 68.2-3; cf. p. 
143). The second part of the dream, which is not mentioned in Caesar at all, presented 
Pompey decorating the sanctuary of Venus Victrix.57 Since Caesar’s descent goes back to 
Venus, the dream was there interpreted by Pompey as a sign of his defeat by Caesar, who 
would thus gain much glory through his weakness. The dream comes at a very important 
moment, that of the battle preparations, to give significant clues about the future. The 
passage quoted above is not the only instance where the Lives of Pompey and Caesar 
meet.58  It seems that Plutarch at various  instances  in those two Lives uses the same 
material and highlights different sides of it according to the particular aspects of each 
Life, and according to the way he wants to portray his characters in their own Life and in 
other Lives.59
And there is a further example of use of common material. Before the battle at Pharsalus, 
and while Pompey was being indecisive as to whether to engage in a battle with Caesar or 
not, people used to criticise him for wrong tactics, and called him  ‘Agamemnon’  and 
‘King of Kings’:
(41.2)  oi  $’  aXXoi  navreg  ckoki^ov  rov  Wop/rrqiov  < f> uyopui% odvTa  kou  napa^ivov,
’ Ayafiepvova kou fiauriXea jO auriXeeov anoKaXovvre^, <h$ di) fi/q fSovXoftevov airoSeaBau rijv
57 If one compares the two versions of the dream in the two Lives, one has the impression that there is a 
problem of inconsequentiality  in  Caes.  42.1:  Why  are the Romans here  applauding?  Why  is there no 
reference to Venus Victrix? Is the text corrupt, or is Plutarch severely abbreviating the incident? Compare 
Pelling (1984), 44-45, who gives a full review of other sources (Livy, Appian, etc.) and of the opinion of 
different scholars on the ‘textual problem’, and presents a good case for considering the text to be sound; 
see also Brenk (1977), 224, and n. 10.
58 See e.g. Caes. 28.4~Pomp. 46.4; Caes. 35~Pomp. 60; Caes. 35.2~Pomp. 62.2-6; Caes. 41.2~Pomp. 67.5; 
Caes. 44.9-l2~Pomp. 71.1-4; Caes. 45.7-8~Pomp. 72.1-3; Caes. 4S.5-9~Pomp. 77.2-4.
59 Cf. Pelling (1979) and (1980) on the common sources and material which Plutarch draws upon in the 
Lives  of Crassus, Pompey,  Caesar,  Cato, Brutus and Antony which he must have written  as  a single 
project; also id. (2004c), 325.
185yw vcLp% icLv, oAA’  a/yaXXofievov fyeyubvaxv roovvrcov e^rpn^ievtov aurov k o u (fwirxovrcov 
em arKTjvvjv.
All the rest, however, reviled Pompey for trying to avoid a battle, and sought to 
goad him on by calling him ‘Agamemnon’ and ‘King of Kings’, implying that he 
did not wish to lay aside his sole authority, but plumed himself on having so many 
commanders dependent upon him and coming constantly to his tent. (41.2)
The passage  is  along the  same  lines  as  67.5  of Pompey.  In both passages the name 
‘Agamemnon’ pays no credit to Pompey, since it underlines his love for authority and his 
fear to  risk what  he  already  possessed,  and  will  finally have  a disastrous  effect  for 
Pompey’s side at Pharsalus. For it is seemingly partly due to those names, which Pompey 
believed were unjustly attributed to him, that he was compelled to go out to war against 
Caesar against his will (“e#c rovraiv amaorcaiv avveXouuvopevog okwv eig  6 Ilofnrriiog
e% d)pet rov Koutrapa &a>/oov” -  Caes. 41.5)60 -  similar reluctance is shown by Caesar at the 
incident when Balbus persuades  him,  despite Caesar’s  intention to receive the  senate 
standing, to remain seated, which was apparently a fatal political error (60.4-8, see above, 
p. 177). Thus apart from describing a general who was a slave to fame and to authority, 
these names are linked to a dramatic turn in both Pompey’s life and in the course of the 
Civil War; they make Pompey abandon his initial wise decision not to engage in war, and 
drive him to an untimely attack which will eventually destroy him. Interestingly, the 
people who accuse Pompey of a passive attitude in war and, above all, of his vain love 
for authority are, as it seems, equally possessed by their ambitions and by their thirst for 
becoming  rulers.  That  Plutarch  does  not  side  with  their  opinion  is  implied  by  the 
language he uses; he refers to them as if they are a crowd, a mob (“of £’ aAAm navTeg”, 
41.2), without naming or distinguishing among them anyone in particular.
The parallel passages in the two Lives show that Pompey’s figure is central not only in 
the Life which Plutarch wrote for him, but in Caesar’s Life, too. The choice of words and
60 Compare the wording in Pomp. 67.7: “Toura k o u ni noiaura. noAAa Xeyovreg a,vSpa So^g fnw s k o u   T ijg  
7rpog  voug  < f> t? jo u g   aJdoug  rov  Ylofiwqtov  etgefH tauravTo  k o u   trwenetmauravro  T o u g   eaurdtv  eXmtri  k o u   opfiaTg 
eTzaKoXovQyo-cu,  irpoitievov rovg aptarovg fayyuriiovg”  (‘With these  and  many similar speeches they forced 
Pompey from his settled purpose -  a man who was a slave to fame and loath to disappoint his friends -  and 
dragged him into following after their own hopes and impulses, abandoning his best laid plans’)- Pompey 
engages, against his better judgement (“e^ao-avro” -  Pomp. 67.7, “auaov” -  Caes. 41.5) into a war which 
others consider as necessary and inevitable.
186ways to describe events and reactions of the two men nuances their image in each of the 
two Lives, as is die case at Caes. 45.7-8 and its parallel passage at Pomp. 72.1-3. The 
scene is interesting for many reasons. It concerns a crucial moment in Pompey’s political 
and  military  career,  yet  it  reveals  more  about  Pompey’s  personal  thoughts  and 
psychology than about his actual tactics of war. It has also a dramatic value, for it stirs in 
viewers  the  feeling  of agony  and  uncertainty  for the  general’s  future,  and  marks  a 
significant moment in the change of Pompey’s lack, which has its analogies to the tragic 
peripeteia.
Plutarch describes the first moments and reactions of the defeated general after the battle 
at Pharsalus. As he saw his army fleeing and being scattered by enemy forces, he left the 
battlefield and withdrew to his tent in silence, and from there he watched the end of the 
battle until his army was completely routed. Plutarch dramatises Pompey’s withdrawal, 
by vividly describing the moment in detail, and by using direct speech, which is rarely 
employed  by  Plutarch  in this  Life.  He  seems  unable to trace the reasons  for his not 
fighting until the end and not  standing by his troops. This kind of behaviour was so 
unlike  him  that  Plutarch  invokes  the  ‘supernatural’  in  order  to  be  able  to  offer  an 
explanation of his decision -  he says:
(45.7-8) Hopm)io$ B’  (bg KareTBev ano Oarepov roug hmeig fayjj rrKeBaaQevTfig, oukct ’ 
o avrog ovB’ ’  epepvqro Tlopwqiog cov Maiyvog, aXA’  imo 9eou paXtora fSXanropevq* 
Tvjv yvutprp eoiKoog [tj  Bia,  Beiag rprriqg reQapfhjpevog],6 1   a/j)9oyyog (p%ery   anttbv bti 
cricqwjv,  kou  KaJkCppevog eKapaJBoKei  to  peXXav,  a% pi  ov  rpO Trrjg anavriov yevopevy; 
bikfiaivov oi noXepioi rod %apaKog kou Biepaxpvro npog rovg <f>vXaTrovrag. rare & ’ (otmep 
ewoug  yevoptevog,  kou  raCrvjv  p6vrp>  uxg  faun  faovqv  afaig  “ovkovv  kou  bn  rrjv 
TTapepfioXyvC  aneBv<raro  pev  ttjv  evaydiviov  kou  < rrpaTV)yn< V)v  eaOrjra,  favyovn  Be 
npbtovaav peraXafiaiv im etg'rjXQ ev.
61  Sintenis rightly, I think, deletes the phrase in brackets, since it neither fits syntactically (the superlative 
“/x.oA/cn-a” does not require a second term of comparison introduced by rj) nor does it add anything to the 
meaning of the preceding phrase (“aAA’ uno 9eou fiaXiara fSXarrnofievq) rrjv yvamnjv eoncco^”). Cf. Glaucos in
II. 6.232 ff. (at the exchange of armour with Diomedes it was as if Zeus took away his wits, the poet says) 
or Agamemnon in II.  19.86 ff. (he claims that Zeus, Fate and Erinys cast on his mind fierce blindness on 
that day when on his own authority he took from Achilles his prize, Briseis).
187When Pompey, on the other wing, saw his horsemen scattered in flight, he was no 
longer the same man, nor remembered that he was Pompey the Great but more like 
one whom some god has robbed of his wits than anything else, he went off without 
a word to his tent, sat down there, and awaited what was to come, until his forces 
were all routed and the enemy were assailing his ramparts and fighting with their 
defenders. Then he came to his senses, as it were, and with this one sentence, as 
they say, ‘What, even to my quarters?’ took off his fighting and general’s dress, put 
on one suitable for a fugitive, and stole away. (45.7-8)
Plutarch often draws our attention to the theatrical dimension of scenes. In this case the 
theatrical  texture  of the  scene  emerges  both  from  the  use  of direct  speech,  when 
reproducing the final words of Pompey as he goes away from the camp, and from the 
visual character of the actual scene of Pompey changing his garment; he takes off the 
clothes which he was wearing until that moment as the commander-in-chief and wears 
those of a fugitive. The reader knows that he is never going to put on again the clothes of 
the general to command his army.
The scene invites a comparison with the picture of an actor in theatre. Pompey, just like 
an  actor,  puts  on  the  clothes  of the  role  he  has  to  play  now,  that  of a  fugitive. 
Interestingly, at Pomp. 72.3, where the same scene is described, the actual word ‘fugitive’ 
is  not  used;  instead  of:  “#cai  Grpa/vt/Yikvjv  etrOvjra,  fevyovn  8e  npermvtrau/  fieraXafiwv 
ime%rj\9ev” (Caes. 45.8), Plutarch changes the phrase into: ‘W  Xafiwv eafrrjra, rfj napovay] 
rvxm npenovo-av, Cm efyrjXSev”, replacing  “(fie u yo v T i”  with “t#  napouaj) rum)”. It must be a 
conscious choice on Plutarch’s part to avoid directly imposing on Pompey’s own Life the 
image of the fugitive on a king who had achieved so much up to that moment. Moreover, 
the fleeing comes only later in Pompey to prepare the events in Egypt. However, in both 
passages Plutarch’s phrasing hints at Pompey’s acting like a fugitive: firstly, he uses the 
verb  “u7re§»jiX flev”,  which  conveys  the  image  of Pompey’s  acting  in  a  way  which  is 
unworthy  of him,  since he  ‘withdraws  secretly’;  and  secondly the word  “itpemvaav” 
stands in contrast with Pompey’s behaviour: the clothes he puts on may be appropriate 
for a fugitive, but they are inappropriate for an imperator; by doing what is suitable for a
188fugitive to do, he denies his other, his true identity,  as a general -  the two identities 
necessarily exclude each other.
•  62  • The change of clothes by a leader is a motif which appears again, among others,  m 
Demetrius, a Life that is, admittedly, one of the richest in theatrical value and imagery.63 
The situation, and the wording, is very similar to the one at Pharsalus. Demetrius, when 
defeated by Pyrrhus, withdraws to his tent, as advised; he takes off the kingly clothes and 
puts on a dark cloak, and in this he goes away in order to seek refuge:64
{Demetr.  44.9)  kou  napeXBdiv  km  o-Kyvyv,  axmep  ov  fiounXevg,  aXX’  vnoKpmfe, 
(lera^ievwrau ^apMha. fauow auvri rife TparytKvjg eK clvr^ ,  k o u  diaXaStov vnextopvpev.
So he went to his tent, as if he had been an actor and not a real king, put on a dark 
cloak in the place of his stage-robes of royalty, and stole away unnoticed. {Demetr. 
44.9)
Plutarch  here  again  raises  the  question  how  characters  should  dress  and  behave. 
Demetrius, who appears in many ways as a tragic character,  65 is attacked by Plutarch 
when behaving in a theatrical manner, which he clearly considers to be unworthy of a 
king. Clothing, along with the way it is linked to characters’ behaviour, is an important 
theme in tragedy as well. Costume is a definer of status; it can reinforce the political or 
social status of a character, but it can also be a sign of the hero’s mortification.  One 
thinks here of Euripides who was strongly criticised for presenting ‘kings in rags’ (e.g.
62 Compare a similar scene in Aem. 23: Perseus after the battle of Pydna takes off his purple garment as 
well as his diadem, the obvious signs of kingship.
63 See Tagliasacchi (1960), 139-141. Cf. Duff (2004), 271 and 283-287.
64 Cavafy later placed Plutarch’s theatrical image at the centre of his poem about ‘King Demetrius’ (“O 
BauriAeug kyywrpioq” -  published in 1906) -  he even quotes Demetr. 44.9 at the beginning of his poem. This 
unusual image for a king, which presents him changing into humble clothes, exactly like an actor after a 
performance, was what apparently inspired Cavafy to write this poem, though he saw Demetrius under a 
much more sympathetic light (than Plutarch) in his decision to withdraw after being defeated; he rather 
admired him for his good sense and courage.  Cf. Mossman (1992), 106 n. 12; also Pelling (1988b), 21. For 
Plutarch and Cavafy see Lavagnini (1989), and Gonzalez Gonz&lez (1994).
65 See again Tagliasacchi (1960), 140, esp. n. 46, where she refers to all what is so distinctively theatrical in 
Demetrius, and p. 141. Moreover, De Lacy (1952) in his fundamental article about tragedy and biography 
in Plutarch goes as far as classifying Demetrius as ‘a Plutarchian tragedy’ (p. 171) -  see also his analysis of 
the tragic aspects of the Life on pp. 168-170. Others have also seen Demetrius and Antony as tragic heroes, 
for example see Russell (1973), 135, Pelling (1988b), 21-22, Mossman (1992), 92, 96, and 104, and Duff 
(2004).
189Telephus; but Electra too),66 thus questioning the dignity of both kings and tragedy itself. 
Costume also forms the subject of the famous debate between the two tragedians in the 
Frogs  (1061-1068),  where  Aeschylus  reproaches  Euripides  for  presenting  his  kings 
dressed in tatters and rags (1063) to rouse pity among the audience. Aristophanes makes 
the audience reflect on the changing of clothes as a sign of the demeaning of tragic 
characters.67 The image of ‘kings in rags’ is undignified for tragedy, since it contrasts the 
tragic prototype of kings being presented in kingly clothes as a way of emphasising their 
qualities and power, as it is for Plutarch undignified for real-life kings. As Tagliasacchi 
has rightly remarked for Demetr.  18, Plutarch does not attack the actors and their acting 
as  such,  but  instead  castigates  those  people  who  in  real  life  behave  in  a theatrical 
manner.68 So, there may be nothing reproachable in the actors who adapt their voices, 
posture and manners to the character they play on  stage,  but when  it comes to non­
theatrical context and to figures like Antigonus, Demetrius, Seleucus, Lysimachus and 
others  who  changed their manners  and  behaviour after becoming  kings,  then this  is 
regarded as inappropriate attitude; acting and pretence are always considered by Plutarch 
to be unacceptable kinds of behaviour in a real-life context (cf. Demetr.\%.5).
Pompey’s putting on the clothes of a fugitive brings to mind another incident in Caesar, 
which happened under quite different circumstances. There the protagonist is Caesar, 
who  compelled  as  he  was  by  the  difficult  situation  in  which  he  found  himself at 
Apollonia, decided to disguise himself as a slave and board a boat in order to retrieve his 
troops from Brundisium {Caes. 38).69 His army at that moment could not be compared in 
size with the army which Pompey had under his command, and moreover his soldiers 
were  reluctant  to  continue  fighting  as  they  were  physically  exhausted.  So  Caesar,
66 Euripides’ Electra appears in a decidedly non-heroic light, dressed in poor clothes and complaining about 
her poverty (Elec. 175-189, 300-313). But Xerxes, too, visibly signalises the utter downfall of his pride at 
the end of the Persae (909 ff., esp. 1017), with his distressful appearance.
67 About Aristophanic paratragedy and parody see Silk (1993).
68 Tagliasacchi (1960), 131; cf. also above, p. 190 n. 65.
69 Cf. Ant.  10.8, and  14.1: Plutarch describes Antony’s flight after the Ides, only there his disguise as a 
slave shows fear, whereas Caesar’s similar move shows his courage as a leader and his determination to 
win -  cf. Pelling (1988b), 142 and 151.
190perplexed and desperate as he was, decided to take die risk and set out for Brundisium on 
a twelve-oared boat without revealing his true identity:70
(38.1-2)  Ev  8’  ’  AnoXXwviqt.  Kou&ap  o v k   e%fov  ajfyofiaxov  'rhv  eavrov  8vvapiv, 
fipa/hivovtrr)*;  8e  rife  eKetSev  a/nopovpevo^  k c li  rcepmaSaiv,  8eivov  efiovXevcre  fiovXevpa, 
K p v fa   tto lv tio v   eig  tcX o T o v  epfiag  t o   peyeBog  8co8eKaun<aXpov  avauxftrjvai  npog  t o  
Bpevremov,  TTjXiKovroig crroXotg nepiexopevov  rov  TteXayovg  inro  t m v   TcoXepicov.  vvtcrog 
ovv  eoBvjri  Bepanovrog  emKpvrpaqievog  eve  fir ) ,  k o u   KarafiaXoDv  eavrov  a x ;  riva  rtov 
napqpeXvjpevcov r r)av%a£le.
At Apollonia, since the force which he had with him was not a match for die enemy 
and the delay of his troops on the other side caused him perplexity and distress, 
Caesar conceived the dangerous plan of embarking in a twelve-oared boat, without 
anyone’s  knowledge,  and  going  over  to  Brundisium,  though  the  sea  was 
encompassed by such large armaments of the enemy. At night, accordingly, after 
disguising himself in the dress of a slave, he went on board, threw himself down as 
one of no account, and kept quiet. (38.1-2)
Caesar’s decision to abandon his kingly clothes and to conceal his true identity in order to 
reinforce his military position shows his confidence and determination to win; it was a 
desperate move to undertake such a daring act, but to him it appeared to be worth trying. 
Caesar dresses like a slave but behaves as a leader who is ready to take all the risks to 
win a battle; at 45.8 Pompey took off his general’s clothes and put on those of a fugitive, 
but he also acted as a fugitive. Interestingly, their acting as a different ‘character’ reveals 
their quite different attitude; Caesar, in contrast to Pompey, plays his theatrical role, as it 
were, but in reality he never identifies himself with his role. When die sea became rough 
and  the  helmsman  wanted  to  take  the  boat  back,  Caesar  revealed  who  he  was  and 
encouraged him and his sailors (38.5): “ ‘YBt’ e(jrr)  yewaue, roXpui k o u   8e8tSi p/rfiev- Kaiaapa 
(f>epeig k c li  tv ) v   Kaiaapog Tv%r)v ovpmXeovo-av"  ” (‘Come, good man’, he said, ‘be bold and 
fear nothing; you carry Caesar and Caesar’s luck in your boat’). Although there was no 
success, Caesar, by risking his own life, managed to boost his troops and make them 
more confident of defeating Pompey’s troops (38.7). At the ultimate moment of danger
70 Pompey, too, when he found himself in a similarly perplexed situation, acted courageously {Pomp. 50), 
another  close  parallel  which  indicates  how  intimately  the  two  Lives  are  connected.  The  parallel  is 
emphasised by Beneker ((2005a), 318-320) in his discussion of thematic correspondences in the two Lives.
191Caesar takes  off die  mask  of the  slave  and  acts  as  a real  king.7 1   Caesar’s  dynamic 
character, which emerges from this anecdote, stands in contrast to his accepting of his 
tragic doom later on.
In this last passage, as well as in many other cases (discussed above) Plutarch seems to 
hint at an extra synkrisis between the two Lives. Comparing Pompey and Caesar, which 
are closely interconnected, we see that in both Lives there are many common important 
instances in die two generals’ course of life and career which are presented by Plutarch in 
such a way so that they recall analogies in tragedy and in theatrical context, encouraging 
readers to understand Plutarchan characters by means of their tragic parallels, or make 
them think about common human patterns of behaviour in similar circumstances.  The 
two Lives are so closely linked that the strong theatricality of some passages of Pompey 
inevitably carries over into Caesar, too. What intensifies the tragic texture is that both 
generals are at the end victims of a complicated political situation, which is tormented by 
many upheavals, by a most powerful Civil War, by complex balances between influential 
figures of that period which are easily disturbed, by betrayals, and personal ambitions; in 
this complex nexus of personal relationships and political ambiguities Caesar, as much as 
Pompey, perceives all die ominous signs of his tyche but cannot resist his fate.
7 1  Compare the treatment of this anecdote in the essay On the fortune of the Romans (319B-D), where it is 
clearly of rhetorical character, a declamatio; Plutarch is not interested there to outline the strong will of 
Caesar and his decisiveness, but just gives examples of tyche in the life of the Romans.Conclusion
Plutarch’s  work  shows  deep  engagement  with  the  past  in  times  when  there  was  a 
sustained and widespread interest in revisiting die classical authors not only to admire the 
literary value  of their work but also to  learn  important lessons  for both politics  and 
philosophy. In his extensive use of philosophers, poets and historiographers Plutarch both 
promotes and challenges their views and approaches to important issues, and particularly 
their exploration of different sides of human character {ethos). Plutarch was at home in 
tragic  poetry,  exploiting  well  known  material  in  ways  which  depended  heavily  on 
rhetorical effect as well as on the point he wanted to make in each Essay or Life. The 
variety of perspectives and objectives in his work may result in what may seem to be a 
lack  of coherent  argument  and  theory  concerning  poetry  in  general  and  tragedy  in 
particular and its role, yet it reinforces the flexibility of his use of tragic material.
The treatment of tragedy and theatre by Plutarch raises important questions concerning 
both his motives for citing tragic lines and the reflections he invites from his readers. The 
audiorial voice, often hidden behind multiple voices and characters, can be difficult to 
trace. Yet Plutarch’s personal filter is everywhere, and most significantly when it comes 
to tragedy and theatre. Tragedy is an area which can offer significant moral lessons, and 
therefore it helps Plutarch to develop his educational theory and, no less, his complex 
moralism. As an educator and moralist Plutarch uses tragedy as a point of reference, 
fluctuating between, on one hand, its economy, conciseness and capacity to convey deep 
moral truths about human experience, and, on the other hand, the negative implications 
that it may carry if transposed to real life. But, either way, he can always gain authority 
for himself.  Platonist though he may be,  Plutarch does not follow his predecessor in 
banning poetry and poets from the state or from young men’s education, but approaches 
it  in  a  more  pragmatic  and  productive  way,  amending  poetic  lines  and  leading die 
(young) readers to evaluate poetry’s  fundamental role in contributing towards a fuller 
education and in promoting the protreptic use of philosophy. In this way he also manages 
to effect a strong bond with his learned readership. Plutarch’s quoting and challenging of 
poetic lines becomes part of his strategy for highlighting their morally beneficial side and
193at the same time eliminating the danger to readers of treating poetry as a guide to real life. 
His  continuous  recasting  and  reinterpreting  of poetry testify to  Plutarch’s  ability  to 
remould his material as needed to support his argument and develop a personal authorial 
voice, even if that voice is not always saying the same thing, or speaking in die same 
register, in every type of work.
In Plutarch’s work, in addition to the straightforward positive value of theatre as a means 
of education and moralism there is a less straightforward aspect of theatre as a point of 
comparison to one’s own life.  Apart from the aesthetic value of theatrical imagery there 
is also die pragmatic value which tragic/theatrical references gain from die analogies they 
create to real life. As a moralist and biographer Plutarch exploits and adjusts the original 
context of quotations and theatre-as-metaphor so as to suit die Plutarchan context and 
mindset.  The use of tragedy and theatre helps to refine Plutarch’s own description of 
events and human characters. The contrast between illusion and reality emerges as an 
important point here. The audience/readers have to bear in mind that, although illusion 
and reality merge on die theatrical stage, in real life a stark distinction between die two 
elements must be made; otherwise, if they do not adopt this approach, then dangers may 
emerge -  as e.g. the case of the flatterer proves.
In a similar way Plutarch uses tragic hints and imagery in his Lives to forebode disaster 
when die behaviour of die great men he describes involves exaggerated pathos, pretence, 
or ignorance of imminent danger at crucial moments in their life and career. Personalities 
of high calibre and with a history of great achievements, like Pompey and Caesar, meet a 
tragic -  perhaps even undeserved -  end, just as characters in tragedies do, either blinded 
by their passion for success and power, or ruined by their external environment (e.g. bad 
advisors, misguided friendships, adverse public reaction) -  or perhaps because of both. 
Plutarch’s  use  of tragic  parallels  and  imagery  in  the  Lives  casts  tragic  light on  his 
historical, non-tragic source-material. Behind the strong visual quality of theatrical scenes 
and  dramatic  incidents  the  readers  are  encouraged  to  sense  the  ambiguities  which 
‘theatre’ and tragedy create and to prepare for the characters’ impending doom. Thus the 
tragic background and theatrical setting become pointers to what Plutarch’s characters
194share with characters in tragedy, but they also create a tragic thread that links the Lives in 
a subtle, oblique and most powerful way. I have tried to demonstrate that these links are 
more pervasive than hitherto recognised by Plutarchan scholars, especially in the Lives of 
Pompey and Caesar.
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